LIBRARY OF CONGRESS. 



u — x~z'^ — 

Chap. Copyright No.. 

Shell.Jrt.Si.'^. 



UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. 



INTERNATIONAL SERIES 

LIEUT.-COIv. ARTHUR I.. WAGNER, 

AMiitant Adjutant-Oeneral. U. S. Army; late Instructor in Art of War at the 
U.S Infantry and Cavalry School, Fort Leavenworth. Kansas. 



Inquiries into the Tactics of the Future. 



DEVELOPED FROM 



MODERN MILITARY HISTORY. 



PRITZ HOENIO. 

H 

'THE WOBDIS FREE. THE DEED MUTE, OBEDIENCE BLIND. 



TrauKlatefl from the Foiirtli German Edition 

uy 

CARLREICHMANN, 

FirHt Lieuteuaut NLuth Infantry, 



No. 6. 



KANSAS CITY, MO : 
HUD.SONKIMBHRLY PUBLISHING CO. 
1014-1010 Wyandotte Street. 

LONDON: 

W. H. ALLEN & CO. (Limited), 

13 Waterloo Placb, S. W. 

PUBUISHRRS TO THE INDIA OFFICE, 



2f\€i COPY, 
1896. 




^^-'^^^ I 



^ 



« ' ;>•> 



^y 






TA]^.i.\\ OK contp:nts. 






Editor')! I'Ttfuct ♦ " >"""""""'" 

I'ri-.l'Mif. lo Bftconfl Krl itioti ,,..»»." , . - . » ' • 

Vrf.ffu:f Ut I'dtirDi I'Ailion . ,,,,,., i >•>•• ■ 

2» 



Intro'luctiou , , , 

I'AkT I, 
MiliUry-Hi»U>ncal Btttdie», 
I. ThT Attark of the '^th Infantry I'.rt'/H'U: on tht I'arm»,t^a'l 
of Hor anrl on th«: A'ljoininK, Hntrcncht'J, Woo'l of Hriz 
in th«- Hattic of K>',nimiriiiz on July 3. 1866 ... ^'' 

a. 'flu: March ^ 

b. The lJ»Tploymcnt ..,,,/,,,... 70 

C. Th«: I'.atll.-fieM , '^^ 

d, Th«: Atla'k "^"^ 

11. Th*: Attack of Ui»- )',<th Half Oiviuion 'JJSth infaniry lirr/,ii'lt) 

on the H'Mj<h1> of J'.ruvill*: on th»: IfJth of Auyuf.^, I^JO lOl 

a. The March to the Battle fiel'l '^^J 
h. Tlic Ixrploynicnt ' ^^ 

c. The Kattle-ficM ^'* 

d. r.«j/inninj< of the Attack ,.,, ^^ 

e. I'«:rhon;il <^>h»»crvationft -,..,. /,.,,,..,.... .128 

f. Hvcnt» on the i»i'le of th»; French 1^ 

f(. Course of the Atta<k *^ 

III. Retro»pect» 1^ 

IV. Ta/:tic« at I'roblu»-Bor on July 3, 1866 1*1 

V. Tacticnat Marn-la-Tour on August le. IS70 J'5''^ 

a I'Hy';holoj<ical Matter* '^'-^ 

b. I<<;n»arkH on th«T Battle-field and on the Enemy'i 

I'orce* ., '''^ 

c. The I><r|>loyment ,...* '^'^ 

d. Th«r Attack '7'' 

e. Tb'- Kctreat J78 

f. I/OhS«rH 1^7 

K Note* to the Official Atxount Re;<ardinK the Ter- 
rain '''*' 



8 rahlf of Contents. 

Page. 

VI. Objectives of the German and French Commanders 192 

VII. How should the Attack of the 38th Brigade have been Ar- 
ranged ? 194 

VIII. Tactical Comments 197 

a. The Tactical Forms Employed 201 

b. Duration of the Attack 202 

c. Expenditure of Ammunition and the Fire Effect.. 203 
IX. Why was the Charge of the 1st Guard Dragoons Successful ?208 

PART II. 

Psychology.- and Tactics. 

I. General 214 

II. Maxims 222 

III. Inijuiries into the Maxims .... 227 

IV. Of the Moral Training of Troops 253 

PART III. 
Tactical Deductions. 

I. Remarks on Tactical Tendencies 262 

II. Results of Surgical and Ballistic Experiments 272 

III. Smokeless Powder 280 

IV. Tactical Deductions Regarding the Attack from the Experi- 

ments of Bruns, from the Ballistic Properties of the Small- 
Caliber Rifles and from the Properties of the Smokeless 

Powder 290 

V. Of the Extent of Ground in Battle, of Control, and of the 

"Treffen" 305 

VI. Of the Defense 327 

VII. Of Reconnaissance and of Preparations by Artillery 339 

VIII. Of Turning Movements 354 

IX. Of the Frontal Action 375 

X. Of Village and Wood Fighting 382 

XI. Of Night Battles 392 

XII. Conclusions 401 



EDITOR'S PREFACE. 



• The book horewitli presented for (Ih? lirst time in Eng- 
lish is a development of the work entitled "Two Brigades," 
and in its present form is, as the author says, what he orig- 
inally luid in mind. In describing the pi-o<<*sH of evolution 
by which the book has reached its present form, the author 
remarks that though the original work was well received in 
South Germany, France, Austria, and other European coun- 
tries, it met with a cold reception in North (Jermany; prob- 
ably because nobody likes to have his own mistakes pointed 
out. He intimates that although the Official Account of the 
Franco-German War is based on all publications and docu- 
ments that appeared in jjrint previous to its publication, 
and although it is undoubtedly the best technical account 
of military operations ever published, it cannot be denied 
that SOUK* tilings have either been glossed over or that the 
compilers were, in some instances, misled by the defective 
accounts and reports of eye-witnesses. In fact, it is impos- 
sible to avoid the impression that the German General Staff, 
in compiling the Official Account, was careful to let no oppor- 
tunity slip to increase the prestige of the German arms, and 
especially to avoid impairing that prestige when unpleasant 
facts could be passed over with a few words. He also 
I)oints out errors contained in regimental histories, and has 
taken great pains to write as nearly as possible the exact 



1 E^iitors Ptrfacf, 

tnuU in ivi^ani u> events that have often btvn dtvsioribtHl 
Avith uioro patriotism than aecmaiv. 

The it^ader v>t* any work mi the Franoo-Prussuan War is 
likely to be so stivngly impresstnl with the visibU* niilitarv 
^H^wer of Prussia, and s<> dazzUnl by the series of events 
whioh in a eaniimign of a few niontlis bnnijiht to its knet^ 
the tirst military nation of Europe, that it is dittioult for 
him to n»alize that on the side of the (.unmans military mat 
ters wert^ not altogether pertWt. It is new and interesting* 
to tiud that there was tactical deticiency on the part of some 
of the higher German Uwders, and that the lack of orgmuKa- 
tion of the system of iviH>rts and nu^siiges on the battle- 
field left Von Moltke for some hours at i^ravelotte without 
definite and re^liable information of what was going on. 
AVe have heartl si> much of the magniticent energy of the 
iierman U^iiders in marching to the sound of the cannon 
and promptly joining battle wherever they could, that it is 
wholesome for us to read that this wild euerg\- of the sub- 
ordinate h^\der« was not always pn>ductive of the best re- 
sults, and that the triH^ps often got completely beyond the 
civutrol of their generals. The lack of tactical reiH^nuais- 
samv was more marktHl than we have Invn leti to believe: 
and. with all due rt^iHHt to the sujn^rior org^inizatiou and 
the sui^rior training of the German Army, we art^ remindtni 
of the old saying, that "Nothing succeeds like suihvss." 

Honig unites the qualities so dt^rable in a tactical 
writer; namely, a dtvp knowUnlge of his subjtvt and of 
human nature, a facility of exv>ressicm. fearlessness in set- 
ting forth his views, and a spirit of phih>sophical justice-, 
which is shown in giving crtniit to his enemies as well as 
bestowing pniise upon his friends. Even when we cannot 
alti^'ther agrtv with his views, we are foreeil to respect 
them, and his book will be welcomed bv those who are most 



Editor's Preface. 11 

interested in military literature and tactical training. In 
view of the many devices for sheltering troops under all cir- 
cumstances, which has been somewhere happily designated 
as "the cult of fear," it is refreshing to read the announce- 
ment that great loss must be boldly faced and not shunned, 
and that officers and troops must be instructed that these 
losses are inevitable and have to be unflinchingly met. In 
the same spirit is made the assertion that only those men 
talk of night battles who are afraid of facing an enemy in 
daytime. It excites our admiration to find a gifted German 
soldier saying that the French infantr}- at Worth and 
Gravelotte was one of the best that ever fought; and in 
view of the manifest defects of short service, which is now 
the rule everywhere in Europe, we can easily share his doubt 
whether any French infantry will ever again fight with the 
same determination. 

It is, too, rather unusual to find a European author who 
refers to the War of Secession as an evidence of a sound 
military fact, and we cannot help remarking how far in 
advance of most of the European critics he is when we read 
the following passage: "The armor shields and armored 
clothing prepared by the Danes and others do not seem suit- 
able for field service as protection against projectiles, but, 
on the other hand, the construction of rifled trenches, etc., 
by means of the spade, will play a great role in future bat- 
tles; occasions for their use will arise for the attacker as 
well as for the defender, since it is very probable that there 
will be battles of several days' duration — which, however, 
are nothing new. In this connection it is sufficient to recall 
the North American Civil War." 

When a German critic can do full justice to a French 
enemy, and acknowledge virtually that military lessons can 
be drawn from Spottsylvania as well as from Gravelotte, 



12 Editor's Preface. 

the American reader must necessarily be predisposed in his 
favor, and it is confidently believed that this favorable pre- 
disposition will not be in any way impaired by the perusal 
of Honig's remarkable book. 

Washington, D. C, November 16, 1897. 



PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION. 



"Books have their fortunes," says the proverb, and this 
one has been no exception. Perhaps it w^ill interest the 
reader to have me tell something about it; anyway, that is 
what prompts me to do so. 

The book appeared in 1881 under the title of "Two 
Brigades," chiefly upon the urgent request of an officer, of 
literary fame, who has since died, although I should have 
preferred to postpone the publication for some years; in 
addition to the above motive, it was the then controversy 
whether it was to be long-range fire or short-range fire, open 
order or a combination of close and open order, day or night 
battles, etc., that prompted me to publish the book, believ- 
ing that I would be able to contribute something toward the 
settlement of the questions in dispute. 

Any historical-tactical experiences I might want to 
draw upon would, of course, have to be beyond the pale of 
doubt; in that case it was to be premised that in some places 
the book would not be received with favor, for no one likes 
to have his errors pointed out. Of two cases, but one was 
possible: either the Official Account was correct, or mine, as 
their discrepancies are such that they cannot be reconciled. 
But if anyone will take the trouble to compare the History 
of the 57th Regiment published after the "Two Brigades" 
and the Official Account, he will at once admit that, aside 



14 Preface to Second Edition. 

from some small details, the aiitlior of the "Two Brigades" 
is right. 

The Official Account of the attack of the :i8th Brigade 
on August 1(1, 1870, may therefore justly be considered as 
superseded, and that of the attack of the 28th Brigade on 
July 3, 18GG, as rectified in many essential points. I do not 
know how the Official Account of the latter was prepared; as 
regards the former, a well-known general officer, capable of 
rendering judgment, wrote to me on October 10, 1883, that, 
so far as he was concerned, the description of the episode 
in question of August 10th, as given in that work, left much 
to be desired, because (out of consideration for some of the 
survivors) it silently passed over one of the most important 
points: the retreat of the 10 intact battalions of the 20th Di- 
vision at the very moment when Wedell's brigade advanced 
— through some misunderstanding! In the History of the 
57th Kegiment by Baron von Schimmelmann I. reference, 
so far as that nuiy be ex])ected from a work of that char- 
acter, to the incorrect statements of the Official Account, is 
made by special note. 

The edition before me ditfers essentially from the first 
one — in fact, it is an entirely new book, such as I may have 
had in mind from the first. Many communications from 
officers of high and low rank have enabled me to interweave 
events of imj)ortane'e, to elucidate others; and in that respect 
my thanks are due, in the first place, to Major-General von 
Hiller, who commanded the 28th Bi'igade at Koniggriitz; 
to Lieutenant-Colonel von Leszczynski, of the auxiliary es- 
tablishment of the great General b^tatl", who in 18()(j was 
with the 1st Battalion of the 17th Infantry Regiment; and 
to others, though I do not nanu^ them. 

The Introduction and the Second Pari had to be completely 
rewritten. Though the sentence placed at the head of the 



Preface to Second Edition. 15 

book remains correct from the general tactical point of 
view, still no intelligent man may gainsay the great in- 
fluence exercised upon tactics by the small-caliber rifl^e, 
smokeless powder, and the increased effect of artillery fire. 
In making investigations in this field the new edition has 
taken up various questions of general interest regarding 
the future, which made the addition of a Third Part indis- 
pensable. The historical part, on the other hand, has 
merely been amplified. 

A few more remarks on the fortunes of the First Edi- 
tion : According to my observations, the same did not become 
much known in Northern Germany, owing perhaps to some 
inconvenient statements contained therein. I merely men- 
tion the fact, and am not deeply concerned about the reasons 
therefor; the reader may draw his own conclusions. The 
"reserve" shown, however, failed of its object in this case. 
The book was most favorably received in all countries, par- 
ticularly in Austria-Hungary, France, Switzerland, Sweden, 
Russia, and the Netherlands. 

One day in 1883, when I was at the Hague, I called on 
the Dutch Minister of War, Den Beer Portugal; the object 
of my visit is immaterial. He received me with great civil- 
ity and invited me to dine with him next day. There I met, 
among other guests, several general staff officers from the 
Hague, the minister having returned my call in due form. 
The repast was a splendid one, and the tone at the table such 
as may only be found among well-bred and well-educated 
men. You could feel that these men had seen — and had 
learned something; when the roast was on the table, the 
Minister of War rose and most cordially toasted, in fluent 
German, the German comrade and above all the author. 
I responded in Dutch, and, after the lady of the house had 
withdrawn, a genial mood began to reign. The gentlemen 



16 Preface to Second Edition. 

proved thoroughly familiar with my writings, particularly 
with the ''Two Brigades." Some of them recited entire 
sentences, much to my surprise, and the War Minister him- 
self proved no exception. One of the gentlemen cold me 
that the book, which costs two florins in Holland, had 
brought ten florins in some town (Flushing?) at the annual 
auction of the regimental library. That, he said, showed 
conclusively how much the book was held in esteem. If this 
edition should meet the eyes of these gentlemen, I again con- 
vey them herewith my thanks for the pleasant hours passed 
in their society. 

From Austria I have received quite enthusiastic 
comments. 

French officers, too, took much interest in the "Two 
Brigades." One of them wrote me that, book in hand on 
the battle-field, he endeavored to place himself in the situa- 
tion of the 38th Brigade near Mars-la-Tour, and that he 
vividly realized the awful drama there enacted; that in 
Algiers the book was his constant companion; that the 
German author was his master and favorite writer, etc. 

Nor have tokens of approval failed to come from the 
Fatherland. In the fall of 1882 I received by mail a pretty 
drinking-horn. It bore the inscription: "To the Author ot 
the 'Two Brigades.' " I herewith convey my thanks to the 
kind givers. The drinking-horn is my pride, for the book 
has evidently pleased the senders. 

In the spring of 1884 I called on General of Cavalry 
von Willisen, upon the request of a distinguished friend. 
The general received me with the words: "I knew that you 
were the author of the best book on modern infantry action, 
but I can hardlv believe that vou are also the author of the 



Preface to Second Edition. 17 

anonymous writings on cavalry,*" although I am assured 
by two corps commanders that you are. Ever since I 
have been wanting to see you, and if you had not come to 
me, I should have gone to see you, if for uo other reason than 
from a feeling of indebtedness, because heretofore no one 
has written so clearly and convincingly on the employ- 
ment of cavalry. Is it true that you are the author of these 
writings?" I answered in the affirmative, and the general 
shook me heartily by the hand and, as he said, gratefully! 
He said that he had learned much from my writings. 1 
have been in constant and cordial communication with liim 
ever since. One day he led me to his desk, and, taking from 
it a rather ragged book, he said: "Look at it; you will be 
gratified." It was the "Two Brigades." On a blank leaf 
was a list of gentlemen to whom he had loaned the book; 
there were about fifty of them, among them a number of 
general officers. "Kot one," he said, "has read it without 
enthusiasm. It has traveled a good deal, and its outward 
appearance is not very fine, but it remains one of my 
favorite books." 

One corps commander says that the description of the 
historical-tactical events equals a photograph in precision. 
Lieutenant-General von Legat, formerly commander of the 
30th Division and who was my company commander in 1865, 
wrote me from Metz, that lie had visited the battle-field of 
Mars-la-Tour with the "Two Brigades" in his hand, that he 
had found my statements and opinions correct, and that the 
events passed his understanding. General von Hiller has 
repeatedly thanked me for the precise and correct account 
of events of the battle of Koniggratz, and quite a number 

*1. "On the Armament, Training, Organization, and Employ- 
ment of Cavalry." 2. "The Cavalry Division as a Battle Unit." 
3. "Tactical Directives for the Formation and Leading of the Cavalry 
Division." All three published by R. Felix, Berlin. 



18 Preface to Second Edition. 

of communications, many of them from Metz and from vari- 
ous regiments, testify to the correctness of my description. 
In that respect the book has therefore fully accomplished 
its object, and I hope that in its new form it may be instru- 
mental to some extent in clearing up the various questions 
now agitating the minds of militai'y men. 

Fritz Honig. 
Friedenau, February 12, 1890. 



PREFACE TO THE FOURTH EDITION. 



• Since the appearance of the Third Edition, now com- 
pletely exhausted, no warlike event of great importance has 
taken place; still the events in Chili constitute to a certain 
extent a valuable confirmation of the principles and opin- 
ions which were developed in the book before those events, 
and based entirely on experience and on due consideration 
of the progress in technique. 

Yet practical peace experiments and theoretical study 
also have clarified tactical theory in many respects, as 
evidenced in Germany by the many modifications of the 
various regulations and firing instructions, instructions for 
field fortifications, etc., and the same may be said of other 
countries. 

In tactics there can be no standstill! The modifica- 
tions made since 1890 had therefore to be taken into consid- 
eration if for no other reason than that for the most part 
they still have to stand practical test. Discussion, held in 
keeping with war realities, of the principal questions, par- 
ticularly of the infantry attack, will therefore continue to 
form part of our daily bread. I have not limited myself 
to them, however, but have endeavored to bring all tactical 
phenomena of the battle-field within the scope of my in- 
quiry. The elimination of old and the addition of new 
matter was found necessary in order to again bring the con- 
tents and form of the book up to date. 



20 Prefaec to Fourth J-Jdition. 

Chapter I. of the First I'art is the oiilv one that has not 
been modified; "Events on the Side of the French" has been 
substituted for '^f;' Chapter II., of the First Part. A new 
chapter, "Losses," has been added as section '7'" of Chapter 
V. of the First Part. The Third Part has been supple- 
mented by the chapters on "Extent of Ground in Battle," 
"Defense," and "Street and Wood Fighting." The chapter 
"Suggestions Kegarding the Reprint of 1880" has been 
eliminated. 

The title "^Inquiries, etc.,^' I have retained, because I 
wish to leave it to the intelligent reader what position to 
take with regard to my opinions; the inquiries are based 
throughout on the results obtained in the various armies by 
experience and experiments. 

The example of the 28th Infantry Brigade at Konig- 
gratz is antiquated, to be sure; still I did not feel at liberty 
to eliminate it from this book, because many wishes ex- 
pressed to me in the course of time made me aware that its 
retention was desired, particularly in the Austrian Army. 
As regards the infantry attack en masse, no more instructive 
instance is to be found to-day than that of the 38th Infantry 
Brigade at Ma.rs-la-Tour. notwithstanding its failure; but 
such lessons alone should be drawn from it as are warranted 
by the facts. 

Both illustrations are the result of thorough study on 
the spot of all the historical material available; in the 
case of the 38th Infantry Brigade I was able to make some 
valuable rectifications. Much of it is due to the contro- 
versy carried on in the ^[ilitiir Wochenblaft, Xos. 71-78, of 
1891. Since an approximately correct historical and tac- 
tical account of the events was thereby rendered possible, I 
was able to strike out all ])oints which u]> to that time had 
been in controversv. 



Preface to Fourth Edition. 21 

Tactics, however, cannot be exhausted by one example; 
on the contrary, as many of them as possible; should be 
adduced. That has been done in the Third Part, where the 
relation of the defense to the attack has been specially dealt 
with. I thought it necessary to give special care to tactical 
reconnaissance and to the many questions closely connected 
therewith and of luoic or less imjiortjince, including \\nt 
task of leading an army, and to the discussion of the ad- 
v^ced positions, the season for which, if they ever are to 
be of any use, has probably been ushered in by smokeless 
powder. The conclusions drawn will be worthy of note, 
which does not mean, however, that they are claimed to be 
correct in every particular. 

There is no such thing as infantry tactics in battle any 
more than tactics of any other arm; and a discussion of the 
employment of all arms was therefore unavoidable. The 
tactical considerations kept in mind throughout are those 
which probably approximate the requirements of the battle- 
field. All the incpjii-ies have, in the main, reference to the 
fighting in a pitched battle. 

Shortly after the adoption of the Drill Regulations of 
1888 an article appeared in the Milildr Woclienhlatt, express- 
ing the wish that discussions of the Regulations should for 
the present be refrained from. The Regulations were to 
be subsequently revised, on the basis of the official reports 
of the corps commanders. The published wi-itings did in 
fact show much reserve in that respect; the reports of the 
corps commanders have of course never been made public. 
But from the failure of the promised revision to materialize 
it should not be inferred that the same is not necessary; 
various recent phenomena point to the contrary. Mean- 
while there has been ample time to test the fitness of 



22 Preface to Fourth Edition. 

the Kegulations, and further observance of silence would 
be wrong. 

Fritz Honig. 
Frledenau, November 30, 1893. 



The improved fire-arms have not only modified troop- 
leading in battle, but have circumscribed the same and 
rendered it more difficult. 

Tactics must become more psychological, if an army 
would not forego victory. 

Fritz Hbniq. 

Cleve, October 1, 1881. 



INTRODUCTION. 



• Motto: "Whenever art has decayed, the fault lay with the 
artists.''— Schiller. 

Fire-arms have undergone great improvements in a 
comparatively short time, yet it would be rash to say that 
greater rapidity of fire, greater accuracy, flatter and longer 
trajectory, and greater penetrative force could not be ex- 
pected. Although the aims of General Wille, as expressed 
in "The Field Gun of the Future" and in "The Smallest 
Caliber" (R. Eisenschmidt, Berlin), may encounter financial 
and certain technical obstacles, still the time will come 
when tactics will demand the realization of the principles 
advocated by him. That future state of technique and its 
influence on tactics must even now be taken into considera- 
tion. Infantry is affected more than any other arm by 
improved fire-arms and bj' the increased importance of fire. 
Yet fire-arms will never extinguish the characteristics of 
the various arms of the service. Infantry will, as heretofore, 
carry to the end and decide the conflict, and will be unable 
to fulfill that duty by fire-action at long range and by the 
fire of masses delivered at those distances. It must take 
upon itself the fighting at short range, close upon the enemy, 
and drive him away by fire and shock, in order to occupy his 
position. To preclude any misunderstanding of the word 
short, is should be mentioned that according to the Firing 
Instructions of September 9, 1893, ranges up to 600 meters 



24 Introduction. 

are short ranges, theuce to 1000 meters medium ranges, and 
beyond 1000 meters Joinj ranges. It is to be understood, 
therefore, that infantry will suffer heavy losses in battle. 
These the infantry should ncit shun, nor should it be 
kept in ignorance that they are impending, and it should 
be trained in that sense — /. e.. to recognize the dangers of 
the battle-field, because there is no better means to keep 
infantry in hand than a correct idea of the losses, and the 
will (reason and energy) to brave the dangers. The action of 
infantry will, as a rule, be limited to fire-action of masses of 
skirmishers — any other form would be quickly and pre- 
maturely shattered; whether that fire-action of masses of 
skirmishers be styled "regulation" or "organized" is im- 
material to me. In this method of fighting, infantry should 
be thoroughly efficient, because leading and control can 
make themselves felt only within certain limits, and fre- 
quently become wholly impossible after the dispositions for 
the attack, since most of the subordinate leaders will soon 
be hors-de-comhat. These agencies will not prevent disorder. 
One of the principal tasks to be mastered by infantry that 
is to be capable of carrying an attack en masse through to 
the end — for the entire question of ••infantry tactics" hinges 
on that point — is that of fighting in disorder and of learn- 
ing it in time of peace. As any movement is best assured by 
some system, no matter how- simple and how flexible, when- 
ever there is danger of failure from disorder, so infantry in 
order not to be rendered impotent from the start w hen set in 
motion against a common, extensive objective, needs for the 
skirmish fighting en masse certain fixed laws, principles, 
regulations, which will stand actual test; i. e., there should 
be some organization to this skirmish fighting en masse. 
Decisive results cannot be gained without the employment 
of masses, and in that particular former and modt-rn tactics 



Introduction. 25 

do not differ. The difference is to be found exclusively in 
the tactical form by means of which life, energy and aim are 
to be imparted to some principle; still the difference is con- 
siderable, owing to the difficulties of that question. The 
German infantry also fights in masses of skirmishers; 
whether sufficiently so, and whether always on correct prin- 
ciples, remain to be seen; and we may note right here that 
no army has yet organized the skirmish fighting en masse in 
a manner which promises to prove practical. 

In comparing past events with the modern task system 
(Auftragsverfaliren) as laid down in the Regulations, we 
might say that the tactical events in front of Worth, at the 
Mance ravine, and against La Folie on August 18, 1870 — 
i. e., ideas which failed of success, have been adopted into 
our Regulations. The task system at these points of the 
battle-fields was no doubt different from what that of to-day 
is meant to be. The system was improvised, and not regle- 
mentary; it had not been practiced; still in their essen- 
tial points the two are as much alike as two peas: em- 
ployment of the troops by driblets, either w^ithout pre- 
vious deployment and disposition for attack (Worth), fol- 
lowed by belated, and again by premature, advance of 
the rear echelons (Worth, Mance ravine); or with pre- 
mature dispositions without previous deployment entail- 
ing lack of proper arrangement as to depth and width, and 
belated appearance of the supports (La Folie). In obtaining 
what results were ultimate^ gained with much difficulty, the 
system of tasks had to be perpetually "corrected'' without 
thereby imparting unity and combination to the work — the 
carrying through of the action ; here under the task system 
all the forces were absorbed by the advanced positions (La 
Folie), there opposite the main position (Point du Jour), 
they were not even able to deploy, and yet there was an 



26 Introduction. 

abundance of depressions and woods, which it is said are un- 
favorable to the uuitj of action and favorable to the system 
of tasks. The modern task system will certainly lead to 
better results, because constantly appealing to the tactical 
judgment of subordinate leaders; but as surely as no lieu- 
tenant from his sphere is able to direct a battle, so surely 
will the cumulation of results gained by any number of 
detachments charged with tasks fail to decide the battle. 
Yet healthy tactics require this. We do not mean to con- 
demn the task system on general principles, but one should 
not expect a pyramid to stand on its vertex. It is not a 
question of task or order system, but of task and order sys- 
tem — i. e., we want both and both are compatible when 
placed in proper relation to each other. 

Task implies something general, order something specific. 
The former naturally is characteristic of the high command 
in order that, and because, it may utilize many means; the 
latter falls to the subordinate command, which is restricted 
to limits that admit of the execution of an order only, by 
cramping considerations of space, by its limited sphere of 
action, and by the narrow front of its objective. That, how- 
ever, is not the order of things in the Regulations; they 
extend the task system too far downward. 

The experiences of the G uard Corps — particularly of the 
1st Brigade of the Guard at St. Privat — speak so decidedly 
against the system then in vogue that it is superfluous to 
waste words over it. The Guard had learned mass-fighting 
only, and that hobby was instrumental at any rate in bring- 
ing about some — though insufficient — development of front ; 
our attempt at that time at the task system did not even 
yield that much. On the other hand, the Saxons at Roncourt 
—St. Privat. the 38th Brigade at Mars-la-Tour. and Kott- 
witz's brigade at Loigny knew how to preserve combination 



Introduction. 27 

when fighting en masse, and they produced considerable efifect 
in each instance. To be sure the attack of the five and one- 
half battalions of the 3Sth Brigade failed, but, notwith- 
standing its many defects, due to circumstances, it is and re- 
mains, among all the attacks made en masse, the finest exam- 
ple of a tactical offensive against the strategic flank. There 
was therefore hardlj^ any good reason for declining to in- 
vestigate whether more could not have been gained by 
means of timely improvements and by due regard for com- 
bined action, than by completely ignoring what good there 
still remained and by entrusting the consummation of 
the combat exclusively to the hands of the subordinate 
leaders. 

Intimately connected with these questions is the form 
and method of giving out orders and tasks. The Field Serv- 
ice Regulations leave no doubt that the written form should 
be the rule, since they prescribe expressly: "Orders and 
reports are to be transmitted in writing whenever time and 
circumstances do not forbid." And further: "The orders 
of higher troop commanders to their troops will usually be 
in writing. Even where orders could be communicated 
orally, as when the troops are assembled, orders of any 
length will be dictated and taken down in writing. In the 
case of some simple arrangement or of a single task, the 
order is given orally, and eventually reduces itself to a mere 
word of command." According to the Regulations, the task 
system for infantry tactics begins with the brigade. The 
latter receives orders and gives out tasks and uses the oral 
form alone in transmission to the regiments, as do these to 
the battalions and the latter to the companies, as indicated 
in Nos. 95, 103, 112, and 113, Part II. of the Regulations of 
1889. It should be observed, however, that the company and 
battalion leaders have to issue specific and clear orders in the 



S8 iHtnuliivtion. 

prosonoo. if possible, of all platoon or coiupauv oomniaiulors 
without iiifiiu.uitis; on thoir fivodom of oxiviitioii. whilo tvjri- 
m»M»tal ami In igado i-onimaiuloi-s adilrt^ss tlio imlividual 
tasks to tho rojiiiuouts ami battalions. \\ itliin tho task 
svstom thoiv is thoivforo a lino o( ilontarUation botwoon 
ordorand task: tho formor omis with tho loinpanv. tho lattor 
bt\i;ins with tlu» battalion. 

It is dt^sirablo and nsi'fnl on many aooonnts that battlo 
otxiors bo pi'oparod in writing if pi>ssiblo. and it would not 
bt» iuootupaiibU> «Mtlun- with tht> task systoni or with tho lino 
of domarkation botwtvn oihKm* and task, to issm> tln^ ordors 
in ivjiard to tho fortmM- orally, thoso in ropird [o tho lattor in 
writinii. Po bosuro. durinu thooontlii't it will in many oasos 
bo mi>«5t dittlonlt ti» jiot an ordor thronuh to a battalion, and 
still moro so to a oompany. Oi\ tho othor haml. whon rooon- 
na.issani'o has violdtHl snt^ioitnu information ami whon tho 
tljjhtinir of \\w ailvatu'o uiiard or tirsi lino has iltMrotl np tho 
sitnatit>n.troi»p loadors will in most oasos havo snt^ioiont timo 
to uso tht* written form. Ium-o mado applieabU> both to tho or- 
dor and to tho task. A habit is thus formotl of ordtu-inu, only 
what is ntvossary. to onior it at tht> risrht moniont and in tho 
cltMirt^st and bi^t oonsidorini form, and tho roooivor of the 
written order has timo to ivtleot on it ai\d impress it thor- 
oujrhlv on his mind. Moreover, the written order seems par- 
ticularly indispensable for the hiiiher leaders fivm the meri^ 
standpoint of ivsponsiblity. The written form of orders 
should thort^fort^ bo laid down as a rule for the battlo also. 
Any one who has had practical oxporieuco and has atten- 
tively followed the course of an action will concotlo that in 
war few suportluons orders aiv given, in peace very many. 
SubstHpiont critioism would bo instrumental in correctinjr 
tbo suportluons onlers of iHWCt^timo and in rtnuleriuir tho 
preparation for the battU^tield mort^ rtwl. l^attlo tactics 



Introducti/m. 29 

rc'fjuiro nriintr'rrupf.od mutual rf.'laf ions fx-twfr-n ord^rrH from 
above, comjiiijfji«;af iojiH to thff flank, and loportH from below. 
'J'lir; maintenance of tliese mutrjjjj relations ban been ren- 
<Jerr;(J mueb more difTieult by tbe improvements in fire-arms, 
in tbat a larj^e number of leaders is early placed hors-rh- 
combat, and tbat tbe deptb of space involved is very mucb 
increased. All orders, communications, fjnd reports re<juire 
tbffrefr»rr- more tiirje, and, on tbe otber band, tbe superior 
leader from bis sljition can, even witb a good glass, follow 
but imperfectly tbe course of the action from its beginning. 
Tlie di/Iiculties presented by tb(;He relatively new phenom- 
ena are not sufficiently illustrated in peace practice, and yet 
practice should master them as mucb as possible. 

It m.'iy be stated as the rule that no reports from the 
firing line can reach the station of the leader (who will prob- 
ably be with tbe rr-servej; yet tbat will be most necessary 
when the ac-tion approaches sufieriorify of fire. Orders 
from above to those below will, ax a rule, have to be trans- 
mitted through regular channels, and refjorfs going in the 
opposite direction will have to do the .same; in either case, 
with the greatest possible rapidity. From this follows the 
importance of superior direction for combined action as a 
natural sefjuence. This indispensable system of orders, 
reports, and communications should be adapted to the cir- 
cumstances and regulated ho far as possible in each case. 
It is not true tbat any measure not based on personal obser- 
vation is ordered too late. It may, and in many cases it 
will, be too late to give orders; for that very good reason, the 
Regulations make the decision f.f important steps one of the 
powers of the sutiordinate leaders who are nearest to the 
enemy, and not one jf)t should be taken away from that 
power. On the other hand, the range of the superior leader's 
view should be supy^lemented and [perfected by every pos- 
sible means on the part of the fighting troops, which alone 



iU> hitrothivtion. 

will iMi;ibh> hiin \o form a oiH'ViH't i>i>iiuon. It is plain that 
soiuo (aotii'al boinuiarv is imlisponsablo for the purpose; 
that houmlarv lios within tho hrijiado. Tho laitor forms a 
olarifviuii' statitnu so to spoaU. and should thoroforo bo pnv 
vidod with sutVuiont nionntoil organs fi>r v'oniniunioation 
with tho tlanks and with tho superiors. This niothod niiiilit 
liouorally ho found praotioablo. and it points out tho jrroat 
iniportanoo of tho briuado ooniniandor's position. 

All roports sont by disniountod nion will arrivo too lato; 
so says thoory. Kut tho aotual battlo t\old pormits niuoh. 
just as it forbids niuoh. that oaii hardly bo sottlod in tin\o of 
poaoo. In many oasos a kintl of "foot rolays" miiiht bo 
ostablishod botwtvn battalion and briijado loadors. but only 
whon tho situation oalls for it. It w ill bo found moro or loss 
praotioablo whorovor dolayinu- aotion is roquirtnl. How 
many roports mieht not havo btHMi sont from tht^ ri^ht and 
loft winjrs and from tht' oontor duriuj; \\u' U>nii- dolays on tho 
ISth of AusiustI How many woro rondorod? Woro not all 
tho superior leaders near tho Mani'o ravine kept in unbroken 
iiiiioranee of the aotual state of the battle, though their sta- 
tion permitted a good view? And would not many things 
have gone better had thert^ been no suoh laok of informa- 
tion? In every oommand. tht>roforo. tho transmission of 
orders and roports. t>von during battlo. should bo most oart'^ 
fully systonuitizod. This requires the employment of well- 
mounted oftloers and general statT otlioers for purposes of 
observation, with speoitie onlers to send reports as soon as 
possibU*: they would oluH>se their stations aooording to the 
state of the aotion. and report everything of importance by 
means of mounted orderlies Avhile continuing their observa- 
tions. Comparatively safe pi>sts of observation are not 
lacking on the modern battle-tield. as demonstrattni by the 
events in the center and on the right at dravelotte. even 



Iittrodiiclioii. 31 

;»( S(, I'lival — MohJoih; I lie IIjiiikK of (lie ciicrny'H [lOHition 
Hlioiild, li(»w(?v<T, fiiHl be iiHc«*rfjiiii«'(I. Apfirofniulc organi 
/;i(i(iji oT Ihc h.\hIciii of ordcrH ;uHJ rcixtrlH in f)ul.l,le JH there- 
fore more n('C('KK;ii".y llinii ever, :ui(l slioiild lie (r;ir«'fiilly 
(aii};lil in [M'acc. Protracted and fluctualinj; finj-flghtH will 
l)r()bal>ly not beabwtnt in the future, since the iniprovernentft 
in fir(?-arniH have rather added (o than diminJHhwl the HJub- 
T)ornneHH of (lie (ire-fi^hl. That, it in f)r('Hnin('d, will liohl 
^ood wilh oni- jM-enent rilleH, when in I he liaiidH of good 
in fa Miry, of courHe. 

It iH a fact that Hinc(; Ihe warH of 1870-71 and 1877-78, 
all conlinental arniieH of Europe hav(* cha,ng(Mj and diniin- 
JHlicd the terniH of Hervice, i)articiilar].y in the infantry, 
while, on (lie other hand, the number of foot troopH ha8 been 
greatly iiM reaHed. F( may Ite Hafely naid that a longer term 
of Her vice mak<'H a, heKer infandy Holdier than a Hhorter 
one, liencr' cejlain conHe()uences flowing from the reduction 
of the term of Hervic(; will have to b(; reckoned with in the 
tacticH of the battle-field. The infantry of the Imperial 
Fr<'nc]i Army wan certainly on<,* of 1h(? bewt that haH (;ver 
exiHted, bn( it failed in I lie selection of ils tactics and lacked 
many incentives ix-ciiliar to Ihe ^ilerman infantry. Yet it 
remains a matter of doubt whether any Fi-ench infantry will 
ever ecpial that which fought at Worth and Gravelotte. 1 
do not believe that it will. To a certain degree, the same 
may br* Haid of any other infantry of to-day, yet the demands 
made on it have certainly not be(;n diminished. There is 
bound to be more disorder and skulking than heretofore, 
and there is perhaps but one effective remedy for the 
evil — i. e., more and efficient leaders in all subaltern grades 
and some sjiecial organization in rear of the line; of bat- 
tle for dealing with skulkers. Can it be done? The lat- 
ter jierhaps, the foiiner — well, we'll wait and see. IIii- 



B2 Introduction. 

man nature will not be denied, and the evil will affect both 
sides; one reason more why everything should be done to 
have a good system of supervision. 

The mass-battle will require an enormous net of organs 
for the transmission of orders, communications, and reports, 
well organized, well trained, covering the battle-field, extend- 
ing beyond the flanks, and operating laterally and trans- 
versely on the principles of the relay service. On that basis 
the strength of the staffs should be calculated and that of 
the intermediate links and posts fixed, dependent on the 
distances and on the presumable importance of each point 
on the entire line. This is still more important in the case 
of battles of several days' duration, nor can the force of this 
consideration be impaired or broken by the idea that here- 
after battles can be arranged from the strategic point of 
view alone, and that the tactical execution should be left to 
the judgment of the army. It is not permissible that the 
central direction should be kept in ignorance of the progress 
of the battle for hours, and that the armies should be with- 
out communication with the central direction for an equal 
space of time, as was the case at Gravelotte. 

At any rate, in view of the modern armament and condi- 
tion of infantry and in view of the uncertainties inseparable 
therefrom, more consideration is to be given to the suffi- 
ciency of infantry reserves, if the command of the army is 
to retain a firm footing. So far-reaching is the effect of 
improved armament in combination with shortened terms 
of service. 

The defender occupying prepared positions — and more, 
perhaps, when the position is yet to be prepared — is going to 
weigh the advantages to be derived from advanced positions, 
and it is not at all improbable that they may play a much 
greater role in the future than they have in the past. This 



Introduction. 33 

is solely due to modern iufantry and artillery fire in com- 
bination with the diminished tactical value of cavalry. The 
attacker on his part must at this stage seek the best method 
of reconnaissance and attack. It is of no use to appeal 
to experience and principle; the question cannot be solved 
in that way; it may at best be cleared up to a certain extent 
by peace maneuvers planned with that object in view. That 
should be done. It will then be found that movements of 
large bodies must be made at night, that much shifting and 
even changes of front become necessary; all arms must 
therefore be well trained in this particular. 

Many new or modified questions will therefore confront 
the tactician which his experience will be insufficient to 
solve. They should therefore be amplified and supple- 
mented by reflection without losing sight of reality — i. e., we 
must have a healthy theory of fighting, and that in peace 
time. 

The infantry was compelled to change its tactical forms 
and to put up with many additional evils inseparable from 
these modifications, though it did not have to change any of 
its principles; whereas the artillery had yet to establish 
some of its principles, before the two could become coordi- 
nate sister arms. In their common action infantry has the 
more difiicult task to perform ; that of the artillery, in fight- 
ing, being facilitated by the technique and better chances 
to carry out its principles. Infantry is unable to escape 
complete dissolution, and is, in the end, restricted to skir- 
mish fire, but it remains a tactical arm, notwithstanding its 
state of dissolution. The artillery is called the solid frame- 
work of the battle, but the frame must be subdivided into 
small sections, whereby alone it is enabled to preserve the 
requisite order and solidity, and to become pliable, dirigible, 
and highlv effective. Formerlv in infantry firing it was not 



34 Introduction. 

the mau who tired, but the officer who permitted him to tire. 
To-day infantry lire can be controlled only by careful 
training of the skirmisher by fire discipline, and artillery 
tire only by careful training of the battery. Individualizing 
the skirmishers and training the battery as a tactical funda- 
mental tiring machine constitute the best means for the 
action of each arm and for their combined action. Artillery 
had to follow in the train of tactics in so far as small units 
with considerable freedom and entrusted to many but suffi- 
ciently trained hands were substituted for large units in 
large combinations. In the pursuit of new principles, the 
artillery aimed for a long time at the direction and control 
of concentrated masses, but practice has shown their impos- 
sibility; in the artillery, too, there remains to-day only mass- 
elfect by means of individual effect, direction of masses by 
means of individual direction. 

During all the phases of the conflict up to the decision 
it is no longer correct to speak of infantry as the principal 
arm, as compared with artillery. In every action of any 
extent the two arms are interdependent, both must stead- 
fastly aim at the one object — to gain a superiority of fire 
over the enemy, because that is the prerequisite for all 
further action. During this, probably the most sanguin- 
ary and protracted period, the artillery nmy here, the in- 
fantry there, temporarily prove more effective than the sis- 
ter arm, but the accomplishment of the common object calls 
for the earliest possible employment of the full force of fire 
of both. I am aware that I shall raise opposition by no 
longer making any tactical distinction between infantry and 
ai'tillery as the principal and auxiliary arms, as first and 
second arms of the battle-field, and this breaking with tra- 
dition may provoke a new controversy, which, far from fear- 
ing. I earnestly desire. 



Introduction. 35 

In the case of either arm superiority of fire presupposes 
direction of fire, and the measure of effect produced depends 
on the quality of the rifle and gun, on the number of both, 
and on the proficiency in firing. I deem it an indisputable 
truth that artillery fire is more easily directed than infantry 
fire, because, in the first place, the former is effective at 
greater distances than infantry fire, and because artillery 
fire admits of more deliberation and better observation. 
Under certain conditions the fire of the artillery is moreover 
more effective than that of infantry; either arm should 
therefore supplement the other tactically in view of their 
object: they always belong together. 

To be sure, my ideas presuppose many things, particu- 
larly as regards artillery and the training of the leaders, 
which still have to materialize or are to be improved. 
Every artillery man should be able to Mt; during the fire the 
piece must as much as possible be kept ready to fire, and 
when that is accomplished, the question of rapid-firing guns 
receives its best solution, depending as it does not on the 
construction of the barrel, but on that of the carriage 
(brake-apparatus). The proper foundation for the direction 
of fire is obtained only when, in addition, the organization of 
the artillery and the construction of the piece guarantee the 
tactically highest possible eflflciency (masses of hits). That 
would require the artillery to be assigned by regiments to 
the divisions, the corps artillery to be abolished, and the 
number of batteries in the regiment and the number of guns 
in the battery to be diminished. How far the reduction 
should be carried is not to be inquired into here; it suffices 
to state that the present units are too large. Artillery acts 
by batteries, and the smaller the units the better will be the 
direction of fire, provided the artillery has learned how to 
hit. Divisional artillery should be so incorporated with 



36 tutnHiHclHm, 

(ho vlixision ihat iufamn ami artiUovv l>o<omo ooinplotoly 
bloudoil (aiii^aUN ; ihai llu^ last jiim is in position l\\ tho 
timo tUo iufaimv ot" tho viivision is it^aiK tor l>atiK\ that 
the iufautrv is famiUar with tht^ t tVoot of aitiUorv tlvo. ami 
the rtrtiUorv with tho otlVot of iufawtry tliv: a»ul, abovo all. 
that ovtM'Y iivnoral.ii-rosjHvtivo <>f his ai*m (oavalvv inohuUni^, 
IS thotvnijhlv at houto in tho t'nmlaniontal tluhiiuii" prinoi- 
pK\s of iht^ two tiro hranrhos of tho soi'vioo. NN h\ should 
it Ih^ mo»v dittlonlt for au infatitrv jiotioral to obstn m^ am\ 
jntl^v artillorv thv than ittfautn tliv. whon tho aitilloiy 
has btvomo invtloiont in thing In ImttoritMii and bv brijjavio 
divisiious iAU\tihtHgfH)f Thoro is no ivason whatovor: it 
will bo utvossivrv, tv^ bo sniv. to train ot\lotM-s from tho bo- 
jjiuuing' to familiariBO ihomsohos with tho oharaotoristios 
ami with tho spirit of all arnts, ami to loam how to jmlji-e 
thorn. A iivnoral of i«frtutrj\ oavalry, or artillorv is sht^r 
nonstnist\ wo utHHl but ouo ijvnoral. who. to bo snro, should 
bo ablo ktvp his soat in all saddlos. 

Tho oontrovorsY as to tho prinoii^U arm is thoi>^foro an 
idlo ono: in many of tho phastvis at Wi^rth, Vionvillo. and 
ilravolotto wo saw artillory play tho ri^lo of tho princi^hU 
atMh and ju> dtvis^iow will ovor Iv jriviJUHl w ithoui tho fulhvst 
omployiuont of artillory fire. Jiuljiing from tho poat"^ 
manouvors, it would appoar that tho su^nnior oomuuindors 
do not by auy mt\u\s invariably display tho rtH|uisito know b 
ed|so of tho oai^aoity of artillery tir^; otherwise rnawy tbin^ 
would not hapiHM\. Artillery will have to oxeroiso siHvial 
oar\* in onlor not to K* ouirnlfetl in oatastn^pho at tho hands 
of the enemy's artillory and infantry. \Vith artillery, thort^ 
fo*v» everything:: doi^nids on ooiuing into |H»sition as t\niekly. 
as skillfnlly. and in as iin\at strtMijjth as tn^ssiblo. and on 
antioiiKUing tho enemy's artillery in (tifUi»(} the nuh;e. If it 
aooomplisho^ that, artillery with its prt»sent prv^jtvtiles will 



Introduf:twn. 37 

in ujany ca»e« alKO play a decisive r61e against infantry, 
Th^re can be no doubt aw to thi«. If artiJleiy doeB not 
attain this, infantry fire alone may lay it low by ranks, and 
we may in the future read not of ''a batter-y of the dead," but 
of entire brigade divinions. This power and weakness of 
artillery should be familiar to the leaders of all arms; artil- 
lery should not deceive itself on that point, and should 
learn three things in peace: first, circumspection and judg- 
ment; second, hitting; and third, how to develop its full 
power of fire — in other words, how to get the range more 
quickly than the opposing artillery. It appeared necessary 
to me at this point to emphasize this vital question of mod- 
ern artillery; on the other hand, it should not be forgotten 
that thoughtless action may reduce the tactical life of the 
best infantry to a minimum. 

It is not merely the improved gun and the improved pro- 
jectile that have been instrumental in the great ascendency 
of the artillery; the same is due rather to the transmutation 
incident to the course of instruction in their uses — i. «., the 
tactical training of the personnel The progress of other 
armU^ has been similar to that of Germany, and every offi- 
cer should be cognizant of the fact, in order that he may 
place an approximately correct estimate on the opponent 
and enter on the battle-field with a certain amount of prep- 
aration. The changes in the tactical training of artillery — 
in Germany, at least — have been more important and far- 
reaching than in any other arm. Up to a comparatively 
recent time we could speak of the German artillery as a 
"technical" arm, and it is in keeping with the truth to state 
that it entered the War of 1870-71 trained in this limited 
sense. Considering that the effect of that "technical" artil- 
lery was frequently very great, how will it be in the future, 
when superior construction is combined with progress in 



38 Introduction. 

tactics such as but few prophets of the future would have 
dreamed of in 1870-71? But they were there! It took 
them some time to reach pkices of iuflueuce. The separate 
training of the artillery, the course in firing at the firing 
school instead of on the benches of the artillery and engineer 
school, the detail of officers of the furloughed class to the 
firing school, the entire system of training (which we will 
not explain here) for imparting technical proficiency in the 
art of shooting, the tactical exercises and tactical firing 
exercises on the terrain, the organized combination of 
infantry and artillery, the principles of reconnaissance and 
of coming into position, and the observation and direction 
of fire as developed in the course of practice, these and other 
matters which I do not care to make public, prove that, 
based on healthy and tried principles, artillery has at last — 
it took a long time — worked itself up into a tactical arm 
as to which all former tactical conceptions are antiquated. 
And if ever, it is in the future that ignorance on the battle- 
field will be paid for with rivers of blood. 

Infantry and artillery are the decisive arms on the field 
of battle, and intelligent cooperation is required on the part 
of both. This applies equally to the foot artillery, because 
the greater efficiency of the gun is going to compel the de- 
fender to construct considerable artificial cover, which field 
artillery will not always be able to destroy, especially where 
there has been plenty of time to prepare the position. For 
this reason armies will carry guns of heavier calibers with 
them in the field, whose effect should be fully known by the 
higher leaders at least. Here we encounter a new factor in 
tactics, which extends to the preparation (defense) and at- 
tack of artificial positions. The side which recognizes its 
inferiority in strength will endeavor to strengthen its power 
of resistance by artificial cover. Any body of troops and 



Introduction. 39 

any army may find itself placed in the role of the inferior 
(defender); hence the sujjerior leaders should be familiar 
with the principles of the construction of entrenchments and 
the troops with those of their execution. That is the reason 
why in the future the use of the spade may under certain cir- 
cumstances be of eminent importance, and the recognition 
of this fact has in all armies brought forth special instruc- 
tions under which leaders and troops are trained in time of 
peace for these additional tasks on the field of battle. 
Every officer should be as familiar with the instructions for 
field fortifications of April 6, 1893, as with the Field Service 
Regulations, the Drill Regulations, and the Firing Instruc- 
tions. Together they constitute the tactical gospel: every 
one should know how to read and apply them as he would 
the gospel. These Regulations constitute parts of a whole, 
they show how intimately artillery and infantry have to 
cooperate, and that they are the real arms of the battle-field 
requiring for the tactical act enlarged services from the 
pioneers, as compared with former times. That the pioneers 
have thereby gained in importance need not be specifically 
stated. From all this it would appear that large, artificially 
strengthened positions that must be attacked are to be reck- 
oned with in the future. 

Though in the future the principal arm of the cavalry 
will be the horse, as it has been in the past, I remain op- 
posed to the arming of all the cavalry with the lance. 
The more active national spirit in combination with uni- 
versal liability to service are bound to give any future war 
the character of a national war to a greater extent than was 
the case, for instance, on the Loire in 1870-71. It is true 
that under the recruiting laws every able-bodied man is 
employed in organized bodies up to his fortieth year. But 
in a national war even the cripple is a soldier fit ad hoc, and 



40 Introduction. 

the enthusiasm, miseries of the war, aud governmental 
measures will no doubt compel those men who have eoni- 
pleted their legal term of service to take up arms also. The 
employment of the cavalry in front of the army, in the tac- 
tical sense — one should call to mind the conditions on the 
Loire during the last third of November. 1870 — will be beset 
by extraordinary ditticulties; the lance may become an in- 
convenient burd(Mi. whose bearer feels inclined to discard it. 
I have seen such things myself in 1870-71. Raving to pay 
more attention to the lance than to the enemy, the horseman 
when on patrol is the more apt to tind himself at a disadvan- 
tage, as with the cavalry everything passes otf quickly; in 
short. I deem the lance su])erfluous and even harmful for 
cavalry on reconnaissance. Nor does war experience award 
to the lance the superiority in the charge. The Prussian 1st 
Guard Dragoons brilliantly defeated the Austrian Alex- 
ander Vhlans at Koniggriitz. Still I would approve of the 
retention of the lance for a certain number of regiments — 
for instance, for the medium and heavy cavalry; but for 
light cavalry saber and carbine are sutticient. All regi- 
ments should retain the carbine, while 1 would not hesitate 
to discard the saber of the lancers. If in addition to the 
horse, cavalry needs one common arm. it certainly is the car- 
bine. The correctness of this would become at once appar- 
ent in the operative employment of cavalry, which, however. 
I do not desire to discuss here. Even in tactical reconnais- 
sance it will be found good to supplement cavalry with artil- 
lery and infantry as soon as it enters highly cultivated coun- 
try. That bold galloping about of patrols, so misleading in 
peace, will then cease, and many things observed and re- 
ported by patrols in peace will not be observed and re- 
ported in war. During the national war in 1870-71. the cav- 
alry, despite its best efforts, proved unequal to its task in. 



Introduction. 41 

reconuaissarioo on a largo scale; what little Informatlou was 
gathered, waH elicited by a few gun-8hotK or by deployment 
of Kome infantry. As j>henomena, such as observed on the 
Loire, will hereafter be the rule, they should be constantly 
keiit in mind in order to give the cavalry an appropriate 
armament; nor should great expectations be entertained 
even then. This point seems to have been lost sight of in 
peace to an alarming degree, yet it is certain that nowhere 
"will we suffer more disappointments than in the field of 
strategical and tactical reconnaissance by cavalry. The 
higher leaders will be more frequently placed in a state of 
relative perplexity than formerly, and in order to learn any- 
thing at all, they will be compelled to engage with all three 
arras. It is not to be thought for a moment that such 
demands will be made during the operations only; no, mod- 
ern tactical reconnaissance, particularly before the decisive 
battle, calls for them imperiously, nor can theory foretell 
what measures are most likely to lead to success. It is ray 
conviction that here there is ground for serious reflections, 
inquiries, and experiments far from simple in character, and 
that to comply with the enlarged principles the means now 
at hand must be largely supplemented. 

Great differences of arraaraent, training, organization, 
and eraployraent of the various arms and battle units (divi- 
sions) do not now exist among the large armies, and the 
same raay be said of their tactics; in nurabers they are like- 
wise about equal, and there are two points only on which 
superiority — which cannot be accurately calculated in ad- 
vance — raay be gained, and those are tactical training and 
raoral education. Both should be brought to the highest 
perfection. 

The third role on the battle field falls to the cavalry. 
As tactics stand to day, cavalry on the battle-field, as coqi- 

4 



42 Introduction. 

pai't'tl with ihe oiIum- twt)arms, is an aiixiliaiv aim, and I'an- 
not be the principal arm except after the decision or before 
the battU'. This is dne to the eompk'te revolntiou of the 
conditions, especially to the chanjied numerical proportion 
between cavalry and infantry, in connection with the large 
total increase of the armies. To be sure, at Monyille — 
^lars-la Tour, on the Kith of Aujiust, 1870. cayalrv played a 
l>rominent role on the battle ticld. but the case has remained 
the exception. Neither in the >yar apiinst France nor in the 
Turco-Kussian War has there been a repetition. ^loreoyer 
the enemy's action at N'ion^ille was of no small assistance 
to our cavalry; while, on the other hand, the French cavalry, 
for instance, despite its sacrifices, never exercised a notable 
intluence on the course of a battle, either at \Vorth or 
Sedan. Xor did the cavalry bring about a decision at Vion- 
rille, and it will not be able to do so in the future; still it 
is the duty of cavalry, as it was in the past, to attack where 
there is prospect of ailequate success. As tire-arms command 
wider zones than formerly, as rapidity of tire has been large- 
ly increased, both of Avh.ich can neyer be counterbalanced by 
greater speed on the part of the cayalry. and as smoke has 
been suppressed, the tactical employment of cayalry has be- 
come more restricted and its leading more difticult. There 
will nevertheless be cases on the battle-tield and up to the 
yery decision of the battle where an enterprising and effi- 
cient cayalry will find tempting objectiyes for attack; these 
objeetiyes should then be charged under all circumstances. 
This will particularly ai)])ly to silenced artillery and re- 
pulsed infantry. Here the increased power of the tire-arms 
fails to nullify the law of velocity, especially after the deci- 
sion. The battle of the future is bound to mature scenes of 
which eyen the liyeliest inmgination cannot gain a suffi- 
cient conception: infantry morally spent to the degree of 



Introduction. 43 

mcntiil irreKp(>iiKil)iliiy, juhI without aiiiriiunitiori; "batteries 
of the dead"' iiicapahle of irioveinenl ; flags and eolorK, if 
taken along, in profusion. The point therefore jh to inereane 
the enteri)riKe of the lead<'rK, and to sharpen their tactical 
judgment. The cavalry leader must track his quarry with 
the patience of Ihe eagle and seize and carry it off with the 
sani(? resoluteness. In this manner ca\'alry may render the 
decision more deeisi\e on and immediately in rear of the 
ISattle-field, render the opponent impotent, and enhance his 
discomfiture to an unsuspected degrcHi. Human nature 
never changes I Its moral failings and defects can be turned 
to account only by the speed of the cavalry. 

It goes without saying that in addition cavalry should 
possess a certain degree of skill in dismounted fighting and 
should be able to attack in any strength and in any forma- 
tion. Whatever any aim is expected to know in war, it 
should diligently practice in peace. For this reason I deem 
the practice of the mass-attacks as important for cavalry as 
the jiractice of fighting in masses of skirmishers on the part 
of infantry, and field firing for artillery in teiTain that is as 
little known as possible. 

It is not my intention to write an outline of tacties; with 
due consideration for the effect of modern arms, I shall cite 
various events from military history in order to deduce 
therefrom tactical principles and forms, such as will prom- 
ise success under fire. 

For no theory will ever lead to correct conclusions 
unless based or. [)ractice and military history. 

The Drill Regulations for the infantry of September 1, 
18K8 (Reprint of 1880j, for the artillery of June 27, 1892, for 
the foot artillery of ^farch H, 1889, and for the cavalry (\)yo- 
visional) of 1803 are the tactical sediments of war experi- 
ence, but the consequences which will ffillow from smoke- 



44 Introduction. 

less powder, from the small-caliber rifle, and from the great- 
ly increased fire-effect of the artillery, for the training and 
leading of troops, for theoretical and applied tactics, are b}' no 
means fully and accurately determined. Detailed discus- 
sions would therefore be of some benefit, even if nothing 
more than a greater incentive to reflection were gained. 

In order to overcome the probabl}^ very great losses to 
be expected in the future, much has been written for nearly 
twenty yeai^s about the importance of night battles, and 
there are '^tacticians" who seek to gain by the aid of dark- 
ness what they do not dai'e to undertake in daylight. Un- 
der certain circumstances comparatively great results, with- 
in certain limits, may be gained by night actions, but night 
battles are out of the question, and it is battles alone that 
decide wars. Why then this tarrying over irrelevant 
matters? 

For the same reason the so-called "ravine theory," a 
parasitic outgrowth of the "task system," has of late found 
many advocates. Aside from the fact that the requisite 
ravines are not likely to be at hand, their use would in most 
cases bring about a deployment near the limits of short- 
range fire, exactly the thing we want to avoid — viz., great 
losses without opportunity to combat the enemy up to that 
moment and without prospect of gaining the superiority 
thereafter. 

Others propose to throw the open lines in single rank 
upon the enemy without stop, closely followed by all the 
rear echelons, straight across country in the previously 
determined direction of attack, and to within the limits of 
short range, either in double time or at a run, and to advance 
thence by rushes; others propose to creep up, with pauses, 
after the medium range has been reached; again, others 



Introduction. 45 

suggest traversing the middle and short ranges by means 
of rushes not exceeding 30 paces, etc. 

These suggestions should neither be found fault with 
nor characterized as wrong and useless. Tactical disad- 
vantages would not accrue from them unless one of these 
"methods of fighting" were incorporated in the Regulations. 
Cases might easily enough occur where, dependent on the 
.terrain, the fire, and the task, this tactical '^sample case" 
might have to be drawn upon by some organization. Free- 
dom must be preserved to the subordinate leaders, if for no 
other reason than that any other mode would be incom- 
patible with the nature of the combat of masses of skir- 
mishers. At some time, however, the moment must arrive 
when variety will be entirely or almost entirely supplanted 
by uniformity — namely, under short-range fire. Yet even in 
spaces of 600 meters, some cover will frequently be availa- 
ble. However that may be, good infantry to-day must be 
able to push forward, creeping, running, rushing, etc., and 
it must be instructed accordingly. That relative simultane- 
ity is thereby destroyed is of no consequence; it is not 
needed until the final rush, but then we must have it. 

The armor shields and armored clothing prepared by 
the Danes and others do not seem suitable for field service 
as protection against projectiles; but, on the other hand, the 
construction of rifle-trenches, etc., by means of the spade 
will play a great role in future battles; occasions for their 
use will arise for the attacker as well as for the defender, 
since it is very probable that there will be battles of several 
days' duration — which are nothing new, however. In this 
connection it is sufficient to recall the North American 
Civil War. 

In tactics we find certain forms and principles restrict- 
ed to longer or shorter periods. In the history of the tactics 



46 Introduction. 

of antiquity aud of the middle ages these periods comprise 
centuries; since the invention of gunpowder they have be- 
come shorter; and since the appearance of the breech-loader 
in 1SG4, tactical forms and regulations have been and are 
subject to constant change. 

Tactical changes are chiefly brought about by the arma- 
ment; what never changes is man. 

It is well known that it is a law^ of Nature that when 
two or more persons are contending for victory, they study 
each other's means of fighting, and that as soon as either 
party recognizes the superiority of the other's methods, it 
will adopt them in order to overcome the enemy by his 
own methods. 

Thus the Prussian company column, for instance, may 
to-day be found in all armies; thus the swarm of skirmishers 
has everywhere become the principal fighting form of in- 
fantry and skirmish fire the principal kind of fire, and in all 
these important questions the German infantry has led the 
other armies. To be sure, the War of 1870-71 did not find 
the German infantry at the height of the tactical application 
of these principles, so that — and also because it had to con- 
front unprepared a very much superior rifle — it had not yet 
deduced the correct conclusions for the attack; still, after 
the battles in August, the German infantry discovered more 
suitable forms and applied them without difiiculty. 

The tactical combination of movement and fire-effect, to 
whose highest possible development the Great Frederick 
had devoted a lifetime, has been occup,^-ing the tacticians 
ever since the reign of the breech-loader was inaugurated. 

But the times have changed and more perfect are the 
weapons. While the Great King could lead forward his 
closed lines in the cadenced step, while he was not com- 
pelled to halt them, make them lie down, rise and resume 



Introduction. 47 

the advance, etc., before he pomed an enormous fire on the 
enemy and broke into his physically and morally shattered 
ranks, without himself suffering great losses at long range 
— to-day hundreds fall under the bullets of an enemy that 
can barely be discerned and who can be fought only with 
difficulty; in these times the act of battle, moreover, lasts 
much longer. 

Destructive infantry fire sweeps the ground for 1500 
meters, and the question culminates in how to traverse it 
with the greatest safetj, and how to reach a distance from 
the enemy whence he may be subjected to, and shaken by, a 
sustained and effective fire without having one's own fight- 
ing strength reduced below the required degree. Looked at 
from the theoretical standpoint, the excellent fire-arms of 
to-day favor more especially the defender during the con- 
flict; still a close examination, which we shall make below, 
will point out many advantages for the attacker. In a 
purely frontal affair the attack and defense can array an 
equal number of men side b}' side, but on the part of the 
defender more men are able to fire at the same time because 
he is deployed for firing, perhaps in several lines, while the 
attacker is again and again prevented by losses from gain- 
ing the same development of fire for which he is striving. 
The occurrences at Point du Jour show that mere numerical 
superiority of the attacker will not necessarily give him 
either frontal equality of fire or frontal sujieriority of fire. 
The attacker must approach to within a certain distance and 
expose himself, cover not being always available ; this is not 
required of the defender, but if he does expose himself, it 
will be at moments when the attacker is shaken and is less 
to be feared. From the sweeping fire at long distances and 
from the enormous force of penetration of small-caliber pro- 
jectiles arises the necessity to preserve one's own forces as 



48 Introduction. 

much as possible in order to enable them to act at all. Tac- 
tics are expected to furnish the means thereto. 

It is plain that in clear Aveather the use of the ground 
will play a more important part than heretofore, even before 
the deployment. It will receive increased attention during 
the march to the place of deployment and the advance guard 
will find frequent use for good field-glasses. Both require- 
ments involve danger. The use of the ground must not be 
allowed to degenerate into a game of hide-and-seek, which, 
aside from other disadvantages, will dull the sharp edge of 
the attack which undeniably signalized the German in- 
fantry, whatever may have been its shortcomings. We do 
not mean here a reckless rushing in, but the deliberate ex- 
pression of the will, particularly on the part o-f the subordi- 
nate leaders, always, of course, preserving unity of action. 
Any infantry is therefore apt to find itself in position where 
it must expose itself, if only while rushing from cover to 
cover. The entire execution of the combat must be char- 
acterized by vigor. In comparing the fighting methods of 
former and present times, it will be found that much of the 
vigor has been lost and that diffident groping is noticeable, 
which is not justified by the new arms. The necessity under 
which the attacker will frequently find himself, of opening 
fire at the medium ranges, impresses on modern fighting 
methods the stamp of slowness. If that necessity should 
be still greater in practice, it is all the more reason for doing 
everything to sustain the tactical offensive spirit by all 
available means. Therefore, there must be correct and 
quick use of the ground ; the forward impulse must be the 
inherent, elementary force of the troops; but the task system 
pure and simple, as frequently practiced, does not invaria- 
bly support that tactical principle, and herein I find one of 



Introduction. 49 

its chief disadvantages — viz., the stunting of the vigor of the 
infantry combat. 

The use of field-glasses shuts out a general view and 
favors the perception of details. This is not an inherent 
property of the instrument; its use should be learned likp 
that of a weapon, and one should be expert in scrutinizing 
cover, from the mere furrow to the declivity and to the edge 
of the woods; but such general survey with the bare eye as 
his station and command may call for should not be neg- 
lected by the commander. It seems proper to point this out 
on account of some events that have occurred. 

It is the duty of strategy to see to it that when fighting 
is to take place, it be done in the most effective direction, 
and with the greatest possible superiority of force. Strat- 
egy therefore demands an unfailing eye to every phase of 
the situation as regards the calculation of all factors of 
time, space, materiel, and politics, and the utilization of all 
means of communication. All strategists have been indus- 
trious workers, good calculators, and have possessed a good 
knowledge of the theaters of war and of military history and 
an understanding for whatever may be of any advantage in 
obtaining numerical superiority within a certain space and 
time. For that reason strategists have at the same time 
been men of science and, so to speak, men of a system or 
method — i. e., of that peculiar to their own genius. Who- 
ever desires to direct a large army must himself have calcu- 
lated and proved everything that has any bearing on the 
leading of masses. In that task assistants (general staff 
officers) are indispensable to the strategist; and they may 
do the preparatory work, but its examination and the final 
arrangements are the duty of the chief of the general staff. 

The large modern armies require even in peace a great 
deal of preliminary work, arrangements, and provisions of 



60 Introdtirthn. 

all Uiiuls. Sti-;U»\uv is orii;mi/.r«i lor si> niauv srt rasrs \vitl» 
tluMi" sptH'ial rtHiuirtMHiMils. ilu> loUs air assij»iuHl, and moro 
than ovtM' has stratojiv btu-oiiu' a scinicr, aiul iiu»ie lliau ov(M* 
is it t^xposod to tlir daiiiior of inatufinji' a bnroaiu'ratic inon- 
sitM- of luaiiv iiUorailiui; \n hotels ami of 0(hu"Uin>i' aiut train- 
iuj; hiiirau cfiicfs iiish'iul of (Hiitnil staff ()//;V«/>'. In that i>nor- 
nious uiachino (>ach individual occupies a ('oriain place, and 
fi>r i\\i-\\ one (hero is a restive o\' threi' or four otVicers. for 
the same plac(\ the same tluiv. ilu> same traiK. If one of 
tluMii is transferred to anoiluM' place. thini;s dt> not lio >vell 
at lirst, betause lu> cannot kni>\v evervthiui;; the "Kussian" 
is not familiar widi the duties oi the "•Frenchman." while 
either ma\ l>t> more faiuiliar >vith thest^ foreijiu armit^s than 
with his t>wn. 'V\\o uudisturbtnl action of such a stupendiuis 
whet^hvork retiuires a (iilitjenf and iittjenious mimt a man who, 
so to speak, has imprt^ssed o\\ his mind \\\v oniline (>f any 
possible t'ontiuii'ency in war. 

That characteristic is to day inori' ov less ptnuliar to all 
litMieral statYs; to deny it would be ft>i>lish. If tlu^ (jenerals 
are there to h^id the armies, etc.. then a bureau chief may 
suttU'e for a statY officer. NapohH>u 1. himself had at tirst 
but a sinipuMon! Hut if lite mMu>rals are m>t tluMc. which 
in view of human mediocrity in every tield may ptM-hai>s be 
the normal condition, the failure to cultivate uiilitary his- 
tory to the rt^iuisite decree would exact heavy ]HM\alties. 
Properly cultivateih it may be instruunMital in lime of peace 
in prtMeutii;,ii \\\o individual frt>m beconiinu;. as he would 
under existing; conditions, a petlantic bureau t'hief. instead 
of a frt^sh and active i^eneral statY officer schoided in militarT 
history, and it would be nu>st salutary if ni> t>tVutM' were 
admit ttnl to the jivneral statY of the army unless he had been 
on duty in the section for military history. No one who is 
t\>nd of military history, who is jjifted with imajiinatiou. and 



fntroditctwn. 5 1 

who ji,|)|»i-«'cijil<'H vvliJil iiiJij Im* Icjinu'd \>y riK'suis f)f both, will 
vycv l»c<()iiM' ;i iHii^'iiiKTiit ; li<- iiiiiy /lot Ix- llx- \)<:h\. chief of 
hiircjiii, bill Ji, more <'nifi<'i!( jiihI iiHcful j^cnorjil HlalT ofTicf-r; 
hJH fon<liH'HH for- mili(;ir'y hiHtory Ih not (liininiHhr-d, for il 
growH after ii I;ihI<' for il han once been ac<jiiii-<'(J. The 

MlilHHCH of llie fill NIC, to 1)0 HUfC, WllI llOf admit of HUch IMJIH- 

lerly [XTforinaiKeH aH IhoHO of Najmlcon in February, 1814, 
Th(?y will re(|uii'e tin; Hinii»leHt of ijlyriK fo keep one army 
from crow(Jinj^ jnxi cruHliin^ the olher, und il is only in ^;aHe 
unpleaHanl incidc'iilM Khonid llii<jw llw ;^ianl polypuH of a 
modern army from ilH familiar track, that the dark HidcH of 
tin? ^'enerjil Klaff bureaucracy aH now reij^ning in all coun- 
IrieH would conie to light. 

TliiH bureaucrncy Iijih been ftivoi-ed, HJid to Hay, in other 
r(.'Hp(M;tH alHo. ]<\)rnjerly the g(Miernl hIjiH' ofTicer was re- 
quired to command a comj»any for al)onl three yearH and a 
battalion for I wo yearn, and remained Kuniciently in touch 
with the nee<lH of the lrooj)H, wilh all jihaKeH of practical 
Hervice, with Ihe life in Ihe lin<*, and — wilh laclicHl Recent- 
ly the iibove ()eriodH hiive in jnoHt caK<'H been reduced to one 
year, and what interoHt can an officer take in hiH troops 
under hucIi circuniHtanceH, when he knowH 'Mn a year f nhall 
be rid of IhiH duly and be back in my bureau"? lie haB 
purely pernoiial iiilcrenlH, and. an a rule, those of Ihe trooi)K 
will Hullei". A company that liaH IxMtn commanded by Kuch 
ofTicerK for two or three yearn Ih bound to lack the rerjuinite 
HoIi<Jity of interior Htriicture. Moreover, in Heveral in- 
BtanccH ofTlcerH of I bene giJidcK were not rclui'iied to prac- 
tical Hervice at all, ami, what Ih worne, Home Heem to con- 
Hider il unn(M;(!HHary! Since the war academy haw been 
pla* <'<l under the general staff, the graduates of tin? institu- 
tion conHid(?r themselven at once candi<lateH for the general 
staff, and they conliniic to lead a biireaiicrati*' life from a 



62 I nt rod net Ion. 

comparatnilv vomig a^(\ wliik' none should be allowod to 
become a major in the general staff unless he has taken one 
oontiniivnt of men through their entire term of service. In 
this uuuuier an ollieer learns the needs of the troops, and 
that is exaetly Avhat everv general staff officer must know. 
But, good heavens I he has hardly joined the troops, when 
he is "missed" in the machine of the general staJi' because 
with ueAv hands things do not run smoothly; and he is 
recalled prematurt>ly through concern for that "machine 
constantly kept under steam." Hence the growing pre- 
ponderaiu'c of the hurcifucrafic part of this occupation (which 
unfortunately, can no longer be avoided), over the act- 
ire part. 

The service of the general staffs attached to the troops 
has likewise become more bureaucratic, the documents to be 
prepared grow with every year, and the general statY officer 
is preeminently a bureau chief. The work in preparation 
for ajul during the nmneuvers, general staff journeys, and 
other exercises are not a sutticient diversion, and aiv almost 
wholly mechajiical in character: though new in the first 
3'ear, the conditions are the same in subsequent years, with 
the exception of a chajige of locality, and it cannot be gain- 
said that in the discharge of such duties little jiuhjment is 
required, ajid that with a modest measure of mechaiiicaJ 
skill a satisfactory result can be accomplished. Like any 
one else, the general staff officer can sharpen his tactical 
judgment only by means of practical service, experience, and 
exercises, and he needs tactical judgment to-day more than 
ever before. A knowledge of the o]>]>onent's army and of its 
institutions, of the theaters of war, and the sifting of mes- 
sages and reports and their preparation are not sufficient: 
the last kind of Mork appeals more particularly to the tac- 
tical judgment. To be sure, the fact that the gentlemen 



Introductifjn. 53 

of tli<; railway Hootiori aio bound to beoome bureaucrats 
HpringH from the very nature of "strategy organized in 
peace"; and there are many considerations and require- 
ments that stand in the way of any extensive changes. 

The \\'ar of 1870-71 demonstratef* the enormous supe- 
riority of strategy over tactics. The superiority of strateg}' 
was so great that surprising results were gained in spite of 
racHliocre tactics, so that, properly speaking, the Germane 
'won through strategy. It should not be forgotten, however, 
that the moral qualities, the inipondr-rables, were present on 
the German side to a high degree, and remaine<l so. In 
future there will be little difference in the material value of 
armies, yet tactics will continue to level the path of strat- 
(;gy, and strategy will continue to receive its success at the 
hands of tactics. The tactical training of officers, those of 
the general staff included, should therefore be carried to the 
highest degree, since victory will require greater efforts than 
at Worth and Gravelotte, better judgment, more skill in 
the moving of great concentrated masses, better coopera- 
tion of the masses, and uninterrupted communication. The 
masses placed in readiness by strategy will remain con- 
centrated longer, their maintenance, fc^iding, and draining 
channels must be highly organized, and so-called "grand tac- 
tics" — viz., the moving of army corps and armies bj' bri- 
gades and divisions beyond the confines of the battle-field — 
are bound to become indispensable. These things must be 
mastered in time of peace, for the reconnaissance, especially 
of extensive positions, as at Gravelotte and on the Lisaine, 
will probably require more time and effort than formerly; 
to locate the enem>-^s flanks (before the completion of which 
task no battle order should ever be issued) will itself require 
a day, nor is this estimate considered too high in view of the 
circumstances of the 17th and 18th of August. Even then 



54 Inti'iMhwtion. 

imuh it'UKiius u> (.oiupK^U' a avoU cousidorod plan of baitlo. 
linuitinjj this as probable, wo shall invariably tind onr- 
solvos ronipollod to have rooonrso to the Napoloonir priii- 
liplo of loniontration boforo tho battle, Nvhonover an oxton- 
sive pit'parod poj^itimi is to bo attaoktHl. a.nd tht^ oonrontra- 
tion will bo one of niassos oxoooding those at tlravelotte; 
and >Ye shall moreover have to learn llo^Y to move these 
masses from the plaee of preliminary \o that of detinite 
deployment. 

Whether the measnres for oonoentratii>t\. the system of 
orders. reiH>rts. messiiges, and reoonnaissanee dnring oon- 
oentration. the modifications in the deployment ivudered 
neoessary by the results of the forejioinji. the onier for the 
battle and the ooiiduet of the latter, be olassititHl as strate 
irioal or taetieal. they all must reeeive impulse and aim from 
supreme headquarters; the direotion must be in one hand 
and be so organizetl that one hand is equal to the task. 
The station for the central direction should therefore be 
sehvttHi in accordance with the object of the battle, and the 
givatest care should be exercised to maintain uninterrupted 
communication with the cavalry divisions, army command 
ers. and army corps. The cavalry divisions may be so situ- 
attnl as to save time by making direct reports, and by send- 
ing meivly a duplicate ivport to the army connnanders. 
These reports will mostly contain the ivsults of reconnais- 
s;xnces. and it may therefoi*e happen that, dependent on the 
impivssion ivceived from the sum total of all reports, a 
change of station niay be dtvmed necessary for the central 
direction. >sor should the thread of communication Ivtwivu 
all higher commandtMs ever be alloweil to bivak during the 
deployment for battle or during the battle itself. The per- 
ftvtion with whith this system works alone guarantees 
direction. 

It cannot now be prognosticateil as to how far the cap- 



/ atroiluct urn . Ij 5 

tjv<' \ni\\()()it will in*-'-! i)i<- ''Xjx* talioiJH j>la<;*?«] upon it, J 
Klill <onMid*T' if a caprioiorjM riU'auH of nt<:unnn\¥>¥>iuu'j' an<l 
r<'I»orl, inforjor to tli<' w<'ll inou/itw], boM <>n\((-r. Moif; 
HVHf<ni in, liov\'<fV<'r, r<?<|iJir<'rJ, arul wlu'ii that in ha<J, it fjiay 
hf tak'-n for \!;ri\u\i't\ that r<i>orfM and ord^TH will arrivt' in 
j^ood tini''. nior«- j»;irti<ijlarly ko with th*- aid of th<f U-lc- 
t^raph. 1 do not h<-Hitat(f to Kay that th<; profXT orj^aniza 
tirni of tli<' HVHtr'Ffi r>f rf^poHH and ord^TH \h th<; moHt ini[>ort- 
,Trit (i-uUn<- of a "^land \utin\i\\\iiV\t'A-¥,r* No on<; whow; work 
ih «')H<,'wh<fo nfjould h^' toh'ralod tluT*'. It njay \n' aKMUWUid 
thiit th<' j<iin<ip;j| hattl«'« will tak<' jila*'' on a f/ont of 18 — 2<) 
kilonK't^TK. Jf \\\i'. h^fadqiiartwH aro on ono of \\ut fiankK, 
<'ith<'i' during th^' df'[>lov'ni<-*nt or during iUi: battl<', orders 
and roportH will mnivc too latr^; if it ix in thr^ cjtntMr, the 
time will in cvcfy inKtance be rwlueed by one-half. It 
Mhould he noted, however, that the armament of eavalry 
and itK r-rrifWoynK'nt in <ornbination with artillery, perhajjH 
in advanerfd poHitionK, may prompt the eentral direction 
to effect the preliminary deployment at leaxt 12 kilometer-H 
from the enemyV KuppoH^d pf>«ition. The diKtance« Ixi- 
tween the variouK h^adquJirterK are thuH incr^-aKed, and the 
central direction iH \\('yc confronted with an arithmetical 
factor, wliow reduction to u formula in not pernilKKible, but 
which may be determined with fair Htrategic accuracy from 
experience and frotn the ntudy of Home battle«. Modem 
organization of all higher headquarteiH. modern f^pjipment 
of all. from the arrny corpH upwardH, with Hufficient organs 
for the trfiiiKmiKKion of orderK and reports, and habituating 
the varioijK headquartern, by meann of a well connidered 
Hcheme, to the xno«t rapid and accurate p^mHJble rendering of 
rejjortK to their HnfK?rior«, to their inferior-H, and to the 
flankn — thew? are re<juirementH of the command which in 

^German t>?rTn for th^- h'ra^lquarU-rK of thf: commandf^r of 8*:vera' 
arraleg, — Tr 



56 Introduction. 

1870-71, for instance, were not sufficiently met. How such 
a scheme should be arranged and kept in operation will not 
be discussed here; reference to the conditions at Gravelotte 
and elsewhere will enable any one to answer the main ques- 
tion. So much is certain, however, that an army which is 
abreast of the re(iuirements in this respect possesses a great 
advantage and the faculty to solve more difficult problems 
than those encountered by the Germans on the 17th and 
18th of August. Whoever believes in a central direction 
should study this example, as it unquestionably contains all 
answers for the preparation and direction of the battle of 
masses in the future. 

That battle will probably require more than one deploy- 
ment was shown on the German side at Gravelotte, where 
the Germans made three difl'erent deployments: first along 
the road R6zouville — Mai*s-la-Tour on the 17th; on the 18th 
along the road Gravelotte — Caulre Ferme — Doncourt — 
Jarny; and lastly, along the road Gravelotte — Verneville 
— Ste. Marie-aux-Chdnes — Aubout^. To be sure, the reasons 
for these deployments must be sought in very different 
directions. The first deployment (at noon on the 17th) 
had for its object the continuation of the battle on that day, 
but, for reasons not to be discussed here, the battle was 
subsequently postponed to the 18tli. The first deployment 
on the 18th was the result of the embarassiug uncertainty 
as to the enemy's whereabouts; the second deployment, 
including the direction of march given to the II. Corps, was 
the result of definite information as to the enemy's position. 
Though the reconnaissance on the 17th and 18th may be 
called anything but perfect, yet in future the task of locat- 
ing the enemy's flanks will by no nieaus be an easy one, 
even with better arrangements for this object. It will 
hardly be possible to avoid several deployments, increasing 



Introduction. 5T 

in degree of completeness, and, indeed, here we have the 
sign-posts for the battle direction of the future, which is 
out of the question without a suitable deployment in keep- 
ing with the strategic intent. There are many reasons why 
in the future the development of the final deployment for 
battle from several preliminary deployments will be more 
difficult, accompanied, probably by constant fighting, per- 
haps by cavalry battles, while, moreover, the time required 
will be much greater. In each one of the preliminary 
deployments the armies will therefore have to observe 
suitable distances and intervals to make them capable of 
sudden and immediate changes of position or front. I 
believe that here there is much that is new in the way of 
grand tactics, or whatever you may call it, since the advan- 
tages accruing to the defender in the selection of his posi- 
tion, from the adoption of smokeless powder, are so great 
that he will use every available means to deceive the 
attacker and lead him astray, since heretofore the means 
to that end were not at his disposal, and since, dependent 
on his successful employment of ruses before the battle, 
the defender will gain advantages for maneuvering and 
moving his masses which may give him the superiority 
and even the battle. It is only now that the active opera- 
tive-tactical defense has become fully practicable, and why 
should not a leader arise who knows how to draw from 
the sum of these changes all their inherent advantages? 

It follows that in such situations the headquarters will 
in future have to remain within the zone of each deploy- 
ment, and that smokeless powder affects in a high degree 
even the formulation of decisions on the part of the central 
direction, since all spaces are enlarged, all times extended, 
and all problems before the battle rendered more difficult. 



58 Intnnhtvtion. 

It also t'ollo^^s tluu the irt'uoral statY oHii-or in ])artuMilar 
should possess a oonvot taotical ovo. whith i-an bo aoquirod 
by praotioo only. In most oasos it may bo possible to infer 
the jionenU direction of the enemy's position from stratejrie 
considerations, aims, and principles; still, the examples of 
Konijjjiratz, Ornvelotte, the Lisaiue, and OrU%ns show how- 
easy it was in the past to be deceived as to the details of 
the direction and as to the whereabouts of the enemy's main 
body. Misapprehension on the part of the hiuher leaders 
and tlie resultinj; Joiihf are greatly favored by the new arms. 

It is. 110 doubt, to be ascribed to tln^ German system 
that the tactical cajmbilities were not eipial to the strate- 
gical: under that system general staff ofticers weri> almost 
the only ones to reach high command, and the tattical 
school, on the other hand, only produced men skilled in 
detachnuMit tactics. The necessary connecting link in the 
chain of command, brigade and division commanders firm in 
every saddle, was wanting: hence in the battles of 1870-71 
we have detachment tactics, instead of battle tactics proper. 
Though detachment tactics may have sutticed. thanks to a 
very superior strategy, we cannot count on the return of 
such favorable conditions, and the more imperiously do tac- 
tics iH>nunaud that we learn how to tight in large bodies, 
that we discover the tactics of the battleinasses. 

Though strategic discussion has no place in this biHd<. 
I cannot omit touching upon one general matter connected 
with the assembly before battle. Moltke's dictum. "March 
divided, fight unittnl." has. thivugh ^loltke's genius, and in 
the period of hi.< strategy, maturtnl the highest triumphs 
since war has been wagtnl. To dispute this would be to 
deny facts, liut if Moltke were still alive. I am convinced 
that the cluuiges whioh have since occurreil, and which can- 
not be iguoivd by strategy, would have prompted him to 



Introduction. 69 

modify, Jirid jxrluipK to clian^c his (li<tiiiii into "March 
united Jiiid fij^lil iiiiKcd." TliiK in [ilainly foreHhadowod 
by the opcralioiiH around Mdz. W'Iumi Htsindinj^ by ifself, 
how<'\'<'i-, Iho fir-Ht (|Uol('d Bontoncc is fio(jU(;ntly miHuuder- 
stood ;iiid orronc'onHJy intorproted. TroopH will hereafter 
also he divi<]cd on (lie ni!ii<li. })ijt not 8o long ah heretofore; 
the ((tncenlnition will Ijik*- j)l}j<e earlier and part of the 
operative tJisU will he solved with the troopH eoncentrated 
— nnil<'<l. AI)ov<' mII, 1 would caution af^ainst the idea of a 
return of the nia}4:nifieent Ktrategy which Moltke'H Hkill has 
aeeuHtomed uk to connect with warfare. The {general laws 
for i>lanninj^ and condticting operations will remain, but 
the operations will b<- slowej-, their s<'vernl jjeriods will 
re(juire crmsiderMhle time, and the results will probably be 
less decisivf.', whoever may be the victor. It is due to the 
masses that have to be set in motion and to the resistance 
offered by the enemy's masses in connection with defens- 
ively prepared districts, with fortresses, and with railroads. 
To be sure, tli(^ masses harbor within themselves their great- 
est enemy, and we must learn how to overcome him; there 
are many indications that the matter is being given due con- 
sideration in (iermany. Take the ecjuipment with tents, for 
instance. Whether it will succfH'd remains to be seen. 
I'.oth opponents, however, will sufTer from the same disad- 
vantages, and it will sim[)ly be a (juestion which of the two 
can better and longer preserve his armies, nrid thus gain 
numerical superiority. Subjugation will not be effected by 
battles alone; hunger will he a more efficient ally than it 
was in 1870-71 . 

It is radically wrong to believe that strategy extends 
only to the edge of the battle-field and that the latter is 
dominated by t;ictics ,'ilone. The two blend in the battle. 
Leaving aside a few fundamental principles, strategy is sub- 
ject to modifications engendered by the progress of science 



60 Introduction. 

and civilization. It lies in the nature of strategy to utilize 
every improvement, and for that reason every general staff 
officer is, as regards science and that which may convey 
superiority, invariably a promoter of a healthy progress. 

While strategy is subject to considerable modifications, 
constant change may be said to be the rule in tactics. Wise 
regulations should therefore leave a certain amount of free- 
dom to the intellect; where such is not the case, every army 
ought to be provided with a printing establishment to fur- 
nish new regulations that would be abreast of the times. 
That is about the point we have reached, and it is due to the 
fact that we delayed our reforms far too long. Indeed, the 
omissions of two decades had to be made good in two years. 
With tactics it is frequently as it is with fortresses. In- 
stead of working ahead and discovering the laws for, and 
the construction of, cover, the engineer as a rule provides 
for present requirements, indulges in all kinds of fancies, 
and loses himself in forms; and just as the fall of many a 
fortress may be extenuated by the fact that at the time of its 
completion it was already out of date and incapable of suc- 
cessful defense, because a destructive gun is more rapidly 
constructed than a fortress, so have armies been defeated 
which had neither the insight nor the strength to promptly 
relinquish their superannuated '^tactics," or which went 
astray in seeking suitable tactics. And thus it will ever be. 
Yet there are also armies which have been badly beaten 
notwithstanding their timely regulations, but that was due 
to the fact that strategy was neglected for the benefit of 
tactics, that the strategic intellect was not sufficiently cul- 
tivated. This cultivation must go hand in hand with that 
of tactical judgment. 

Strategy and tactics are both based on military history 
and military science, and both may be acquired to a high 



Introduction. 61 

degree. The method of application of what has been 
learned shows the gift of leading, talent, genius, master- 
mind of the individual. A correct school will therefore al- 
ways consider strategy and tactics as inseparably connected 
domains and conform thereto in its work. In that sense 
all great leaders have acted, and they are the ones who from 
their early age have done an immense amount of intel- 
lectual work. If strategy is neglected, the individual will 
never rise to the level of the ar-t; he will rather be moving in 
lower spheres, he will not learn to reflect on the nature, 
causes, and connection of the operations, and in the most 
favorable case he will not rise above the skilled mechanic. 
This has always exacted its penalties, and the disciples of 
Mars should therefore be encouraged to take up the study of 
strategy. His Majesty is not served with one strategist; he 
can not have enough of them. This should be preached 
from the house-tops; yet but a short while ago the very 
opposite was affirmed and — approved! Why are so many 
skilled tacticians useless as strategists? Why do such men 
not feel themselves at home in strategy? There are so many 
reasons for it that we do not care to enumerate them, and, 
unfortunately, we cannot say that they are being systemat- 
ically counteracted. If. on the other hand, tactics is neg- 
lected, or if it goes astray, strategy will not have freedom 
of operation. It is the whole army that must be able to 
fight according to modern conditions ; strategy relies on this 
being the case. 

In tactics it should be kept in mind that the factors 
entering into the calculation are men, and that the psycho- 
logical motives — some, at least, if not all of them — of the 
general, supposing them to be ideal, should find expression 
to the same extent in tactics — i. e., in the individual man on 
the battle-field. Improved modern fire-arms also teach us 



(VJ I ntroihtctioii. 

to C'ilinuifi' more hialih/ the value of psiichohuji/ in taelic.< than iras 
fornierlji neeessari/, aiul for tlml reason the irill-poirer of the 
indiridnal ^ohtier should bo i)orsistontly ami intolliiiontly oul- 
tivatod in ordor to niatuio in liinu by moans of tlio hijjh- 
ost attainable cultivation of the ^^•ill-po^\■ol^ the dotorniina- 
tion to 1)0 victorious undi'r all ciri'unistanoos. This very 
point is but too froquiMitly noiilootod. and the oxporiniontinij 
in fai'titious forms soon dojionoratos into a veritable virtiu)- 
soshi[>. It is in the terrain alone that tactics acquires life 
and health. \Vhat formerly swayed the jivneral alone or a 
limited circle around him — passion and andntion, thirst for 
honor and i»lory, enthusiasm for the object of the war — 
must to-day permeate the army in its entiri'ty — sufficiently, 
at least, to rouse the individual's own impulses to a certain 
degree; and this store of moral force must be suitably 
guided and utili/ed l\v nu-ans of a riuorous discipline, Jis 
was that of the old Komans and that of the a.rmies of Fred- 
erick the (ireat; otherwise the llnest principles and forms 
renuvin devoid of vitality. Intelliirence and habit, fear 
of punishnuMit, and hope of reward no lonuer suffice to 
ovi>rcome the difficult situations in which the infaiitrynmn 
to day is apt to tind himst>lf in any action where he means t(» 
be victorious. More is re(|uired: the soldier must make the 
lienerars cause his own, must carry within him the same 
tire, must be sensible of the same ardor, or he will uot rise 
from behind the eovering fold of ground to advance again 
in the face of tlu' storm of bullets. 

^Vherever we may look, we see good ideas degemn-ate 
into drill ground faui'ies. For the same reason the quon- 
dam echelons of the threat Frederick became the fa.vorite 
tactical features in the hands of unwise men who failed to 
notice that a ditVerent era had long set in. And so it is in 
our days; we have gone from one exti*eme to the other, we 



Introduction. 63 

have lost the hjgical connection : ^'La recherche de la palernite 
est interdiie" and a system is advocated which accords no 
place to the action of the higher leaders. 

Hordes we must have, bnt we must also have definite 
principles for their fighting. 

Besides certain precepts, the system of hordes of skir- 
misliei-s also assumes that the soldier has been trained to 
self-activity from the start, to the development of all his 
moral and intellectual faculties and attributes, in order 
that the sense of honor and of duty may actuate him when- 
ever he is no longer under the constraint of form or under 
the eye of the leader. It should never be forgotten, how- 
ever, that human nature is frail, and that the soldier should 
be acted upon directly and immediately by personal exam- 
I>le wherever it can reasonably be done. 

In the past few wars the tactics of the oj>ponents dif- 
fered widely on account of the inequality of armament and 
on account of the difference and lack of understanding of 
the jirinciples and organization of the opponent; in no case 
were the tactics in keeping with the spirit of the armament. 

Certain it is: First, the armament of the infantry of 
the attacker (Germans and Russians) was, on the average, 
inferior. Both sulfered some extraordinary losses against 
the better armed defender. 

Second, the losses began to be felt at a distance, where 
the opponent was unable [i. e., where his weapon did not 
permit) to answer the fire effectively. 

In the Prusso-Oerman campaign there were several 
instances which invite reflection, and which, if properly 
judged by the facts, ought to lead to proper deductions. 

In that work such officers alone could take a useful part 
as were present at the events, observed themselves, others, 
and the opi)onents, and were in a position affording an ex- 



64 Introduction. 

tensive survey; they slionld. however, closely folknv all im- 
provements of arnunnent. so as not to teaoh things that are 
ont of date. 

This book is intended to be military-historical, psycho- 
logical, and tactical. 

For whoever has watched actual battle and the recent 
technical improvements, and who has also considered the 
growth of the national sentiment and of the military spirit 
in France and Russia, is bound to examine the tactics of the 
future under these three headings. 



PART I. 

MILITARY-HISTORICAL STUDIES. 

7. The Attach of the 28th Infantry Brigade on the Farmstead of 
Bar and on the Adjoining Entrenched Wood of Briz in the 
Battle of Koniggrdtz on July 3, 18GG. 

(a) The March.— ()n the 3(1 of July, 1866, the 28th Bri- 
gade had completed its deployment to the northwest of the 
ridge of I'opowitz by 2 p. m. From our previous position 
near Alt-Xechanitz on the right bank of the Bistritz we had 
been able to observe the course of the battle as far as Lipa; 
here we were as though shut off from theworld. We saw 
nothing and could not be seen. The short march from 
Nechanitz had taken the brigade over an hour, because, while 
the infantry was crossing the Bistritz by the rex>aired nar- 
row bridge, General von Hiller, who was on the further 
bank, received orders to halt and to let the reserve artillery 
pass.* As the bridge was too narrow for two columns 
abreast, the 28th Brigade halted where it was. To send the 
artillery to the front to prepare the attack was perfectly 
correct. 

After Alt-Xechanitz had been talcen, F. — 28tht followed 
the Saxons by order of General von Scholer, marching 
straight for the bridge. The latter was in flames and we 
were in a dilemma. F. — 27th, with commendable devo- 

*Statement of General von Hiller, February 10, 1890. 
tMeans Fusilier Battalion of the 28th Regiment. See author's 
footnote, page 67. — Tr. 



66 Inquiries into tliv Tactivs of the Ftitinr. 

tion. crossed the Bistrit/. farthoi' to tho left with the water 
up to their shoiikieis, but the main (luestioii was to save 
the bridge for the passage of the main body. To accom- 
plish that was the chief problem, and to show how in need 
small means, when well organized, may accomplish great 
things, I will brietly state what happened. F. — 2Sth 
unstra[>ped their mess-tins, and, after the manner in which 
formerly tires usini to be fought in the country district 
where the regiment is recruited, formed two lines, which 
the other men kept supplied with mess-tins tilled w ith water 
from the Bistritz.* In this way the small means at hand 
permitted great masses of water to be poured on the burn- 
ing bridge. The men who were tighting the tire directly 
stood in the midst of the tlames, not without great danger to 
the devotion of F. — llSth, the tire was gotten under control, 
the bridge was saved, and the open spaces were covered 
with planks and boards procured by this battalion. Thus 
the smart Khinelanders of F. — 2Sth had done a piece of 
work that would have done honor to trained pioneers; the 
latter were — not there I The value of the presence of mind 
ajid of the organized work is evident, for, as matters stood, if 
F. — ilSth had not acted so promptly, no great bodies of the 
Elbe Army could have taken an active part in the battle, 
since no other passages were construefed, as is well known. The 
soldier should be familiar with such instances, that he may 
know how to help himself in similar situations. 

During this passage I stood in the middle of the en.er- 
gency bridge, and, as it had no railing, my ]>osition was not a 
pleasant one, because the bridge, of which a number of parts 
were missing, was tottering under the weight of the guns 

♦Statement of Colonel Kneusels, the chief of 11th— 28th (11th 
Company of the 2Sth Regiment). See author's note, page 67. — Tr. 



Military Historical Studies. 67 

and carrriages (according to my notes, 6 batteries each of 
the 7th and 8th Army Corpsj. During the long time it took 
the artillery to cross, I was thinking more of what would be 
the result if a few shells should burst here; and not without 
reason, for as yet I had not noted any jjrouounced progress 
of the battle; it rather seemed to be at a standstill, and from 
Alt-Nechanitz I had been able to observe with the naked eye 
the advance and retreat of several columns. Some appre- 
hension seemed even to have seized the cool and heroic Lieu- 
tenant-Colonel von Schoning, commanding I. — r)7th,* whom 
the circumstances had completely deprived of all control 
over his battalion during the passage. Sullenly and impa- 
tiently he looked on from the other bank, he himself with 
the 1st Company being separated from the remainder of his 
command. Under such circumstances time passes slowly, 
every one feels the inconvenience of the situation, and the 
oftener I consulted my watch, the more impatient I became. 
Still I will state that the long column of artillery moved 
with great steadiness, and that, with the exception of a few- 
puffs and cuffs, no accidents occurred. I breathed more 
freely, however, when the ar-tillery was across, for nothing 
is more uncomfortable than to be deprived of all freedom 
under such circumstances. The main thing was that the 
bridge, which had been repaired by our infantry with com- 
mendable care, proved eijual to the demands. 

At Alt-Nechanitz I had observed few traces of the bat- 
tle, and our long delay there from 10:80 a. m. until 1 p. m. in 
no way differed from an ordinary assembly of troops in 
peace. The ofTicers of the various regiments visited each 
other, conversed, and shared what little edibles they had, 

♦The Roman numerals before the dash denote battalions, the 
Arabic figures companies; after the dash the Arabic figures denote 
regiments. 



08 Inquiries into the Tactics of the Future. 

and none seemed to have any premonition that the 3d of 
July was to be a historic day in German history. To be 
sure, the attention of the conversing groups was frequently 
attracted by the battle-field, which extended in incompara- 
ble grandeur to our extreme left, with its gigantic masses of 
fire and dark, hovering, heavy clouds of smoke; but the con- 
versation, as in the midst of peace, turned on the most harm- 
less topics, nor did various adjutants, etc., inquiring for Gen- 
eral von Herwarth, arouse unusual curiosity. The general 
impression was that great masses were engaged on either 
side, and even the men seemed to feel it; their quiet and dec- 
orous behavior during that hour deserves special mention. 

On the farther side of the bridge the picture changed; 
the bodies of some Saxon soldiers and of a poorly clad 
woman were the first dead I saw. Some of the houses along 
the Bistritz had been badly damaged; the broad village 
street, however, presented quite a peaceful appearance; its 
solitude and various hospital flags alone reminded one of 
war. Beyond the village we met a fusilier of the 17tli Regi- 
ment; as he approached I recognized him as the servant of 
Lieutenant von Czernicki (F. — 17th\ a friend of mine from 
boyhood. I just had time to inquire for his master without 
noticing that he was carrying an officer's cloak and saber; 
as he pointed to them, I understood what the good man was 
unable to utter. His master had been killed, and what the 
fusilier was carrying were the dead man's belongings. The 
meadows of Nechanitz spread in such luxuriant green that 
signs of the not inconsiderable action which had taken place 
there could hardly be discerned; here and there a body cov- 
ered with a cloak was all: the field had been thoroughly 
policed. In Lubno we first met some of our own troops. It 
was the 7th Rifle Battalion which had taken position behind 
the edge of the village to hold this point in case of a re- 



Military-Historical Studies. 69 

verse. A few greetings, and on we went. It is one of the 
cases in which such use of the rifles has been criticised. I 
am unable to do so; the rifles could be spared because the 
battle was constantly progressing, and there can be no 
doubt that it was most important to hold the bridge, and the 
rifles were the very men to develop their full fire power in 
Lubno and in the surroundings of the village. Measures 
should not be judged by their results; it should rather be 
inquired what their object was, and whether that object was 
of sufficient importance to keep back a whole battalion. In 
this case the answer should be in the affirmative. 

Although on the whole the (preparatory, tactical) meas- 
ures of Generals von Herwarth and von Scholer and the 
dispositions for the attack on Problus — Prim surpass many 
greater and smaller attack movements of the wars of 1866 
and 1870-71, still the most important matter was neglected 
— i. e., timely provisions for crossing the Bistritz more rap- 
idly. A single narrow bridge was not enough; two or three 
should have been constructed here or near by, all the more 
because the case of a reverse should have been reckoned 
with. Had that been done, the Army of the Elbe would 
have engaged earlier and in greater force, which was par- 
ticularly desirable from the strategic point of view, because 
the direction of Koniggratz, which might be assumed to be 
the enemy's principal line of retreat, was more sensibly 
menaced from the south than from any other point. If Bor 
had been reached at 2 p. m., for instance, which would not 
have been at all impossible, a retreat on Koniggratz would 
have become impossible and the greater part of the enemy 
would have fallen in the hands of the II. Army on the field 
of battle. Thus the most trifling omissions of a tactical 
character exact their penalties when considered from a 



TO I iKjiiirii'ft into the Toi'tics of tJic Future. 

higlior point, ;md tlu're nv;is oertainly no IjU'k of time or 
material for tlio t'oustriiction of (ho rtHiuisilo l)ridj!:es. 

In such oast^s spocially solootod ollii'ors should bo sta- 
tioned at the crossinjjs to assijiii the troops to bridges, and 
it is advisable to assipi artillery and cavalry to one, and 
infantry to another bridge. Under eireumstances like those 
before ns the infantry bridge might perha])s not be very 
strong, and had that been the ease, the oonstrnetion of a 
seeond bridge for infantry ».'onld have presented no diftionl- 
ties even in the absence of resources other than those found 
in Nechanitz. l>ut Avhen iIumv is but one bridge, a bridge 
guard becomes all the nmre indispensable. There was none, 
and I remember vividly the bewildered faces of the infantry 
as the artillery trotted through its ranks without ceremony, 
and only came to a walk on the bridge. It was the "right 
of the stronger." 

By not making timely provision for the necessary cross- 
ings the lu>adquarters of the army made a mistake that could 
not be rectitied. The Prussian Otlicial Account does not 
mention the incident, though it is one of the most instruct- 
ive of recent wars; nor does the Austrian Account, which, as 
regards our side, frequently draws on the Prussian source. 
The former simply states, on page 308. "(hat (ho 2Sth Bri- 
gade followed the 27th at 8(X) paces." That nu\y have been 
the distance at the start, but the imident which I have 
related incrt^istnl it to an hour's manh. The consequence 
was that the 2Tth Brigade attacked before the 2Sth. al- 
though it had farther to march than the latter. AVas that 
intentional? In the subsequent course of the action the 
two brigades never wore abreast of eaih other, although 
the 2Sth accelerated its march. 

(h) Tlw ]'>t'ploiinicuf. — The unpleasant imideiu had 
placed General von llillor in a vory painful sidiation; since 



Military-Historical Studies. 7 1 

the 27th lirigado liad entirely disappeared fioiii liiw view, 
and as there was no one at the moment to tell him where to 
march, nothing remained for him but to act on his own 
responsibility. Marching on to Popowitz, he inquired of 
Major von Sell, commanding the 7th Kifle Battalion left at 
Lubno, who pointed out lo him the direction taken by the 
27th Brigade. CJeneral von Ililler now gave orders for the 
2Sth Brigade to follow the 27th. During Ihe march on 
T^opowitz, Captain von Schadow, of General von Herwarth's 
staff, brought an order to General von Hiller to halt the 
head of his column, and form line to the right. General 
von Ililler rode forward to inform himself of the situation, 
and in doing so met General von Herwarth himself, who 
pointed out to him on the left a barely visible s[)ire as the 
objective of his attack, saying, "That is Problus; advance in 
that direction."* That, according" to my notions, is the 
"task sj^stem" (Auftraf/sverfahren). 

On returning to his brigade. General von Hiller found it 
still in the act of forujing uj), and had time to communicate 
the order of General von Herwarth to the regimental and 
battalion commanders. They then rode to the front with 
General von Hilh^r beyond the ridge of Popowitz, so that 
they also could inform themselves of the situation and qui- 
etly talk the matter over. Meanwhile, the battalions had 
formed in double column on the center in two lines, but the 
"finer work" of dress and dircn-tion was still lacking. That 
was now done in regulation style, so that the brigade was 
facing due east, the battalions dressed accurately as with a 
string. Since Golonel von der Osten (57th Regiment, in 
first line) was an expert in these things, it was quickly done; 
at any rate, the time spent on this calm and deliberate prep- 



*From a letter of General von Hiller. 



72 Inquiries into the Tmtics of the Future. 

aration amply paid for itself in the subsequent action 
(Sketch I.). 

In the first line were 2 battalions of the 57th Regiment,* 
I. — 57th on the left, F. — 57th on the right ; in second line. 2 
battalions of the 17th Regiment,! II. — 17th on the right. 
I. — 17th on the left. Luxuriant fields of rye as tall as a 
man covered the height and the entire space to the Problus 
— Prim plateau, except the meadow bottom in front of Pro- 
blus — Prim. All commanders were in front, and there was 
a silence and attention among the regiments that could not 
have been greater on the drill-ground. After convincing 
himself that the brigade faced exactly in the desired direc- 
tion. General von Hiller again repaired to Colonel von der 
Osten,J of the 57th Regiment, pointed toward the southern 
point of the wood of Popowitz, and said: "That is the direc- 
tion for the present; afterward the church spire on the left.§ 
"Have the colors displayed!" That done, Colonel von der 
Osten turned toward his regiment, called for three cheers 
for the King, which were given with a will, and added with 
his fine, rich voice: "And now with God." His calmness 
and assurance made a deep impression on those assembled. 
The commanders then resumed front toward the enemy. 
My own attention (I was on the right of the skirmish platoon 
of the 2d — 57th) was deeply engrossed; I had hardly imag- 
ined going into a battle in this manner; what I saw far sur- 
passed my imagination. 

Our men, who had not heard a gun shot except at Miinch- 
engratz, and Mho to-day had for several hours watched the 
advancing and retreating columns in the center, were in ex- 
cellent spirits. They had marched 23 kilometers on soaked 

*The II. formed the escort of the reserve artillery. 
tF. — 17th was with the advance guard of General von Schuler. 
$Died in Berlin as lieutenant-general. 
§The church spire of Problus. 



rtr»;- 




Sketch of the yitUtck oft/ifl4*l>I)iviswn alKdnit/^rati Theza'^in/'nngjutihtfomheAiiatk. 




t Austriana tnJJaxons. 
XX AbaUis. 



•*f_2-_U» 



Sketch I. 



Military-Historical Studies. 73 

roads and across fields, and had been under arms for ten 
hours without anything to eat. Having received its orders 
early, the brigade had started early. At 9 :30 a. m. it stood 
in rear of the right of the I. Army, whence it moved off to- 
ward the south and reached Alt-Nechanitz about 10 :30 a. m. 
The lack of bridges enforced a long delay, and the early start 
of the brigade and its early arrival on the field remained 
without effect on the course of events. But, the long delay 
ended, and the brigade once on the field, it was the fine exam- 
ple of all, particularly of the higher ofiicers, and the imper- 
turbability and assurance they exhibited, that inspired the 
men with faith and confidence. Early in the morning a fine 
rain had fallen, which changed to a dense fog about 7 a. m. 
It settled slowly about noon; the columns of smoke and 
flames of the burning villages and woods drifted in long 
lines slowly to the southwest, borne by a light northeast 
wind. Toward 2 p. m. it cleared up, but the events on the 
height of Problus could be seen but indistinctly, and it was 
only after the heights had been taken that the weather 
cleared up entirely. In consequence of the rain and fog, 
the tall rye-fields were saturated with water, so that the 
troops arrived at the heights of Problus as wet as though 
they had been in water up to their necks. That was more 
specially the case with the leading platoons, but all suffered 
equally from the soaked ground, which impeded movement 
very much. 

At the command of General von Hiller, ''Brigade 
march," the brigade moved off. At first all battalions were 
in double column on the center. As soon as the ridge of 
Popowitz had been crossed, the brigade assumed a different 
formation; General von Hiller, who was riding on the 
right of 2d — 57th with Lieutenant-Colonel von Schoning 
(I. — 57th), ordering T. — 57th* to deploy. The other bat- 

*4th — 57th was detached as escort to Schmelzer's battery. 

G 



74 Itiquirk's into the Toi'tks of the Future. 

talions meanwhile took the short step, which was done to 
perfection despite the artillery fire, and 3d and 1st — 57th 
deployed their skirmish platoons in donble time, their rear 
platoons followin}:: at the regulation distance. Lieutenant- 
Colonel von Sehoning now joined the skirmish line of 3d 
and 1st — 57th, where he remained during the remainder of 
the action. As General von Hiller and Colonel von der 
Osten were riding (; — ]0 paces to my right until 2d — 57th 
was deployed, I was in a fortunate position to hear every 
word they spoke. After descending into the bottom be- 
tween the ridges of Problus and Popowitz, the brigade had 
about the following formation: Firing line, 3d and 1st — • 
57th (at first one platoon deployed, afterward prolonged and 
reinforced by another platoon) ; exactly in rear of the center 
of these two companies (3d on the left, 1st on the right) was 
2d — 57th ; closed in company column 200 paces to the right 
and abreast of 2d — 57th was F. — 57th. In second line there 
remained for the present TI. — 17th and I. — 17th. The bri- 
gade had loaded before starting. 

Having established the first few movements, I must 
relate a curious incident. "When the brigade moved otT. the 
bands of both regiments struck up; that of the 57th Regi- 
ment was at first with I. — 57th, and when that battalion was 
ordered into the firing line, it remained with 2d — 57th. 
Notwithstanding the wet rye-fields, the soaked condition of 
the ground, and a very severe artillery fire, the bands of both 
regiments continued to play with perfect precision and with 
the customary intermissions until the first line was within 
250 meters of the abattis of the woods of Briz, and ceased 
playing only when 2d — 57th was deployed. The last march 
played by the band of the 57th was the men's favorite march, 
in which, according to custon\, the pauses recurring between 
the bars were filled up by the men joining in with: "O 



Military-HiHtorical Stud/ks. 7 5 

Johnny, what a hat I" In this instance the men did not join 
in, but the enemy did with a sudden and heavy hail of lead; I 
still rememl>er how (-omical the situation was. The staff 
' oboist had failed to notice or hear the repeated orders of Col- 
onel von der Osten to stop; the commander of 2d — 57th did 
not seem inclined to interfere on account of the proximity of 
the su7)eriorK, and was, moreover, about 50 paces in front on 
horseback; the mounted officers could meanwhile see how 
closely we had approached the enemy, but the troops them- 
selves could not 3'et overlook the plateau, when the music 
suddenly ceased. It was not the staff oboist, however, who 
had given the signal to stop — it was the enemy; the former 
looked angrily around, and Colonel von der Osten's order, 
"Northe, stop," was heard jiist as the music had ceased. 

I have related llie foregoing because it is a typical ex- 
ample of how firmly peace habits are rooted, and because it 
shows a nne piece of discipline, notwithstanding the comical 
incidents connected with it. If peace habits are rooted 
so firmly, then this harmless example conveys a serious 
warning to teach the men in peace only reasonable things, in 
order that their lives may not be fruitlessly sacrificed to 
wrong habits. Moreover, can anj' other large body of troops 
show a similar example? 

After crossing the ridge of Popowitz, the view changed 
completely, as though the curtain had been raised in the 
theater, and a stage suddenly laid before our eyes. And 
what a stage! The entire hostile front was wrapped in 
smoke and flame in the fiillest sense of the word, from Prim 
to Problus, Stresetilz, Lij>a, and Chluni. Between Prim 
and Problus we saw one long line of artillery, and on our 
side, as far as the eye could reach, advancing skirmishers 
and columns, waving colors, playing bands. The effect of 
the sudden transformation was noticeable also among the 



70 I iKiiiirits into the 'iact'wx of the I'litnir. 

MUMi. I'lvtM'v om> I raiu'ii lii^ ium'U h) s(M\ and I can say hon- 
I'slly dial I imajiinrd myself most anywhi'io oxt'opt in a 
{^roat dtvisivo Itattlo. And tlio t'lVoct must havo been sim- 
ilar on many, for ovon tho admiiinji "Ah!" was not lacking. 
AVlu'thor anything grandor ovor oi'i'uncd in history bofore 
1 do not know, bnt 1 may say (hat I ha\(^ novor stHMi any- 
thing (>vtMi appiHiximaloly alTocting (ho imagination as this 
battlo slago: and wIumi, nndiM- sui-h rirfnms(anoos. a snnirt 
advance is k(>i»( u\\ (lie soldior contincrs wiihont knowing; 
(ho advance was as (hough "well givased." A lively and 
well-directed artillery fire grcvtod us, but we advanctHl 
without hahing to within i!."iO meters of the abattis of the 
wood i>f Briz. 

(c) The Batllc-Field.—Tho battle-field of the brigade 
was a wide depression extending 12000 meters north and 
south between the ritlges of I'opowit/. and Troblus. Its 
deepest point lies about midway botwtvn (he two. With 
the exception of the cross-road Avhich h»ads from Popowitz 
to the T.nbno— XiediM' Prim highroad and is lined with 
trees, the baltle-tield was tMitirely bart> and JrvoiJ of cover, 
while all tln^ riMuaining infantry of the Army of the Elbe 
wail able to appro.ach nnd(M' I'over to within .'>00 and TOO 
meters of the main poin(s of (he enemy's ])osi(ion.* The 
villagi>s of Vroblus and Prim, which at th«^ (ime of the a((ack 
of the 28th Brigade were still in the enemy's ]>oss(^ssion, 
were, on the side toward us. pre]>ared for defense; that fact 
was nnUni>wn to the higher conmmndei's, and nn(il after 
the orders fov i\w attack had been given, the murky weather 
prevent(Hl details from btnng nuide out even with a good 
glass. Tn the subsequent loui-se of (he attack we were 

♦On page 369 of the Prussian OfBclal Account It is stated that 
from the wood to tho villas^ the 27th Brigade had to traverse 1600 
paces of open ground. The actuaj distance is 70l> — SOO meters. 



Milit(i/ry]liHtoric(il HtwUas. 77 

very niiicli Hiii[)iiH<(I to Huddenly oncountor abattin, wliich 
wore 15 feel liif^h ii) Hoiur* places and cncircl*'*! iJif entire 
north and \v(?HtC'rn edffc of tlio woods of J>or and liri/.. A 
rid^f? steeply sloping toward the west extends from Problus 
to Nieder Prim, but it had not been prepared for defense. 
The dislanee from the edge of the ridj^e 1o the wckkI of Briz 
was then about '{HO meters, and aKhouj^h that may seem a 
short distance now, it should be rememb(?red that the ground 
was almost as flat and bare* as a table. Though about 800 
meters from Problus low meadow grounds streteh to the 
Bouth, where they closely approach Nieder Prim, they were 
of little effect as cover, because no attention seemed to be 
paid to them; at any rate, we mardu'd across them with- 
out half. The field of action of the 2.S<h P.rigade must there- 
fore be counted among those entirely devoid of cover and 
shelter. What could hit Aow. there in 1800, however, will 
no longer be practicable in the future, 

Th(? distances had not been systematically marked by 
the enemy; at any rate, I observed no marks except on 
felled trees along the Lubno — Nieder Prim road; others 7 
neither noticed, nor <li(l I hear of any. 

(d) The Attack. — Maintaining the direction indicated by 
General von Ililler, the brigade marched bravely onward; 
some of the officers exhibited some exuberance of spirit, and 
I believe that there are few examjiles in military history of 
a large unit marching to battle with such a light heart. The 
difficulty of maintaining a certain direction is shown by the 
fact that, notwitliHtanding the careful pi-<'vious arrange- 
ments, the brigade advanced its left shoulder more and more 
toward Nieder Prim. When General von Uiller noticed 
that, and also that the large felled trees on the Lubno — 
Nieder Prim road were range marks prepared by the enemy, 
he moved the entire brigade more to the left; still the skir- 



78 Inquiries into the Tactics of the Future. 

mishers of 1st — 57tli found an opportunity to subject the 
enem^- to a lively fire as he withdrew from Nieder Prim. 
1st — 5Tth passed through Nieder Prim followed by F. — 
57th.* General von Hiller showed an icy coolness, but his 
chestnut horse was all excitement and bathed in perspira- 
tion. All his talking and petting could not quiet the ani- 
mal. The horse was of noble blood, and there was a peculiar 
charm for me in watching its movements and efforts; I do 
not repent having made full use of the opportunity, for never 
afterward have I seen a noble horse struggle so long with 
excitement, or observed the beautiful attitudes peculiar to a 
horse under such conditions. It is not less instructive or 
enjoyable than the observation of a man under similar 
circumstances. 

Although the horse gave his rider a good deal of trouble, 
the general never changed a muscle of his face. His peace- 
ful, kind expression remained the same and he was as laconic 
as was his habit in peace. "The church spire to the loft, 
gentlemen, I pray!'' These and similar words he repeated 
several times. B}^ the side of the small figure of the general. 
Colonel von der Osten on his big horse looked like a knight. 
He too was cool and attentive to his regiment and observant 
of the enemy. While the brigade in this shape was crossing 
the meadow west of Problus — Prim, we heard protracted 
hurrahing from the left front. It came from the troops who 
took Problus! Shortly afterward a cuirassier brigade 
passed to the left of 2d — 57th, after attempting a charge on 
the Saxon artillen- position at Problus — Prim. The charge 
of this cavalry is very instructive, but, as is usually the case, 
the most instructive incidents are very adroitly buried if 
any blunder has been made. General von Kotze had ap- 

*The positions of troops on the maps of the Austrian Official 
Account are wrong. A better sketch of the attack will be found on 
Plate I. of the History of the 16th Regiment, and on Plate I. of the 
History of the 57th Regiment. 



Military-Historical IStudit'S. 79 

preached under cover by the broad road which leads from 
Popowitz through the wood to Problus, his squadrons march- 
ing in rear of each other with half-platoon front. The 
capture of Problus was calculated to suggest a charge on 
the retreating enemy, whom the two cuirassier regiments 
had approached under cover to within 700 meters; in that 
case it was necessary for the cavalry leader to choose the right 
moment by personal observation and judgment. To be sure. 
General von Kotze did observe, but not with a tactical eye. 
In view of the fact that in front and on the right there were 
several batteries, but 700 meters distant, which during the 
preceding conflict had had time to get the exact range and 
which could not be attacked under cover, it certainly was a 
mistake to come out of the wood 700 meters from that artillery, 
to deploy and to charge that mass of artillery uphill* Owing to 
the short distance, the first squadron of the Pomeranian 
heavy cavalry, which marched at the head, received such a 
fire that after some 400 paces it turned off to the right; the 
squadrons following in rear attempted the same feat, but in 
vain. As it usually goes with cavalry in such cases, the 
fastest horse leads and all others follow. The cavalry could 
not save itself by returning into the wood, and galloped 
along its southern edge in the direction of the ridge of Popo> 
witz, during which long and exposed ride it made a good 
mark for the enemy. The two regiments hurried to the 
rear intermingled in one big mass; this big ''pulk" rode 
down the right wing of 11th — 28th, and the left wing of 
the skirmishers of .'^>d — 57th and I. — 17th came near sharing 
the same fate. The disorder was indescribable; the length- 
ened commands "Ditch" informed us that the mass of horse- 
men had also encountered obstacles, and for a moment we 

*The same thing was attempted under similar circumstances, 
but with larger bodies, at the Mance ravine on August 18, 1870. 



80 Inquiries into the Taeties of the Future. 

saw as many legs of Lorses and men in the air as swords. 
The horsemen in rear crowded those in front in panicky 
flight, until the crowd was out of the enemy's fire, and even 
then they continued their flight. The fallen horsemen grad- 
ually disentangled themselves ajid hastened after the others 
by ones, twos, and threes. The retreating mass did not make 
an inspiring impression, and the greater was the merriment 
proA^oked by a cuirassier of the 8th Regiment, who, in trot- 
ting past 2d — 57th, called out: ''At them, boys; they are 
retreating." This fine cavalry, which lost 1 officer, 32 men, 
and 58 horses, was useless for the rest of the battle, and how 
welcome would not that cavalry have been a few moments 
later in the same direction ! If General von Kotze or any of 
his advisers had manifested any tactical judgment what- 
ever, it would have been easy after the capture of Problus 
to reach that village under cover, and Bor in the same way 
after it had been taken. The moment for attack would tlien 
have arrived and the results would presumably have been 
great. Thus the lack of tactical judgment exacts its penal- 
ties. It is bad enough for the other arms, but cavalry can 
never make good such blunders; it simply disappears from 
the field for good. At the moment when the retreating mass 
passed the first line of. the 28th Brigade, one-sixth of the 
horsemen covered the ground and the remainder were no 
longer masters of their horses.* 

Soon after the general staff officer of the 14th Division, 
Major von Thile. reached General von Hiller. ''Problus," 
he said, pointing to the left, "has just been taken; the bri- 
gade is no longer needed there; advance straight between 
the villages" (Problus and Nieder Prim). The general lis- 

*The Prussian Official Account does not mention the incident. 
The Austrian Account does mention it (page 339, III.), but at the 
wrong place and at a wrong (later) period. 



MiUtary-Hiatorical SttiMes. 8 1 

tened and a loud "Very well" was all he answered. Major 
Yon Thile's face was beaming with joy; he turned his horse 
and rode away to the left, giving a few cheering words to the 
•troops. As the brigade approximately had the indicated 
direction, it was not ditlicult to carry out the task. The gen- 
eral ordered the left (2d-^57th) to hold back a little, and the 
thing was done. The height between Problus and Prim, 
from which the Saxon artillery had iviihdrawn by this time, 
was now being occupied by the 12th Saxon Infantry and 
4th Rifle Battalions coming from Nieder Prim; we also ob- 
served 2 or 8 columns which were rapidly retreating from 
Problus and taking the direction of Bor. The 2 battalions 
just named greeted 8d and 1st — 57th with several volleys, 
which, however, did not do much damage.* The 12-pounder 
smooth-bore battery (Schmelzer's) had followed the move- 
ment of the 28th Brigade, and when Captain Schmelzer saw 
the situation, the battery with gunners mounted on the car- 
riages galloped forward through the midst of the skir- 
mishers of the 3d Company of the Fifty-seventh, and coming 
into lattery in front of them, opened on the enemy with can- 
ister at 400 jiaces. Never since have I witnessed equally 
resolute action, so much tactical judgment, and more deci- 
sive effect of a battery. That was initiative, an initiative 
by which not only the two hostile battalions were mown 
down by ranks, but by which the confidence of the attack- 
ing infantry was raised to exuberance. This example dem- 
onstrates how great the moral effect of the proper use of 
a battery may be on the other arms. The battery command- 
er's ringing command, "400 paces, to the front, canister," 
was carried beyond the skirmish lines of the 3d and 1st 

*The statemert (see page 42, History of the 57th- Regiment) 
that the 3d and 1st Companies halted and "took cover" against these 
battalions is incorrect, as our skirmishers did not interrupt their 
advance. 



82 Inquiries into the Tactics of the Future. 

Companies of the Fiftj^-seventli to the second line of the 
brigade, and attiacted the attention of the entire brigade. 
After a few ronnds liad driven the opi)osing infantry away, 
Schmelzer's battery galloped to the top of the ridge, whence 
it oi)ened with equal etlect on the two badly shaken bat- 
talions, and on Bor, and on the abattis of the wood of Briz. 
The OflBcial Account states that the battery executed that 
maneuver against the village of Problus; at any rate, that 
is the inference. It is possiUe that the battei-y had pre- 
viously fired a few rounds on the above mentioned Saxon 
detachments withdrawing from IM'oblus; it is not possible 
that it fired on Problus, as the village was then occupied by 
the 27th Brigade; moreover, the battery had accompanied 
the 28th, not the 27th Brigade,* and had galloped, not 
through the skirmishers of the 27tli Brigade, but through 
those of the 3d Company of the Fifty-seventh. 

Up to this time our infantry (."Ul and 1st Companies of 
the Fifty-seventh) had each two platoons deployed; F. — 57th, 
which, like the remainder of the brigade, with the exception 
of I. — 57th, had moved in double column on the center, had 
one platoon each of the 9th and 12th Companies deployed; 
all the rest ^^'as in close order. From tlu^ psychological point, 
the "literary" version of the Official Account, bottom of page 
309, is not very intelligible; it is stated there that the en- 
emy's lire was unable *'to accelerate the movement of our 
men." We may also discard the statement on page 371, 
"that the 28th Brigade suffered less at the hands of the hos- 
tile artillery, because it got into a dead angle." During the 
entire action there w-as a rare degrei* of attention from the 
division down to the last musketeer, and, although the deter- 
mined behavior of the higher leaders gave to the movement 

♦The Official Account states, on page 368, that the battery was 
with the 28th Brigade in the second line of the division. 



Military-Historical Studies. 83 

the appearance of a resolute and determined advance, yet 
the fire of llie Saxon art illery managed to considerably accel- 
erate our movement, and what the artillery fire did not 
•do, the division commander did. Before the brigade had 
reached the crest of the ridge south of Problus, Major von 
Thile had ridden along the front urging greater rapidity of 
movement. About .'{ p. m., moreover, tin? Army of the Elbe 
knew what was at stake. At that hour Problus had just 
been taken. The results of the day could be fully reai)ed 
only by the most rapid possible advance of fr(?sh forces, and for 
that purpose the 28th Brigade was nearest at hand, as Pro- 
blus formed the strategic point of the enemy's left. I will 
also state that between the ridges of Problus and Popowitz 
a dead angle does not exist and could not exist. The de- 
pression is generally flat, and becomes steep only in its last 
third. When we reached that point, the entire Saxon artil- 
lery had prudently withdrawn from its position. From that mo- 
ment until the wood of Brix was taken, we received no more 
artillery fire. 

The smaller losses of the 281h Brigade.as compared with 
those of the 27th, must be exphiined by other circumstances. 

There is, in the first place, the difference of time. Ever 
since the blocking of the bridge nt Nechanitz the two bri- 
gades had been completely separated.* The 27tli liiigade 
had marched off at once without waiting for the 28th. f 
Thus it came that the 27th Biigadc, which derived much 
more cover from the wood of Popowitz than the 28th Bri- 
gade found on its own ground, found Problus and the height 
south of it strongly occupied, and had to withstand single- 
handed the fire of that numerous artillery and infantry. 

♦Compare page 36. 

fin all these descriptions the maps of the Austrian and PruS- 
sian Official Accounts of the battle of Koniggriltz have been used. 



84 rnquiries into the Tactics of the Future. 

SubseqiuMitly. avIumi llie 28th Brigade had crossed the ridge 
of Popowitz, the change of the enemy's fire from the 27th to 
the 28tli lirigade could be plainly observed. lint the former 
h.id already sntTered severely. As Problns had fallen ear- 
lier than (he height to the south of it, and as the Saxons had 
abandoned their artillery position on the latter before the 
28th Brigade came up, the 28th Brigade was less exposed to 
lire and sutTered less. Moreover, most of the shells failed to 
burst — they were Prussian percussion shells — and acted 
only as solid shot, and the 28th Brigade accelerated its 
march as much as possible in order to traverse the zone of the 
annoying artillery fire as quickly as possible. 

Schmelzer's battery, whit'h meanwhile was engaged on 
the height south of Problns, had been closely followed by 
our skirmishers exactly in the formation previously stated, 
the second company of the Fifty-seventh being in close order 
and in rear of the center of the skirmish line. 

A curious incident may be stated here: While JM .and 
1st of the Fifty-seventh, in conjunction with Schmelzer's 
battery, were maintaining such an etTective fire on the two 
Saxon battalions, Lieutenant-Colonel von Schoning, turn- 
ing ai'ouud, noticed that the colors of I. — 57th were with the 
second company. He sent his adjutant. First Lieutenant 
Boker, to that company with orders to have the colors at 
once taken to F. — 57th, which was still in close order. Hence 
we saw, at that critical moment, the color section of L — 57th 
struggling all alone to n^ach F. — 57th with the colors. Ow- 
ing to the considerable distajice ajid the soaked condition of 
the ground, the color section did not ivach F. — 57th until the 
firing line came to a halt. btMug thus without any ])rotection 
for about 20 minutes, ^^■hen the adjutant had rejoined Lieu- 
tenant-Colonel von Schoning, the latter remarked, "This is a 
hellish fire." Lieutenant Boker replied, "It is a good thing 



Military-Historical Studies. 85 

that not every bullel liils," aiul he had barely uttered the 
last word, when he fell dead from his horse. (Statement of 
Colonel von Schoninj?, subsefiuchtly wonnded at Vionville, 
'and deceased.) Soon afterward Lien tenant-Colonel von 
Schoning, whose horse had been hit several times, received 
a glancing shot on the left side of the neck, but, hero that he 
was, he remained in the saddle. The blood ran down over 
his tunic; Von Schoning pulled out his handkerchief, tied it 
over the wound, and led his battalion to the end of the 
battle. 

The crest of the ridge, which had been taken under fire 
by Schmelzer's battery and by our skirmishers, was covered 
with an unusually large; number of dead and wounded. The 
cries of many of the latter were heartrending, but, being in 
column, we could not always step over them as carefully as 
we should have liked to, particularly because we were just 
then wheeling to the left in order to gain the direction of Bor 
and of the wood of Briz.* We all were surprised to see only 
wounded and dead Saxons, and Colonel von der Osten said: 
"Why, they are Saxons! (Jood-niorning!" Soon after- 
ward a wounded Saxon officer raised himself up from these 
tangled heaps and said to General von lliller, as he ap- 
proached: "Back: you won't be able to get through here!" 
The leading of Ihe brigade as well as of the regiments at this 
time deserves the highest praise. Distances and intervals 
between the lines had been strictly observed, and after 
marching 1.50(1 melei's through high rye-fields and suffering 
severe losses, the brigade reached the height of IM-oblus in 
such fine shape that the wheel to the left conld be made with- 
out first coining to a halt, despite the uninteiTU[)ted'fire of the 
enemy. The oblique movement to the right and the wheel 

*The History of the 57th Regiment here speaks of a third Saxon 
battalion, stated to have come from Nieder Prim. I did not notice it. 



86 Iiiqiiirtcs into the Taetk\s of the Future. 

to the left had uncovered the I'lont of I. — 17th; to cover the 
new front General von Hiller ordered two companies of this 
battalion forward to ])rolong; the line to the north of 3d — 
571h. (roncral von Hiller, a man of great modesty, pre- 
served a. heroic coolness. The wheel having made an exten- 
sion of the skirmish line to the southeast necessary, two pla- 
toons of the 2d Company of the Fifty-seventh were deployed 
for the purpose.* They advanced in double time until 
abreast of 3d and 1st, and soon after the entire first line 
halted.f Now we became aware that we were in front of a 
strongly entrenched position, from which an uninterrupted 
skirmish tire was maintained. Notwithstanding the short 
distance, the strength of the defenders could not be made 
out, and nothing remained but to open fire on the high 
abattis just for luck. 

General von Hiller saw at once that on this ground, 
which was perfectly fiat and devoid of cover of any kind, 
every minute's delay was dangerous, and decided to take the 
wood as quickly as possible. He ordered the second and 
third line to close on the first. Just as the second line had 
almost reached the first and we were on the point of making 
the assault with united forces, the signal "Cavalry" resound- 
ed on all sides. The situation was critical. We were on 
open ground and about 200 meters from a strongly occupied 
abattis (1 brigade of 5 battalions and tlie 1st Rifle Bat- 
talion at Kor). Th(> skirmishers rallied, the battalions 
formed sc^uare; we waited in suspense half a minutes a min- 
ute — the cavalry did not come! A Saxon squadron, which 
had lost its way in the wood of Briz, had suddenly appeared 
at the edge of the wood, and on seeing its mistake and com- 

*About 300 meters in front of the abattis. 

tThe music had just ceased playing. See page 75. 



Military-Historical ^Studies. 87 

ing iiiid<'i- 11)0 fire of the 1st — 57th, it turned about and trot- 
ted back. That was all. 

This little incident had checked the advance. It goes 
to show what harm signals may do, particularly when given 
before the facts are ascertained. Had that particular 
trumpeter not sounded the signal, which, in accordance with 
the Kcgulations, was repeated right and left, the abattis 
would have been taken without much loss and many pris- 
oners captured. On Uut battle-field all trumpet signals 
except "All advance" should be carefully guarded against. 
They are prohibited, but they are not thereby prevented.* 

While forming groups the rifle platoon of 2d — 57th re- 
ceived a severe fire from front and flank, and the leader. 
Lieutenant von Stojentin, was mortally wounded. He 
turned the command over to me, saying: "I am done for; 
hurry to get up there, or all are going to be killed here! 
Adieu I" I did not see the gentleman again. He was a 
brave officer. 

A description of the line of battle becomes the more nec- 
essary at this ])oint, as no satisfactory' idea of the situation 
can be gained from the Prussian and Austrian Official 
Accounts, or from the Histories of the 17th and 57th Regi- 
ments, either from the texts or from the troops marked on 
the maps; the troops shown on the maps of the Histories of 
those two regiments rather obscure the text. AVhen all 
three lines had ascended the plateau between Problus and 
Nieder Prim, it was not possible to change the direction of 
the long skirmish line of 'Ad and Ist — 57th. They continued 
the march straight to the front and brought up against that 
part of the edge of the wood which lies exactly in the mid- 

♦Simllar mischief had just before been done by the signal 
"Assembly" after the capture of Problus. Details will be found 
on page 230 of the History of the Sixteenth. 



88 I iKjitiiiiis into the Taclics of the Fiitinr. 

(lie bowU'on tln'lwo piualli'l roads leudinj; Iroin IM-obhis aiui 
NuhUm- Trim [o iho woiul of \\\\/.\ both (•ouipjiiiios lijiHod 
about L'OO iiiotiMs from llu> abatlis. iM -oTlli was uoav 
thrown forward to (ho rij;ht (I'astwarcl). whooliiij; at tho 
sauio timo to tlio loft; l'\ — fiTth roinniiuHl on tlio oxtroiao 
iii;ht. st> that tho skinuishors of its !)th (\>uipauv toiu'lunl 
tho road from NitMliM* rriiu to tho \\i>od of l»fi/. and halted 
abroast o( tho tirst lino. 1. ITth had k(>pt strais;ht to the 
front likt> ;U1 and 1st — oTth. As this ba.ttalit)n had a oon- 
sidiM-ablv shortiM- distamu' to tho wood, it onconntorod. to- 
j^othor with tho two just nuMitionod conipa-nios of tho l"''ifty- 
sovonth, V(M'v obsiinato rosista.noo botwtuMi tho northorn 
think of tho :>d — oTth a.iid tho n>ad from Vroblus to the 
\\«md of llriz, wliioh canstnl it to roinfori'O its skirniisliers. 
The skirmish lino now was facing; tho abattis at a dis- 
tanee of 1*00 nuMors in tho following order from riiiht to 
left: 11.. skirmish platoon; 1.. skirmish platoon; lib. i»la- 
toon;.")ih, platoon; H'. ami 1 1 1.. skirmish platoons. The II. — 
17tb. following in rt>ar of 2d — 57111, fornnnl S(inare during 
the incident 1 havt* rt^atiHl. about 50 paees to the left 
rear of lM— 5Tth. As 1.— 57th. I.— 17th. and F.— 57th 
had (U^ploved strong skirmish lint>s (1st — 57th all IhrtM^ ]>la- 
toons, ;>d — 57th and l2d- 57th twt> idatoons (>a(h. II. — 17th 
two and V. — 57th four i>la toons), the skirmish line of tlu» 
brigade exttMuhnl from the road Troblus — liriz wiuul to the 
roiid NiiHler Trim — -Hri/. win>tl, eompassing tlu» wo«nl in a. 
seniieirele. i^Sot^ S^keteh 1.) 

.\fter the tM-ror eanstnl bv the signal hatl betM\ eleared 
up. and when Ilu> skirmishers had not vtM (»r had barely 
rt>aehed ihtMr former places, (General von lliller, fei^ling tho 
gravity of the crisis a.nd turair of ///<' ilifficiillit of ijcltiiuj a 
h/ing-iloun finiuj line fonranl, roile hack lo 11. — 17th. niul (jnve 
or(h'i\'i to ^fdjor ron 7^i"(7'c/>7ci'» "/(> adraiur in JonhJc fiinc and 



paHH the sIcirmiHh line in ordc/r to (jive a nevj irnpvhe lo the whole 
movcrnenL" (Jciicml von Hillcr joined the l(?ff; of i\nt bat- 
lalion, and, on rcarhin^ the HkiriniHij lino, ^aiJopod forward, 
raising? IiIh Hwor<l Jiiid <;illin;<, "Willi me, HkirrniHhorH!" 
"'riio etiMic lino," llic ^cncr-iil conliniioH, "roHo and riiHhod 
rcHoluloly forwjird willi druniH boalin^, Tlio cjiooririfi wjih 
continuouH and llio cnoniy'H line? waH broken iil :ill |)oinlH 
al alinoHJ llie Hanie lime." TjoHe on my lefl II. — 1711) clam- 
bered over I In? nbatliH, bill, b<'in^ in yloHr' order, llie bat<al- 
ion naturally IohI Wh formal ion and wan Homewliat dJH- 
huieed by llie moic nimble skirmiKlierH fai'llier norlli. 

II iH (pjeer llial allliouj^li many aceonnlH of lliin ev(?nt 
liave been wrilten, jl di<J nol ocenr lo any of llie liiHlorianH 
lo aHcerlain who gave llie inipnlHo to tho aHKaiill. Had llir- 
re^imenlH, an I have* done, addroHHed the man lo whom they 
owe HO mncli in eonneclion willi lliiH foal of arnm, we would 
read in llieir re«;inienlal liiHlorien whal I have wrillen here, 
inHlead of I hone lavoiile bul iiiaiH- jdiiaHeH. InHtead of 
j^lorioijH fealH, Hie re{^'iiiM'nlH would lunc on<' t/loriovs feat, 
worlli more llian Hie dozeriH vvliicli eannol be HubHianlialed. 
My liea.H impelH me lo ei'e<'l HiIh niei-ilcd mojiiimenl lo lh<i 
liei-o of lior and lo make up f(jr Hie neglect of the troops 
whom lu; led to Hueh j^loriouH victory. From the tactical 
point of view, it waH my duly lo i^ci lo Ihe bottom of this 
oxam[de, which, nmhiHs jiriilrnifJis, \h ajjplicabh? to-day in 
ma,ny i)haHeH of bailie, in oi'der (ujoin and at/ain to preach the 
truth ill v'liirh f liclii'ic, that trodfis mill conquer only when led, and 
I feel (lee|)ly iiidcbled lo Hw i-evorod general for actpiaint- 
ing me, 1 hough relucianlly, with the details of the affair. 

The most obslinale rcHiHtance was encountered by I. — 
I7Hi and 1.-57111, Hie least by F.— .57111. I.— 57lh encoun- 
tered cloH(»d bodicK wliicli liad lo b<' overpowered by ha.nd-to 
hand fighting, and Ii'm-c Caplaiii a(»ii Ledebiir, comnianding 



90 Inquiries into the Tactics of the Future. 

the 4th Company, was killed at a range of 10 yards. The 
deployed platoons of I. — 17th and I. — 57th followed the 
enemy in the general direction of Bor, which farmstead was 
subseqnently taken by 2d — 17th. At the further edge of 
the northern one of the two copses situated here, 3d and 
4th — 17th encountered one battalion of the Sigismund regi- 
ment, which was totally dispersed by rapid fire delivered 
at 50 paces, and left several officers and about 150 prisoners 
in our hands. Subset|uently II. — 17th and I. — 17th met 
in Bor, after the fighting there had ceased. Both battalions 
were halted there by General von Hiller. Some platoon» 
had an opi)ortunity to fire on Coudenhove's cavalry division 
at a range of GOO — 700 paces. About 5:.'^0 p. m., the King 
came riding along from the north and was surrounded by 
the jubilant men of the 3d, 6th, and 7th Companies of the Sev- 
enteenth. The war lord stopped his horse a moment and 
addressed some gracious words to the troops. All three 
companies of I. — 57th likewise followed in the direc- 
tion of the retreating enemy. At the point where I was, 
the enemy did not leave the abattis until we closed on 
them; on the further side a man from the 1st Battal- 
ion of the 1st Saxon Infantry Brigade fell into my 
hands and entreated: 'Tlease do not harm me; I am only 
a carpenter." Si>ecially remarkable is the fact that the 
men, though carrying their packs, made the long rush of 
200 meters ivithont stop. The consequence was that the 
additional effort in climbing over the abattis so exhausted 
the men that immediate pursuit became impracticable, and 
it would, moreover, have been very difficult in many places, 
owing to the dense underwood. As these various causes 
had loosened the formation, some of the commanders as- 
sembled their men on the road leading from Bor southward 
through the wood ; thus II. — 17th and 2d — .^>7th. In forming 



Military -Historical Studies. 9 1 

the company my servant, a small Westphalian, came up to 
me; he had been shot through the cheeks before the assault 
on the abattis. As he happened to be quite near to me at 
4he time, I told him to go to the rear. But the brave little 
fellow thought otherwise; he said he wanted to be in the 
attack on the abattis, and he kept his word ! Now he went in 
quest of a dressing station. His name was Werthmann, and, 
on my recommendation, he got the medal of honor, but the 
regimental histories fail to say anything about the afifair. 
The delay mentioned explains why II. — 17th and 2d — 57th 
were late in reaching the further edge of the wood. In cross- 
ing the wood, where the Fifty-seventh took about 140 pris- 
oners, we saw the effect of our own guns, with which the Sax- 
ons were also armed. After the infantry had withdrawn 
from the wood, the Saxon artillery opened a severe shell fire, 
and I confess that the din, the echo, the flying splinters of 
wood and iron have deeply impressed themselves on my 
memory ; and those who had to stand that artillery fire will 
understand why in 1870-71 the French showed some nerv- 
ousness under it. Up to that time there was nothing more 
terrible than a bursting percussion shell, and the Saxon 
artillery shot well. As soon as the men had been assembled, 
therefore, the advance was resumed, but 2d — 57th lost tem- 
porarily all connection with the other units of the rf»c:i 
ment. Emerging from the nothern edge of the wood, 2d — 
57th met General von Killer, Colonel von der Osten, Col- 
onel von Kottwitz (17th Eegiment), and Lieutenant-Colonel 
von Schoning, the latter with a bloodstained handkerchief 
about his neck; they had ridden around the wood on ac- 
count of the abattis. 2d — 57th advanced thence in a north- 
erly direction, resting its right on the northern edge of the 
northern copse of Bor, the greater part of the company ex- 
tending westward over the open field and facing north. At 



92 Itiquirh\'< into the Tacticfi of the Fiitiiir. 

that mouuMit the si}j:iuil "Cavalry" again rang out along the 
>YhoU' lino. The ofVu'ors just naiuod sought tho sholtor of 
the wood and so did 2d — 57th; but, as no cava.lrv could 
bo soon from thoro. iM — HTth rosuniod its fornior position, 
■\vhonoo it ^^•itnossod tho grand attack of Coiidonhovo's cav- 
alry division and tho charg(> of tho 1st (luard Dragoons. I 
do not boliovo that a single shot >vas fired, and indeed the 
view of those splendid lines of horsemen wa« so overwhelm- 
ing that the men from sheer surprise and suspense forgot 
their rilles altt^gether, althongh the distance of about 700 
paces admitted of elTective tire; and 1, though their com- 
mandtM". did no bettor! Soon many ridt'rless horses ran 
panting here and there; several came through our skirmish 
lines, where some of tluMU were caught, so that the offieera, 
nmuy of whom had had their horses killed, could provide 
themselves Avith mounts. Thus, Captain von Stwolinski 
(1st — 57th), First Lieutenant von liernewitz (lid — 57th). etc. 
(Their hoi'st^s had betMi strm-k by several bullets.) CeneraJ 
von Ililler now ordertnl 2d — 57th to return to the northern 
edge of the wood of Kriz and to occupy the same for the 
present. Meanwhile, we heard prolonged clu^rs from Bor; 
it was the greeting which the Seventeenth, posted there, 
were giving to their war lord (page 00). In that way I 
unfoiiunately was deprived of the enjoyment of this scene, 
of which 1 (uily learntnl in the evening, when the brigade 
was assembled.* 

I must mer.lion here a special incident. Shortly be- 
fore proctHHling to the assault on the abattis, we observed 
tlothes waving along the entire front of the abattis befoi"e 
us, which gave us the impression that the enemy meant to 
surrender; that was not the case, however, the Saxons 



♦These axe the facts! What is stated on page 45 of the History 
of the 57th Regiment is incorrect. Queer that nothing is srad there 
about the King, whom 3d — 57th should have seen. 



Military-Historical studies. 98 

maintaining a severe skirmish fire against us to the la«t. 
The waving of the clotlies was observed by many, but, 
notwi(hK(iUMling my elToHH, I have been unable to ascer- 
tain the cause. 

It seems that tlie Saxons made good us(; of the time we 
lost in forming KciuaicH, for the withdrawal of their main 
]»()(ly; oIliciwiKe iiioi-c prisoners would, under the circum- 
stances, have fallen in our hands. As regards our own fire, 
the dead and wounded lying in rear of the abattis showed 
it to have been more effective than we imagined, particular- 
ly op[)Osite 2d — HTth, which may be explained by the fact 
that Ihe enemy here was enfiladed by 1st — 57th, On mak- 
ing a closer examination next morning, I found that most 
shols had gone high, jis flu? branches of the abattis and of 
the trees on the edg(? of the wood bore many marks of in- 
fantry bullets 15 to 20 feet above the ground. In the wood 
of lUi'A neither infantry fired much, though single shots 
could Ix' heard there until next morning (the pieces which 
were picked up loaded were being discharged). 

The fight at the abattis was very obstinate, but I did 
not see any hand-to-hand fighting with the btiyonet any- 
where; several Saxons were still firing as I was crawling 
through the abattis, and my (;ompany commander. First 
Lieutenant von Bernewitz, who had the hardihood to remain 
mounted until he reached the abattis with the .'id platoon 
of 2d — 57tli (which was in (;loHe order), became the target for 
a heavy &re, and his horse received several shots at close 
range. TFc now dismounted, ''only," he said, "because he 
could not ride the beast over the abattis." The scene was 
not devoid of comic features, when at his call "Ilorseholder" 
quite a number of men promptly volunteered for that duty. 
The list of casualties shows a first lieutenant of the Land- 
wehr, lMiilii)pi, 2d — 571 h (tth platoon), as wounded in the 



94 Inquiries into tltc Tiwtics of the Future. 

foot by a bayouet lliriist. riiilippi was uot picked up near 
the abattis, but was found deep in the wood by Ensign 
Schroiber, who assisted him to mount a captured horse and 
in that way transported the not very military figure to the 
dressing station after the fight was over. It was a queer 
sight: the small ensign with a big sword by his side, in top 
boots, holding the big sword with his left hand to keep it 
from getting between his legs, and with the right carefully 
leading a. big black Austrian chai'ger on which sat Philippi, 
knapsack on his back, holding on to the saddle with both 
hands, his legs pulled up high, his back arched, and in reai' 
of the liorse, as "escort," a troop of 20 captured Austrians 
and Saxons of all arms, some in odd garb; the procession 
provoked ringing laughter. Thus are grave and comical 
scenes combined. 

According to statements made to me by Lieutenant von 
Kedern of F. — 10th, who had met Philippi afterward, the 
"bayonet thrust" was an accident due to his own awkward- 
ness. But, as it usually goes with such things. Philippi 
became an "interesting" personality, and however often he 
told his story, I have never believed it. The "bayonet 
thrust" in the first edition of the Regimental History of the 
57th Regiment has been changed to a "contusion" of the 
foot, probably in consequence of my w'ritings. 

The Saxon Official Account says that the 1st Rifle Bat- 
talion distinguished itself highly by its stubborn defense of 
the abattis, though at the time threatened in rear. It was 
the ."^d Company of the 57th Regiment that advanced against 
the rear of the 1st Rifle Battalion. The battalion had occu- 
pied a copse to the north of the wood of Briz, and its retreat 
was probably difficult. It also lost the greatest number of 
prisoners. There Avas no bayonet fighting at this point 
either, but there was probably a stubborn fire fight at 50 
paces, and closer, against I. — 17th. 



Military-Historical Studies. 95 

The tactical leading must be pronounced excellent. 
The action of the 28th Brigade in forming squares under the 
circumstances might be criticised, and I have been told that, 
instead of complying with the signal, General von Hiller 
meant to proceed at once to the assault on the abattis. To 
this it may be replied that, the signal having once been 
given, the general could not prevent the troops from obey- 
ing it. It has never been ascertained who gave the signal.* 

Owing to the cover in front, the appearance of cavalry 
was not at all an impossibility. 

The Prussian Official Account says, on page 394, that 
"further pursuit was entrusted to Captain Streccius with 
the 2d Company of the 17th and 2d Company of the 57th 
Regiments and some re-formed skirmish platoons." The 
reader may decide for himself whether and how far Cap- 
tain Streccius' advance (to the northeastern edge of the copse 
of Bor) may be called a pursuit. It is certain that the 
2d Company of the 57th Regiment was never for a minute 
under Captain Streccius' orders, whom I never saw on 
the day of the battle, and that none but men from the Sev- 
enteenth could have been among the formed skirmish pla- 
toons. For the 3d, 1st, and 2d Companies of the 57th Regi- 
ment, which were following the same direction in open 
order, were never separated from the regiment; F. — 57th 
was too far away from the 17th Regiment; II. — 17th did 
not reach Bor until after it had been taken by I. — 17th, and 
no one got farther than that point I 

The wood of Briz was now occupied as follows (5 p. 
m.):t northern edge and northeastern angle, including Bor, 

*This is confirmed by a letter from Greneral von Hiller of Feb- 
ruary, 1890, to the author. 

tAs regards time, I will state that, according to my observa- 
tions, Problus fell about 2:45 p. m., and that the farmstead of Bor 
and the wood of Briz may have been taken about 3:30 p. m. 



96 Inquiries into the Tactics of the Future. 

3d — 57th, 1st — 57tli; eastern edge, F. — 57th; northern edge, 
2d — 57th; Bor and the two copses, I. — 17th and II. — 17th. 
About 6:30 p. m., General von lliller conducted the 28th 
Brigade to the plateau west of the wood of Briz, where the 
entire brigade camped during the night. The 27th Brigade 
bivouacked in and around Problus. 

Hiller's brigade had purchased its success with the loss 
of 10 officers and 190 men, and had captured 12 officers and 
300 men. 

Of these losses, S officers and 99 men fell on the 8 com- 
panies of the Fifty-seventh, and 2 officers and 91 men on 
the 8 companies of the Seventeenth; the 3 companies of 
I. — 57th (firing line) had suffered most — viz., 6 officers and 
64 men; the 2d company lost 2 officers and 20 men. 

The account on page 43 of the History of the Fifty- 
seventh would make the reader believe that General von 
Hiller was encouraged to make the attack by the King's 
adjutant, Lieutenant-Colonel von Stiehle, and that the 
lieutenant-colonel arrived before the signal "Cavalry." 
According to the written statement of General von Hiller, 
now before me, both statements are in error. If it were 
otherwise, the general's credit as a leader and as a hero 
would be lowered. In fact, Lieutenant-Colonel von Stiehle 
did not arrive until after General von Hiller had brought 
up Bieberstein's battalion (II. — 17th) and "the lieutenant- 
colonel did not strengthen the general's resolution to at- 
tack," hut hrorigJit him. a categorical order not to advance further 
when he saw what arrangements General von Hiller had made for 
the occupation of Bor and of the tvood of Briz! After General 
von Hiller had arranged for the occupation of the edge of 
Bor, the troops there received fire from the southeast; from 
their headgear. General von Hiller recognized the firing 



Military-Historical Studies. 97 

troops as Prussians, and sent the adjutant of I. — 17th, Lieu- 
tenant Hesse, to inform them of their error. When he 
reached them, he found that the second battalion of the 
Thirty-third, under Major von Bieberstein, had taken the 
Prussians at Bor for enemies. Further mischief was thufe 
happily averted. Not until after these incidents did Lieu- 
tenant-Colonel von Stiehle find General von Hiller. Soon 
afterward, after dark, an order came from the 14th Division 
for the brigade to move to Problus. As the men were very 
much fatigued, General von Hiller sent his adjutant. Lieu- 
tenant Arndt, to request permission of Count Mtinster to 
let the brigade camp where it was, which request Count 
Miinster granted. 

When yet beyond the enemy's fire the brigade had been 
divided into two lines, and after the advance had begun, 
three lines were formed. This formation was retained un- 
til the first halt (250 meters from the abattis). The regi- 
ments were one in rear of the other. Their march was 
across open fields, and during the movement a considerable 
oblique movement and a wheel to the left were made. 
Within effective infantry range (200 — 250 meters) the bri- 
gade passed from the open to the close formation (squares), 
and then resumed open order; all its forces closed on the 
enemy simultaneously, surmounted high abattis, closely fol- 
lowed the withdrawing enemy through underbrush, very 
dense in parts, and soon after overthrowing the enemy the 
brigade again stood assembled and formed as though after a 
bloodless peace exercise. It traversed over 2000 meters, 
and used exclusively double column on the center with skir- 
mishers in front. I. — 57th alone, whose able commander 
was subsequently, as colonel of the Eleventh, wounded at 
R^zonville on August 16, 1870, in one of the many bloody 



98 Inquiries into the Tactics of the Future. 

attacks on Height 1)70, had been completely deployed during 
the action, with the exception of 2 platoons.* 

At about ;>r)() meters the slvirmishers [lid and 1st — 57th) 
opened fire and flred while in motion, and not without good 
i-esults, as we found later. Notwithstanding their op^Mi 
order, they sulTered the greatest losses, which may be in 
pai't attributed to the signal "Cavalry." The small losses 
of the strong columns may, in view of the uniform character 
of the terrain, be thus explaimHl: that the Saxon musket did 
not carry as far as the second and third lines. All officers, 
including company commanders, remained mounted during 
the whole of the action. 

The attack may well be tailed a model of brigade lead- 
ing, and General von Herwarth, who had watched it attent- 
ively, used to speak of it up to his death. General von 
Falckenstein said to General von Ilillcr at Hanover that 
(Jeneral von llerwarth had expressed himself to him to the 
effect that he owed his success to the 14th Division, and I 
can testify that General von Falckenstein addressed the 
regiments (IGth and 57th) in the same sense at Hanover 
when they were transferred from his own to the X. Corps, 
then in the process of formation. 

The night on the plateau of Problus was very chilly and 

*One of my readers has written me on this point as follows: 
Colonel von Schoning had been severely, though not mortally, 
wounded by a rifle bullet in the upper part of the arm. He was to 
be carried off by four fusiliei-s on their rifles, and gave his consent. 
But as the French soon afterward made a counter-attack. Colonel 
von Sch(>ning ordered the men to leave him and retire alone. "I 
don't want you to be killed on my account." he added. In the attack 
subsequently made on our side, the Eleventh reached the place where 
Colonel von Schoning was lying immovable on his back, his face 
toward the enemy. "Never again," saj's my correspondent, Mr 
Heinemann, of Altona, "have I had such an opportunity to admire 
a hero as here. Notwithstanding his sufferings, he called to us: 
'Children, are we winning?' 'Yes, Colonel.' 'Well, then, let us 
give cheers for our king'' and we gave three cheers with a will. I 
have not seen him since." 



Military-Historical f^tudies. 99 

rarely have I suffered so much from cold; but I was able to 
satisfy my hunger. Up to that time my food on July 3d 
had consisted of a small, hard piece of bread, which I had 
been carrying in my knapsack since Mtinchengratz. At 
Bor two musketeers of the Forty-ninth reported to me and I 
put them in my platoon and kept them until next morning. 
My wounded servant had meanwhile been taken to Problus, 
so that I was destitute of the most necessary things, and 
when night descended, I fell asleep in the midst of the men 
buzzing about like so many bees and hunting for food. 
Their pains were in vain, however, as darkness rendered 
their "expeditions of discovery" difficult, and the men had 
to content themselves with coffee without anything else. 
During the first refreshing sleep I was aroused by the two 
brave Pomeranians; one of them had a steaming pot in 
his hand, the other raised me up: ''Ensign," said the first, 
"here is something to eat." I was touched by their good- 
ness of heart and gratefully accepted the kind offer, which 
consisted of rice soup with bacon. I have never forgotten 
these kind Pomeranians, nor has that night been effaced 
from my memory. The men, closely crowding together for 
mutual warmth, were sleeping between numerous small 
cooking fires; others moved between them like shadows; 
flaring masses of fire rose in the distance; the air was im- 
pregnated with the well-known resinous odor of burning 
pine; some shots would fall in the wood, and off and on I 
would hear the groans of the wounded. I rose and walked 
some distance northward, but the irregular groups of the 
men soon caused me to cease my wanderings, and I lay down 
again. I did not wake up until 0, when all were on their 
feet. The commanders now restored order and regularity; 
part of the men went for water and food; others were 
detailed to bury the dead, which I was to superintend. 



100 hiquiriva into the Tavtica of the Future. 

\\hh\[ \0 i\. \\\. \\c hoiXixn to oook wUixi i\\\u\ii'\[\o\\i^ ami pro- 
vision Nvjiii»»us lijul tnniisluHl; it was luiiihtv lil(h\ About 
ui>ou I ho oOiotM's sMul doloiiJi lions of nuMi from tho rojjinionts 
«>f (ho IJth l>i\isit>n nvimK to Tivblns (o burv tho doad ot^l- 
ooi*s in ih(> mavovard of ih(> villajio. (Mr. It was an impi-os- 
sivo ooi*onu>nv; all tho hiiihof otVtooi-s \vort» a^sonibltHl 
around tho jirav»>s. and n»>\t to tluMii \voro tho o«>rps of otlb 
oors. MinistiM's o\' both d(Mn>n»inati»»ns pr»>nonm't>d briof 
funoral sonuotis; oaoh of us thott stoppod up to pav tho hist 
t^arthlv iributo to tlu> di^id. and thoti >vo loft tho vlllajjo. 
whith now niado tho iinprossion «>f tt>tal tlovastatii>n. On 
our arrival at tho camp o\\ i\\o platoan wo lu^ard tho jovful 
HOWS that tho train had i-omo up with bii^ad. and mtMi woro 
at onoo soin to draw tho rations. l>ut our disappointnnMtt 
was irroat: tho broad wa.s sti nuWd.v that it \\i\d \o bo buriod 
at ouot*: rii'<\ poas. oi>lVot\ and salt wtM't* itt insutUoiont i^uan- 
tttios. V\'tto, howovor. iti suoh situatiiMis frotpnMitlv o]>ons 
a wido tit^d to morrimont. a.nd joUtvs on tln^ "huniioi" oam 
paiu'n," as it was ovon thon justly oalUnl, wtM-o not lai'kinu-. 
Standinji' about in jiii>tips. tht» ovonts of tho battlo woro 
disiiisstHi; »moi\v tuu^ undorst ood that a viotmn had boon 
won. but ovtM-v thouuhtfnl i>t^K'or roali/.od tin* total absoitoo 
of pursuit. I romombiM' laouttMumt l.anooUo sayinu- in a 
vory dissatistlod way: ">\'hat havt* wo iiot? nothinu but 
tho battlo t\old." About 'J p. n\.. 1 wont alom^ into tho wood 
of l\r\r. to s<H> what kind o\' a ivtitMt tho onomy had matl(\ 
Wltat I saw il(Mit\s tiosoripti<>n: tht> oorpst^s of inon and 
horsos wort^ litorally pilod in hoai>s wluMovor I lookod. I 
start od baik; tho sun shom^ ploasai\tly i>n tlu^ othorwiso 
loYoly valloy of tho Klbo. 1 had hanily ivjoinod tlu^ bat- 
talion, vvhon wo woro ordoitni to liot roady to ntaroh. Wo 
inarolttH^ aloni; tho wostorn tnliro of tho W(Mid of l>ri/. and 
saw tho ontirt> battlo «;rtuind (*f tho ir>th Hivisiini. In tho 



M ilitary 1 1 iHlorwal Sludi('H. 101 

(tlcariiif^H Im'Iw<'''Ii K(«'inf«'l(l ;iri<l KU-zirck the (•(>v]m<'H lay ho 
<l(;iiHO lliaL I caniiol. rcmainlxtv hccAih^ il. woi'hc irj the Franco- 
I'njHHian War at Mar-H-Ia-Tour; the riflcH hjid all br^en Hluck 
in tbo ground vvilli (lio bayonet, an tliouj^li Hie vietorH 
(lenired to hIiovv I he ext<'iil of <h(! enerny'H de'feal, and an the 
heavy bultH were np, the riflcH hnd a HJanlin^ poHJIion, ko 
that the cloarin^jH in I Ik- full H<'nHc ;if)j)r'iir('(l liUf hji'^f,- hop- 
ficldH. I'ruHHianH I Haw lyin^ about Hi'nf^ly; the diHtance 
betvv(-'en IJieirj and (he Haxonn and llie AnsfrianH of th(; 
VIII. Corjm aveni^ed loO — 200 pacen. The men were Bing- 
iiiK on Mm- ii\:tv<\\, l)ul ;i( lliiil Hi^:ht the eoliium became 
Hih-nl; (ncn I he hij^liei- crMninander K<'e(ned nITecled, for the 
bn.H.'ilioriH rnjiih' a nliorl Inill, ;is fliou^h to t^ive i'vcry oik; an 
o[)poil unit y lo observe wli;il loHKen the i-epenled ollenKive 
of (In? opponent ii/^aiiiHt (he J5(li I>iviHioii had eoHt him. 
At)out 0:.'>0 J), in. we resiched (he village of I.«ibc}in, prettily 
Hitunied on (he mountain HJope; the entire valley of tin; Elbe 
jiH fji.r n,H Koni^^rJil/, Hpre;i<| pict ureHfjiiely before uh in the 
nivH of the setting snn, but the iinn^er would not let uh 
think of anything but eatifi^. At that (inn; l^ibcan had big 
cheri7 orchards, and it wan not lon^ t»efore the men 
were [)erched in the Hplendid cherry-trees to the topmost 
bninchen; t)y next iriorning th(r lre(«H were entirely bare, 
ivarge |)o(a,to heldn were phmj^hed uji, but the potjitoen were 
not bigK'^*'' than a finger. We did not get brend until we 
reached Kollin I 
//. 77tc AUacIc of Ilia lUlh Half- Division (S8Ui Infantry JJri- 

f/nde) on the Jleif/hl.s of Jiruvilh in the Battle of VionviHe 

on the 10th of August, J 870. 

(a) The March to the lialtle- Field.— At ry.'.U) a. m. on 
the loth of AugUHt, tJie .''8th Infantry Hrig.'i<l(;, KegiinentH 
N(w. 10 :ind r,7, with LM I-ight and 2d IFr-avy I'.;ittery, 



102 Inquiries into the Tactics of the Futnir. 

aiul with iho '2d ;unl ',k\ oomnjuiios of pionoers of (ho X. 
An\iy Torps. siartod from Thiauoourt undor (lOiiornl von 
Si'hw;u/.ko|>i>iMK Aooordiuji- to (ho Historv of (ho 1st 
((iKUil l>r;\>ioon KoiiiiiUMU. bv H. von Kohr. iho bripnh^ 
had boon piooodoil a( 4::U) a. n\. bv (ho dnaid dragoon Hri- 
jiado widi (ho horso ba((orv (^lMani(/.). This do(at'hniont 
arrivod a( S(. llilairo. (ho oonmion dostina(ion of (ho 
troops. a( 10 a. ni.* (\nin( Hiandonbavg 11.. (ho ooni- 
niandor. on hoarinji' at'(iUoi\v tiro from (ho oas(. doi'idod, 
ui(h (ho oononrrtMU'o of lionoral von Sohwar/.koppon. (o 
nniroh (oward (ho si>nntl of (lio gnns.i Tln^ ls( linard 
Dragoon Kojiimon( and (ho horso ba((iM-\ wori» aUuu^ avail- 
ablo for tho pnrposo at tho timo. 

l.iontonant (uMioral von Sohwar/.koppon know boforo 
tho s(ar( from 'rhianoonr( (ha( a roi'onnoi(orinji" dotaohniont 
nndor l.ion(onan( t\>lonol von Oaprivi, ohiof of s(alY of tho 
X. Army thorps, had boon son( on( to asoor(ain (ho whoro- 
aboiKs of (lu^ lariio bodios of (l\o onomy obsorv^nl on Angnst 
15th. noar Vionvillo, and ho miglu liavo oonnootod (ho ar(il- 
lory t\iv with tho nvonnaissanoo. \\c was jKn-sonally with 
tho 10th Half-Division. I as appoars from tho statonumts of 
A'on Kohr and of \\\c o7(h l\ogimon( (pajio 771. 

AUhoniih it was an in(onsoly ho( Anu;ns( day. (ho 
infan(ry marolunl so smardy (hat i( roachod S(. llilairo 
shordy aftor 11 a. m. A( ^VotM a rost of 1(^ nunn(os was 
1akoi\. and m> odior hah was mado.^j 

Aooordinji (o n\y oalonladon. tho distanoo from Thian- 
court to St. llilairo is nt h-nst '2'2 kilomotors: aooordinir (o 



♦Official Account, page 602. I. The cavalry, according to this 
statement, made 22 kilometers in 5U hours. 

tText of tho Offldixl Account. 

3:Page 266 of the History of Regiment No. 16. 

§The Official Account. T.. page 594. fixes the hour of dovvxrture 
of the 19th Half-Pivision fivm Thiaucourt at 7 a. m. The distance 



M Uilari/ H isloricul ^ladlcH. 103 

that of thr- l<;ili Uc^'irrM'iit, liO kilornctorH. (Sor- pa^(; 2(i(; of 
the rogirnon(al hiHJory.j* 

from Thiauftourt to Woi'-l Ih 17 kilomf;torH. As the best Infantry can 
not keop up a faHtc;r paco than at the rate of 12 mlnuteH per^kilo- 
meter, the march to W(w"'l required .'{ h/jurs and 34 mlnutcH, including 
a rcKt of 10 minutcH. The Official A<;count further HtatcH that General 
von VoiKtH-llhet.z left Wof-l at 10 a. rc to ride to the battle-fieUl. As 

he was in rear of the half-diviHion, the latter must have been pant 
Woi'l at 10 a. m.; otherwise we should have seen General von Voigls- 
.Ithetz. That alone is Biiffieient to prove tiiat the 19th Half-lJivision 
sidilcd from Thidiicoiirl hcforc 7 a. vi. it was not until later that Gen- 
eral von Sfhwarzkopjjen Icarnrd tiiat General von Vrjigts-Rhetz had 
ridden toward the sound of the guns. 

]j(it us compare with this the statements of the 1st Guard 
Dragoon and of the ItJth and r»7th infantry Ilegiments. On page 
124 of the history of the former Ijy Von ilohr it is stated: "The 
brigade (iirandenfjurg fl.) started at 4:30 a. m. and marched through 

St. iJenoit en \Vo("'vre and Woi-I to St. Hilaire. The 5th Squadron 
of the 2d Guard Diagoons (Von Trotha) formed the advance guard. 
Just as the brigade (-onimander was about to post outposts at St. 
Hilaire, the sound of guns was heard from the direction of Metz. 
As it increased every minute, ('(junt van lirandenburg marched 

toward the Kound of the guns with our regiment, i^lanitz's battery, 
anil with the 4th Squadron (Von fiindenburg) of the 2d Guard 
Dragoons, whicii latter was joined by the commander of that regi- 
ment. Count PMnckenstein, and ncrU a mcntiafio to thai (■(feet to demral 
ron Srlnrdrzhojiitcn, with the, remark timt Trotha'x Hqiuidron left in 
the oiilixt.st posUioii vas at the dispoftat of the divinioH." 

It does not sf;cm probable that the cavalry started two and one- 
half hours before the infantry. On the other hand, the difference 
between his statement and that of th(; Official Account as to the cir- 
cumstances attending the departure of General von Brandenburg II. 
for the Imttle-fleld is by no means trifling (compare page 602 of the 
Official Accxjunt, I.). 

On page 2(10 of the History of the 16th Regiment we read: 
"The detachment [the 10th Half-Division, author's note| started 

from Thiaucourt at 6 ><. m. for St. Hilaire, the Fusilier Battalion of 
the 16th Regiment forming the advance guard, and arrived there 
about 12 o'clock." 

In the History of the 57th Regiment by Von Schimmelmann, 
published in 1883, page 77, the hour of departure is stated at 6 a. m., 
that of the arrival at St. Hilaire as 12 o'clock noon. 

■^Since August 9fh the infantry of the 19th Division had been 
marching without packs. At St. Ingbert the packs had been loaded 
on the cars at the railway station under the supervision of an adju- 
tant from each regiment; in the case of the 57th Regiment that duty 
had devolved on me. The men carried the mess-tins strapped to the 
rolled overcoat, an(' the ammunition in the knapsack was transferred 
to the haversack. / ccording to the calculation in the preceding foot- 
note, the 19th Half- Division must have been past Woel by 10 a. m. 



104 liKiuirUfS into thv Tactics of the Fiitiiir. 

Tho pivsumixion was thnl (Ihmmiimwy was rinifaiiuii to 
\'tM"diu\. ill part on [he vo'm\ on whii-li \vi» (hiMi weiv. ami on 
that aoi'oiint tluMc had boon soino anxiot v ainonu; iho slalYs 
ilurini; tho niaroh to St. Uihiiiv. Tho maps >voiv fivoly 
oonsnltoil. a.iul the surprise was jjiwit >vhou >vo roavhed tho 
ononiv's lino of rotroat without sooinj; a traco of hint. Tho 
o battalions, tho _ battorios. and 'J pioiuHM- oiunpanios wont 
into oanip siMithoast of St. Uilairo. tho outposts boins; 
furnisluHl bv F. — oTth and Trotha's S(\uadron of tho iM 
Guaitl Dra^roons. Moanwhilo. tho tollinj:- of tho ihurvh- 
bolls in the snrroundius; oountrv piiH'lainiod tho arrival of 
tho onomy. Tho view Avas unobstructed as far as the hills 
of the Mouse, and there was no traoe of a bivt^/.e. .Vs far 
baok as St. Honoit en >V(.h'>vio others had drawn my atten- 
tion to uun shots, whieh 1 was unable to hear in spitt^ of my 
bt^t endeavors, and only here in the eamp at Wool 1 was 
able to distinjiuish them. 1 thoui^ht the sound eame from 
our i*ij;lit rear. In that t-aiie we would have been in rear 
of the enemy, whieh ito one was disposini to believe. It soon 
turned out to be a faet. 

At St. llilaire tlu^ troops were orderetl to oook. despite 
our vexiuix situation.* Ouriui; this time 1 was with the 
rijrht thuik guard with several other otVieers. amonu: them 
Lieutenaut-Ooloiiel von Koll. The otVuers were listiMiin-; 
attentively to the sound of the guns, aiul thought that we 

Fivm tluMV to St, lUlairo tho distaiioo is 5 kilometei-^. which can 
rei\vlily bo oovoroii in U, hovn-s. Thoro is no donbt. thoroforo. that 
tho SSth Pri^arjuio trorht'il St. Hiloiir tyirlicr than stated in tho Othoial 
Aoconnt and in tho historios of the "liUh and r«7th Rogimonts. Ao- 
conling to tho timo of tho I. Battalion of tho "-Tth Kfi^iuuMU it w.is 
just 11 o'clock. Being aiijntant of that battalion, and it InMng my 
wook to got tho oniors. on which occasion tho watches wore daily 
ixnnparod with that of the g^Munal staff oflicer of tho division. Major 
von SchertT. my st.atoments may safely make some claim to tvlative 
accuracy. 

♦Tho Olhcial .\ivonnt savs nothing about that. 



MiUtary-Ilutorical studies. 106 

would rcHunic I Ik- riuirch u.i. orico, ThiH "bat fit; fover" ih 
almoHt invjuiahly tin; n-HuH. of ihit \n\(<-vin\i\\y of the 
troopH n-^sirdin^ Iho plariH of tho coininandor in (-hief. It 
waH not HO hen*. Kinoo ihc. morning of tho IfJth, alrnoHt 
evory ofTlc«T kru-w tin- Htratcgic Hituation approximately and 
the obj«*(l of our rruircli c/xddly. The eonverHation had 
tunH'<l on the Kul)jc«| during; fhe march; all wer«* in ex[)ef;- 
tation of w. g^i-cnf cvcnl ;uid highly Huri>riH<Mj to find Ht. 
riilairc unoccujjied, altliougli the* Houiid of guriH iuid been 
heard from th(; right for Hom(; time. 

Tlu' order to cook, received by the troojis nf)t without 
iniHgivingH, Ih Hignificant in judging (Icncral von Schwarz- 
kf)i)i>en'H conccj>lion of the si tun lion. It showed a i)ur[>OHe 
to remain at St. Ilil;iir<* until further orders should be re- 
ceived; alHO that the ojiinion jtrr-vjiilcd thnt there was am- 
jile time to cook before; tlje arrival of orders, notwitlistand- 
ing tliat the sound of guns haxl been audible for some time 
and was getting stronger. It is certainly cr)rrect to use 
fVf'vy oj)i)ortunity to cook in fu-der th;it the ti-oojis rn;iy not 
reach their destirifition in jiri enfeebled stale. I'ut (^leneral 
von Hchwarzkojipen liad failed to find the enemy where he 
expected to meet him, and from the right rear he heard 
continued, severe artillery fire; the enemy must therefore 
have been engaged atHorneotheryjoint, Unfortunately, we do 
not know the general's conception of the situation in detail; 
it HufTices tluit al that time he had no idea of what was going 
on in his rear, that he hejird the sound of the guns and did 
nothiny to ascertain its <;ause, negle(;ting fin; first duty of a 
commander who finds that the premises on which an order 
is based are wrong. In view of the fact that Count Bran- 
d(mburg had his susfu'cions Jis enrly as 10 a. m., and acted 
accordingly and sent word to General von Kchwarzkoppen, 

that the former never thought of cooking, but was imbued 
8 — 



106 Inquiries into the Tactics of the Future. 

with the sole idea of marching to the sound of the guns — 
it might be supposed that General von Schwarzkoppen 
should have come to the same conclusion, all the more as 
Count Brandenburg had shown him the right road, as it 
were. While the fires were burning, some horsemen came 
galloping from the east, attracting every one's attention. 
On the right of the Fifty-seventh, where the view to the 
right was unobstructed, the men felt so certain of our im- 
mediate departure that they were pouring the boiling soup 
on the ground before it was ordered, and the alarm signal 
was not given until an officer arrived on a horse covered 
with foam. The camp-kettles were now emptied and the 
troops put in march. It was 12 o'clock noon,* our destina- 
tion was Chambley. We hardly believed our eyes when 
we found the place on the map. 

The order of march was as follows: 4th Squadron of the 
2d Guard Dragoons,! Fusilier Battalion of the 16th Regi- 
ment,J 2d Light Battery X., I.— 16th, II.— 16th, 2d Heavy 
Battery X., F. — 57th, I. — 57th, two pioneer companies X. 
The II. — 57th, with some mounted orderlies from the 4th 
Squadron of the 2d Guard Dragoons, was left to the north- 
west of St. Hilaire for the protection of the train. 

At this point we will briefly refer to the opinion pre- 
vailing at the headquarters of the II. Army regarding the 
situation on the evening of the 15th. It was believed that 

*The Official Account, page 603, 1., fixes the time of our departure 
from St. Hilaire at 12:30; the History of the 16th Regiment (page 
266) at "soon after 12:30 p. m."; the History of the 57th leaves the 
question open. 

fOne squadron of the regiment had been ordered to report to 
the commander of the X. Corps, General von Voigts-Rhetz; another 
had been detached to the brigade division of horse artillery of the 
X. Corps; the third had gone with Count Brandenburg. 

$At Suzemont F. — 16th turned off to the south to establish com- 
munication with the remaining portions of the X. Corps by way of 
Mariaville Ferme. 



Military-Historical Studies. 107 

the hostile army would do its best to get unmolested across 
the Meuse, and the anticipation of the enemy at that river 
with the greater part of the II. Army was made the goal of 
the operations. Orders to that effect were issued from 
army headquarters at 7 p. m. on August 15th. But the 
same order assigned to the smaller portion of the II. Army, 
consisting of the III. and X. Corps and the 6th and 5th 
Cavalry Divisions, a different direction of march, which 
implied a certain tactical task. The parts of the II. Army 
diverged in two principal directions on the 16th of August, 
the main part westward, the smaller part northward. The 
object of the latter was to attack a strong hostile rear 
guard, which it was thought might possibly be on the Metz 
— Vionville — St. Hilaire road. Subsequently the right 
wing of the II. Army was to follow the main body westward 
according to circumstances. In reality, however, some- 
thing else happened; the smaller right wing of the II. Army 
encountered the entire hostile army, and the main body, 
abandoning its original direction, had to be brought up to 
the right wing. The interesting events connected there, 
with and their consequences we shall not discuss here. If 
any one desires to study them in detail, we refer him to 
the Militdr Wochenhlatt, Nos. 71-78 of 1891; it should be 
stated, however, that the destination of the III. Corps was 
Vionville (Mars-la-Tour), and of the X. Corps, St. Hilaire. 
A more detailed examination of General von Schwarz- 
koppen's conception of the situation is here necessary. 
General von Voigts-Rhetz knew that on the 15th the en- 
emy was still west of Metz; it had been reported among 
others by the 9th Dragoons from Nov^ant. and was -the 
cause of the measures presently to be discussed. Army 
headquarters, corps headquarters, and division headquar- 
ters were on the 15th in Pont k Mousson. Here "the en- 



I OS Inquiries into thf l\idics of tlit Fututr. 

oinv's plans and owv own." as tluMi assuiU(Ml. wiM't* disonssod 
l>t>(>vt»tMi tho rrim»> ami CuMUMal von Wnjits l\h(M;'. ; >vhcllu>r 
(uMicral vou Sil\\vailvi>ppiM» \vas piuv^tMil, 1 do \\o\ Um»w. 
Tht^ (lisoussioii luul r«>ft>r«MHt> onlv to what Iho Prinro 
loarmnl or assununl o( tho »>utMii} u\> to tlio arrival of in- 
struotions from (l(MUM-aI von Moltk«* ^ll):.'U) \^. \\\.). That 
was sutliti«Mit [o liiroot (uMioral von N'oi^ts Khot/'s attoii- 
tion nu<n^ to ilu> iiort!: than to tho ir<\<!, sinco W boliov»Hl 
that.owinji' ti> tho rt^pv>rt(Ml prostMUt* of tl\o FrtMU'h at Ko/.oii- 
villo ami Mot/, it n»ii:l\t IxH'onn* noi't^ssarv to or»hM- tho 
X. (\»rps to nun t> to tlu^ lirt^at road sonimvhai farthiM- to 
{\w oixsi o( St. Hilairo. It is not to bo snppostMl that (umi- 
oral von NtMjits Khot/. withhold fri>ni (uMu^ral von Schwarz- 
koi>pon tho opiniiH\ ho ha»l fiMMno«l. and as tlu» latttM- i^iMi- 
oral, boinii fartlu^si to ilu^ U>ft. woiild probaMx hav«> tho 
luoivdiftloult task, ho shonld havo ondoavorod from tho tlrst 
to Av»»/> in rommunicotion ^(U^tworti with lho,<t' troofK'i which had 
hr'm iu<itiijnt<d that dinvtion by l^onoral von Voijrts-Khot/., «,<? 
Otnfnil von Schtcankoppcn ircU htftr. Mntiial twchan^c of m« 
fonuation is ono of tho most in\portant dntit^s in tho oaso of 
sovoral oobnnns. partii'nlarly wIumi thoy W(M*(^ s«> far sopa- 
ratotl fron\ t>at'h othor as horo aiid wIumi tho situation itst^lf 
was s»> shrou(h>d in donbt. I'roni tho b(\uinninu- of tho 
n\arih (uMUM-al von Sohwar/Uopi^tMi shonld havo iMnploytni 
for that pnrpost^ part of tho strong- oavalrv nndtM- his I'om- 
inanii. and a half sqnadri>n wouM havo sntVu'tHl. l>nt that 
renj <'>\<f'«/»<»/ was noj^lootod, witli tho rosnlt that ono of tho 
main oolninns was ignorant of tho dt^injrs of tho othors. 
Ami loast of all slionld that pnvantion havo boon noj;lootod 
aft or tlu> liontM'al hford the fsound of ^uns from the fast! 

iuMUM-al von Voiiits Khot/. had boon diroottnl to ivaohSt. 
llilairo Mai/.oray with tho \. Corps, "brinsiinjr np as noar 
as possibh^ tho portioiis of tho i-orps still at Voui ^ Mons 



M Hilary- 1 lidorical Htudien. 109 

HOfi ;irj<] in Ih*- v;ill<-y ()f \\\c M«h<'II<*." fri af^cfjrnpliHhing 
hiH laHk ;iri(l in vif'vv of Ifir- *\\\Scrcu((' of oi>iriion \n-iwo<tn 
hiinH(;lf and (hf rririf^c, (iouoral von Voij^tH Ithotz drow 
very clevr-rlv orji of I lie dil(frnrna. H** w;nt only the 10th 
Ilalf-DiviHion ;ind duiud l)r;it^'oon Hri^ude to Ht. Ililaire. 
making,' ;il I Ik* huuh' firrif a rr-'onnaiHHanf;f in force a(;ainst 
flie froo|»H of)H< rvt'<l Jif Itz-zonv illf on the fvfnin^ of the 
inth (I., n41, (>ni<i;il Arconntj. Thr- Hth r'avalry DiviHion 
waH to make the reconnaiHHanee, Not eontent with that, he 
diHpatchcd hiw chief of HlafT, Lifutcnant Colonel von Cap- 
rivi, with 2 hoiHe hattcrieH and a H(iu;idron of the 2d Guard 
Draj^ooriH fioni 'riiijiiicourt to Xonville. At Thianeonrt 
waH the JMhI Itc^'irnenf and 1.— 7Sth, at Xovr'-jint I\. and 
F.— 7S(li, iHt Lit^hl liattery, Int and '.U] HrjUfidronH of the 9th 
Dra^ooiiH. I'.ofli of theHe detaohrnentH were to aHHenible 
at (>harnl)ley irj Hijj»|»oif of llie reconnaiHHanee; the 20th 
I)iviHir)n wJix to follow to Tliijiiicourt. 

Xonville jirid riiMrnbley are HJtuated 5 kilonieterH to the 
HouthweHt ;uid houIIi reHpectively of MarH-la-Tour, Thian- 
(;ourt iH fiboiit IS kilornetepH from Marw la Tour, and Bt. 
Ililaire iH 15 kilomr-terH from Mars laTonr; the T'liambley— 
Xonville — Snzerrifint road iH ajiproximately parallel to the 
St. I'erioil S(. llihiire roJid, and the dintanee between 
them av<'r;ij^r'H iiboiit 15 kilonieterH. In examininj^ the de«- 
tination of the III. rorj)H, a point half way between Vion- 
ville and MarH-la-Tonr, the conception and x^lan of General 
von Voi^tH Khetz become (piite plain from hiH diHpOHitions. 
Tie meant to comply with the T'rince'H order and at the HJime 
time tjik*' fiH much ground io the northwent ;ih jiOHnible, ho 
;iH to be .'ible, in ciiw of necennity, to bring three-quarters 
of the X. GorpH to the Hupport of the TTI. OorpH by the 
HhortcHt route. In view of the above diHtanccH, the diKymRl- 
tionfi certainly permitted of thin for three-quarterH of the 



110 Inqitiries into the Tactics of the Future. 

corps on llie 10th, tliouj-b it is doubtful whether the 19tb 
Half-Division, etc., Avonld have been able to arrive in 
time after it once reached St. Hilaire. Since General vou 
Schwarzkoppen knew of these ai'rangements before the 
march from Thiaucourt, it was incumbent upon him to 
adhere to this plan. That could be done only by maintain- 
ing communication with the Chambley — Xonville — Su7,e- 
mont road by cavalry. It may be a matter of dispiitl^ 
whether that was the duty of General von ^\1ili•ts-Ehetz or 
of General von Schwarzkoppen. According to my opinion, 
it was an obvious duty for the latter, since he commanded 
the column, while General von Yoigts-Rhetz merely ac- 
companied it: and the general was very jealous of his 
prerogatives. 

It having been neglected to place cavalry between the 
two roads on which the X. Corps marched, it was the more 
necessary to take the proper steps at the first sign of a con- 
flict in the east, as no enemy was in sight at St. Hilaire and 
vicinity. As many organs of communication as possible should 
have been set in o})eration before 10 a. m.; first, toward 
(Chambley: second, toward Xonville; and third, even toward 
Thiaucourt. They would have learned how things were 
looked at there and what was being done, and would have 
informed General von Schwarzkoppen. The situation at 
St. Hilaire being known, several orderly officers, officers' 
patrols, should have been dispatched in these directions, 
while the general staff officer of the lOtli Division should 
have been sent in the direction of Xonville, where every 
endeavor should have been made to discover the most 
important spot, the trail of Lieutenant-Colonel von Capri vi. 

The soundness of my propositions is proven by the Offi- 
cial Account (I., 505). 1. rrompted by the artillery fire 
resounding from the north. General vou Kraatz, before 



Military-Historical Studies. HI 

reaching Thiaucourt with the 20th Division at 11:30 a. m., 
had dispatched officers' patrols northward. The statement 
points out what General von Schwarzkoppen should have 
done in the same direction. General von Kraatz then 
marched his division toward the sound of the guns. So 
much as regards reconnaissance. 2. The detachment of the 
Seventy-eighth, etc., above referred to, had been at Nov<5ant, 
whence it was to join the 91st Regiment (minus 1st and 2d 
Companies), I.— T.^th, 1st Heavy Battery and 2 sciuadrons of 
the 9th Dragoons at Chambley. The leader of the latter 
employed half a squadron to establish communication with 
the detachment at Novdant; this is an illustration of the 
communication between the marching columns (Official Ae> 
count, I., 5G9). 3. The 20th Division was at Thiaucourt at 
11:30 a. m. (Official Account, I., 595); Lehmann's detachment 
(of the 91st, etc.) placed itself at the disposal of the III. 
Corps as early as 11:45 a. m. (Official Account, I., 569), like 
wise on account of the artillery fire heard at Chambley; the 
distance thence to Vionville being G^ kilometers, the rear 
of Lehmann's detachment was probably still at Chambley 
at 10 a. m. Had patrols, from the first, been sent out toward 
Chambley (15 kilometers) to maintain communication, 
they would have learned that that detachment was con- 
tinuing its march to the northeast, and General von 
Schwarzkoppen could have known by 10:30 a. m., that the 
detachment at Chambley was also marching toward the 
sound of the guns. Maintenance of communication would 
have evolved a system of reports from the decisive direc- 
tion! The order to march to Chambley did not reach the 
Nov^ant detachment until it had marched off to follow the 
5th Division; when, at Gorze, the leader of the detachment 
heard continued artillery fire, he also marched toward the 
battle-field (I., 555). We see thus the leaders along the 



119 Inqvirifs into the Tadics of fhti Futurt, 

wholo lino tioviato from (heir oixiors for i\\c dixy on thrir own 
rfS^HUiaibiliifi iuui in <*«>M>vt/N«'M(Y of fh^ir ;>r(*ri(M<.< m(>nsurcit, 
spontoneousifi /dlvH.' I. i\MiMt HrainlonlMirii m;\r»ht^s from 
St. llilnirt^ at l(^ a. tu. on at roiu\t of \\\o artilloiv llrt\ >vhtM\ 
tho IIM1\ Half l>ivisii>n was snll a iriH>d ho\u's inartli in roar 
(l>orhaps \o tho south of WooU: *J. t\>U>iu>l l.t>huiann 
marolu^ about 10 o'olook from ("hambU^v f»>r tho samo 
rtnison: .'^. ("olont^l voa l.vnkor maroht^s ovtMi lu>fon^ that 
hour fro»»\ Nov»\M\t; i. r>onoral you Kraatr. maivluvs froui 
Thiaut-ourt at U :.'U^ a. u».: o. l.itMitonant t\>hu»ol von i'ap- 
rivi luaroht^s from XinwiUt^ ttoutTal vi>u Sohwarr.koppou 
>vas thooulv ou»^ whodivl not maroh. althi>ujrh ho Utumv that 
tho oiitMuv was not at St. Uihiirt^ a.uil as tho liMh llalf- 
Pivisiot» was mortH>vor farthost otT tho main dirootii>n. \W 
uooossity 10 bo "i) f>ort(^f" was tht» uu>st prossiuir it\ tho oaso 
of tho half division. It was Oonoral von Sohwar/.koppou's 
dntv to n\ako tho utH-ossarv arrauiromtMUs whirh wtM'o v«»ry 
simpU* imitHHi. V'vtMi hail somo of tho moasnros boon too 
lato at\d had thov faiUn! to produoo tho dosirini otTtvt. still 
thoy would havo st^t him richt as a loailor. 

Tho distanot^ luMwoon Mars la Tour and St. llilairo is 
lo kilomotors; had tht^ oth Oavalry Pivisiou aoooniplishod 
its task, it mijiht havo iuformtni litMioral von \oii:ti« Hhotr. 
(and Sohwarr.koppoiO on tho ri^ail to St. llilairo not \-Mov 
than \0 a. m. V\^r tho Trinoo at Tout ;^ Moussou roooivtnl 
tho tirst rt^port from Niouvillo from lltM\tM*al voii .Mvous 
lobon at 10;.*>0 a. m.. whiv-h is alumt (» kiUunott^rs miM'o than 
tho distanoo thonoo to tho Thiauoourt^-8t. Hilain^ roail. 
Tho omission rtMjdortnl tho situation of tho l!>th Half- 
l>ivisioi\ dit^ioult: it is woll known, howovor. how roadily 
tho rtMnliM-iuir of tln^ most important roports is fors^iMton 
in tho boat of battlo. Front all thoso ivasons 1 boliovo that 
tho onlor to oook. oto.. was injiulioious, and lonsidor niysolf 



Military II iKtoricM HluduM. 118 

homr; out by lfi<* furi Wr.ii t\u' 20fli [>iviHion, which wuh in 
rear arid whi'fi al Thiaiioourt wan farJh«r from fJi<r batJh;- 
i'n-\i\ (li;ifi l)i<- IfltJi waM at Hf. Hilair^', <Jif) not f-ook, but. 
iri;irrh<-(l ;i,n«l H«fil r<-[)0(lH; ;iii«J in lii'- hilU-r vcH\ift\ tii'- f;ir- 
«(itnHj»cr(ion of i(H i^cix-nil ;ifnl iJi*' coriN-rifH of tiiH vc\><>vtH 
{() the army <:ttuitniu\t\<v rruiv Ix- onHid'-rfrJ um <-x«:fu\>\iU'y* 
Th<* jfffKTal alMO inforKicl Hi<- lf)ili hiviMJon MpontarK-oiiMly 
of hiH »fi;uf fi (o Mk- h;illl«- fi<hl. VV'jiH Ih^rr* any rrtoiprocfil 
a<'(ion on (h«- i);ir( of i\n' lOlfi iJivinion toward th*- 20lh? 
And W5IH not tin- fonuov witfi itH Htronpj cavalry in a f;<'rtain 
W?nH'- Um- ^.'iiid'- of Wn- hitl<-r? 

The (J<'Hf inalion of Hie FII. CorpH waH MarH laTonr — 
Vionvilh', t)ijf the FrctK\i rnij^iit very wr-II hav*- paHK^-d bf?- 
yorid MjjrH hi Toi/r by (lu* firrK- tti*- III, Cor[)H rr-ach'-d the 
tiijrhro;id. 'I'h'- ;irlion rnii.'hl (liiiH \niv<- \)<->-u f;ikinj.' ]A',u-m 
•,\.\ ;i |»oint l«-HH ()i;in 15 kilonK-lcrH Ji w;iy, for if iH wr-ll known 
that Hoijn(J may \}C vftry d(*'0[»f ivr- jH-r-orrJirif.' fo w«;ilh«r and 
direction of wind. 

(h) Ucjiloymcnt. — \'u to liiH arrival !if Kijzr*niont, tiie 
diviHionjil crjrrirriandcr int<'nd<'d \<} takr- liic ffK-my in fbink 
t»y w;iy of Vilh- Hur Vrrjn; t)iif, on Jirrivint^ fhoro, that flir<-f- 
tiori H<''-ni<-d loo riM)(y. I-'roni our liorHfH wr* could only HOff 
lon{< firing lincH Jind dcuHc cloudH of rJUKi, but tho Hovority of 
th(; tiro, ;i.nd fli<' woundr-d of \\\<- III. CorfiH corninf^ toward 
the a[)i»roa(liinj^ luilf (liviHif>n, witli no ycry favorablo re- 
I)or(H of I Ik- h(;)I<* of I Ik- h;iltl«', ni;iy hfivc [>roini»l«d liiiri to 
Hcok in lh<' firHf iil;i«-o to drsiw fi<-;ir*'r \o t|i<- r<'ni;iin<l'-f of the 
X. TorjiH, whi<-h wjih r|iii(«' ri;;lil. 

Arrionf^ the wounded I recot^ni/ed f jeij(cn;iril I)reiHinj^, 
adjutant of the n2<j (?) Rejiiirir-nl ; horne jirid rider were cov- 
ered with (>erH[)ir-;i lion ;i.nd dnHt .;in<l tlx- rider H'-<-r(i<-d loh;ive 

••'Kri';' ;";;';hlchf,ll(;ho Klriz«:lw;hrlfU5D," No. 1), pri^': fi'il. 



I 14 Inquiries into the 'l\ic(ics of the Future. 

had a fall; ho was also slu>t throuuh tho h\u; ami his foat- 
uri'swtM'i^ almost bovontl fiH'i\iiiution. As wo hadboon cathMs 
toj;t>thor. I rodo up to him and shook hands, makinjj a tow 
romarUs. hut ho lodo listlossly on. Ou askinj; his sorvant 
about tho stato oi tlu^ battU\ ho said, "HadI" Soon aftor- 
ward 1 mot auothor ofliotM- of tho llOth ['!) Hoiiimont. who 
was shi>t tlu'ouiih tho ohost. Hofoiv I had timo to spoak, ho 
said: "\\\^11. 1 luipo viui will bt^ moi'o lucky than wo havo 
btHMi. You will bo suiprisod. This is no oat-killinji. as 
iu '()(»." That did not sound voiy onoourajiinii. but thoiv 
was a touoh of soldiorly humor in his words. Thoso and 
others, all had takoa tho road to St. Hilairo. Uoinji struck 
by that faot. 1 oallod tho attoujion of my oon\n\andor to it. 
and was ordorod by him to dolloot tho stroam, as ho oallod 
it. of tho woundod ti>ward tho south. Most of tho lattor did 
not ijuito undoistaml my loason. but tho sorvaait of Liou- 
tonant Oroisiui::. a ouuuinu: liraudonbnrgor, at oneo turnod 
his mastor's horso iu that dirootion and tho othors foUowod. 
so that 1 was ablo to rosumo my ]^laoo in a fow miuutos. 
Fato willod it that l.ioutonant Oroisinu; should bo my noigh- 
bor that nijxht. In tho tomporary hospital our trousors 
woto probably oxohaiiijtxl by mistako: at any rato. on tho 
noxt day I had ridinir trousors with a shot-holo through 
tho oalf. whilo my own woro missinj::. and 1 was trans- 
]>ortod to tho roar in Droisinii's trousors. 

Tln^ Othoial Aooount statics, on pajro t>04, that, aftor dt^ 
ployiuj; for battlo at Sii/.omont. tho 4 battalions had ro- 
sumod thoir advamo ou Tronvillo. aiul tixos tho hour of 
doploynumt at 4 p. m.; both statements are in error. 

The brijrade deploytni but onoe for battle, and that was 
not at Suzomont. but about 1000 meters southwest of Mars- 
la-Tour on tho U^ft batik of tho doopout branoh of tho Yron. 
on whose stooy> slope a surgeon of I. — 57th, Pr. .loston, fell 



Military- J J islorical Studies. 



115 



Willi liiH lioi'Hc.* As fiirdici- Hiipport, for my Hlatement 1 
liuve a iiM'dicinc cjirl, u siirj^coii, and homk* hoHjiital aHHiHt- 
antw; tlio cart had lont a vvliccl; the Hurgcoii told iiic in an- 
Hwor to my iiKjuiry how h(! Imd come there, that he had bare- 
ly escaped «ome chanseurH, who had attacked hiH drcHsing- 
HtJifion. Sii(;li iiKiidoiilH fiirninh good markw for the 
iiiciiiory. 

The brigade was drawn up facing Tronville,t and, more- 
over, it waH not at Suzemont at 4 p. rn. The dintance from 
St. Hilaire to Marn-ia-Tonr in 15 k ilometerH; we marched 

♦During the fall the horse slipped off the bridle, the reins being 
torn. In his embarrassment, the doctor asked me what to do. I told 
him to let his horse stay with the broken-down medicine cart men- 
tioned below, which he did. 

fSketch of the deployment of the 19th Half-Division, 1000 meters 
southwest of Mars-la-Tour. 



RoKimont No. Ti?. 
I. Hnttiilion. Fn-i. Hatt/dion. 



Piori. X. 



2d Hoavy Unttory. 2<1 Li«ht Battery. 



Rffffiinoiit No. 10. 
II. ISiittalion. I. Hattalioti. 



^V 



To Maiiaville Fermo, where 
F. —Kith was posted 



(Compare Hketcli pa^e 604, Vol. I., 
of tiio Official Account.) 



116 Tnq^uirics into the Tactics of the Future. 

without n n///,//c |>;his«\ aiul must liave ilrawu up southwost 
of Mars la Tour not lator than o :.'>() p. ni.* 

From Su/.omont, (uMiorals von St'hwar/.kopptMi ami von 
^Vt^loll had riddon forward to inform thiMustMvos of tho 
situation anti o\' tho terrain. Dotinito information of tho 
lattor could havo btHMi obtaimnl. as (uMUM-al (\>unt HrandtMi- 
burji" 11. had Ihhmi on tho litliio from Hrnvillo to Villo sur 
Yron and i'h^s(> to tlu> onomv siui't^ noon with 1. an*l lator. 
with 5 squadrons and a hattorv. Whon tho onemy's IV. 
Corps bojian to doploy on tho loft of our 111. Corps (from 
St. Marool to (^royt^ro FtM'mo). (^ount l>i-andonburjr was 
obliiit'd to withdraw \o Mars la-Tour, whoro ho arrivod at 
."i p. m. It is thus I'ortain that tho H'. C\>rps arrired on the 

*Tho Rosimental History of tho KUh Rofrimont states, on page 
2lU\ as follows: ".\t o:;>0 tlio brigado drew up iitwr Snzomont on a 
meadow soutli of the villaso. and traversed hy a bra-ueh of the Yixin 
brook." That a^rret^ with my nott^. only Mars-la-Tonr should be 
substituted for Suzemout. as we formed nearer to the former than to 
the latter. 

The Regimental Hist.or>- of the 57th. page 75. approximatt^ my 
statements more closely, in that it tlxes the hour of our formatiou at 
3:45 aud locates the place betwivn Maa-s-la-Tour and Suzemont, 
south of the sivat road; on the other hand, ita statement that the 
liUh Regiment was in first line is incorrtvt, as the 57th Regiment, 
which had been marching in ivar of the UUh, was. much to our sur- 
prise, moved to the front through the ranks of the KUh. probably 
bet^-ause it was the junior regiment, which the tlieu custom assigned 
to the first line. 

The ernM- of tJie OfhciaJ Account at this point is thus explaine<l 
on page 70 of the History of the 57th Regiment, -'thaf in the piriutni- 
tion of the Offirial Arcointt onli/ those offirial tr[H)rts were araihihlc which 
tear irrittcn imniatinttl!/ after the btittle, aimm<) whirh that of the .uth 
RetjinieiU inis not sii/tieientlii e.rha list ire." I want to state in this con- 
ntvtion that the report written immediately after the battle com- 
prist\> but about 10 lines, and contains next to nothing; that the 
"researches of the author" of that regimental history were probablv 
limited to the "Two Brig-adt^s, " the only available source at the time; 
aaul that the description of the Othcial .\ccouut was prepared bv the 
historical section of the general staff, based on the preliminarv 
study of an othcer, then a major of the general staff. To be sure, 
the report of the 57th Regiment was very incomplete, but instead 
of simply stating these facts, which were probably known not to me 
alone, ajid which exonerate the description in the Official .\ccount. 
the author attempts to whitewash the general staff— at the expense 
of the innocent regiment, without accomplishing his other object' 



Military-Historical Studies. ] ] 7 

line of battle at and after 2 p. m. Tlu* j^oneral, therefore, was 
the best autliority on the terrain and on the enemy's forces, 
and innst have made reports about them. The l.'Uh Dra- 
goons must likewise liave made reports. Whetiicr they 
were sufTieient is an o[)en (jueslion, but no reports of that 
kind reached Oencral von Sfliwar/koi)j)fn. 

After 2 p. m. the (ierman line of battle, which uf) to 
that time had extended to the northern edge of the Tron- 
ville copse, oblicjuely across the (Iravelottfi — Mars-la-Tour 
— Verdun rr)ad, luid been pushed back to tliat road. IJy 
2 p. m. (irenier's division liad already occupied Height 840,* 
and ]>y 2MU p. m. the northern edge of the Tronville copse ;t 
at 4 o'clock j)ortions of Cissey's division j)rolonged the line 
in the direction of (trcyf'rc Ferme. Hastening to the front, 
the ntli Chasseur t)attalion of (Jrenier's division o(;cupied 
the wood lo the norlh of .Mars la-Tour on Ihe angle between 
the two creeks atiout 2:.'»0 p. m., and was subserjuently 
join(;d by the !J8th Regiment. Altliough the French cav- 
alry ymsted at Ville sur Yron was not very active, it had 
n<'vertheless noted the approach of hostile forces in rear of 
its position f'>S(h ]'>r'iga(h'), and iiad informed (leneral 
i^admirault, who tiien oidered the at>ove movement and 
hastened to occupy the strong natural 7>o8ition north of 
Mars-la-Tour.J 

♦All references to the terrain are based on the maps of the 
Official Account. 

tThe French never had poKsession of the entire copse of Tron- 
ville, but. only of its northern portion, and the danger of our being 
assailed from there was small, as the copse was impassable, or, at 
any rate, difficult to cross, on af;fxjunt of the dense underbrush. 
It seems that (leneral Crenier purposely avoided the copse on that 
account. This will alH<f> appear from the subsfKjuent description, 
inasmuch as one of his brigades tcyok the diref;tion of Mars-la-Tour 
from the northern edge of the copse, while the 20th Divifiion only 
encountered small detachments and dispersed men in the brush. 

JMarshal MacMahon had also urged the acceleration of the 
march. 



118 Inquiries into the Tactics of the Future. 

lleiiiht S4(> -was the si ratejric jitunt of tlio battle-field on 
the left, north of the VionvilU> — Mars-la Torn* road. It 
toninianded the eonntrv in all directions (1 have oonvineed 
myself of this subset|uently). and it lies exactly on 
the line Flavijjny — \'ionvilK^ — l>ois de Ti-onvilU^ — Uruville. 
Thence the French tired on Mars-la-Tcur and had the en- 
tire battle-field of the :v^th l^riijade nnder fire. Flaviug 
failed to anticipate the enemy on lleiuht S4(>. \ve shonld 
never have thonjrht of assaultinjj it. as failure was certain. 

The case of an isolated weak brigade, far out on tTie 
enemy's fiank. approachinir the battlefield on his line of 
retreat, is so strange that it could not but fill the enemy 
with api>rehension. For the latter, noting the movement 
from lleiiiht 84(5, had naturally to assume that further 
forces would come from the same direction and that so 
far the advanced troops alone were in sight. Placing our- 
selves in the enemy's situation, we would ivach that con- 
clusion solely because any other action on our part would 
have seemed unintelligibU'. Without further infornunion, 
the enemy was not at liberty to assume that a single bri- 
gade alone was advancing from that direction. It is neces- 
sary to point this out: otherwise the suitden {-heeJc of Lad- 
mirouWs counter-uttncl- in the battle at the moment when he 
was victorious and when he held the fate of the French 
army in his hands is unintelligible. In addition, the cap- 
ture of Prussian Guard Dragoons tended to strengthen his 
belief that the Prussian (luard had arrived. (Compare the 
statements of Ba/.aine and vt>n Kohr.^ 

We cannot close with these remarks. The interesting 
situation calls for an investigation as to what might have 
been if General von Sclnvar/.koppen had more seriously con- 
sidered the circumstances. Shortly after 11 a. m.* his de- 

*A11 data as to time are based on notes made by himself on 
that day by order of Lieutenant-Colonel von Roll. When I wi\s 



Military-Historical Studies. 119 

tachment Btood at Kt. Ililairo roady to march; he could have 
marched. Was it permissible to march? Y(tn, without a 
doiibl, j)r'r)vid('d he n'poitcd his a<;tioii at once! (leneral von 
Schwarzkoi)j>eii had orders to reach St. Hilaire; he ap- 
proved of the departure of General Count Brandenburg and 
remained in rear himHcIf at a moment when the general 
K(rat('gic KJl nation had Ivoi KlripjM'd by the kindling, battle 
of the obHcurity heretofore euBhrouding it. If he merely 
decided to divide IiIk forcew, Hhould he not have ordered: 
"I'jirt of the cavalry remains here," and should he not have 
led the infantry and artilh-ry without delay toward the 
sound of the guns? Had there been any demand for the 
cavaby hiter, it could have reached Mars-la-Tour by 
2 p. m. We are therefore justified in saying that not only 
the situation, but also the characteristics of the arms were 
misunderstood, inasmuch as the cavalry was given an in- 
fantry task and vice versa. 

Had (Jieneral von Kchwarzkoppen started at 10 a. m. to 
march from Woel to Mars-laTour on learning that the 
vicinity of St. Hilaire was free of the enemy, the half- 
division would assuredly have been able to reach the battle- 
fiehl by 1 p. m,, and in that case the seizure of Height 840 
would probably have been considered. 

(c) The Ballle-Field.— At :\:P>0 p. m. the half-division 
had reached the previously stated point to the southwest of 
Mars-la-Tour. Our previous description has already given 
some data on the conformation of the battle-field. In refer- 
ring tlu* reader to <lie maps of the Official Account I wish to 
state that Mars-la-Tour is commanded from the north and 

wounded, I dropped the note-book. It bore my name, contained a 
change of ribbon for my decorations and other marks serving to 
Identify the owner. On policing the battle-field the note-book was 
found near the body of Lieutenant-Colonel von Roll and sent to 
me at the hospital. 



120 Inquinea into //(c Tnclics of (he Ftihnr. 

wcM. It w:is (litMi !i inisiMiibh' villap;(> and ocrupic*! h\ :\ few 
rlu»ss(Mirs A »lit>v!il, who wit lulirw ou our aitproach. Tin* (lis 
taiu'o from [\\c 'Vvou\'\\\v copsi* to tlio Mais la Tour ,laniy 
voixd is L'oDt) uu'liMs; t l\(Mlislauc(> fi'iMu ll«M,ulit SU» («n\vt'^ro 
1'\muu> I»> tho Mars la Tour N'ionvillo road is tho sanu\ 
A ravine start ini: on tlu> oast of Mars-la 'l\)ur oncirt-U^s 
tho villa^o on tlio oast and north; opposili* tho >vost- 
orn oxtrtMuit.v of llu^ villair*" it turns sharpl.v to i\\o tiorth, 
an»l hiloi- on boais (lu> nan\t> of Vr(»n. About ('>()(• nuMors 
si>nth *)f (irt\v^ro I'Nmmuo it is jointMl bv anolhor ravino com- 
iu}; from (ho oast from th«> Uois {\o Triuivillo. which oncir- 
clos that oo|>S(M>n tho (>ast and tho north and on roachiuii" tho 
nortluM'n point of tlu> copst^ takos a wostoi-lv oourso. Its 
iivtM-aj;o tlistam-o from tho b'rtMuh position (lloiuht v'^U* — 
(<ro,V('^r(» l"\'rn\(>1 is ab(>ut (lot) !iu>t(Ms. At tlu» Uois do 
Tr«>nvill(> llu^ sidos, i\oi sto(>p at first, boconu' prot-ipitons, 
and n\idwav b(>two<Mi thtM'opso and (iroN^ro l'\Mnn> thov aro 
abt>nt \'2 motiMs in luM^lit. tho bottom itsolf btMuj; about 
('»() mot(M-s witl<\ Tho oonlli;uration of tho tlrst of thoso 
ravin(>s. tho owe rnnniuix to tht> north, was similar; both 
woro iUy and liard on \\\c da.v of tlu> batth\ thi» bottt>m of 
tho formor sonu^what w idtM*. howi^vor. Tln> hii;host pi»iut of 
Uw l'""romh position was lloiiiht SUJ, which falls awav io tho 
w»>st to Contour T'Jt). About half wa.v b(>tw(>on thoso points, 
and oblitpiolv to tluMr (•onnoctinj', lint\ a r«>ad ran fr(>m l>rn 
villo to Mars la Tour, which was jointMl farther oast b_v a 
sot'ond also oblitiui* n>ad from ih(> same villa_m\ Holh l(>d 
obliquolv across iho ravint^ in front of tho FrtMich position. 
Tlio lattor >u>t onlv I'ommandtHl tin* battlotU>ld in this wlnjx. 
but had in its front a considorablo obstach\whicli t'onld not 
bo approailuHl ntith'v conr oxct^pt from tho Tronvilh* t'opso 
and from tln^ ravim* which runs from st>uth to nortli. 
Othorwiso tho quadranjjlo. w hoso sid(> had a lonjith of L'otH) 



MiUlary-f/iHlorical HlwUm. 121 

rn<'l<T'H, ofr<T<<J litll'- <ov<f. 'V\\i- Hrjrfjior; liaH 5i j;<'fi<Tul in- 

rliiiJilion lo (fi<- Hoiilh ;ih f;ir .'ih \\\c Vionvilh; — MufM-la- 

Toiir ro;j<l, jjjkI IIk-ii il f^^j^ijjH <o rJHr* nlif^hfly towjird Ihf; 

Moulli, Our hf-Hl. )i;if rjf i\]i]innu\\ wuh llif; ruvjru; vvhif;fi ex- 

ffn(I<-<I norHivvMrd, buf ru'coifti'i'/.tu^ i(H irni>orf;inr;r;, <^Jf?noral 

I,;i<lmir;ii)ll Ii;mI < Ioh«'<I i( hy fho 5fli ChaMHfMjr iiattalion h(;- 

forc (lio ;j.rriv;il of flic .",><( Ii Uri^jidf. In flir? aiiiiU' vvIkto 

Ihc I wo r;i viticH join vvjik ;i Hiruill <-<)\ih<', vvliifh w:iH hf-lf) by 

tlijil rlijjHH'-iir b;il t;ilioJi ; li<'fi<<' ;i, (urnin;^ '>f lb«- l-'p'-noh 

pOMJIir)ri fforn IhiH ot li<'r'wiH<M'X<;<'ll<*nt Win- of iii»]n<ni(;]i waH 

irni>njr(i';ibl<' ufifil i\\<- (■<t]>H<- Hhoiild ]><■ fjikcn. ]''rofri tho 

(wcHlfffij roii<J from I'mvillo lo Mnrn Iji Tour, Jif ;i f>oifit 

;iboiil HO M)() rrH'IciH Houlh (»!' Iho rjiviti'- runiiifi}.' <-uhI ;iru] 

wohI, au <-iti\)UtiUitict\i and fir-dj^f cxb-ndf-d r-aHtward for 

ahoul ino ifirflcfH; IhiH bnrik of r;ar(,h waH of threat irrifiort- 

aiMc in (lir* HubHcqufTit (^votiIh. I rnenliori il on that ac- 

rounl ; i(, ftior<-ovcr, foriti<(l lli<- only cov(;r avail.'iblf in lliat 

wliol*' H<*flion nordi of T'onlour 780. Not only of)ulrl jhiH 

bsiHIr- j^round jiol bo lurnod ;jnrJ wjih dovoid of covi-v, but 

olli*'f obHtncb'H vv<T*' jiIho HubH^fjU'-nl ly cnrounffffd, which 

tli(? OfTi^ijil A<<oiinl fjiiJH fo rnonlion.* Thr- ravino oncir- 

c.Wuif Mar-H la Tour cotiHiHlod of Hulxlividod rnoadowH, which 

woro fi-nrtod in wifh wiro and (-xb'ndr'd lo <''onfr)ur 780 — i. e., 

from III*' MarH-Ia-ToiJi' — Vionvilh- ro;id (o fli<- «orilour; fhoy 

<ov<rod a Hi);i.fo of oOO rno(<iH. I'orlioriH of thiH ground 

could not ]><' fovf-rod by Iho onorny'H infantry lirff, Htill tho 

cullin}^ of IIk- i'i-tii-('H cauH<'d a Iohh of time and chocked the 

moviricnl jiiid brf)ii^li( on (li<- 571 h K<-f^imont HoriouH \ohwh 

from arlill"ry, milrnilhuHf, ;ind infantry i\v(t. 

ThoHo (h-hiilH of I ho ;^round were nof Hhown on fho ^cn- 

enil Hhifl ni;i|i and wore unknown (o fho troopH; moroover, 

•M<!rit.)ori of f.h<;m Ih only marlo In f/>nnf;r;t.lon with thr; charge; of 
the Int fliianl lJraKf>onH; y«jt. It woh chlofly tho Infantry that had 
been delayed by theae obHtaclea. 

9 



fl\o substHiuont «lopU\\ u\»MU of iho T^ l>;U(aHo\>s was n\i>ilo 
so rniMi^lv that thort^ was uo thwo for oxatnlnittji tho ground. 

All thtv^o things mi:hi havt^ l>oou VnorM to tho hijihor 
Uwiiors. as that onthv sootiotj had b<sM\ \\\ our um!isp\»t<Hl 
jHvsst^sion up to « p. in.: atui wo »^m\m- )\ot mon^lv (»> tho ttM" 
rain, but also tt> tho strtM\jith of tho onotwv, r»ut tho\j>ih 
thot>^ was laok of infonuatiou ott tho lattor poittt hofort^ 
wo wvi>* or\iortHl to attaoU. wo oouhi n»ako out tho j^Mf^mw'.* 
w»K<.vyv< alonjj tho wholo lit\o faJrlv woll with tho In^iv oyo 
just hofotv tho attaok. 

Ot\ our sidt^ o hattaUons wo»^^ a\ailahh\ siiviuu t\ot 
Quito 2 tuou por tuotor. Tho hattlo jHH>uutl of tht\so hat- 
taUous waii, luortnnor, dovoid of oovor fr\uu i^otttour 'J^O to 
Uoijjht S4t> — Ort\\^rt* bVnuo. 1\> vat»qnish tho ouotu^y- thoy 
had to trjworso from Toutowr 7S(> to tho ouotuv. V.U>0 u\ottM*s 
of j^Mitlv slopii\ii jrr\Miud with a ooi\sidt^rablo and \inkui>wn 
obstaoh^ ah>t>j» tht^ ot\tir^^ fnMtt atid with auotluM- iU»staolo 
rtlouj; i^irt of tho jir\>uud. Pisiistor was oortaiu ovou if wo 
had to travorso. ftvtu Contour TSO to tho onouiv, 11H>0 t»»otori4 
Althvnigh tho oxivtitiou of tho attaok is o^hmj io oritioism 
fn>m tho thiH^rtMioal |H>iut of viow\ vot its taotioak at\d |»j\r- 
tiouk'jrlv it^ morak otTtvt on tho onoinv was vorv jjrtwt. bt^ 
oaust^ it was oartitnl t>ut with an onorijv vorv ratvlv tn^ualod 
sinoo. Tho visjx^r of tho attack oont\nutHl t^onoral \A\i\' 
mirj^ult's apprt^housiou th^it fuH^tr Otrman fi^fr^ «yr* jijik 
/»r\S),-%««.; '♦\>»jj v^K //»7,)»»Y.* His anxioty for his rij^rht riv^ 
otxHl i^onoral U'\dmirault*s attontioti ii\ that dir»vtion. and 
his ftwr v>f boinjj assiviUnl thort^ with superior foroos kopt 
him friMU rx\'tpititf tho full bonotlt of his taotioal suo- 
vH>ss, \MuH\ iitu^tio»uHi»howovor, bofon^ tho court of iu» 

♦Th? OfRctal Act>owt\t. T.. iv W>1, statps thts tn ttaJIcs. 



MilUo/ry-niHt/trical HludU^. 1^'' 

qrjjry, why he. ha/1 not ]ir<ft\U'<\ from hb mioxtftm, be an- 

WhiUf \\\tt '.'M\\\ Hr'ni.hi^t' h\(><n\ timwn up »^>ijthwf^.t of 
Man* )a-Toiir, Ihrj oh;iplainH «yJrJrr-«>^-d fhf; rrK^n. The Prot- 
imijiut chaplain, A(t\t*trt, who «fK>ke fimt, naU'McA Him wordu 
>w> injridi'riouMly, wai« k^> dr-^fply rnov^d hhnw^f, an^l n\n»\n' in 
Much a whiijjnfr way, fhal no one corjjrj h^^ much edified by 
that Horf. of "spiritual comfort," and the incident hau rjon- 
vinced me that, uuUmn he alK^> nmrtlff'ntM wAHUtU feelingn, 
a chaplain may do more harm than jto^kI in nuch momentu, 
and that in moMt can^^H it. will he h^-*«t to k^f^'p the chapJain« 
away from the troof»« alt/>gether. While Chaplain Aebert 
waM H])('',ik\fiii, we Haw a Hinj.'le rider cominj^ from Tronville 
at full Kpeed, hiK ¥>\ir\)\\cM tiuW-nnij^ in the air, and an he 
approached, f recoj^niz^d him a« the Catholic chaplain, 
Ktuckmann, a d*^r friend of mine since l>40ft. In front of 
<^'oIofiel von <^.'ranach Hxt line; he reifrned up like a f>^-rfe«'rt 
horxeman, the nij^ht of which in itnelf had a revivinj^ effect, 
and, after exchan^in^ a few word« with the colonel, he rr>«f; 
in bin Mtirnifm and Hpoke in hiw wharp VVVf«tphalian diale^rt: 
"Comr-jjuJ^fH, the [II. (l<n'\t¥> \h enj^aged in a K^rvere Htruj(f^Ie, 
To you han fallen the duty to nave it. Attiick therefore the 
enemy with intrepidity and <^)od will bf^ with you. A men I" 
That Hounded more like it, and acted lik^' a charm. Imme- 
diately afterward the rejrimentn unfurled their colorn. the 
]nn(:<in were loa/Jed, and Colonel von Cranach n(h\r(^nft<\ hin 
men about an followH: "You have nhown yourwelve** jjal- 
larit fcIlowH on the march; Khow yourm-lvftn now the name 
in halt le, and, whatever may happen to you, keep your colors 
hij^h, HO that no Prenchraan'n hand may touch them. Xow 
with Cod!" 

'^ofy Jjc/}inninfi of fM Attack. — Upon the arrival of the 
10th and 20th DivinionH and of their hfoAcin on the battle- 



194 Inquiries into ihe Tactics of the Future, 

tieUl. r«oiunal von Noiiits-Khetz luul at his disposal S 
frt'>sl\ biigados, and, in view ot" the state of tho bat- 
tle, ho thoujiht it iuomuboiu upon him to omv^lov thorn 
ottonsivolv for tho roHof of tho 111. Corps. Tho arraujio- 
iiiouts iiuulo for tho purposo t>v tho X. (\nps vvoro as 
follows: 1. Conoral von Kraatx with 10 frosh battal 
ions was to advanco through tlio oo\>so of 'rroiivillo against 
tho hoight of Kruvillo, so that, as tho battlo stood, 
tho fnnUal attaok propor foil to hiui. 2. Ooueral von 
Sohwarzkoppon was to support this frontal attaok by an 
attaok in a uorthoastorly dirootion ^northwost auglo of tho 
Tronvillo oopsel. It was boliovod at tho hoadquartors of 
the X. Oori>s that this latter attaok would take tho enemy 
in flank, t^. Both attaoks were to be made in oombiuation. 
Assuminti that an otTensive of that kind under existinj; oir- 
cumstauot^ was oonsideivitnl proper, the same was wt^ll 
planutHl by the oomniauder of the X. Corps; for. assuming 
oorroot oonooption and judgment on tho part of the loaders 
of tho two moYomeuts. the Hois do 'rronvillo otTorod tho 
safest approaoh. and had the ll> fresh battalions soon after- 
wanl appeaitnl on the northern edge of the oopse. Grenier's 
division would not have btvn able to take the otTensive in 
the dirtH'tion of Mai*s-la-Tour. and would have at least been 
oontaintHi. Within oortain limits the 10th TTalf-Division 
also had some oover in the Yron ravine. l*ut the suoooss 
of the two movements depended on tho loaders of tln^ two 
attaoking groups; and they should have oonsulted together. 
But between the issue of the order on the part of the oorps 
commander and the attaok of the ;^Sth Brigade, the situ- 
ation on tho enemy's side ohangtxl, inasmuch as the latter 
considerably extondtHl his line toward the west, so that by 
continuing to make tho northwest angle of tho Bois de 
Tronville its point of attaok. the :>Sth Brigade would be 



Mxl.xUj,rijli%>M/ruM HtwluH, \2i/ 

tisiiiktitl Uni'M, iunUmA of flanking Uu; Hm^my. Thtirh wnumn 
Ut tinvi'. ft4'Mn wtutt' \tiiviU'M\ii.r tllttit-jilty on that day in rhf^n 
latJng a coniiAin^d uttjutk of larg<; tt^nlUm fontn-A udur tintth 
other, UtHMUiHi'.U hm thtt [tlau whm not only not cjarrSttA out, 
////./ ihf. 10 h(dUdv/Ti.H of Ifi/i 20ik hxxiai/m vAlMr^M aX lliA rAry 
ifi//f(iMd VjivfM t'm W^/klCx Wujo.rk oMo/MfA. The e/fUUimplaUid 
frontal attiwM faiUitl Ut UiSLUfr\A\\7j(t aXUp^etUer, nad the 
\m\HU'A 'AitmU of iUe UnU Ifalf lHvinion r*^nUM. It in 
not ihe luieuiloit to examine why th'? eonthlneA atta/;k an 
plann<^j emmhleA fiont ihe U-j(inninjf. hut yhe commanding 
t^enei'iil of tbft X. <Utr\m an well a« the ^^^mroander of the 
IfMfi htv'mion were \Aiu:tH\ in the fn<r/«t \m.\nfn\ nittiAtUm. f<ft 
they did not J^-arn the r-f:*t) «tiiU; of ntfiurfi until tyK> late. It 
l« hard t/> unthtrHiMu] how that ^^>uld have liaf/fKfn*!^ had 
there f>ee» the ne<^«««ary comrnnnieation Ytetwfum th* com- 
manding general and the two division commandertj and be- 
tween the latter \\ieutnt'.\ven; >«»ill it may l><- explaine^l by 
the fa/di that at that monrieot the attention of the c^^ramand' 
ing general and of the commander of the ir;>th f>ivi«jon wa« 
ii\Xrii.i:Uti\ hy movemeniM the enemy whm. making toward 
dreyere Vermn. To l>^f «ure, a ^infe <ti^;f</.i:^ nhould not be 
made until the /ro»/ In tudlvely engaged. In that ren^tefd 
deneral von K^rh warzkopjK'n wax left in the lurch, and no 
bjani'- 'ran aUiuh to him, but Htiil he wa* not depriv<-rl of 
the [fini,M\n\\ty of finding ont what (Uiueral von Kraatz 
waj* doing. 

General von B^rhwarzkopfA-n had commnmented hi« in- 
UmtionH tjo General von U'edell, but the lower officers were 
not informed at all, and even ('AtioneXn von Cranaeb and von 
linxen hud merely the g^-nr-ral direction jpoiuUid out to 
them. At any rat^?, Hueh an opfK^rtune, exhauKtive, mutoal 
r^mMultation an at Pof>owit7. did not take place, and the 
whole YtuHinem bore the Ht^mp of precipiiaium and uncertnin- 
ty frf)ni the beginning. I know for f-ertjihi that the battalion 



126 Inquiries into the Tactics of the Future. 

commanders did not know ^^bat was expected of thoni, for 
Lieutenant-Colonel von Koll, who was subsequently killed, 
said saroastioally: "If Stuckniaun had not been there, I 
should have been totally in the dark. What little I know 
I have learned from the address he made. Stuckmann, it 
seems to me, is in charge to-day." As General von Wedell 
and Colonel von Cranach were ridini; some 50 paces in front 
of Koll, I suggested that he make inquiry there. INIean- 
"while, I. — r)7th was crossing the ravine about 1000 meters 
southwest of Mars-la-Tour, whose slopes were so steep in 
part that order could only be preserved with the greatest 
ditticulty and the two batteries advancing to the left of 
I. — 57th got into a serious predicament. They succeeded, 
however, in coming from the trot down to a walk and in 
taking the slopes obliquely; neither battery had an idea of 
their character. The incident with its comical and serious 
aspects prevented von Roll from following my suggestion. 
As General von Wedell and Colonel von Crajiach were 
watching the passage of the ravine from its eastern edge, 
Lieutenant-Colonel von Koll had an opportunity to join 
them, and I was again in position to observe all measures 
taken by the superiors up to the divisional commander. I 
did not hear much, to be sure, but I saw all the more. 

Meanwhile, the French had resumed the fire; against 
whom we did not know, but soon learned. II. — 16th was 
marching from the point of assembly straight on Greyt^re 
Ferme, passing by the west of Mars-la-Tour; I. — IGth ad- 
vanced through Mars-la-Tour, and the enemy's increased 
fire was chiefiy meant for these two battalions, which were 
engaged, when F. — IGth, I. — 57th, F. — 57th, 2 pioneer com- 
panies, and the 2 batteries were still south of Mars-la-Tour 
and west of the great road leading thence to Les Barques. 
They all passed the village on the east. There was nO 



Military-Historical Studies. 127 

Buch thing aH preparation \>y artillery, which took up itn firBt 
pOHition Kouth of th<' MaiH-la-Tour — Vionvillo road when 
the infantry fll. and I, — IfJth) waH already under fire. 
There was no sign of any selection of a firing position or of 
any orders for the artillery. It was not until we crossed 
the Mars-la-Tour — Les Baraques road, which is lined with 
poplar trees, that we could fairly well make out the enemy's 
position, which extended from Height 840 to Greyiire Ferme. 
At the same moment a storm of shells was fiying about us, 
an indication that the French had noticed our movement 
and had been waiting for our appearance. About 200 paces 
farther on. General von Hchwarzkopjien joined the officers 
above mentioned, and at that moment our batteries opened 
from their first position. The 38th Brigade here formed a 
single line from left to right, as follows: II. — IGth, I. — 
10th, F. — 10th, I. — 57th, F. — 57th, and 2 pionef-r companies 
X., F. — ICth being somewhat in rear at first fit came from 
Mariaville Fermej. Up to that time, a moment of deci- 
sive ini})ortance for his tactical dispositions, General von 
Bchwarzkoppen was southeast of Mars-la-Tour. It is an 
established fact that up to that moment the commanding 
general of the X. Corps personally directed the left wing of 
the battle, and that he considered the duty of the X. Corps 
to be to save the III. Corps from being crushed. Defensive 
action would not have accomplished the object; it became 
the duly of tactics to understand the situation and to act 
accordingly. 

The question is: 1. AN'as General von Schwarzkoppen 
aware of the general situation? 2. Did he correctly under- 
stand his order? 'i. Did he make report of the change of the 
situation on the enemy's side (extension of his right), or did 
he take steps to meet it? The first will never be known; 
2 and 3 are inconsistent with his measures. There is no 



128 Inquiries into the Tactics of the Future. 

doubt that the commander of the X. Corps had ordered an 
attach, iut, on account of the intervening changes on the enemifs 
side, it became the duty of the commander of the 19th Half -Division 
to regulate the attach, so far as concerns the 38th Brigade, accord- 
ing to time and circumstances. It was the duty of the division 
commander, and it was practicable, to give unmistakable 
orders how far to advance and what to hold. As regards 
infantry tactics. General von Schwarzkoppen, wherever he 
was present, endeavored to have the proper tactical forms 
employed. It was exactly 4 o'clock* when the brigade 
started. We had been facing east, as above stated, and the 
left flank battalion (II. — 16th) was nearest to Mars-la-Tour. 
As that battalion advanced straight from the spot on 
Grey^re, while the companies on the extreme right had to 
make a wheel of some 2500 meters, the movement was loose and 
ragged from the beginning. II. — 16th was firing when the 
other battalions were just starting, and the general result 
was a successive arrival of the battalions on the line of bat- 
tle; and, as the troops, the more they had to take ground to 
the east, endeavored to make up for the greater distance by a 
faster pace, this caused precipitation. But, despite the accel- 
erated pace, it was impossible to restore proper uniformity 
to the movement; the battalions were defeated in detail from 
left to right,a,nd. the right reached the enemy's line completely 
exhausted and at a time when the battalions on the left had 
already suffered defeat. 

(e) Personal Observations. — In executing the move- 
ment we passed the southwestern edge of Mars-la-Tour, 
where General von Schwarzkoppen and Major von Scherfif 
were halting mounted in the midst of a severe artillery fire. 

*Von Rohr says, page 127, that the 38th Brigade passed Mars-la- 
Tour at 5 p. m., and fixes the attack of the 1st Guard Dragoons at 
5:45 p. m. The former is too late; the latter is correct. 



Military -Historical Studies. 120 

Near them, somewhat in rear, were 2 squadrons of the 4th 
Cuirassiers, which, however, soon turned about and with- 
drew when tlie artillery fire ineieased (see Sketch II.j; tli(* 
1st Guard Dragoons took their place; Count Brandenburg 
II. was riding along tlie Vionvillc — Mars-la-Tour chauss(?e. 
The troops were rapidly advancing, and when the skir- 
mishers of 1st — 57th, with which Lieutenant-Colonel von 
Roll was riding, passed General von Schwarzkoppen, the 
brave general joined him, addressing some cheering words 
to the troops. When the severity of the mitrailleuse, artil- 
lery, and infantry fire from the left front gained an amazing 
severity. General von Schwarzkoppen remarked to Lieu- 
tenant-Colonel von Roll: "Roll, deploy strong skirmish 
lines, and we'll catch them;" and later, "The left shoulder 
forward a little, toward the angle of the wood," pointing to 
the northwest angle of the Tronville copse. Meanwhile, 
1st — 57th had deployed 2 platoons and taken the direction 
of that angle of the Bois de Tronville, so that it looked as 
though there was going to be a gap between the 16th and 
57th Regiments. General von Schwarzkoppen, who re- 
mained for some time with Lieutenant-Colonel von Roll, 
then ordered: "Roll, put a whole company in there." It 
was done (2d — 57th). Soon after, the horse of the captain 
of that company was killed; the captain, being very short- 
sighted and pinned to the ground for a little while by the 
horse, lost the supervision of the company, which was ad- 
vancing its right shoulder too much. That was due to the 
direction of the ravine around Mars-la-Tour, into which the 
men crowded in quest of shelter from the enemy's murder- 
ous fire. The 3d platoon connected with the left of the 
skirmishers of the Ist — 57th, and the gap between the Six- 
teenth and Fifty-seventh was only closed when Lieutenant- 
Colonel Sannow pushed in F. — 16th. Originally F. — 16th 



130 Inquiries into the Tactics of the Fidiire. 

was about 150 meters to the rear of 1st aud 2d — 57th, but, 
haviufj a shortor wlieol to make, the battalion subsequently 
gained that distance. AVe anticipate this in order to ex- 
plain how the line of battle was formed, because, when it 
halted, the companies of F. — 10th were between 1st and 
2d — oTth, which were deployed. 

Outside of these orders from the division commander, 
none were received by the troops during the action, except 
the order of retreat. The brigade commander rode north- 
ward of Mars-la-Tour, followed by Colonel von Cranach, 
and as I. — 57th was crossing the Mars-la-Tour — Vionville 
road, both batteries came in position to the north of the 
village. T will now state what else I heard and saw while 
in the vicinity of the division commander. Lieutenant 
Eggeling, from the staif of the comanding general of the 
X. Corps, was just riding away, when Major von Scherflf 
pointed to the map and, turning to the west, remarked to 
General von Schwarzkoppen : ''That is the 5th Cavalry 
Division which is going to support the attack on the flank."* 
At this time the division was trotting past Mars-la-Tour 
on the south. As I. — 57th reached the Vionville — Mars- 
la-Tour road, I noticed to the right rear the approach of 
heavy columns (it Avas the 40th Brigade); soon afterward 1 
noticed some statf to our rear riding on and alongside of the 
chauss«^e (Count Brandenburg IT.). Of the line of battle 
east of the Bois de Tronville nothing whatever could be 
seen. On reaching the Mars-la-Tour — Vionville road. Gen- 
eral von Schwarzkoppen turned his horse and rode back 
with Major von Scherff. 

(f) Events on the Side of the French. — Before detail- 

*It is to be inferred, therefore, that this officer communicated to 
General von Schwarzkoppen the intentions of General von Voigta- 
Rhetz regarding that cavalry division. 



Military-Historical Studies. 131 

iiig the course of the attack, I deem it necesHary to state 
how things had devr^loped up to that hour on the enemy's 
side, according to present results of historical research. On 
receiving orders to join in the battle. General Ladmir- 
ault directed Grenier's and Cissey's divisions to turn south- 
ward, Grenier in front, Cissey behind him, Legrand's cav- 
alry division bringing up the rear, the artillery reserve 
between the last two divisions. After the corps had been 
given the direction of liruville, the general, hastening to the 
front with his staff, reconnoitered in person the ground 
from the Yron to the Bois de Tronville. On arriving at 
Grey^re Ferme he saw the necessity of securely closing the 
valleys (of approach) joining here from the south and east.* 
He therefore ordered at once: 

1. A 12-pounder battery to be brought up, which he 
posted himself to the west of Grey^re Ferme so as to sweep 
the valley to the south. That battery opened fire as early as 
2 o'clock against the 4 squadrons of the 1st Guard Drag- 
oons then opposite the battery, killing the horse of Lieutenant 
von Bismarck,1[ and continued its fire without interruption as it 
found objects to fire at. 

2. To secure his flank, General Ladmirault ordered up 
the 5th Rifle Battalion, and subsequently — 

3. The entire 98th Regiment, to the vicinity of Grey^re 
Ferme. These troops, at 2:'Uj p. m., stood as follows: 5th 
Rifle Battalion to the west of the valley covered by the bat- 
tery, and 500 meters to the latter's front (south); the 98th 
Regiment stood east of the valley and southeast of the 
battery. After the general had thus posted the troops 
marching at the head (advance guard) of Grenier's division, 
the main body came up, w hich he allowed to continue the 

♦Bonie, Campagne de 1870, quoted by von Rohr, p. 125. 
tVon Rohr, p. 125. 



182 Inquiries into the Tactics of the Future. 

luaroh dm^ south (^approximatt' dhtHtion of Tronville). 
Suooossful at tirst in its oftViisivo moveuuMit. tlio division 
Avas drivon baok by tlio iJOtli ^liornian. — Tr.) Division, and 
had approximatoly the foUoAvinj; positit>n on the ridjie of 
Bniville before the arrival of General von SohNvar/.koppen: 
Kejrinient No. 13 depU\ved as skirmisliers, nortli of the rav- 
ine within 1200 meters of the great road liruvilK^^ — ]Mars la- 
Tour; in its rear juul overhippinu' on the U^ft Avas the 48d 
Keginunu; farther in rear, baok of the right of the 13th 
Kegimeut. was the tUth Hegiinent. extending ajs far as the 
great road. On the great road was a mitraiUense battery, 
and another battery on Height 840 ^both beU^nging to 
tlivnier's di visional. 

l>y 3 p. m. the entire artillery of Oissey's division had 
eome forward and had taken up one oontinuous position 
west of the great road from Bruville; the 57th and T3d Regi- 
ments of Cissey's division are said to have been resting 
siuoe 2:30 p. m.. "north of the ravine of Orey^re." removing 
their packs. The regiments "Nos. 1 and t». the -0th Chas- 
seurs, the artillery reserve, and Legrand's oavalry division 
were approaching. But lIOOO meters north of Orey^re 
Ferme, west of the road to Jarny. 1 regiment of Chasseurs 
d'Afrique, 1 of Guard Dragoons, and 1 of Cuard Lancers 
had been posted since 2 o'clock. Hence there were quite 
considerable forces of all arms between the great road from 
Bruville and the road to Jarny and west of the latter be- 
fore the arrival of Ceneral von Schwar/.koppen. Though 
they were not directly visible, still artillery and infantry 
fire had been kept up from Creyt^re Ferme ever since 
2 o'clock, the former being directed against Mars-la-Tour 
about the time of General von Schwarzkoppen's arrival. 
Generals von Barbv and Count Brandenburg had with- 



Military Uisloricai Hludien. J '^'> 

drawn to Mui-h la-Tour hefore tliat iirtt, before 2 i>. rn. roni':ial 

Account, I., r/>o, oo:',^ 

To give the rffadcr a connrjcted ar;count of the develop- 
ment of the French line of battle, I Hhould Htiite: AfU^r 4, 
Mnd h<'fore5 o'clock p. rn.,the entire divJKion of CiMKey hucc^^- 
Hively join^-d the Jirnt line; firnt, the 57th i^'ginIent (f^Mt of, 
and on, Ww. great roiid from lirnville; to itK right rear the VUl 
Uegiujent; they were HubHequently joined on the right 
(witnif by the 20th ChaKHeur battalion and reginjr-nlK Now. 1 
and «, the former in ftrKt, the latter in Kccond line. I have 
be(;n unable to aHf;er1iiin accurately the time when the artil- 
lery rcHcr v<- joj n <'<l i n 1 he arrtion . I have the i mpr*?«Hion that 
it wan at the i'nno when w^' w^-re crwHing the Vionville— 
MarH-la-Tour road — t. e., when we were attiu;king (about 
4:.">0 p. m.^; for from that time on the artillery fire became 
much more Hevere and we could fe^d from the detonations 
that reinforcenx'ntH rnuKt have arrived. All the batterif^ 
having Hufl'ered loKneK,* it Ik evident that the entire artillery 
rftWirxo, took part; in the caHe of one battery only, 7th— 8th 
(Dick HayH 9th— 8thi, no figureH are given. 

Though it may not have been practicable to observe 
directly from tlK- O^-rman left after 'A.'Mi p. m.f what troopH 
were in the vicinity t,f Grey^:;re Ferme and what was f/oing on 
to the wcKtof the great road from liruville,* ntill it could be 
seen: 1, that the entire Bruville ridge waw Htrongly occu- 
pied; 2, KhotH were conHtantly heard from the vicinity of 
Grey^re Ferme, even artillery fire, which nat Marfs-la-Tour 
on fire about 4 p. m.; Ti, an immeuHe cloud of duKt waH viHi- 
ble in the air for a long time over the wtction north of Grey- 
ere Ferme. The atmo«f»here waw clear, pure, and light. 

•Dick, pa«e 242-275. 

f Standpoint of General ron Schwarzkoppen. See sketch. 



134 Inquiries into the Tactics of the Future. 

The immense cloud of dust was the first thing to engross 
our attention on that day, more even than the fire, and was 
Tisiblo before "we turned off toward the place of assenMy of the 
brigade, 1000 meters southwest of Mars-la-Tour. It was 
our "point de rue.'' As one is in tlie habit of observing 
the flight of a baUoon, so we followed that oloud of dust 
around which we were moving in a semicircle. We de- 
bated what it might be, and my commander, with his unus- 
ually keen eyes, declared that the enormous wall of dust was 
steadily moving from northeast to southwest. I did not 
notice any break in it while we were circling around it. On 
approaching the standpoint of General von Schwarzkoppen, 
w'e could see plainly: 1, that the dust cloud was moring; 
and 2, to the soufhirest. exactly toward Grey^re Ferme; 
3, also that the heights of Bruville were strongly held, and 
therefore that the cause of that dust-cloud was still adire. 
What was that cause? llie nwvcment of large bodies, which, 
however, could not be discerned themselves! But the sight was 
so striking, (I have never seen the like in my military career), 
and having plainly before our eyes the heights of Bruville 
garnished with masses of troops, it was not difficult to 
foresee that something of importance would soon develop 
from Grey^re Ferme. 

(g) Course of the Afiacl-. — The arri^■al of considera- 
ble reinforcements on the enemy's side had been noticed 
since 2 o'clock; active movements were observed in his 
line at R^zonville (withdrawal of the IT. Corps, inser- 
tion of the Guard Corps and of a division of the III. 
Corps), and no diminution of the forces in the center 
was perceptible. At 2 p. m. it was known on the Ger- 
man side, from captured prisoners, that the II.. VI., and 
Guard Corps were present on the other side. At 3:15 



Military-Historical Studies. 135 

p. m. the length of the French line of battle was almost 
doubled— from St. Marcel to Oroy^re Ferme— and the con- 
viction gained ground on the Cjerman side that the entire 
Army of the Rhine was in front of us. On our side 2 army 
corps, a division, and 2 cavalry divisions could be counted 
on becoming successively available until late in the even- 
ing; the enemy's withdrawal had been prevented: Flav- 
igny, Vionville, Mars-la-Tour were in our hands; only our 
left wing had temporarily quitted the Bois de Tronville 
because ontflanlccd after 2 ]). m. by two fresh army corps 
(III. and IV.). 

Between 2 and a:15 p. m. the situation had been crit- 
ical, for the enemy might at any moment be expected to ad- 
vance across the Vionville — Mars-la-Tour road. When 
these anxious hours were over, the 88th Brigade had reached 
Mars-la-Tour, the enemy having withdrawn from the Bois de 
Tronville since 3:1.5 p. m. The left of Orenier's division and 
some batteries had continued their advance on the west of 
the Tronville copse until about 3:15 p. m., and until opposite 
the southern edge of the northern portion of the copse. 
They withdrew to the position, ITeight 840— Grey^re Ferme, 
when they met the artillery which had hastened forward in 
advance of the 20th Division under Colonel von der Goltz. 
At a point 600 meters north of the Vionville— Mars-la- 
Tour road, where shortly before the enemy's artillery had 
been. Colonel von der C.oltz took up the battle about 3:30 
p. m. Two battalions of the Seventy-ninth were in the 
Tronville copse, while the remainder of the 20th Division 
was forming up. The batteries of Colonel von der Goltz 
were joined by those of the 40th Brigade, so that after 3:30 
p. m. he had 24 guns under him west of the Tronville copse. 
The appearance of these fresh forces in front in connection 
with the reported approach of German troops from Hannon- 



136 Inquiries into the Tactics of the Future. 

Tille against his right flank, and the order from Marshal 
Bazaine to hold the position, were the causes of Ladmir- 
ault's defensive. A subsequent offensive on the part of the 
French, as soon as they should feel strong enough, was not 
precluded. 

General von Yoigts-Khetz decided to take the offensive 
himself against these new forces, and issued the necessary 
orders at 3:30 p. m. The general meant the 20th Division 
to attack in front, the 3Sth Brigade to attack the enemy's 
right flank, and the 5th Cavalry Division to act on the ex- 
treme left according to circumstances. The commander of 
the 20th Division misunderstood that order — at any rate, he 
did not act in accordance with it. For that reason the at- 
tack was not carried out as planned, inasmuch as of the 15 
half-hattalions ordered to make the afta-cJc, 10 — those of General 
von Kraatz of the 20th Division — ivithdrew in consequence of the 
misunderstanding at the very minute when General von Schwarz- 
Jcoppen, agreeahly to his directions, had thrown forward the SSth 
Brigade. 

Prince Frederick Charles left Pout t\ Mousson on horse- 
back at 2 p. m., and was at Vionville at 4 p. m. (26 kilo- 
meters). The commander-in-chief intended to keep on the 
defensive on his right and to attack the heights of Bruville 
with his left, X. Army Corps (see Official Account, I., 611), 
which was in perfect accord with the measures initiated by 
General von A'oigts-Khetz. 

General von Schwarzkoppen had been ordered to sup- 
port the frontal attack of the 20th Division by a flank at- 
tack. The execution had been left to him, and it became 
his duty to make certain of the cooperation of the 20th Divi- 
sion, by waiting the latters development, and by keeping a 
sharp eye on the doings of the enemy. The general's station 
permitted both of the foregoing to be done, and although the 



Military-Hislorical Studies. 137 

criHiH juKt paHW^d had been Herious, Btill at this hour, about 
4 p. m,, there was nothing pre8Hing in the 8ituation; the en- 
emy wa« rather delaying. Hince General von Hchwarzkop- 
pen had received the order to attack, the situation on 
the Wu\<'. i)i the enemy had been conKiderably changed 
Cwhich, however. General von VoigtB-Rhetz could not Re<f 
from hi8 station at Tronville), the French right having 
been extended to the road to Jarny and advanced to 
Grey^re Ferme. Admitting that General von Bchwarzkop- 
pen was unable from his station to gain a suflScient idea of 
the strength and extent of the French right, still the above 
mentioned movements on the part of the enemy could 
hardly have escaped him altogethf^r. and in looking over 
the wide space between the road to Jarny and the Tron- 
ville copse, he should have realized that 5 half-battal- 
ions were not sufficient for an attack there, and that if 
he attacked nevertheless, his front would be too extended 
and he would be taken in flank himself. Timely repre- 
sentation made under these circumstances would perhaps 
have caused General von Voigts-Khetz to modify his order. 
No such message was sent and — what is much worse — Gen- 
eral von Hchwarzkoppen did not wait for the deployment of 
the 2mh Division. 

For the execution of the attack General von Bchwarzkop- 
pen assigned to the right wing (I., F. — ^57th. 2 pioneer com- 
panies), the northwest angle of the Bois de Tronville (^Official 
Account, I., 605); to the left (11., I. — 10th), he gave a due 
north direction toward Greyere Ferme (^Oflficial Account. I., 
C07j, whence it becomes plain that, as the brigade was deploy- 
ing by wings. F. — 10th and I. — 57th would have to advance 
in a northeasterly direction between the two wings. These 
dispositions having been made, the attack was undertaken 
without obtaining sufficient information of the extent and 

10 — 



188 Inquiries into the Tactics of the Future, 

strength of tlio ononiv's lijilit wiiij; — a fradirt' that was ro- 
peated two days lattM- a( St. l*i-ivat — tliouj^h such infonna- 
tion shoiihl bo aseorlaiiiod before ani/ attack; moroovor, as 
the objectives of attack assigned to the wings of the brigade 
were widelj' apart, the one being to the north, the other to 
the northeast, and as the brigade had been formed on the 
then prescribed maximum front 1000 meters southwest of 
^lars-la-Tour and facing toward Tronville, scattering and 
irreguhir movements became unavoidable, unless front was 
first taken toward Oreyt^re Ferme and toward the north- 
west angle of the Bois de Tronville. 

That General von Voigts-Khetz dispatched the 5th Cav- 
alry Division to the vicinity of Yille sur Yron to act against 
the enemy's right during the contemplated attack of the 
8 brigades was probably due to a higher consideration, inas- 
much as it sprang from accurate information of the em^- 
my's doings furnished by the latest rei)orts from Barby's 
brigade. Barby's reports were sent to corps headipiarters, 
and they were probably not, certainly not early enough, 
communicated to General von Schwarzkoppen. That 
should be kept well in mind in criticisiug General von 
Schwarzkoppen's measures. On the withdrawal of Barby's 
brigade. General Count Brandenburg "also" withdrew at 
3 p. m. in the direction of Mars-la-Tour. The cavalry had 
therefore been in close touch with the enemy since he had 
emerged from Doncourt, it had seen w^ell, and had reported; 
that was 2 hours before the attack of the 88tli Brigade, but 
the proper rules and necessary arrangements for an effi- 
cient system of reports, particularly on the Hanks, do not 
seem to have prevailed. Thus it may be explained that 
General von Schwarzkoi)pen, who should have been best 
informed and to whom, as the senior officer present, all 
reports should have been brought — if merely shown him in 



Mililary-IIulorical Studies. 139 

puHHiriK — v\JiH ill fiicl not. in u ponilioii lo fuHill llio rolo that 
under Huch cirouinHtancoK fallH to the lot of the Henior ofTi<fT 
on the \'.ic\\c;i\ ari<] Htnifej^icnl flnnk. It Ih one of many 
inHt}in<<'H (hat ^o lo hIiow i\ut irnportanee of a properly 
rr'^iil;il<'<l KyKlfMn of r^poilH. 

The allaek of Ihe Iroojm of the .''>8th lirigade whi(;h 
were advaneinj? (^antward was diHJointed, and ho waw that 
of the individual hallalions. I waH from beginninf^ to end 
exactly in the eenlf-r of th^ line of fjattle, mounted, and 
eoijh] Koe in nil dii<'<( ioriH unlil Ihe Hmoke became ho denne 
that 11. — IfJLh and I. — lOth were liicM^n from my vi<'w; I 
:im (iMMcfore an eye-witncHH. 

The individnul battalionH HUCceHHively advanced from 
left to ri^hl lovvnrd the north and norfheaHt, tlie two battcr- 
icH Hupjjorlin^ tin* movement fi-om Iheir Cnecondj position 
norlli of MarH-la-Tour. 'I'ho two left llnnk battalionH, It. 
and I. — loth, havinj^ the HhortoHt road, advanced farth- 
<;Ht to the north, croHHed the ravine of Hruville, preserved 
their lead to the end of the action, and may be Haid to have 
fought a separate action under Colonel von lUixen, On 
the ri^ht F. — 571h and the 2 f*ioneer comf)anieH had to 
doHcribe the greatest arc, and when we consider that the 
lino which executed the wheel extended as far as the Bois 
de Tronville and had a length of 2500 meters, it becomes 
plain that, nothwithstanding the acceleration of its march, 
that wing would arriv<*d on (he line of battle al, least half an 
hour after Ihe battalions on (he left. The su[)f)ortH of the 
two center battalionH (12th and IJth— lOth of F. — Kith, and 
4(h and '.Ul — r»7th of I. — 571 hj moved forward exactly on a 
line, while (lie skirminhers of 2d — 57th became mingled with 
those of 10th— 16th. (Bee Sketch III.)* 

♦It, wiJH owing to the fact that V. — 16th did not reaf;h Its place 
from Mariaville Ferme until iHt and 2d — 57th had deployed skirmish- 



liO Inquiries inio the Tactics of ihe Future. 

lu\c:inuinii at Oontonr ISO. tho forniatioii of \\\o hv\iX'M\o 
(vom lofi to rijiht was as follows: 

Fu"«t lino: oth UUh. T(h- UUh. 'M Itiih. iM Kith. 
llth — U»th. *J platoons of lM — oTth. lOth— l(»th. I plattHUi 
of l!d — o7ih. o platoons of Ist — oTtli as skirntishors as far aa 
tho l>ois do Tronvillo. 

Sorond lint\ lot* ttitMois in voiw. Sth. t>th lt>ih: Hit. 
liSt—ldtlK 1-th. ;)(h-U»th; tth. :Ui oTih: Utli. !Mh :>7th; 
I2th.10th— r>7th:2r. T. X. 

From this point and from tho i-avim» north of Mars la 
Tour tho formation was ohaniiod as follows, singlo lino ho- 
inj; formod ovorywhoro and tho sorond lim^ ]nishini; in 
whort^vor it found room: 

rirsi lino: 5th— KUh. (Uh— l(>th.* Tth Kith, v^th— 
KUh.t 4th— U>th. :'.d— UUh. "Jd- lt»th. llth— l(»th. 1st— l»5th. 
i! platoons of 2d — oTth. \0{\\ — IGtli. 1 platoon of i!d — 57th. 
12th. Oth— ItUh.J 1 platoon of 1st— o7th. llth. l^th— o7th. 
1 platoon of 1st -o7th. I'Jth. U>th -o7th. 1 platoon of 
1st — 57 th. 

ors south of tho Vionvillo — Mars-la-Tour chausstV by Couer.nl von 
Sohwaiv.UoiHHMi's onior. b\— liUh then tidvanood oxaotly botwtvn tho 
loft of tho skirmishors of 1st— fiTth and tho risht of 2d— r>Tlh and 
maintaiuod its souoral dlrei'tiou. thus hroakiug up 1.— STth from the 
bosinniug. 

*0u tho maps of the Rogimoutal Historios of tho KUh and 57th 
Rogimonts, tho r-.th and (Uh Oomvvvnios of tho KUh Rosimont aro 
shown too far to tho north, noar tho nwino rnnniug oast aud wost. 
I disputed that in tho first edition of this book, and to-day. after 
ivpoatod n->soatvh. 1 repeat that it is wrong, for tho 5th Frenoh 
Chasseur l»attalion Jioror ct'ont'd to hold the angle where the two 
ravines join. 

tit is doubtful which of the two oompanios. Tth or Sth. was on 
the right; it is of no taotioal oons^Hiuonoo jvnyway. 

JThis statement agrot^s with page 271 of tho History of tho UUh 
Regiment, hut ditTers materially with rog-jxrd to tho Fusilier I'at- 
t:Uion of tho regiment. Captain Ohly has oontirmed my statement. 

While abroad in tho fall of ISSO. I Uwrned of tho impending 
publication of the History of the l(5th Regiment. Knowing th.at 
such publications boar an official character. I endeavored to come 



Military- JI iHlorical. Hl/udiefs. I H 

K<'f;orul lirif, 20() iii>-\«-vh to thr; Houth: 4fh — 57th, 'Ul — 

r,7th, 2 r. (;. x. 

(.'f> to Tonlour 7S0 t\\c )ohh<'H wcrx' not vr-ry hoavy, Jind 
vvhiU- ilir- advance waH coniifni'd thence to the north, we 
could diHiinctly Hee the advance of a portion — ffHtimated by 
von Koll af OhaftalionH — of (/reni^'r'H divJHion in a Hontherly 
dir<''lioii. II moved with threat rafjidity, in double time, 
<h»ufi III'- Hlfjpe, and rear^hefj lli'- norflu-rn edj^e of the ravine 
before we liad apf)roach<'d to within 80 — 100 inetr-rH of the 
Huiiw from the Houth, <^)p[)OHed to thin infantry of the 
enemy waH the j^reater f^art of F. — IfJth, f. — 57th, F. — 57th, 
2 ]i')<)ii<-cr 'oinpanieH, X. 

On the other hand, II.— Hith and I.- Hilli ff^uiid the 
further edi;e of the ravine unoccupied, aw CiHHcy'H divi.sion 
waH Htill on the niarr;h between Orey?^re Ferine and the 
great road i'voiu P.tuville to MarH-la-Tour; I could plainly 
obHcrve the movement frf>m my horne fbein^ with F. — 10th 
and I.-57thj. The rij^lit and eenter of the brij^ade were 
(jnder Hevr-re fire from Heve/;i| tieiH M, from the northern eflj^e 
of the ravine; 2, from Ibti^ht 84t» to the road liruvilh — MarH 
laTourj, Tlie Iohhch increaxed; we had ex[)ected to take the 
enemy in flank, and now were flanked ourHelvcB fronn 
Oreyere Ferme (CiHHey'H diviHionj. Thref? deployed bri- 
gadeH of the enemy were i^itted against us at 5 o'clock, 

to an iin']f;rHt,anfllng with thf rf;girriffnt in order to prevent further 
incorre<;t HtaternentB by furniHhinK data bawed on my extenwive 
r('.H«-/,i.r(.ht:H. It would have been Impertinent on my r^art to Inform 
tbe re^^lment dlreetly that Hueh and Kueb KtatementH v/ere ineorreet. 
I therefore aHked the regimental eomrnander for anKwerH it) Heveral 
fjueHtlonw whieh I Htated would be Important for a taetleal study 
baw;d on tbat event. I Ktated at the same time that it waH my Inten- 
tion to publiKh the Htudy In 1881. The regimental commander 
declined, and Hlmply informed me of the Impending appearance of 
the IflHtory of the l«th Regiment, and that I would find In it 
the anHwerH to my queHtlonH. The settlement of doubtful jxjintH 
thuH became Impractlcahle. 



142 Inqviries into the Tactics of the Future. 

which, subsequently, were reinl'oreetl by half a brigade (of 
Cissey's division) and 1 chasseur battalion (of Grenier's 
division). Up to this time our opponents were lying- 
flat on the ground, so that nothing was visible except 
the upturned visors of their headgear, and they cov- 
ered our detachments on that shelterless ground with 
a destructive fire. At about 80 — 100 meters south of 
the ravine F. — Kith, and the line from F. — 10th eastward, 
halted and attempted to reply to the enemy's fire. From 
that moment the attadc flagged; the men lay down, but even 
then failed to obtain cover; two-thirds of the oflicers were 
hors-de-coni1)ot, and, deprived of its soul, the attack col- 
lapsed. The men held out for a little while longer, then the 
unavoidable happened — they fell back. 
The following was the result: 

1. The 5 battalions did not make their appearance be- 
yond the ravine of Mars-la-Tour as brave assailants, for, out 
of the 20 companies, but 8 (1st, 2d, 8d, 4th, 7th, 8th, 11th— 
16th and 2d — a7th) reached its northern edge. The troops of 
the 16th Regiment opened the action before the center and 
I'ight as stated, having the shorter distance to cover; they 
did not find the battle-field so well prepared by the enemy as 
did the others, and anticipated Cissey's division at the north 
ern edge of the ravine; only when the latter came up in dou- 
ble time were our companies compelled to give way before 
the enemy's greatly superior numbers. 

2. With the exception of these 8 companies, no pavt 
of the line got farther north than a point 80 — 100 meters 
south of the ravine. 

8. Needle-gun and chassep6t did not mutually exer- 
cise their destructive effect; the destruction fell on us alone. 

4. After we had begun to retreat, the French got 
within 50 to 30 meters of us simply because, concealed 



Mililary-IIislorical Studies. H3 

by the denso smoke, they surijiised us, and because our in- 
fantry was too exhausted to run. On the left of the bri- 
gade alone (I. and parts of II.— IGth) the French inter- 
mingled with our men; hence the 400 prisoners lost by the 
16th Keglment. 

5. It was only now, on the retreat, that our losses 
amounted to destruction. Details will be found in the 
chapter on losses. 

As the French line arrived within 150 meters north of 
Contour 780 the 1st Guard Dragoons appeared and whirled 
the enemy's infantry down. The latter ran to the rear, 
masking the front of the French position ; they forgot to fire, 
or fired wildly, and threw away knapsacks and arms. A gen- 
eral pause ensued along the entire line of battle; even the 
artillery was silent; the action seemed ended. The brave 
horsemen saved many of our men from captivity. 

Subsequently the signal "All advance" was heard from 
the direction of the Tronville copse.* It came from .the 
20th Division. A few minutes later the 38th Brigade could 
be seen divided into two groups, one in the angle between 
the Tronville copse and the Vionville — Mars-la-Tour road, 
the other 500 meters east of Mars-la-Tour: the former the 
57th Regiment, under Major von Modem; the latter the 16th 
Regiment, under Lieutenant-Colonel Sannow. Six bat- 
teries were in action north of the Mars-la-Tour — Vionville 
road. The above is the course of the action. 

To reach the battle-field the 38th Brigade had marched 
37 kilometers under an oppressive heat;t still its strength 
was not all spent. 

At a distance of 2500 — 2000 meters (approximate dis- 
tance of the Vionville — Mars-la-Tour road from the line 

*Itmay have been 5:45 or 6 p.m. 

fThe Oflficial Account states the distance as 42 kilometers. 



144 Inquiries into the Tactics of the Future. 

Height S46 — Grey^re Ferme) one-third of the companies 
were deployed as skirmishers.* At the beginning the first 
line was formed of skirmish lines supported by a platoon 
each. In second line followed, in half-battalion formation, 
8th, 6th— 16th; 4th, 1st— 16th; ,12th, 9th— 16th; 11th, 
9th — 57th; 12th, 10th — 57th (in company column, two to- 
gether); while 4th — 56th, 3d — 57th, 2 pioneer companies, X. 
followed as individual company columns. When the first 
line halted 80 or 100 meters south of the ravine, it was 
joined by the second line. The 4th — 57th and 3d — 57th were 
retained lying on the ground in close order 200 meters far- 
ther south upon signal from Lieutenant-Colonel von Roll.f 
In the last stage of the action 12th, 9th — 16th were lying 
doivn in close order, 11th, 9th — 57th and 12th, 10th — 57th were 
standing in closed line; 11th, 9th — 57th fired several volleys, 
after which the advance was resumed, which, 20 — 30 meters 

♦General von Schwarzkoppen accompanied the troops on horse- 
back as far as the Mars-la-Toiir — Vionville road — ;. c, within the 
zone of infantry fire, remarking repeatedly, "Skirmishers only, 
gentlemen." 

tHe did not wish these two companies to slip from his hand, 
because, as he said, he anticipated bad results from this "chase" and 
from the disorder. Both companies suffered small losses. (Compare 
later on with chapter on losses.) In the History of the 57th Regi- 
ment, -which in other respects has profited much from the first edition 
of this book, these two companies have been located on the extreme 
right by the side of I. — 57th. The author's error is all the more 
unintelligible to me as he was with 4th — 57th, and I can still see him 
as he fell when hit by a glancing bullet. I moreover saw both com- 
panies on the retreat. Had they been at the spot indicated in that 
history, atid formed as a half -battalion hi company columns, their losses 
would have been treble those they suffered, and something like those 
of 12th, 10th— 57th. 

But in addition these two companies, as the action stood, could 
not have reached that point except by a diagonal movement, irliich 
wotild have carried them over about 1000 meters of the most exposed part 
of the entire battle-field. This statement alone has been sufficient to 
draw from every practical officer to whom I have mentioned the sub- 
ject the remark that it u'as impossible. But I saw these things plainly, 
and the small losses of 4th, 3d — 57th constitute additional proof. 
Aside from the military-historical point of view, such errors are to 
be deplored as standing in the way of correct conclusions and lessons! 



Military-Historical Studies. 145 

further, brought it up against the advancing masses of the 
enemy (skirmishers and columns intermingled in one line). 

The brigade thus had employed very different forma- 
tions, ''swarms of skirmishers," ''closed platoons," "closed 
company columns,'' half-battalions "in column" and "in 
line," and that on ground of uniform character. This consti- 
tuted a tactical error from the moment when Contour 780 
was crossed; beyond that line skirmishers should alone have 
been used, but in those days we had neither an accurate 
knowledge of the efficiency of the enemy's rifle nor the requi- 
site skill in the fighting of masses of skirmishers. 

The regiments of the brigade fought abreast of each 
other, and on arriving 80 — 100 meters south of the ravine 
had crossed 1400 meters under the fire of the enemy's 
masses; according to the Official Account, they lost 72 offi- 
cers and 2542 men out of 95 officers and 4546 men which 
they numbered before the battle. The strength as given 
is approximately correct; in the case of the losses the fig- 
ures are incorrect.* There was no lying down or rushes 
during the advance. Three battalions of the brigade, 
F. — IGth, I. — 57th, and F. — 57th, advanced in the then much 
affected "accelerated" step, without pause of any kind, and 
did not halt until forced by the fire and by the attack of the 
enemy. Hence the expression "chase" on the part of 
Lieutenant-Colonel von Roll, and hence the physical ex- 
haustion when forced to halt. I am unable to state 
whether II.— IGth and I. — 16th advanced by lying down and 
by rushes; I could not always observe them; but I consider 
that statement to be one of the stories which are wont to be 
spread as history and by other means in connection with 
most any event. The 57th Regiment is indebted to the 
1st Guard Dragoons for losing but few prisoners and for 

♦Compare later chapter on losses. 



146 Inquiries into the Tactics of the Future. 

tbe escape of most of those that had been captured; the 
10th Regimeut fared N\orse and lost more than 300 men, 
mostly from the 2d and 1st battalions, because the charge 
of the dragoons could have no effect in that quarter. From 
the right of 3d — 57th (extreme limit of their attack to the 
north and east), the dragoons wheeled to the left and gal- 
loped back circling around Mars-la-Tour 250 meters to the 
north of Contour 780. The material results of the attack 
were not proportioned to the losses. Lieutenant von Streit, 
who visited the enemy's position on the next morning, as- 
sured me that not 10 French dead were lying north of the 
ravine which runs east and west. The half-division had 
had nothing to eat all day. 

III. Eefrospects. 

Of the two attacks which we have undertaken to eluci- 
date after thorough research, the first, in view of the mod- 
ern state of tactics, can claim historical interest only; its 
details could not be carried out against an opponent armed 
with small-caliber rifles,* and what was formerly practica- 
ble in the way of tactical leading of large units is barred 
by the modern rifle with its flat trajectory, long range, and 
great penetration. The second attack, on the other hand, 
remains to-day almost the only source from which, by 
judicious use, we may derive practical laws for the tactics 
of the future; for that purpose it is necessary, however, to 
dissect the events under the magnifying-glass, so to speak. 

Notwithstanding the difference in the general state of 
the battle, of the numbers engaged, of the armament, and 
of the unequal results of the attacks, both have many fea- 
tures in common which provoke instructive reflections. 

♦Wherever small-caliber rifles are mentioned, smokeless pow- 
der is also assumed. 



Military-IIisiorical Studies. 147 

The dissimilarities are to be found in the first place in 
the objects of the opponents. The object of the defense of 
the wood of Briz was, and could not be anything else but 
to cover a retreat already begun. At Vionville (Mars-la- 
Tour), liowever, the French meant to hold the field of battle 
and to repulse our attacks. At Problus the forces of the 
defender were about equal to those of the attacker; at Mars- 
la-Tour they were far superior to ours. 

The armament of the f?axon-Austrian infantry was 
inferior, that of the artillery equal to ours, if not superior, 
but at Vionville (Mars-la-Tour) the arm of the French in- 
fantry was much better than that of the German infantry, 
while the artillery of the latter excelled that of the French. 

The attack on Problus-Bor succeeded; that on the 
heights of Bruville was the greatest tactical defeat suffered 
in any attack in the entire war. The conditions were 
similar at Konnigratz and Vionville: 1, as regards the 
morale of the Saxons and of the French; 2, as regards their 
tactical efficiency; and 3, as regards the field of battle. 
The position in the wood of Briz had been artificially 
strengthened, but it was not thereby rendered more difficult 
to assault than was the other by the ravine extending along 
the front of the French position; and if the obstacles on 
the latter field are considered — wire fences, which were cov- 
ered by the enemy's infantry fire — the French position is to 
be considered stronger than the Austrian. 

The attacks of the 14th Division on Problus-Bor and 
of the 19th Half-Division on the heights of Bruville differ 
chiefly in respect to the preparations, the deployment, the 
proper disi»ositions, and the promulgation in unmistakable 
form of the object of the action ; as regards the leading of 
large units under the enemy's fire, they are instructive on 
account of what was done as well as on account of what 



Its Inquirit's into the Tactics of the Future. 

WAS i\oi tloiu\ 'riu> \\'\\\ \o \vi\i\ Mini i'oniritl was (lu> saiut* 
on ho{\\ oiOMsious; llu> sUill dilTorcil. 

I am (lisiiu'liiuMl to admit as a faot that dirtH-tiiui >vns 
moriMlilVuull at Mars la 'l\n\r than it was at IM-oMus; tluuiiih 
ii was moiT ri^strioltHl— /. c. in spai-t'. Tlu* (HHUMillit's of 
loadinji' and control wtMo probably jiroattM* at Trobhis. for 
thoro loatitM's and troops w(Mt> aliUo without warliko t>xptM'\- 
oniH» — »'. ('., prartii'o. and 1 bolit>vo that on that vorv ai'coiint 
llu> ailiim was diroctt^l with (ho ii't>n strii-lni^ss. and at 
tlu^ san»t> timo with tho si-rupuhmsnoss. ohara^'ttM'istic of a 
poaotM^xot'iiso. At Mars la 'Pour all tho headers and uiauy 
of tho nuMi had war t>x|>(>rionrt>. 'V\\v arnnnl poav'o from 
18(U> to ISTO and tho manifost dosiro for war on tho part of 
tho Fronoh had uiortH>vor rompt^lod ns to stndv tlioir tao 
tics, so that a knowliHluo of thorn on our ])art may b(» as 
sumod. Oral and writltm instructions issutnl bt^foro tho 
war attest that. It cannot bo admitttnl that wo faiUul to 
foresee bt>fort> the collision what was impendiuii' and what 
would be required of tlu» leaders. They knew that on 
ground devoid of shelter and under destructive infantry 
fnv combined dirtnMion was bound to conic to an end. and 
that, once that point was reached, the troops would be out 
of hamf : if such was tht^ fact, practical success could not be 
ijainiHl under !iuch circunisti}nee.<. If, n\oreover, the leadiM's 
exposed themselves unduly — as was dom^ — fiu* the purpose 
of compt^Uinji- success — the loss of the leaders, t^vtMi of the 
superior leaders, became unavoidabh\ which happenoil, as 
we know, and nothitiji' could remain of a large body of 
troops but dead scoria\ morally and physically broken, with- 
out orjjauizativui, without leaders, and for the time heini] nut\t 
for stM'vice. 

It is wrouii' to exan\int^ the situation of individual 
troop units in an abstract way. Frontal attacks against 



Military- ffistorkal Htudip./t. 149 

:i w«'ll l<'<l <-ii<-tiiv proiiiiH*- rcHullH only Jiflcr lli«- Hup'-riorify 
of fin- liJJH br'cri j^aiiicfJ. To (l;iy the dociHiori jh Wic work of 
(lio fIsinkH more IIijjii t-vi'V, and horo Ihf; action of Iho Army 
of flic Klhc on .Inly ''., IHOfJ, alHO forniH {^oo<l illuHfrafioii. 
Mh niiirvli (o (he field is (»|>cn lo fril iciHiii, ;iri(l in Hfafirijj 
Oiaf flic Jiriny waH i(>]\i\H'\\c(\ to wiiMJ through a <l<'flIo 
(Xccluniilzj tlic ()tli(;iii.| A(:<:ot]nt \h in error.* To ndrlnco 
[)ioor iH (piitc nnn«'<'('HHary. Rtill, after the delay of (wo 
lionrH, the cxeollenc*' of Hut leading of the Army of the Elbe 
(Mtli and IHtli DiviHioriH) eannot be denied. The initiative 
of the Hubor-dinate lead<'rH never tr-ariHf^reHHed beyond the 
boiindH of llie fij^htin^-f^ronnd of (he brigade, and the mo- 
ment, a HnceeHH had been won, meanureH were; taken to 
Hecure it before i)ro('eedint^ further.! We have here nii- 
merouH nieaHureH, none of whieh waH laekin^^ in uniformity 
an<l eombiriJition of leading. It might be ealied ;iti ideal 
cawe of the liiHk HyHt<'jn, but ;i moment'H reflection will show 
that modern conditionK would <all for material modifica- 
tiouH. Such i»rogreHHive, HyHtematic, and cautiouH action 
loHt to the victor great reHultH, to be Huro, for there can be no 
doubt flint after the capture of the wood of I*ri7>, the entire 
2Kth I'ligjKh' might have advaneed on liriz and KoHnitz, if 
the Mill) Division li;id followed (he j4(li by the HhorteHt route 
through Pi'obluH and KoHiiifz, iuHtead of making a long 
detour and getting Htuck, and if the IHth DiviHion had 
been y)ut in motion in the HJiine direction, which waw not at 
:ill iriifiracticable. Tli;i( would have rcHnlted in a catas- 
trophe to the AuHtriauH on the field of battle. One of the 

♦PaKo. 399, II., Omcfal Af.coiint of 1800. 

tSelziir<; of lli(! croHHitiK .'if NffliunH.K, ejipl iiie of .Ncfluinitz, utn] 
Liibrio, oftfii nation of f,h»! wf)0'l and riffRo of I'opowltz, of the wooi] 
of 0()fM-I'rlrn, of the villaKfrH of Nffii- and Nifjdor-I'rlm, of the pheaH- 
antry of .lehlitz, of Stezire)<, Steinfelrl, 01)er-l'rlnri, ProbluH, height of 
ProinuH, wood of liriz, and farmstead of IJor. 



1;>0 Inquiries info ihe Tactics of the Future. 

oluof roasous >vliv things iliil noi lakt' siuli a uiiu was ra*ii- 
oral voii Horwartli's failure to havo tho loqiiisito bridijos 
built at tlu> proper time. Kut even as utattois aotuallv 
stoiHl. the luaiu foiees. .'> ilivisious of the Arniv of the Klbt\ 
would have reaehed the Austrian line of retreat sutVu'ieutly 
earlv. if the eoiuiuander oi tln> h»th division had resolutely 
followed the direetion of Problus. The division -would eer- 
tainly have been joined by the troops at that village and in 
the vicinity, a^si they felt themselves morally ami physically 
equal to it, ami tlu> situation dematuh\i the utovement. 
That was wt^U reoojjni/.ed by the 14th Division. Here, 
however, we have the ease of (uMieral von Kt/.el, which 
resembles that of tuMieral voii Kraat/. at \ionviUe. lu 
order to see the connection of thinjjs, it is necessary to lay 
bare the causes without sparinj;: otherwise we fail to arrive 
at history or at correct deductions, or to jiain anythiup: use- 
ful. Moreovt>r. the tnitire cavalry should have been at 
CMiarbnsit/. which was likewise practicable. 

The fact that we confronted an opponent whom we 
never had overcome in a ui'eat battle, and whose ethcieney 
we respected, accounts for these cautious tactics; they re- 
(luired the presence of the hiijhest leaders at the decisive 
points. In that respect the attack of the 14th Oivision 
airain furnishes a model. 

Subsequent history has demonstrated how easily the 
lutxiern tire tijjht may degenerate into an action of numerous 
companies and smaller bodies impelled forward by the more 
bold than enlightened initiative of their oflicers. ^Ve have 
had to experience the mischievous side of such individual- 
i/.ed combat but rarely and in a limited way, but the tiuestion 
of what will result when the individualized contlict emls in 
ilefeat is most uncomfortable. The question might have been 
answered by the battles of Vionville on August ItUh. and of 



M Hilary- I/islorical Hludun. 151 

Loijfny on IX'coniber 2, 1870, IijkI not Ww. cwcmy b*.'<;n i»oh 
hchh<mJ of Hiirli iiiiliiiiilcd Hhort-HiglitodnoHH. 

/ V. '/'aclicH at l'rohlunlior on July S, 1806. 
On .July .'', IHOfJ, w<; boliold an fiiliro diviHion on diffi- 
cult ground and ncvf-r for u rnorriont Hlipping from thu 
graHp of itfi cornniiiinjc;' fr-oui hr-j^inning to (;nd of the 
•action; everything waH reguhitod, and whatevf-r did creep 
in waH at once Hnhjfctfd to control. in the attack, long 
HkirrnJHli lincH followed by Hniall HiipportH alternated with 
llic double eoliinin on the cr-ntr-r (FuHilier Battalion 57tli, 
II. and I. Jiattalion ITtlij. At the key-point of the enemy'H 
poHition, one battalion (F. — 5fith) Hnffered Ioshch er|ual to 
thoHe HnH'err'd in 1H70 at the handH of Irn[>erial French 
troo[)H ju-nied with breecfiloaderH, Jind uKliou^li deprived 
of ilH leadei-H, it carried tli<; obntinately defended village by 
aHHault. Immediately after the HucceHHfiil aHHault the flrHt 
care waH for the defenne of the captured point. The diH- 
ordered Hwarmn were re formed. Everywhere the diviwion 
and brigadr; genenilH were active in the first line, gave their 
orders there in perHon, jind Hfmrred on the troopH. The bat- 
taliooH were re formed id ;i, v<-vy short space of time, and 
every cover was carefully utilized to minimize the losseH. 
In that way an entire division remained in the hands of 
one man all the time and throughout the several hours of a 
difficult attack; he always knew where the tactical units 
(battalionsj were. It was the ben u( if ill idejil of a Inrge move- 
ment in attack, carried out vvilh a perfection probably never 
seen on any other occasion. 

Not only did the officers throughout the military hier- 
archy, each in his place, h;ep their Iroops in hand, but there 
was at the same time no neglect of the second great tactical 
hiw of Iceepinf/ the troops in motion as long as possible and of de- 



152 Inquiries into the Tactics of the Future. 

laying the lire until it promised good results. The action 
of the entire 14th Division as it was would have been im- 
possible had not time and circumstances been utilized before 
the battle in the manner in which they actually were. 
The lirst requisites for any tactical success are correct dis- 
position, correct direction, undisturbed posting of the indi- 
vidual, principal units (brigades) beyond the enemy's fire; 
and, after the completion of the deployment from the 
marching column, resolute and uniform advance to the at- 
tack. These preparations are not the least instrumental 
in securing success, and we attach the greater importance to 
them in the attack because all were not sutticieutly respected 
in the attack of the 38th Brigade on August IG, 1870, and be- 
cause plan, disposition, and deployment are rendered more 
difficult by smokeless powder and long-range rifles. Generals 
and general staff officers had spent the forenoon of July 3d in 
familiarizing themselves with the battle-ground; to be sure, 
they had more time than on August 16, 1870. After the 
tactical bodies had been directed into their courses, the 
most important law on which all tactics are based, that of 
human nature, was strictly observed. The march was not 
stopped at the edge of the zone of fire, but continued within 
the same, without, however, losing control of the troops. The 
first halt in the attack of the 28th Brigade being made within 
250 meters of the enemy's abattis. Up to that time the resist- 
ance of two Saxon battalions on the edge of the height south 
of Problus had to be overcome, and the rows of dead Saxons 
bore witness to the efficiency of our infantry fire. The height 
of Problus commanded the entire fi^ld which the 28th Brigade 
had to cross, and in front of the abattis of the w^ood of Briz 
the ground was devoid of any cover for .300 meters. That 
we were able to advance so far without check was due to 



Military-Historical Studies. 153 

the enemy's armament, to the tactical forms employed by 
the assailant, to the unequal distribution of the defender's 
forces,* and to the uniformity, celerity, and vigor of our 
movements. 

Psychological Matters. — The great Frederick overcame 
the armies of half of Europe, not only because of his great 
personal military superiority, but also because his tactics, 
their nature, and the appropriateness with which he applied 
them, rested on a sound basis, on a knowledge of human na- 
ture. Where he deviated therefrom, as at Kollin, his grena- 
diers, notwithstanding their iron discipline, vanished as did 
the 38th Brigade at Mars-la-Tour. The great king and leader 
was a psychologist, and expressed himself in that direction 
as unreservedly as in all other directions. Hence his con- 
tinued success. When his army was already imbued with 
the confident military spirit which generals spread, the 
great king in his secret instructions to his generals w-rote as 
follows: ''The average Prussian soldier is indolenff — i. e., 
he does little or nothing of his own accord, he has to be 
driven. The great king never forgot that no one likes to die, 
and that natural egotism strives for the longest possible 
preservation of life and shuns mortal danger, and his words 
may still be applied to many of our men. In taking notice 
of this fact we gain an approximately correct idea of what 
may be expected of the man in the way of self-sacrifice, and 
how much remains to be accomplished by discipline and by 
the personal example of the officers. This knowledge will 
assist us in devising suitable forms by w^hich we can make 
use of the indolent individuals. There is an anecdote 

*F.— 57th. for instance, hardly met with any resistance, so that 
it would seem that the enemy had withdrawn from that point, while 
I.— 57th as well as I. and II. — 17th encountered obstinate resistance. 

t'Tlie General Pilnciples of War 'ir struct ions by Frederick the 
Great after the second Silesian war. 
11 — 



154 Inquiries into the Tactics of the Future. 

Avliicli, like many others, characterizes the lack of suscepti- 
bility of our men, aud I quote it as showiuj; (hat beautiful 
words aud fervent speeches frequeutly are lost on them. 
A commander of the Pouieraniau Cuirassier Regimeut, in 
proud remembrance of the past achievements of the regi- 
ment, is said to have begun his address as follows: "Cuir- 
assiers, lloheufriedberg Cuirassiers," etc. The words 
sounded strauge, and through the ranks of the armored 
horsemen passed a whisper: "What 's that? We are Pase- 
walk Cuirassiers!"* 

Many of our men are inii)ri'ssed by one thing only, by 
deed. Hence, the great king rewarded on the spot every dar- 
ing deed, every bold resolve, in order to spur ambition and 
exercise a direct intluence on the masses through the zeal 
and heroism of the ollicers. Success in the great king's 
attacks rested on the conviction that any check in the attack 
movement was equal to a failure of the attack. Hence he 
did not create artiricial rest- and breathing-spells, but 
endeavored to aroid them, and tactics culminated in the 
cultivation of that sense of honor of the olticers which is 
our particular strength, and in the develojnnent of their 
will-power. 

That constituted their training. The moral effect of 
fire is, as a rule, more destructive than the material effect; 
this is still more the case to-day in consequence of the small- 
caliber ritles, and particularly of the new projectiles (im- 
proved shrapnel, torpedo shells), than formerly; and in the 
purely theoretical sense those tactics ought to be the best 
in which the moral force of the leaders is most effectively 
manifested. But the attack on decisive points was as 
bloody under the linear tactics of Frederick as at the time 
of Napoleon's column tactics, and in the more recent past. 

♦The regiment was quartered in Pasewallj.— T/*. 



Military-Historical Studies. 155 

which partakes of both. The great king's tactics were 
based on disriplino as strict as that of the Romans, and his 
generals were heroes like the generals of old Rome. Move- 
ment and fire effect were intimately connected, the soldier 
fired by command; the ranks were kept closed as much as 
possible; fire was opened at short range (about 200 paces), 
and with a heretofore unknown intensity and rapidity; anfl 
that which the great king accomplished by closing on the 
enemy with as many muskets as possible, and then shaking 
him by fire regulated hy command, constitutes to-day the 
aim of many tacticians; compare the "Summer Night's 
Dream."* It is a significant fact that in the case of 
every large attack heavy losses were reckoned with from 
the beginning, and that the will to be the first in the hostile 
ranks and the last to withdraw was systematically culti- 
vated. The bold spirit of the attack of the Prussian Army 
is the gift of the great king, and should be fostered par- 
ticularly on account of the modern arms. The tactics of 
the great king took account of the weakness of human na- 
ture, were in keeping with time and circumstances, and were 
healthy. We, on the other hand, take no account, or too 
little account, of human egotism, and look upon man as part 
of some sjjlcndid mechanism and expect him to act with 
the same precision, instead of giving due consideration to 
the failings of human nature. Meckel and his followers 
represent one extreme with impossible demands on the pres- 
ervation of closed "firing machines," and their opponents rep- 
resent another extreme with impossible demands on the 
morale of the men, such as the majority of them are. There 
the closed ''firing machine" — i. e., the officer — is expected to 
do everything; here demands are made on the man such as 
will be fulfilled only in an army of heroes, in the belief that 

♦Berlin, E. S. Mittler &. Son, 1887. 



150 Int]uiri(\< into the Tactics of the Future. 

the iniiul Nvoultl rt^placo the soul, and intolliiiviu-o, courage. 
Of all tho levors, ogotisiu alone never ceases to operate; 
it sni)presses the other forces in the case of most men when in 
great danger; and if self-preservation is habitually looked 
upon as the most natural aim, while the leader, on the other 
hand, must at all times insist on the highest personal sacri- 
fice, that of the man's life, this existing and permanent 
antagonism should prompt us to lay our stress on the culti- 
vation of nu>ral ftu'ce and intelligence, and to endeavoi' to 
retain or regain the command and control of men, so that 
the leader may be able to lead his men and nmy be held 
accounfahU for the fulfillment of his duty. The requisite con- 
ditions, contempt of death and heroism, will-power and zeal, 
determination and discipline of the s]urit. can be found in 
satisfactory (|uality tmly among i>rofessional si^ldiers; not 
among hirelings, and only in a corps of oflficers which, wher- 
ever it may be, makes intelligence and moral force and un- 
swerving sense of duty its aim. and which is burning with an 
v.raltcd ambition, the ambition of devotion to the common 
weal, to king, fatherland, and nation, to all the ideals which 
fill the breast of the man of superior education, of sujierior 
moral strength and of noble views of life, which make a man 
of the officer and exalt him. These moral forces will ever be 
intrinsic properties of healthy tactics, but they do not de- 
velop their beneficent eftects until the individual is sufti- 
eiently advanced in years to comprehend the meaning of 
the term rcsponsihilitif. Responsibility in itself compels 
reflection and Jahor, generates a moral conception of the 
profession, a sense of duty, a love for one's own goal, and 
inspires men who are appointed to act with courage, 
provided they possess inner worth, faith, and confidence. 
Weak men invariably shun responsibility; instead of dis- 
closing and stimulating their determination, responsibility 



Military-Historical Studies. 157 

does not manifest itself in such men at all. It is requisite, 
therefore, that among men whose inldlectual powers are ex- 
pected to operate consciously in great danger and under great re- 
sponsihility, the strengthening of the character be made the 
basis for everything else; and although unusual strength of 
character is, as a rule, an inherited gift, yet it may be im- 
parted to a certain degree to all well-disposed men by sensible 
training; chiefly by the citation of fine examples of deeds 
of devotion and self-sacrifice, by assigning a conspicuous 
place to the ethic-moral principle in the theory of life and 
in education, by the exercise of abstinence and of renunciation 
of the pleasures of life, hy an introspective mode of life, by the 
acquirement of love for v;orh, which of all is the only lasting 
pleasure on earth. Legitimate and moral egotism is not 
debarred by such a theory of life from having a strong, 
material aspect, which is fortunate, since everything, in 
order to be sound, should have a moral and a material side. 
The sense of duty and consciousness of responsibility to- 
gether are the chief levers stimulating the intellectual 
powers, for it is only under the agency of the sense of respon- 
sibility that one works seriously. Eesponsibility teaches 
reflection! Acute thinking, if continuous, is the greatest 
strain that can be imposed on man. Its effect is strength- 
ening, not weakening; for it becomes indispensable to the 
brain, which forces the material substance to follow, even 
though the miserable body be struggling against it. Re- 
sponsibility also engenders the proper sense of shame, which 
constitutes a powerful lever in overcoming moments of 
weakness. I have seen men who succumbed in such mo- 
ments, and have convinced myself in the course of associa- 
tion that they were men devoid of innate worth, or possess- 
ing it only to a small degree, but who, in the absence of the 
true sense of shame, were all the more haughty. Culture en- 



158 Inquiries into the Tactics of the Future. 

genders modesty, lack of culture arrogance; and though, iu think- 
ing of the many dangerous situations in which I have been, 
I can by no means deny a creeping sensation, I have in every 
case inwardly rejoiced to have overcome the weakness and 
to have risen superior to the lower instincts inborn in man; 
and I am free to state that I invariably rose superior, without 
asserting that I am naturally and unusually brave. In 
inquiring what made me invariably rise superior to myself, 
I find in the main two forces: intellect, and through it duty; 
responsibility, and through it shame. I have made a psy- 
chological study of myself iu order to render an honest ac- 
count to myself in every instance as to how my heart stood, 
whether I retained control of my mental powers, etc. 
I considered it a discipline of intrinsic attraction to me, and 
have made the discovery, that progress therein is toilsome, 
that it frequently has to be begun over again, and that the goal 
cannot he reached unless the mind has previously heen trained to 
work. I therefore think less of the "smartness (Schneid) of 
youth," though it frequently leads to fine results, than I do 
of that of the more mature age, because the latter implies 
greater development of the mental powers; the smartness 
of youth and the will-power of women frequently resemble 
each other. Human nature, however, easily defies far-reach- 
ing theories; the more developed mind of mature years 
should, therefore, never be in doubt as to what it wants — 
what is reasonable, in order not to ruin the buds of youth be- 
fore they unfold into blossoms. I could almost wish again, 
in my more advanced age, to see a war with man-killing bat- 
tles for the sole purpose of comparing my own self of these 
years with that of my youth. In no danger did I ever con- 
sider myself more than a fair average, but I have seen many 
officers above this average, and some below; among the for- 
mer were those for whom I could not suppress my adraira- 



Military -Historical Studies. 159 

tion, and I must add that many soldiers have also excited my 
admiration, and these brave men I place above the best of the 
officers. I cannot say that I ever felt hatred, or that hope 
of reward was much of a spur to me; on the other hand, 
an understanding of the situation, keeping my eyes and ears 
open, observing the action of my peace-time acquaintances, 
that of our own troops, and of the enemy, etc., has had a 
greater attraction, for to me man has ever been and is most 
instructive; I found that man changes more or less, not 
excepting those whom I ought not hesitate to consider as 
endowed by Nature with the essential gifts of the hero. 

Since I am an average man, who, nevertheless, re- 
mained master of his intellect in serious, staggering situa- 
tions, it ought to prove, that by means of careful education 
and training the same average measure of moral strength 
may be produced in the case of all men who are not dejenerafed 
— officers as well as men — particularly so in the case of 
officers; and it would be right to administer inexorable punish- 
ment tchenever that average fails to materialize. In this respect, 
however, we seem to have become very indulgent; great 
victories have induced a disijosition to leniency. This is of 
doubtful expediency, and may lead to evil consequences. In 
order to avoid sensation and publicity, many things have 
been covered with the veil of charity; this may be political, 
tut it is not military. Even in the case of people of superior 
order, the effect of shame on their actions should not be 
underrated. Shame was a powerful stimulus in the 
rising of 1813. Shame then spurred the officers to the 
highest human efforts — shame over the defeats suffered, 
shame over the lost position in the state, in society, 
and in the intellectual world. Shame presupposes con- 
temporaneous society and a certain relation between 
the same and the individual. If the contemporaries 



160 Inquiries into the Tactics of the Future. 

remain in ignorance of shameful deeds, tlieir noble 
impulses will not be roused to action, and it was the recog- 
nition of the necessity of this action that prompted the 
great Romans to adopt their punitive measures. Again, if a 
member of a community has the comforting knowledge that 
nothing will penetrate beyond the four walls, such knowl- 
edge may be instrumental in stunting the sense of shame, 
the sense of responsibility, etc. Publicity, like everything 
else, has its disadvantages; but, as war constitutes an act in 
which all passions and forces of the individual are publicly 
manifested, punishments should be made public no less 
than rewards. And in the case of men who are not degen- 
erate fear of punishment is a much more effective means than 
hope of reward. 

I have observed that those who were conscious that 1 
knew of some weakness they had shown were ashamed, no 
matter how often they had done the utmost of which human 
nature is capable; I have known others w^ho avoided me on 
that account, who could no longer look straight into my 
eyes. Shame is invariably the lever, and it should therefore 
be utilized. 

If an army is composed of the dregs of society, the 
officer with his moral qualities is everything, his men are in 
reality nothing but a shooting-machine in battle; and when- 
ever the battle has gone against them, these machines have 
collapsed, even under Frederick, since the parts of the dis- 
ordered machine have run so far that they could not be 
gotten back under fire. Frederick himself has bequeathed 
to us much classic testimony in this particular. When, 
however, the army represents the sum of the nation's 
strength, as is the case to-day, the distance between oflScers 
and men as regards their qualities naturally becomes less; 
and nothing is gained by the rod and other means, which 



Military-Historical Studies. J 61 

formerly served their purpose. The greater respect for the 
oflQcers should therefore be inspired by their higher intel- 
lectual level, the road to which should be prepared with 
clearnessand directness. The presenceof themost ideal class 
of enlisted men in a national army, however, cannot extin- 
guish the moral differences between officers and men; it can 
merely modify them. Tacticians are wrong, therefore, in 
•resuscitating the forms of Frederick or those of the attack 
of the 14th Division at Problus-Bor (though it otherwise 
stands as a model in military annals) as the only means 
for controlling the forces, necessary for a decision, in the 
act of advancing on the enemy; but it is no less wrong to 
renounce at once all forms on the battle-field, and leave 
the man to his own devices, because that puts leading out of 
the question altogether, and because most men will not ad- 
vance sufficiently close if left to themselves from the be- 
ginning. The days of closed formations in the execution 
of the attack are over, and probably no one believes in their 
practicability to-day. Every important action is bound to 
be a conflict of masses of skirmishers, and it only remains to 
determine whether, in the application of this correct princi- 
ple, the proper means have been adopted. Fighting in masses 
of skirmishers restricts the authority of the leaders; and the 
disorder thereby rendered unavoidable threatens to destroy 
it entirely. Officers from the captain down should be par- 
ticularly impressed with this fact. It will not be practica- 
ble to eradicate the evil completely, but reasonable steps 
should be taken to minimize it. The proper means will be 
found in suitable tactics, in the moral training of the sol- 
dier, in the efficiency of the officers, and in the greatest pos- 
sible number of subalterns and non-commissioned officers. 
Modern tactics require more subalterns and non-commis- 



162 Inquiries into the Tactics of the Future. 

sioned officers tbau formerl}', but this xery essential is 
impossible with our modern mass-armies. 

V. The Tactics at Mars-la-Tour on August 16, 1S70. 

(a) PsycJiological Matters. — Before analyzing the action 
of the 38th Brigade, I ask the reader to return with me to 
the description which I have given. 

The work is not very cheerful, but it is indispensable in 
order to gain correct ideas and, perhaps, no less correct de- 
ductions. The circumstances antecedent to the action of 
the brigade and the psychical and physical condition of 
the men will also have to be considered, since the tension of 
the spirit in most men of the lowlier kind is dependent on 
the physical condition of the body. 

The 38th Brigade had marched from Bingen to Pont h 
Mousson in ten days, and had stood the fatigues well despite 
the heat. During the march news of victories arrived from 
right and left, and the men were looking forward to an 
encounter with the enemy with the greatest confidence. I 
dislike the term "burning with eagerness," since it consti- 
tutes simply a falsification of human nature, which would 
rather preserve life than sacrifice it. But in this case 
Napoleon's wicked declaration of war had affronted king 
and nation; there was but one opinion and one sentiment 
as to the king's resentment of the neighbors' insolent pre- 
sumption, and what was then imbuing the German soldiers 
was ardent love of country and fervent patriotism — in one 
word, passion. The individuals therefore exerted their 
strength spontaneously, and their splendid marching and 
good behavior in battle constitute a fine field for inquiry as 
to how far offended political honor may affect the morale of 
troops in battle. 

The cause of the general had become that of the sol- 



Military-Historical Studies. 163 

dier, the cause of the nation that of the army, producing a 
degree of most intimate and passionate fusion, the equal of 
which is rarely shown by the psychology of war, even in its 
fortunate periods. The course of events nevertheless 
shows what passion may accomplish and what it may not, and 
it may well warn us not to place too high expectations on it. 
The battalions of the 38th Brigade reached the battle-field of 
the 16th of August with an average strength of 900 men — 
truly a splendid feat.* In comparing therewith the high 
percentage of losses from sickness and infirmity customary 
on marches in peace and in war, it becomes plain that here 
will-power was the underlying cause: the will-power of the 
individual, and thus of the army, withstood fatigues and 
night marches, and insufficiency and irregularity of food. 
With the thousand kinds of danger, however, in which 
the life of the individual is directly threatened and where 
the individual remains constantly under the impression of 
such danger, battle reiiuires a much higher degree of will- 
power. While it manifests itself on the march in dogged 
perseverance, here it calls for buoyancy and heroism, and 
frequently the same man who has marched until ready to 
drop cannot he gotten from behind sheltering cover by word 
or whistle, order or command, or even the repeated and 
heroic example of the officer, to advance again over the fire- 
swept space; and the same non-commissioned officer who 
through a long term of service has enjoyed the reputation 
of being a brave soldier, and has returned from some other 
war decorated with the outward signs of his bravery, who is 
expected to possess superior morale, and who is appointed 
to the honorable duty of holding on high the symbol of 

♦According to the History of the 57th Regiment, the two bat- 
talions of the Fifty-seventh numbered 31 officers and 1825 men as 
they entered the battle (page 88), which agrees with the figures I 
gave in the first edition. 



0\o \hvKm"« \>hou tho ort\oo\\«* NNUtoUful t\\o is not, or ran l><> 
»\o Um\)SV>\ ou hi\«» «iui 0»ou oul,v »U>«s^ tho muoi^hI ou\Mou\ 
wrtvx^ ovov 0\o rtoUi whou iho oomumu«l ^'Ooloi^w on \\\^W u^- 
\s^U* 0\o Ih^»mvv t^nwjHM^U'U^Y tv> his \hU,Y, Suoh U \»i»u au»l 
s«oh ttUo \s iW ^*o^^io^^ h\"»<iv of *U^Ut> rhawji^^s \uo?»( of 
thorn oom\^UM<^lv> awtt viyivotT m>o>\ (htM>>Nol\os u»n,\ vS\jo 

\ ««\t> t^> its 

Whoow^^ U^uis* (»>»o\vN luust Kuow \uo\\» i\\\\\ iho ortloor 
who o\Mo»^ thou\ into knOo shouUi uovor forjjx^t (hat tho 
mtNj^suw ho av\^U<^ to himsolf Is j^»)>Uoahh^ to hut fow of 
J\i« t\wn>» Nor !iho\th< ho forjjxM that wUl powor, <h^YOtiow, 
\HMm^H^\ auti hra\on »K^ not \u\arlahlv aot \\\ tl\o sa>uo do 
jiiw \« an othor\v\so <>t\so\uto uuu\, Vavio\\s phouo»uo»a 
au\i !i^nuimo«t?ix h\M^il\ «tul «\o«ttt\ ^^lvS|H\!4Uiot\s, wUI t«\\v<\tr 
tho s\>«\Ns stt>n>jith; uoYor xyJU it ho to iU^^y a?* it was ,Y<\stxM^ 
*^«l\\ a«d tomovtvYY it XYiU W ditYo\v«t ftv«> \Yhat it is to 
*hv>» TTho t>^oiutiou to ^iio a )ii>^M and uohU\ oaiu> atnl 
hoixYio dtv^th marks that mowont \Yho« »ua« oxalts hitwsolf 
to tho hijjhtvit ottioiouoY, ln>t it is not tho t)*M'*).3v .vf^iUfum of 
jvs^Yohioai \it\\ l»v stud^viuji \vs^Yoholoj£\ iu taotios yyo o«« 
wot tt^\m^ with kno\Yt\ quatuitit'^s, sitt^v \vj^>'ohi\^U viuai\titio«t 
<^itYor as nw^oh as do \\\ow a«d van in tNU*h of thon\ OYor,\* 
motnontx Tho s^uno dt^nt that I \><M'fortu toda.Y »\\sol«to\,v 
and ««h*^itati«>il,Y t«a> at somo othor momont tiud \uo it^ss 
\vt\^\^mH^ aud t\\ul^v. Tho S4UU0 is tht^ t^^st^ with tho tnajoi^ 
itY of ot^»v\^ and ho who snviv{\ss»^s this \n»\>sntv is a\> ox 
tmot>Una»\v n\an; ho has stnj^jHHi hi\>\solf of h\uuanit,Y; ho 
is ji\>>«Uv F»«»tio wiU and othi^-^t will aiHHnnvUst\ jM^ai^ 
ti^N^ll^v tho siuno t>^sn\ts, Tho iattor oxaits wan ahovo 
hnman watnrt^; \vhi\o tho fornvor in>hn»^ him YYith an onthns 
iasiu whioh »\*»m*\s him to tho limits of hnman aohioYo^nont^ 

b\ an art^vv >vx^ havx^ no nst^ for fanaticism on a^^^nnt of 



fh*' ((.'■■ . /^. 

m*! f'jfttntmfry . .-ink, h r>.fU^ »,, ;,'^(>n,j 

ffftA* r J»W' 

rr, .v*^fy 

#*j*f*, h*fW0^*^t trill *t^#rf r*wMphi' ** *r%fr*^$^m ih fh*r fn\0f^ T> 
)^ 'A \nAy(' fA ♦h i ' < r*^ If r^ «M mll*ir*A wMf fh^ 

ff(0t(^, ithti Uft/f ;vv4 *fMM f^M^**, ^Pftr ffvwf* 

I9r*<^^ rth4*^ th*' fftHft*^^A *A *rrtrfytUiftf( fh»f »ft*^>** *ft4 

r^^Mvt^f 9ihA *rif*m ihtr mi^iu^M Ws*A * ^ftj^mr SA*^, f%ikt if 
' 'yft fA iAU^ miffrpffj HU^j^ fftt a nnnitj^iMi 

'* (^^l>f^/^ tdhA mrrff *A ffc* ifi*'r '-^' '' ^ A t fl 

\.. A 1-^ k^ \U fd'iftA. ffiA ftU fllM*«r»r tif, '% 

yr*^*rm tit*'. f0if^tA*r irftm ^^'itt^ «r*/? 4fiA fh*^ imltt^A i/ft 

.n\A h*^ * i¥mr*'jk tA ftAU'tcfym fjfp fh*'. *Att^A:f, h*/;t^m€ 
mUmftAi/fAHitt r ftnA 

<■;.-. .n 

*'/mttt fh*', *Aff^':f 'A fh<^ bfliffl*' »« ';tf*<tf^^ Ir. 



166 Inquiries into the Tactics of the Future. 

with it. booauso it will enable bim as a leader to give 
sensible orders. 

I do not hesitate to aoknowledire that the tire at Mars- 
hi-Tour atVeeted niv nerves for months. Troops exposed to 
anything similar are demoralized for some time — the oflS- 
cers as well as the men: nor am I alone in holding this 
opinion. General SkobeletV. whose force and rare personal 
courage no unbiased mind will deny, said after the third 
battle of rievna: "We have made the assault and taken 
the enemy's works, but the assault has cost us less than 
the retreat. The terrible fire has demoralized oflBcers and 
men. It should be well considered whether the prize is 
worth such exhaustion. Demoralization is infectious, even 
in the best army." Yet the losses of his troops did not 
equal those of the oSth Brigade at Mars-la-Tour. Serious, 
thinking men will not gainsay what 1 assert, since they know 
themselves and human nature and judge its failings lenient- 
ly: narrow, vain minds will oppose it, and to attempt to eon- 
Tinee them would be to carry owls to Athens. Couragt 
not based on transcendental convictions will soon pale. It 
is said that before going to the war, Skobeleff consulted a 
fortune-teller, and that she prophesied that he would escape 
all danger unscathed; that from that time on he wore a tal- 
isman in which he reposed implicit faith. It would not be 
the first of such instances. Trajan, one of the finest and 
most heroic personages in the annals of war, did the same. 
Their opponents may call it weak, superstitious, unworthy, 
and unchristian, and so it may be. but the warrior's Psyche 
has nothing in common with the word : whence she derives 
her strength is inmiaterial to the cause, so long as she is 
there and is of the moral kind. 

(i) Bemarhs on the Battle-Field and on the Enemy's Forces. 
— Of the line of battle of the X. and III. Corps east of 



Military-Historical Studies. 167 

Mar8-la-Tour nothing waH viKible except four batterifiS, 
which were in action north of the MaiK-la-Tour — Vionville 
road and west of the Tronville copse. On horweback, how- 
ever (from Slope 780 of the map, Houth of the Mars-la- 
Tour — Vionville roadj, we could survey the French position, 
which extended from Height 840 to Oreyere Ferme; we even 
could diHtinguinh a mounted group of some size among the 
Troops on Height 846. It wan General Ladmirault with his 
staff. To the right and left were long lines which we could 
follow to the west as far as Greyere Ferme. Among the 
infantry we could make out lines of artillery, which even 
then were directing a lively fire on Mars-la-Tour and on the 
4th Cuirassiers. It was not jjossible to make a correct es- 
timate of the enemy's forces, but there could be no doubt 
that at least we had a division in front of us. Moreover, the 
sun was shining slantingly along the entire French position, 
which was as yet free of smoke and dust. The conditions 
were as favorable for a good view as they could be at that 
distance. The clock pointed to 4 o'clock as the brigade 
started.* 

In time of peace any general officer who would attack 
an opponent of whom he has no information, learning when 
too late that he had run up againts a position unassailable by 
frontal attack, and which was held by greatly superior and 
better armed forces than his own, would be sent to Cov- 
entry on the spot. That standard of measure is inappli- 
cable in war, because in actual war various favorable circum- 
stances might counterbalance the numerical inferiority of 
the attacker. Such circumstances could not, however, be 
counted here, as the enemy was awaiting us in deployed lines 
under cover.r and we could not expect to surprise him. The 

♦When the 57th Regiment moved off, I wajj asked: "What time?" 
I answered in a loud tone of voice: "It is 4 o'clock." 

^At lea.st Grenier'8 division. 



168 Inquiries into the Tactics of the Future. 

Vvvuch posilit)!! was as stroiiu as Ihoujjh Nalnrc meant lo 
show by (his cxampK' how positions shonhl bo soh'ctod in fn- 
turo. A slanlinij exposed plane oipiallin};' in oxiont tho i-an<:;(^ of 
the rifle; at niedivni range an obstacU' in tho shapo of a nioad- 
o\v-bottom Ji — 400 i)ares wido and en I np b.v nnniorous wire 
fonees; at close ranuv a ravint^ which rondorod tho position 
noxt to nnassailabU'. Ami of all this thoso in connnand 
know nothinij, althoniih that part of tho uronnd had b(>on in 
onr possession the whole forenoon I Tho example is 1_v])ieal 
for the seleetion of a i)osilion on the part of a defender 
who desires to profit to the fnllest extent by the small- 
caliber rifle; f lie samo (>xami)h' also u;o(^s to show how caralrjf 
should not act, how the si/steni of orders should not be r(\i:;nlated, 
how the sifsteni of reports should not he mana.ued. Snftieient 
reconnaissanee and eorrei-t and quick leports will pretMui- 
nentl}' be required in the future, and the omissions in these 
respects and on fhat ground are valuable lessons. 

Before ii'oin.U" into battle on the llUli of August, Grenier's 
division nnmberiHl, accordini;- to the latest resean-hes, 7750 
rifles. At the time when the ;>8th r>rii>ade attacked that 
division, the latter no lonjjer had the same strength, as it 
had previously taken the offensive and been driven back to 
the height of Bruville. Let us nevertheless take that figure. 
The 08fh "Regiment and the ."th Chasseur TJatfalion of this 
division stood at (^reyC're Ferme, whence they maintained 
a rather weak tire action. The :^8th Brigade witli its 4400 
rifles was fluM-efore pitttnl against 7750 rilles ou the 
other side. 

Cisseif's division numbered S350 rifles; it did not take 
part, however, until the catastro]>he had become imminent. 
The 57th and 7:>d Kegiments and part of the 20th Chas- 
seur Battalion (about one-half of Cissey's division, some 



Military -II islorical Studies. 109 

417.1 i\\\cH} \\\vuc(\ oil I Ik- ."'^tli lirij^adf, whilo \\\c rf-rnain- 
iuiL, 4175 rifloH v/cac (ttii^nircil in tho dirf?frtion of MarH-Ia 
Tour and againnf fho Ooinian artillfry y>OKtod farlh*fr woHt. 

At tho (MJJininatin^^ point of tho action, thr-rofon', th<; 
oppoHinj; forcfH wore 11,925 rifleH a^ainnt 4400; tho former 
w*'ro on flu' Hfiot from thr- b^'j^inninf^, thf lattor r-nj^agod 
f>.v.r:res<iii:':l.y and <it ahorter ranj(o, 

A flirt lior jioint aj^ainHt the OermanH Khould be «pecial- 
ly mentioned — viz., the very j^reat Huperiority In the nt]m- 
ber of FrfiH-h t^unn, and in that partifiilar the attack of the 
.'{Sth IJrif^ade diflerH materially from others. The fact haH 
been eHtabliHhed that the entire Frr-rnh artillery of both 
diviKioriH and the icH'^rv*' artillery were in action at the 
time when the .'{8th lirij^ade wan croKHinj; the Vionville — 
MarH-la-Tour road — i. «., 'id, 12, 12, and in addition 2 mit- 
railleuHe batterlcK, making in all 72 giinH. Ah against 
these 72 guns we had but '50. The nnperiority of fir^, not 
only of the French infantry, but also of the artillery, could 
not but be great under the 'ircurnHtanceB. 

{cj The Dephymmt. — Thr; brigade as formed to the . 
south w^Kt of Mars-la Tour lent its flank so much to the enemy 
that its line was almost perpendicular to the enemy's front, 
which may be explained, but not justified, by the fact that 
Tronville had been assignf-d to thf brigade as its first objec- 
tive. The order to attack was now received. The battle- 
ground sprc*ad before us extended 2.500 meters from left to 
right, and the regiment which had to take most ground (^57th 
Regiment and 2 pioneer companies X.) should first have 
gained its new front by a large wheel to the left, before the 
general advance was begun. That was not done, as I have 
shown above. 

During the movement the unavoidable evil results be- 
came apjmrent, and to minimize them every battalion com- 
\z — 



170 Inquiries into the Tactics of the Future. 

mandor urged his troops forward at an increased pace. It 
did not lu'li) any. The original error could not be made good 
by a more rapid gait. The brigade had not paid sufficient 
heed to the question of "space"; the battalions, even the 
'Companies, became successively engaged, and were succes- 
sively rei)ulsed, from left to right, so that the IGth Regi- 
ment (.11. and I. liattalion) had already come to a halt at 
the moment when the Fusilier Battalion of the Fifty- 
seventh (right Hank of the brigade) just reached the skir- 
mish line. The numerical conditions were quite inade- 
quate for carrying out the attack, and the method of em- 
ployment of our forces destroyed the last hoi)e of success. 

To the blunder of ignorance as to the enemy's strength, 
his position, and the battle-field, another no less fatal one 
was added: proceedimj to ihc a I lad- irifhout previous suitahle 
deployment* 

(d) The .-l/^rtrA-.— During the great wheel to the left the 
I. Batallion of the Fifty-seventh, when about 2500 meters 
from the enemy (south of the Mars-la-Tour — Vionville road), 
deployed two-thirds of 2 companies (1st and 2d) as skirmish- 
ers by order of the division commander, and one of these 
companies (2d — 57th) was directed by the division com- 
mander in person toward the IGth Regiment, so that when 
the battle came to a standstill, the distribution of the trooi>s 
was as indicated in Sketch 111. 

During the advance the troops crossed each other 
obliquely. The attack itself was a "chase," so that the men 
colla]>sed in front of the enemy's position from sheer ex- 

*At the inspection of F. — 57th on the drill-ground on the Cher- 
near Tours, by General von Voigrts-Rhetz in February, 1S71, General 
von Schwarzkoppen was present, who just before had resumed com- 
mand of the 19th Division. On noticing me, he came riding up and 
said, in his jovial way: "Comrade, you were the adjutant of the 
brave Lieutenant-Colonel von Riill. That was a had bufihirs>t at Mars- 
la-Tour. Who could have guessed that so many were against us?" 



Military -Historical Studies. 171 

haustiou. This brings me to the ravine at Mars-la-Tour. 

The Oflicial Account states that all 5 battalions crossed 
the ravine. I say only 1st, 2d, 3d, 4th, 7th, 8th, 11th— KUh 
and 2d — 57th. During our advance the French opposed to 
F.— IGth, I.— 57th, F.— 57th, 2 C. P. X. a strong line which 
came forward to the northern edge of the ravine; our 3 half 
battalions halted 80 — 100 meters south of the southern 
^dge of the ravine and did not get one step farther. It is not 
sufficient to say so, however; proof must be adduced. In 
doing that I beg indulgence for stating some personal ex- 
I)eriences which I cannot omit, as they are part of the proof. 
1 do not thereby intend to bring myself to the fore, and in 
order to escape any such suspicion, the first edition of this 
book was publislH'd anonymously.* 

As far as 150 meters to the north of Contour 780, 
Ohly's half-battalion (12th, 9th— IGth) and 4th, 3d— 57th 
moved abreast of each other. The latter here threw them- 
selves down upon signal from Lieutenant-Colonel von Roll, 
while the former continued its march by an order from 
Lieutenant-Colonel Sannow, delivered, according to the 
History of the Sixteenth, by the adjutant, Lieuten.ant von 
novel. I was at the most 30 meters to the right of 12th, 
9th — IGth. At that moment Vice-Sergeant-Major Thiel, who 
commanded a platoon of 2d — 57th, came up from the left 
and reported to Lieutenant-Colonel von Roll: "I report 
respectfully that my platoon no longer follows me. They 
are lying down. I have repeatedly rushed forward. It 
was of no use." • Lieutenant-Colonel von Roll, a man of 
quick disposition, turned to me saying: "These fellows!" 
and ordered summarily; "Ride back with the platoon 
leader. You will find me with Lieutenant von Warendorff" 

•Various reasons have in the meantime prompted me to put 
my name on the title-page. 



IT'J ltujuirit'!< into the 'l\u'tics of the Future. 

^Ist — 57th). I rt';uh(>(l llu> platooti. :in«l tlu> brave ])l;»l(H)n 
U'!\dtM'. a Uovo in iUv t'ullcsl si'use o{ i\\v wovA, wavitii:; his 
8\vonl and calliii.u; "l'\>r\vardl" suctMMHh'd in cari'vin*;' sonu' 
noui'oniniissioncd olVictTs and men >viHi liini. Most of tho 
rtMunininj; nuM\ \v«M-t' Ivinu' d»>ad or wt>nn(h'd o\\ \\w urouud ns 
[\\c\ had stood in [ho ranks, anions thi'ni sovtM'al whom 1 had 
trained as i-ocrnits ii\ lS(!(i and IStlT. and whom 1 kniMv wtdl. 
'rh»\v had ah-oad.v nu>t tho I'ati* of tho bravt> sohli(>r.* 
To tho h'ft roar. ah>nsido of (Milv's half hat talitm, woro 
(ho rt^st of those whi> advant'(>d to the foremost line. 
TluM'e the plattXHi leadtM*. N'iet* St>rm>ant IMajor Thiol, was 
UilltMl, iu\i\ also two non I'onimissiontHl oflieers whom 1 
knew. 1 rejoined Lieutenant Colont^l von \\o\] t^xactly in 
rt»ar of th(> riuht of Ohlv's half battalion. At that moment 
nth. !Mh— oTth was o\\ onr riiiht foiinini; line and t»rin«; 
•J or ."* vi>lh\vs. l.iiMittMiant (''i>lonel von Kidl remarked: 
"Well. AVai'ondortY [Ist — r»7th| will bo lilad." [Uo assumed 
that that eom])an,v was btMUtr sh(>t into U'ou\ the rear.) Kid- 
inu straijjht forward, lu^ said to me: "Is that laentonnnt- 
(^oliMiel Sannow?" 1 said it was. l.itMitenant (^olonel 
von ludl rtMiiarktHl: "1 am lilad; we must iret sonu> order 
in this business. V.- -.~)7th is lirinij into my llrst I'lMupany 
U'ou\ tlu> rear, my stH'ond eompany has botMi torn apart by 
tlu> nuMi of the Sixtt^enth. If only Hernewit/. [chief of 
;M — r>7th] will take .mux! oiwo of (h(> iH>lors. That is a 
hellish tirt\" 

He made several i>thtM- rtMuarks. 1 omit tluMu bt>eause 
they were of a personal eharaettM- and had little io do with 
the nuitter before us. 

Thus we reaohed F. — l()(h. The followiuii was tho 
sight wo behold: Liontonant-Coloiud Sannow had ordered 



•Although oomplotoly iloployoil as skiimishors. tho company 
lost 8 officers and 90 men. 



M Hilary- Historical Studies. 173 

Oljly'H half'-halalljo/i to lie down in roar of \\nt hrd^f; which 
haH Heveral timcH been mentioned, and waH availing hiinnelf 
of the cov(!r alHo. To the right lay hin adjutant, Lieutenant 
von Hovel, Heverely wounded, and the dead liorHen of both. 
Cai)tain Ohiy wan in the center of 12th, 0th — lf»th, mounted, 
clifrriiig liiH UM-n jind firing re[>eatedly from the Haddle. In 
front and on i-iWM-v Hide of the h}j|f hafjillion, HkirniiHherH 
W(?re lying on tli<- ground: thoHr; on flu- left from 10th — lOtli 
and 2<l—r>7ih, thoHO on the right from Int — 57th; the half- 
battalion itHelf wan in cIohc formation; a few nhotH were 
fired from the firnt linr*, but no regular fire action was 
maintainffd. Never have I Heen an oflicer of Huch cooIuchh 
jjrid bravery an Cai)tain Olily, chief of 12th — IfJth. The 
Higlit Ih indelibly inipreHKcd on my mind. IIIh Hharji voice 
rang (hrough Ihe rolling fire of the enemy: "F.^rwiird. lids!" 
''Then; they come; look out!" Again: "High the colorw!" 
Finally he rode* forward to carry (everybody with him, but 
it wJiH in vain. The dr-ad and wounded were too many.* 
Ah Lieutenant-Colonel von Koll halted in front of Lieu- 
tenant-Colonel Hannow, the latter Hald: "Roll, you had 
better dinmount." He did ho; immediately afterward the 
horHe wan hit in the chewt; it rearr-d, and after a few boundn 
foil dead. Lieutenant-Colonel von Roll then knelt bcHide 
Lieutenant-Colonel Hannow, the latter remarking: "This 
iH the only Hhelter. VV'e cannot advance an long aH the fire 
Ih ho Hevere. We have to wait until they have fired away 
their ammunition." 

iH HO Hevere. We will have to wjjit until they have fired 
awjiy their ammunition." 

A f(;w minutcH later Lieutenant von Wolzogen, adju 
tant of I. — lOtli, reported to Lieutenant-Colonel Hannow, 
HiH white borne wan bleeding from Heveral woundH; he him- 

•Thls half-battalion lost 8 offlcors and about 210 men. 



174 Inquiries into the Tactics of the Future. 

solf was uutoiuhod mul prosorved a horoio coolness* The 
import of his inessajjo was: "My commander is wounded, 
we are repulsed [I. — lOth], Colonel von Brixen is dead." 

The adjutant had barely finished his words when the 
enemy eharjjed from all directions cryinj;; ''En avant, en 
arant! courage, courage Tf Lieutenant-Colonel Saiinow 
ordertnl: "Back to the ravine; assemble there." Lieu- 
tenant-Colonel von Roll: "Warendortf [1st — HTth], there!"J 
That ofticer, however, turned instead toward the Bois de 
Tronville. Then: "Take n>y adjutant to the rear." These 
were his la^t words; a bullet pierced his brave heivrt, and he 
fell without a sound. 

He was sickly, and suiTerinj; from abdominal a 'id 
nervous ailments, but a rare will-power swayed the feeble 
frame of his body. 11 Is heart was full of noble impulst^s. 
A lucid intellect and admirable judgment were his. Idea 
succeeded idea in rapid succession; the mind was never at 
rest. To his nuMi he was a father; his sentiments were 
those of a sterling Prussian otticer. Honor, duty, devotion, 

•Of all the mounted officers who entered the zone of th.nt sweep- 
ing fire, but three remained untouched: Captain Ohly and the Lieu- 
tenants von Wolzogen and Bermuth, all of the liUh Regiment. Their 
horses bore several wounds. 

tF. — 16tJi and I. — 57th were probably 20 — 25 minutes behind and 
on the flank of the hedge. 

tOvD this part of the battle-field not a man got to the north of 
the ravine of Mars-la-Tour. V^'hen visiting Captain Ohly in Cologne, 
after the appearance of the portion of the Official Account here con- 
cerned, I expressed my surprise as to who could have prepared that 
statement. Captain Ohly's words were: "You know best where 
I was juid my half-battalion. You were there." The fable of the 
drummer who. after the victory of Belle Alliance, was put on a horse 
to alarm the tlooing enemy, has been preserved down to our days. 
Ollech, in his biography of General Reyher, mentions only one. 
Delbriick, in his biography of General Gneisenau. mentions severaJ, 
although the falsity of that widespread statement is proven by the 
History of the 2d Dragoon Regiment, which appeared several years 
before Delbriick's book. The attack of the SSth Brigade has lii like 
manner been converted into a fable to the detriment of history. I 
do not care to be instrximental in perpetuating the fable. 



Military- II igtorical Studies. 175 

and kindnoKH j^uidod him. ff urnan fa'iUut^H, which, sm a rule, 
iLr(t har'KhJy uud njfJiU'HKJy oori<J'-rnn<?r3, wcr^re invariably 
irt'iiUid hy him with indnJgr:fnoe. 

IliH nij^hlK wfffC' for the moKt part \hihh('<] without 
HU'ftp. In i]\<t i\<']t] }\('. liardly r^vor indultjod in more than a 
modfrato drink of wine or a cup of coffee. 

Ife waH fond of Ktirnulatinj^ youn;^ offleerH to reflection, 
and never evaded eriticiKm wljen preferred in a befitting 
and conHiderate manner. He HometiraeH «eemed to pro- 
voke criticiHm in order to change the Kubject and to know 
the men. He knew them and mjide a formal ntudy of them, 
lie had a lueKentiment of hiK death. ()u tfie march to the 
battle-field, he Haid to me: "I nhall noon have an opportu- 
nity to prove my pf^ace exjimple — but no;! shall not survive it/* 
lid became Hilent then. After a while, he got out hiH cigar- 
oaHe. "We will divide," he remarked, "PerhapH, it Ik the 
IfiHt thing I give you. The battle will be bloody, verv 
bloody. liemembf'r me when I anj no more and when, at 
Kome future day in beautiful Hanover, you are Kpeaking of 
to-day." He then relapwed into a brooding «ilence; it wa« 
only in the battle that the buoyancy of hlH Bpirit returned. 

I want to mention Komething else. At Pont a Moub- 
Kon we were (iuart<rfd on a noble family, and the lady of 
the houHe Hhowed uHtounding familiarity with the French 
Army. At Hupper a lively conver-«ation developed, which 
turned on generalH, armie«, etc.; afterwardH wc letired to 
our room. During the night, an I waH about to lie down, 
Home one knocked at ray dfK>r. "Do not lie down," 8aid the 
lieutenant-f'olonel on entering. "It Ik clear outsid*; and 
quiet, the warlike noine haH Kubnided, there is a beautiful 
Htarlight 8ky; let u« enjoy it, and take a walk in the Hlum- 
bering KtreetH." The convernation turned on the probable 
outcomr' of the w^r. On the market Houarc Lieutenant- 



176 //;</// 1 /iV.s' i"///() the Tactics of llic Future. 

(\\Un\v\ voii K('>ll s(op|)('il ill Iroiil of (lu> (own hall and 
spoke ill an aninialcd lone: "He nhaJl overthrow the imjieriul 
arntics, the throne of Nupotcon irill rollupsc, I'dris will fall. 'I'lte 
nation is sicl- ami orcr-i'.rcitctt and is noinu to rise. Thinl- of the 
l>ufi-e of Urunsirieli-, tlrink of Napoleon I. t>uch a man is (joinij 
to arise III is time also; the name of the modern dirlulor vill proh- 
ably be Leon (iambetta." Hardly had (ho echo diod away, 
when an ahinn sijiiial ronsod (lu» sihMit camp. It was 
Napoh'on (hiy, (ho \TA\\ of An«;iis(, and wo nn>vod in(o a 
]>osi(ion of ro.uiiiicss Ixm-miiso ini'oniia(ion had Ixmmi I'o- 
ooivod (ha( on (iu> ir>(h of Any;nsl (ho I'^ronch niii;h( (Mk»> 
tho olVonsi\(>. 

lltM'o I nins( diijjiTss for a inonion( \o o(hor ihMails, bo- 
oauso (hoy aro instruotivo. As 1 shall i>rov(> in iUo chap 
tor on lossi^s. ours Inid boon <;roa( so far; s(ill no( so heavy 
thai W(> would luwc Ixmmi (o(ally incapable of sonu' rosist- 
anco. NN'liy did wo not niako that rosistanco? Uocauso 
wo woro surpris(Ml in (ho fulU>s( sonso of (ho ((Mmu; so much 
so (ha( (ho (roops, already for (he mos( part deprived of (hoir 
oHlcors. lost (hoii' heads. ]\'<iirholo(jiral mot ires, therefore, 
surprise and rinisternation with their ronsequenres, irere in part 
the causes of the disaster. The course of ovonls was such (hat 
bo(h sides, takinj; (ho olV(Misivt\ burst upon each olhor at the 
most eritieal pidut and at the most eritieal moment, so (hat in 
some places tho opponen(s aclnally ran iu(o one aiioduM*. 

Holh had exocu(od a bi«j wheel (o (he lef( at tin* same 
(inu\ Tin* Frencli wi(h Knoll S4(5, tho Oermans with Mars 
la 'l\uir as (ho pivt)(. Tuilor llu^se cii'cnnistaiu'os. it w.is 
natural (hat our rij^ht winii' encoun(iM-od (ha( i)or(ion of 
tin* iMUMiiy wliiih had doploytMl durinu' our advaiico, or bet- 
ter, which was awailinji' us. wliile our loft and llu> tMiemy's 
rijjht mulually mi^t on tho otTensivo. 

l?nt whih* wt> had Won unabh* to do the oiumuv either 



Military -Historical Studies. 177 

niutorial or iiioriil (huiiaj^o, his poHilion, arranged in ticrn, 
permitted of Die employment of liiH fire-arms on the most 
extensive; scale, and of tin* employment of a part of Ida forces 
on tin; offcjiMvc at Uie sanu' time. Tliereby we suffered much 
materially and niorally. 1'li(* fire increased instead of 
diminislied, it came nearer and nearer, the smoke became 
imi>»;netrable. A greatly superior force; stood close in our 
front unsuspected. Had the French not halted 80 — 100 me- 
ters south of the ravine, and had they fought instead of 
despoilin<; oiii- dead and wounded ukmi and liorseH, Ihe l»ri- 
gad<' would liavt* been done for, and future history would 
have chronicled: "To this jioint five brave I'russian bat- 
talions i)enetrated; none canu* back." It would at the same 
time; liav(; been the most suitable inscription on their monu- 
ment on the field of honor as iji the annals of war. 

I was being led to the r<*ar by a fusilier of the Sixteenth 
and by a musketeer of I. — n7tli, part of the time by the 
side of Lieutenant-Colonel Sannow. After he had turned 
to the east, Lieutenant Ililken, of F.— 57th, came along; he 
was leading the horse of Captain Kcholten, of the Sixteenth, 
who had been killed, and asked me: "Don't you want to 
mount?" I replied: "I can't; I am wounded." He said: 
"Kteinmetz has probably got enough by this time.* What 
nonsense this is! Thank heaven, the French are not send- 
ing cavalry after us." 

When he had gone along a few paces, a fusilier of 
12th — 57th by the name of Opderbeck passed us; In? was 
shot through the left arm or through the left liand. which he 
held out, scicaming with pain. T addressed him rather 
roughly, "Don't yell so;" Dpd<'rbeck then took the direction 

*It was ihon believed that the battle was being conducted by 
General von Steinmetz in continuation, as it were, of that of the 
14th of August, and he was the first that would be credited with 
"taking the bull by the horns." 



178 Inquiries into the Tactics of the Future. 

of Mars la-Tour, Avith cvidcMit doliberation, and I noticed 
generally dial I lie men had well observed the terrain, as 
those who >\t'r(> without leaders went back to where they 
had come from.* Immediately afterward my two men 
were hit; they fell, and we all remained lyinj? on the sr«""d. 

The French hailed in (he i)osi(lon relinqnished by ns 
(80 — 100 meters south of the ravine)t in order to close np 
their lines in rear, which had probably biH'ome disordered 
in crossing? the steep ravine. Jt was not nn(il some time 
afterward that Greuier's division passed over ns, first a 
skirmish line, then anoth(M\ then battalions in line. The 
first skirmish line kept u]) a brisk fire; in the second the 
men were iu(erminj;lin<i' in confusion. 

Every one seemed bent on enconraji;in'i; himself by yell- 
ing, ^'Courage, courage! En avanir No one jiaid heed to the 
enemy except to those of his men and horses that were 
stretched on the ground. This was the moment when the 
1st Guard Dragoons charged. 

(c) The Betreat. — 1 am unable 1o state how long the 
French remained south of the ravine, because time is wont to 

*Opderbeck and I had been cadets together. Afterward, as an 
artillery officer, he committed some indiscretion Ihat cost him his 
office: at the outbreak of the war, he reported as a volnneer to the 
57th Regiment. In this rather difficult position he behaved toward me 
with much tact, and was a source of much merriment to the men on 
account of his irrepressibly cheerful disposition; he bore all fatigues 
of the march, etc., without apparent effort, and yet he did not strike 
one as strong. Opderbock was soon cured, but was again wounded 
in the same arm at Beaune, on November 2Sth, and so severely that 
an amputation was necessary. Owing to his valorous bearing, he 
was again commissioned, and is at present mayor of Liidenscheid. 

tHere Lieutenant von H(>vel, adjutant of F. — 16th, who waa 
lying some 200 meters north of me, was picked up. carried off. and 
brought before General Tiadmirault. who asked him to what army 
the troops engaged here belonged. Hiivel said, "To that of the 
Crown Prince," which caused visible surprise. It Is possible that 
the statement was of decisive influence on the enemy's measures. 
Lieutenant von H«ivel told me this when we both, subsequently, were 
undergoing treatment at Bonn. 



Military-Historical Studies. 1T9 

fly during such occurrences. It should be noted, however, 
that the French infantry did not penetrate into Mars-la-Tour, 
wliich had been burning ever since the beginning of the bat- 
tle, or get farther on the east of the village than to within 150 
meters to the north of Contour 780. General von Voigts- 
Rhetz, observing the ill fortune of the 38th Brigade, ordered 
the Onard Dragoon Brigade to attack, but the 1st Guard 
Dragoons alone were on the spot. Coming around the east of 
Mars-la-Tour, th^y charged; tho hostile infantry lost every 
vestige of order, the lines intermingled, though in the main 
remaining on the spot,* and busied themselves, as hereto- 
fore, with policing the field and leading back wounded and 
unwounded prisoners. For a little while the hostile in- 
fantry fire ceased altogether, and it would have been pos- 
sible to assemble all parts of the brigade in an orderly 
manner and lead them to the rear; at any rate, we could now 
see numerous men endeavoring to carry off their wounded 
comrades. A little man of 2d— .57th, who with another 
was leading a wounded man, picked me up, saying: "Boy, 
carry him alone; there lies our adjutant, I'll fetch him." 
The name of the brave man to whom I probably owe my 
life was Dienemer; he lived at Solingen, where subsequent- 
ly (1873-74), as adjutant at Griifrath, I saw him frequently. 
A fatal circumstance here occurred: An adjutant gallop- 
ing along the brigade from left to right called out at the 
top of his voice, "Retreat to Thiaucourt."t I raised myself 

♦The statement to the contrary on page 86 of the History of 
the Fifty-seventh is wrong. 

tit was the adjutant of the brigade. In the manuscript of my 
winter essay, 1872-73, the fact is noted on the margin in the hand- 
writing of Colonel Arnold, no doubt after he had found my state- 
ments correct. The brigade adjutant was von Kalbacher, recently 
deceased, as colonel and commander of the 74th Regiment. The 
order for the retreat had been issued by General von Schwarzkoppen 
not by General von Wedell. The order had been delivered by Lieu- 
tenant von Bernuth I. On hearing of it, General von Voigts-Rhetz 



m* to oast a lrts( ^^inuw o>»m' tho iioU\. VvvvxXAc mis»M-\ all 
ar\MUul im\ ««<t thou that onior; could 1 asv«»uuu^ auvihiuir 
olso but that ovorvthiuij was hvst? l>otl\ iv.^jiniouts hail 
h^f tu^irlv all (htMi* ot\U>tMs; tht^ nion sul>s»^|uontlv tiH>K in 
l^^rt tho dirtvtiou of Trouvillo. luaiulv tuulov l.iouUMiaiu 
Tolouol Siuuiow: tho jjrtNitor i^uM, without ot^loors, it^trao<^i 
thoir stoi^ ou tho r\v\ii to Thiauoourt, aiu! tlU! uot ivjolu 
thoJr vH^h>rs uutU tho uoxt aftoruoou. This o\au»|>lo ^ijtu^ to 
shinv hvnv u\isohioYOUs suoh a *Muoihi>t\ of doUvoriujs onltMs" 
ma^Y Ih\ Afitn* i»ouoral \am\ WtHh^ll ivooJy<h\ tho oitlor. in 
ssti^ul of iHnumuuioatiujj tho satuo quiotlv to i\^louol vou 
l>auaoh auil Major you M^hUmu. both v>f wIumu oimUi oasilv 
UuYO Ihvu fouudx au^l iustt^ul of huutiu^j u\> a fow uioiv 
ot^loors. for which thorr^ was au\ph^ timo, tho atl^jutaut noIUhI 
rt^lH^\ttHilY at tho top of his luuus. "Kotivat to Thiauoourt." 
^YOt uouo of tho oommauiUujj otthvrs rtvoivtHl tho vudor! At 
that \uotuout tho rtMuuauts of tho briiiat^o wtMV uothiuu but 
shadows, 

Tho sjuuo prtvi^utatiou which charactorixtnl the ad 
\auiV prtnaiUni ou tho n^trtwt, aud it was oulv boYoud (\ub 
tour 7v^^ that thiujjs moudtnl. Hort\ ou tho tlold strt^wti 
with tho cor|vst\!5 of mou aud horst^ attd uudtn* artillUn\v 
t\rt\ which had btvu nn^ivutni with tho jjrtwtt^t voI\ouum»co. 
l.ioutouaut Nouuioistor. fnnu tho statT of tho X. Corps, was 
ridiuj* at a walk aloujr tho liuo of attack, stoppiujr hort* aud 
thort^ aud jjiviujj ortiors. Tho otiicor displavtHi horruc 
strxnijrth of charactor aud is dtNsorYiug of tho hijjht^t praise 
for his doYOtiou aud ciH^htc^i^. It hms he r.^iV'ftf tt^ho HHtan.}lfJ 
ihf ("Atvvt. His u\orit is as imiH^rishablo as u\y jjratitndo. 
*'Ooiwnxdo," he said» *'ha\-v yt[»«r«olf taken over there. wbort> 

countt"»n«ank\tHl iho c>r\i«t»r. Th<» troojvs w*r* to be ass<»mb\tHl ii\ th* 
iltr^-tion of l^xnwtlle. but tt was ti>i> late to r^^aU ;Ul tho mi^u 
d<e>jvrlYiHt of th^lr l^^i^der*. 



MtliUxrij HuU/rwU Hbuiwi. I hi 

^UtfTh \n a 4r*fmiuie/ittjAiiof$,** It wan to 1^ tifmth *A Majm- 
laTour. 'Th'/**- uoi i»o »/j» tf*ait r'iWa^t'.^ t^r MiM, 

'# rj«*;' \n our iu-nrtM that all m\0tt n^fi \ttt Uftd; ft^m of joy 
f.*'\U'A in our *fyt^. U'h^f t(*^ufhfU-n$tM 4o ufft wirar fb^ war- 
rJof'« h<-art at, K»i''h mtttttfuiM'! U'hat <J/m* wr/f. tb^ an- 
ffHinUt'A wni\, tb*; t/rrHblr iUi*st\f\rf>\uU'i\ m\nA <A \%tn\hftrA ai$d 
i'/rttHAirttt nufti^ think, aftd f<?*rl, and bop^?? How awfnllj 
'/ '- i« tb^f af/f/f<y'ia»jori ^/f KU'b a At^f-at*. On^ ft*?** 

f; ';;i/j tb'- ^fv^f ift'TiftitM; ou*-. woul4 lik/r t// know bow 

tiiiufcn Ht**, %'nuv: on tlw; brft and H0it; wi^ baK but 'jw-e bfcau 
Han it b^i^fn *fnd/*d In o«r faror? liff^tat, ^K^ore ii«, oiw*r- 
tuiniy around ri«, jn fblx w/Kt t/rrrlbb? '/f all unfniinhfin w« 
b-av<f f b*; ifHtxlti'iif'Ul, Tb^r <jfJu1ort'iu% un^n tbat "tb^ jf':r»- 
<'fai niUiai.iifU in Wft iinfarr^rabb^ d/i<« not r*;a^rb nu; arid 
on H'f w^mf, (Sflt-^u-A. «bot t/> \f\tii'jt^, nnifatbt^U^, toward our 

Tb^r r*dr<iat of tb«> '{^tb Firi^cad^? r^/njttjt«t^* tb^ modt 
horrible drama of tli/; j^«iai war. Tti/? brigade? loirt 53 p^r 
(■*'%ii.* \\\H \tro\t<tr\'\<tu of th'r d/t*id to tb^r worjnd*^! ' ': t; 

strong m^j drof/j^-d d<;«»/J; tbfr t/rrribb- b^^asit, tb'r , ,',^ 

*-xfra/frdInary marcb, and tb** f^jnalljr ^fxtraordlnary at- 
t^^;k b^ t'/ffintim*iil lh*'. Istnt r'ffonant of ijtr'fnjftb. and tfa^ 
t,*'.hnYior of tUt^nti U^rrWAy dj^aj/p^/jnt/rd warriom wan aji 
varying a« tb^^ir b<-art«, f saw m/m cry Iik^ cbildren, 
otb^-tn <'.o\\A\mt'. without a mtuni^: in nn^^t caw*?* tb*; n^*fd of 

*A/;^/r4tD« to pSM^ ((2< of tlM OtUiM A*jttfmm, 1,, ^/t p^ e^tL 
^ \ufAnAtA. Tb« latter ar<^ al«o SmtSnAhA \n thf: fiirnr«« of 



18'2 Inquiries into the Tactics of the Future. 

^v;l(^M• supprt^ssod ;\11 otluM* t'colinu,s; (lio bodv tltMuandt^d its 
riijhts. •'\>';itorI watorl" \vas jibout llu^ only sound I 
h(>ard from (hoso phantoms. Tho onomy's load dropjuHl 
anu>n.ii- tlio misiM'ablo (/(7»ri's liko hail; tht\v nun-iMl on slowly, 
thoir lu\uls droopinj;' from fatiiiuo. foaturos oovtM'od with 
linn^stono dust oiiniiinj;- to tho porspirinu,- faoos, disiortotl 
and oblitonitod. Tho tonsion oxooodod human oapaoity; 
{he man had ooasod to bo siisoi^ptiblo to anythina:; noithor 
tho sublime nor tho vulgar appoalod to him; ho faihMl to 
rtH'ojiiiizo his frionds and his superiors. Thus tho mon 
moved ai'ross the Held where shortly InM'ort^ tht\v had been 
singinji" eheerfnl mart'hing songs. A ftnv nimble s»iuadrons 
juul t\ot a soul would have esoaped. Anyone who has over 
IooUihI intelligently into such features knows how deeply 
they impress themselves, for they remind one of the expres- 
sion of ihe madman: mad from bodily over-exertion, mad 
from awful impressions on his soul; and madmen seemed 
to be there in faot. Through the midst of these infantry 
phantoms single riders, powerful men on big steeds, are 
galloping in the direction of Tronville, the saber at the 
ihargw eonvulsivoly gripping the panting horse with the 
thighs, their faces red atid streaming with perspiration. 
They were cuirassiers (No. \). What did they want? No 
one knew, for they did not know themselves. Evidently 
they believe themselves still in the charge. 

•AVhen^ are yi>ur otVicers?" asked the comrades i^f the 
batteries in actiott of those passing. "We have no more." 
was the sad rt^ply. lltMt^ and ther(\ however, one was left, 
and thus, after all the ntisery. the blood-soaked tleld still 
witnessed some heroic sights. We mention here, in the 
first place. Tolom^l von Oranach. who, riding toward the 
ileJtris of 1. — 57th. took the colors from the hands of the 



Military -Historical Studies. 183 

exhausted bearer and brought them to a place of Haf<*ty.* 
Keveral irufii had been wounded or killed while carrying the 
colors of F. — 57th, when Lieutenant von Streit Haw itw lawt 
bearer (Lance Corporal Dorn) fall some 25 meters in rear. 
Roin(? Fren(;h HkiriniHherH were wilhin a few steps of Dorn; 
and now tli(!re was a race for the colors between them and 
Htreit. The young officer was quicker; he seized the colors; 
on all sides rang out the "Vive'Vempereur!" everywhere the 
enemy's bands struck up; joy there, apathetic men here. 
Th(? Hoiinds of the music cut deep to the heart, destructive 
fire HweejiH the field, but the young officer has no thought 
but that of saving flu; colors; some Frenchmen run after 
him, others send Iheir bullets, none hits the mark, the lead 
seems to honor virtue; the strength of the hero does not 
flag, panting he carries the colors out of the zone of fire, and 
finally finds safety for fhem with 1st — 57th. f Too 'great 
efTorts had been demanded of the troops, physical and 
psychical exhaustion was the result; an accident was instru- 
mental in saving their honor. Had not Providence been 
kind, execration, dishonor, and ignominy would have at- 
tached to the number of the regiment, and no one would 
ever muster sufficient courage to write in its vindication. 
Yet these troojis did Iheir duty like brave men, and the 
annals of war probably do not record an instance wliich, 
taken all in all, can be compared to this one; yet the sacri- 
fices will not have been made in vain, if the proper lessons 
are deducted therefrom. 

Another young officer of F. — 57th, Lieutenant de R6ge, 
came unscathed out of the battle. Men were wandering 

♦Prince Frederick Charles, who heard of it, intended to have the 
scene painted. So far as I know, the preparations had all been made, 
when he suddenly died. The Fifty-seventh was thus deprived of the 
great honor of becoming the counterpart of Keith at Hochkirch. 

tFrom a written communication from Lieutenant von Streit. 



184 //N//n'r/V.s- iitto the Tdclica of the Fiihirc. 

sinjilv about (hi> wide badlo tii'Ul ; lu> stMztvs a stray ami rid- 
crU'ss horse aiul nuii'klv mounts. Kaisiuu' his sword, ho 
coUofts tho orphauod uumi ou tho road fituu Mars laTour 
lo NioMviUo. So(>u a bodv ol' ,■")()—(>() mon is assombhMl; 
froutinji (htMjunly assaulttnl position, Iho bravo mou stand 
in nudes, toars slroaminj»; from thoir (\v«»s. It is tlio young 
(dVii'or who sliows what tjroatnoss can (K). "I loads up, 
men I" ho says; "wo aro not dot'oatod; wo iwo n\oroly ro- 
pulsod. Tlio foituno ol" war is ohanuH^ablo. To-«lay wo 
havo bo(Mi 'lii'kod'; tho noxt tlnu^ wo 'II pay thoso f'oUows 
bai'k with intorost." llo i^ivos ilu> comnuind "About," and 
llu^ nuMi march ou{ of tho enemy's tiro. 

Only tlu)so who havt> hovu prosont in a similar mur- 
tlorous contlict. when almost ovory stH'ond man was shot 
dowU' *■'*'• form an idi-a of what moral strouiith and con- 
tidonco in one's own powt'r wi'ro necessary to act thus at a 
monuMit when nothini»' was loft of the briuade but sonu^ 
phantom like forms. That is the Psyche the army m>eds 
that wishes lo comiut>r. As reijards tlu> uumi. 1 will not 
«unil to mention that 1 did not see a siujile num throw away 
his ritle ov auythinji' else; hardly did 1 hear a wounded man 
numii ov wail. The well-trained soldier, it seems, ])reserves 
a certain ureatness o( soul (>ven in tlu> nmst terrible 
misforlum>. 

.\ft(M' dark some fu^itivc^s of tlu> ;?Sth l>rij;ade arrived 
at the camp of St. llilaire, where, as jM-evionsly stati'd. 
11. — r>Tth, with some Canard Drajjoons and the headquarters 
jiuard of the X. .\rmy (''orps had been left for the safety of 
the trains of ilu> l!Mh Hivislon. of the (luard Drajioon Uri- 
j:ade, and (>f ihe ht^idquarters of tlu' X. Corps. 

At about l():;>0, ou the t>veninji- of the KUh. the column 
marched otY for Thiam-ourt in the foUowinu: order: At the 



MiliUirylliHlorical Studies. 185 

hfad tho adjutant of the battalion,* with the headquarterB 
t^nard and (Jlnard Ora^oonH next, the train, II. — 57th bring- 
iiijj^ uj» tlie rear. I>(;tw'een .'* and 4, on the morning of the 
17th, the head reached the deserted and Hilent village of 
Tliiaiiroiirt. Iff-re an intendanee councillor of the X. CorpH 
brought the adjutant an order to march to the battle-field 
of AuguHt 10th. The adjutant rode back on the road to 
St. Hilaire to communicate the order to hiH commander, and 
found the battalion between 5 and a. m., near St. lienoit, 
soundly HleejMng on both Kid<'H of the road. IIIh oom- 
njander had meanwhile r^'f-eiv^d the same order from 
another Kource. 

Between and 7 the start for Tronville was made. 
When the commanding general of the X. Army Corps saw 
the battalion intact, he shed tears. 

1 have been unable to ascertain by whose order the 
battalion retreated to Thiaucourt during the night. It is 
possible that the statements of the fugitives of the 10th 
promjjted the commander to retreat; if the order origin- 
ated with some higher commander, it would likewise ex- 
f)laiii tlif situation. 

On that evening the 38th Brigade stood southeast •t 
Tronville. None of the battalions numbered more than 
.'{00 men. 

The result of my observation is as follows: 

1. The brave assailants did not emerge in front of the 
••nemy VlTt paces beyond the ravine; they did not get 
farther than to a point 80—100 meters south of the ravine 
(F.— lOth, I.— 57th, F.— 57th, 2 P. C); I.— 10th, 7th, 8th— 
10th, 11th— 10th, and 2d— 57th alone got farther north. 
I'roof: The first three battalions were never out of my 
sight from beginning to end. 1 was mounted up to the re- 

•Accordlng to a communication from him (Lieutenant Kropp). 



180 Inquiries into the Tactics of the Future. 

treat, was able to see and had a good view, and rode the 
distance from F. — 57tli to I. — lOtli (see my previous state- 
ment)* l\v order of my late commander, who did not want to 
lose his second company. I also walked over the battle- 
field during November, 1870, and found that the large 
graves corresponded with these statements. I established 
the extreme line of the 10th and 57th Regiments by corpses, 
buttons with numbers, scabbards, etc. One of the largest 
graves was just south of the bank and hedgef behind which 
3 companies had sought shelter.J The bank and hedge 
still existed in the fall of 1S7G. 

2. The distance was not passed over hi/ rushes, certainh/ 
not in the case of F.— 10th, I.— 57th, F.— 57th, and 2 P. C. 
According to Major Meissuer's statement (Milifar ]Yochen- 
hlatt, 1891), II. and I. — IGth did advance by rushes, but I 
doubt it. for the reason that in those days the advance by 
rushes was not practiced and such things cannot be im]n'o- 
vised. The entire distance was covered at the accelerated 
step and the movement was checked 100 meters south of 
the ravine. The men lay down, and nothing human or 
divine could have gotten them forward once more. Those 
who may, nevertheless, think that it might have been jios- 
sible, fail to consider the moral strength of the musketeer, 
in connection with that tire, the exposed plateau, those 

♦Position of troops. Sketch III. 

t Sketch III. 

; Nothing is to be seen to-day of the former large graves on the 
battle-field of the 38th Brigade. The ground is French territory, and 
the French Government had the bodies exhumed and reinterred in 
a large cemetery near Mars-la-Toui-. There on a bare slope rest 4.000 
warriors I Since then local studies in that respect have become 
impossible. I will also state that the French Government had a 
grand monument erected in the cemetery: somewhat displeasing, to 
be sure, since it does not seem to stand to the honor and glory of her 
dead warriors, but as a monument of vengeance. 



Military-Historical Studies. 1S7 

losseft, and the cornplete physical exhaustion. Devotion 
and self-sacrifice have their limits. 

'.i. Beyond (north ofj the ravine, Chasse[>6t and needle- 
gun did not mutually do their work of destruction; the 
effectiveness of the fire was all on the French side. For, 
(a J We never were where we are said to have been. 
{bj During the entire action, both regiments fired but few 
► rounds. The statement under fa) is not likely to be con- 
tradicted by military history; that under fbj will presently 
be explained. Although they are based solely on the tes- 
timony of jjarticipants, my statements will be found indis- 
putable in so far as the .38th Brigade did not succeed in 
opening a regular fire action, and could therefore inflict 
but insignificant losses on the enemy. Bince the French 
losses were considerable, they must have been inflicted by 
some one else — i. e., by the German artillery and by the 
Heventy-ninth. 

(f) Losses. — The German losses were as follows: 

(a) Regiment Xo. 10: 

KILLED. WOUNDED. CAPTUBED. 

Officers. Men. Officers. Meti. Officerg. Men. 

I. Battalion "| 220 ^i 269 

IL Battalion y 27 123 y 21 220 . 1 356 

F. Battalion j 1&3 j 292 j 

Total 27 526 21 m T ~356 

48 officers and 1313 men, exclusive of 1 officer and 
423 men missing, of whom 1 officer and 356 men had been 
capture^l, which statement agrees with the Oificial Account. 
Total loss, 48 officers and 1736 men. 



188 



Inquiries into the Tactics pf the Future. 



(bj Kegimom No. 57 



1st I'onipanv . . . 

-d C'ompanv .... 

od Company 1 

4th Ooinpnnv ... 

5th Ooiupanv . . . 

<>th Ooiupanv ... 

Tth Ooni]\'iny ... 

8th Company ... 

0th Company ... 

10th Cinnpany . . . 

1 1th Company. . . 

l'2th Company . . . 



KlLUKl^. 


\VOlNl->Kl>. 
Oftuvrs. Mon. 


OArVlKED. 
Orticors. Mou. 


1 


10 




51 ^ 




1 


;ii> 


2 


58 




1 


14 


O 


4-2 






10 




41 





y 1 



^26 



10 


o 


37 


48 


.) 


82 


44 


o 


48 


44 


1 


^4 



423 



1 



26 



G 230 1 8 
Total loss, 24 otfioors, t>53 mon. f 

ic) 2d and ;'d IMonoor Companies No. N.: 1 officer, 
8 men. 

(i1) 1st Foot •'Abtheilnnir*' of the Hanoverian Field 
Artillery Kegiment No. X.: 44 mon and 40 horses. 

(e) 1st Guard Dragoon Kegiment: 14 officers, 82 
ujeu. 204 horses.:|: 

On the French Side: 

I. Orenier's Division: Keirimeut 08th: 1 officer. 10 
men. Chasseui-s No. 5: 1 officer, 20 men. The forejroini; 
troops fought against 5th and 0th — 10th, the latter losing 
in all officers ;.nd 127 men: the contliot therefore was least 
Moody at this point. 

♦According to the OflicijU Account. IS men. 

tAcciirding to the regimental records. The Official Account 
states the losses of the 57th Regiment as follows: 

Killevl, 6 otlicers, 3t?6 men; wounded. 17 officers, 42i! men; cap- 
tured. IS men; total loss, -o officers, S06 men. 

tPage lo4 of the History of the 1st Guard Dragoons by H. von 
Rohr the losses are stated as 15 officers. 126 men. 246 horses. 



MilUaryHUtoriml Htvditi. 1*>9 

llhy^xmt'Mt No. L'i: f; oflScerw and 91 men, killed and 
wonnded. 

liej^irnent No. 4^'>: 5 otfifjirn and 18^1 men killed^ 
wounded, and rn'mniBi:. 

K^fginrient Xo. f;4: 1 officer and 2^ men. 

Artillerj': 14 men. 

yVAiZ, />^ offtctitu find ZJtZ ro/:n. TTieir ^'nn<r /»>«« exT/fride^J 
from the {rr-'-at road from liruville to about the Hoi>j d<- 
Tronville. 

Ke^ment« Xo«, I'ilh and 4.>1 were »abered by the lirt: 
Otiard Draji^rxjnH and fired into from the rear Tby Herentr- 
ninth, (itiniiiiU). The lr^He« of these reg^iment^ of Orenier'g 
diviiiion are thereby explained. They were probably, «f 
<A<f< A//ttr, mostly due to the fire of the H*ivhTtty ninth, which 
fired into the wildly retiring maHHes withont receiving fire 
in return. It should al»o l>e noted that in the foregoing 
figures are included the Umnen suffered by the regimentJi 
Xr>«, i;i and 4'i ^^e^'/re the arrival of the 38th Brigade, during 
Grenier's offensive movement toward the road Mar»-la- 
Tour — \'ionville; in other word*. the«e regiments snffered 
their principal losses to the «oa//t of the ravine. 

2. Cissey's Division: 

Regiment Xo. 1: 10 officers and 4<K) men. 

Regiment Xo. 6: 3 officers and 17 men. 

Regiment Xo. 57: 23 officers and 279 men (97 killed, 
177 wounded, 5 missing^ 

Regiment Xo. 73: 18 officers, 347 men Skilled, wounded 
and missing), 

Chasfieurs X'o. 20: 5 officers. 68 men Hcilled and 
wounded;. 

Artillerj': 20 officers. <5 men. 

To^a?; 5-5 <:;)^cerj? ar</? 77/7 m«n. 

Who inflicted these losses on the division? With the 



ISH") Inquiries into the Tactics of the Future. 

attiU'k of Cissov's division tho battlo at this point was prac- 
tically ended. The 88th lirifrade encountered in its front 
the regiments Nos. 18 and 48, which sntTered comparatively 
little. It is impossible that at this point (^hassep6t and 
needle-gun mutually did their deadly work. 'V\w French 
Kegiments Xos. 57 and ~'.\ did not attack until the strength 
of the 88th lirigade was as good as spent; nu>reover, they 
took the debris in the left flank, nor did the French Fifty- 
seventh suffer so very much. 
8. Artillery Keserve: 

Battery tUh — Sth 1 man. 

Battery 7th— Sth \ 

Battery oth — 17th 1 othccr, 4 men. 

Battery (S\\\ — 17th *J otHcers, (> men. 

Battery 1 Ith — 1st 5 men. 

Battery 12th -Ut 8 men. 

8 otiicers, 24 men. 
Add l.egrand's Cavalry Division (4th): 

2<l Hussars 28 otticers, 80 men. 

7th Hussars 9 officers, 53 men. 

3d Dragoons 13 officers, 105 men. 

45 officers, 238 men. 

According to French sources, therefore, the entire 
IV. French Army Corps lost 

Grenier's Division 14 officers, 348 men, 

Oissey's Division 85 officers, 1117 men. 

Artillery Keserve 3 officers, 24 men, 

Legrand's Cavalry Division 45 officers, 238 men. 

147 officers, 1722 men, 
as compared with the heretofore accepted figure of 200 
oi^cers and 2258 men. 

It should be borne in mind that the statenuMits as given 
by the various troop units are based on ditVerent assump- 
tions. Some merelv uive killed and woundt^l; others also 



Military-Historical Studies. 101 

Ihff miHHing; othor-H rncroly give the total number hors-de' 
conihal. To go into the detailH of these figures would 
had UH too far; an<l having given an account of the devel- 
opment of the French firing line, I must leave it to the 
reader to judge in how far these losses may have been in- 
flicted by the 38th Brigade. 

((j) Notes to the Official Account Ihfjardinfj the Terrain. 
— The description of the terrain is insufficient, and how 
liarmful such inaccuracies may turn out is shown by the 
fact that in Colonel von Lettow's tactical examples, which 
are intended for instruction at the war schools, the attack 
of the '>8th Brigade is described as taking i)lace over open 
ground. It vjas more than that, although up to Contour 780 
II., I., F.— U;th and I.— 57th found some, and F.— 57th and 
2 P. C. found less cover. For it was the two great ob- 
stacles (wire fences and ravine), in connection with the 
absence of cover, that gave the ground its character. 

The land around Mars-la-Tour is ver}- much subdivided. 
The subdivisions were then enclosed by wire fences, like- 
wise the meadows along the brook which encircles Mars-Ia- 
Tour in the north. The wires had to be cut with the sword 
bayonet under the enemy's fire, causing checks, delays, and 
losses. Hince the general direction of the movement was 
from south to north, the transverse wires alone were cut, 
and when subsequently the 1st Guard Dragoon Regiment 
I»assed around the south of Mars-la-Tour to attack the hos- 
tile infantry, it encountered the intact longitudinal wires, 
and had to jump them. These circumstances are men- 
tioned in connection with the dragoons, not with the in- 
fantry. The fences extended up to Contour 780. 

It was necessary to mention the bank and hedge on 
Height 780, 80 — 100 meters south of the ravine, because they 
constituted our sole cover, and the natural objective of our 



19:J Inquiries into the Tactics of the Future. 

luarvli and targtn for the tHunnv. In fact, about ouetifth 
i>f the luigado was Iviug near it.* 

IV. Objectives of the French and German Commanders. 
Tlio eneui\' iuterrupttHi liis movement in onler to re- 
pulse the attack of lieruians, intendinu to resume the march 
so imivrativelv deuiandtnl bv the situation of the French 
armv.f That a oajKible letxder might have secured a tactical 
victory is uudisputtHl. AH the I\'. French Corps had to do to 
have victory fall in its lap was to advance after r>::'0 p. m., 
and to take the direi'tion of Tronville, as there was not 
a single effei'tive Imttalion to op^H^se the advance of these 
15.000 men. The situation of the Germans would, for a 
time, have btvn most critical: but in view of the positions of 
the German XII.. IX.. ^ 111.. \ II.. and Gimni Corps, it is 
a matter of doubt whether the victory would have atYorded 
the Fi-ench ijVi tVtrt' results. But that uetnl not have bt^n 
the Marshal's aim: having shaken himself loose at 5 p. m.. 

•Plan 5B of tha Official Account shows the position of both sides 
nnder the designation '"in the 5th hour of the afternoon." On this 
plan, as well as on that given in the History of the 1st (.Juani Dra- 
goons, the lines marking the attack of our infantry are prolonged 
to the north of the triinsvei"se hi\x>k in front of the French p<.>sition. 
That is incorrect. In like manner, the charge of the 1st Guard Dra- 
goons is incorrectly notevi on plan oB of the Official Account and on 
the plan of the little in the History of the Sixteenth: the 4th Cuii-as- 
sier Regiment also seems to be markeii incorrectly. At one time the 
1st and Sd squadrons are southeast of Tronville. at another time 
the Sd and 4th squadrons are west of the Bois de Tronville. More- 
over, in the onlir dt tnUitilie (.Supplement I., page 11. I.) Legrand's 
cavalrj- division is mentioned as having 16 squadrons, while on Plan 
SB it numbers IS. 

The trooj»s of the 3Sth Brigade are marked altogether wrong 
on Plan 5B of the Official Account (.compare Sketch HI."*. The History 
of the Sixteenth goes still farther, in that it shows the entire SSth 
Brigade, with the exception of -fith 16th. t) the north of the ravine, 
how it really was has been explained. 

"♦"We shall not attempt to inquire whether that cv ntinued to be 
yiiirsMtl Ba:aine's intention on the afternoon. According to their 
statements before the court, the commanding generals had no other 
plan; Ladmirault's action is not otherwise intelligible. 



Oft tbif? Wtti, hM uUfmld r*4.ih*^ havfi tcuAfrstrtfrti^ to withArHiW 
towHtd fiwf iaUfrUfT hr every AnuUiftU: road; aor eaw it b*; 
Afttit'A ihax fit- miiiht Jiar*r 490« uo until ftooft on tb^ 17tb, 
wft^:*- Mp t// tMt hour tUti ^fervaoLOM voold uot hsLwe Yteeo af>l<e 
to reuew tbeir attack, \>ntiu% thht upajfjt; of tim^ RaaoListe 
mi^ht havf psiiaed a irtart r/f 3*1 ktU/mtfUfm. Aod virfit'tiier ttr 
ftot he i'jftild \iaiV*t ]o\ueiA huftdM with yhif'Mii\if/u d^ytgoAtA 
Oft tU*; fjxafrtiiftg itttwi-f*. of hiM Hirfsiy. Ifowf v<ir poorty^ 
VfHyjiirie utay have \teeu iuf'trmed. he t-xmUl not fmt naUer- 
Hiaud tfiat if he reniaUteA vKrt*/rioij>j on tb<e J^Jtik and falVed 
to wijarcb a«rar at oor^^, Iw; ira« *'.eniiXu ttt \te samaSMk by 
auiMfrior Un-t-M* Anrtuf^ tbfr iMjxt f^w da/K. For to tli« novtli 
of M^rtz^ where tfaie Oermsum were adraoefo^ «w a broad 
f r'^t, thier*; waj* ufftMiuiL Ut o{t\ttDV!^. them, 

iu jod^og tb^ fj/urae td eren^ tke fttrate0e i^nsL- 
tion rnoKt \te kefA: in rtew, Bazaiae bad fteen brooj^t to 
bar, he bad itei-'U forcM to a hUt*Ar \taxt\e. hM phuM had 
Xteen dm-jfutierted. stud he aUowod h\mi¥>M to \te iaHnfmeed 
Yfx the result of tb<e battle to Uinu tm the Ufrtrem of lAetx. 

\S'bil<e <wi tbfe French isid^ it «ra» mseemarj to he rU:- 
UfTwoM — L e^ tft rec^fOfiner the battle-fidd «f the i0tk amd to 
regs^ tbe VUmrlWe — Mjuu-la-Toar r*tad, the Oenmam iaA 
wan to for^^tall tb<e eoetny and to liare fmperior Ufreem tm 
hand for tbe a<ext few dar« f<M(> t]»e por):^;«e of wioumfi the 
tactical d^ri«ioo in battle, Tbe »fetlM»d deyeoded extixt^j 
on tfa<e fm<:ta/t§ aeti«w; tb^^ objeet eonld iM»t be igaioed fry 
imrely defennire aetUm^ the offimnire 9kM»e eoold roodMHife 
it, Tb<? qaeKtMm va« i«o t/, fsaatge the attaek an t/t remam 
nafHetesiily i^r*m% for defeuxe td what nrigltt be j^ain^d. 
That wnM dfme hy tbe ^tb and <Stb THrhmnm, To b<e «are. 
tbej v<;«»; nu:tf»; farorablr mtaated after i ft, m^ a» no offeo- 
tire waa latuiehedagatut them after that honr, InhatOe 
it i« «onnd to aamine Ihe eaemx ax afUntL in tbe manner one 



liH Inquiries into the Tactics of the Ftttttre. 

would adopt if in bis plaoo. Ilis aim should uaturallv havt* 
boeu a tactiral viotorv ou his right, aud tho t^onuan aim to 
proveut such a viotorv. If in doing so \vt^ exhausted our- 
selves, Nve would be facilitating his task; if we remained ou 
the purely defensive, we would not be giving him enough 
TO do. Action >Aas therefore called for on the Oerman side, 
offensive action, but not without due IuhhI to the smallness 
of the force on hand. That was not done: the llOth Division 
failed to attack altogether and the ;>8th Urigade was de- 
stroyed at the decisive strafeijicol point of the htftle-feld. 

The order for the X. Corps to attack Avas j^erfectly 
proper under the circumstances; the execution was the duty 
of the subordinates, whose eyes should have supplemented 
those of the commanding general. In view of the small- 
ness of the available force, it was evident that the enemy 
could not be driven from the Height 84(5 — (^rey^re Ferme. 

VII. How Should the Attaek of the SSth Briijade Have 

Been Arranged? 

1. The order should have stated: The brigade will 
attack: line of direction is Height S4l> — Grey^re Ferme; 
northern limit of the attack is Contour 780. Communica- 
tion with The Trouville copse aud with The SevenTy-ninth. 
which advanced to that point. 

2. The signal for The aTTack will be The advance of the 
20th Division. 

o. Execution, (a) 2 P. C. occupy Mars-la-Tour and 
prepare the village for defense. 

(h) Opening out the brigade and wheel to the left. 

(c) The brigade commander Takes sTation uorih of 
Mars-la-Tour. 

((/) Battle formation and de]iloynuMit of skirmishers 
on the VionvilU^^ — Mars-la Tour road, clearing awav ob- 



Military -lliHtorical Studies. 195 

HtriJctiorjH, inlv'dx\<<t to Contour 780, halt. DiHtribution of 

th<,' trooj>K from wff«t to ea«t:* 

On Height 7ii5: 
."ith— l<Jth, 6lb — 16th, and a battery; 

then 7th— 16tb, 8tb— 16tb, l»t— 16tb, 2.1— HJtb, 3d— 16tb, Bojg 

4th— 16tb. de 

Ist-oTtb, 2d-r,7th, 3d-57tb, 9tb-57th, 10tb-'i7th, llth-57lb, Tron- 

4th-57tb, 12th-57tb, ville. 

The ii.\('.r'd.y^<t dJKtarjco betwrftTj Contour 780 K^Hith of 

thfi brook and the Hamr? contour north of the brook m 

oOO maUiiH. For our then arm, thJH dJHtance wa« to<j frreat, 

and a fire action could not be conducted with effect. If we 

could not entice the French to come farther to the Houth, 

where we could belter deal with them, there remained the 

pOHHibility of maintaining a careful fire, during which our 

loBHCH would have b^^^n nmall and which would have accorn- 

pUf.hed our ohjed. And up to thai point our loHKeH had in fact 

been Hnjall; they be<'ame great only on the ridgf. 

{ej One battery to take position north of MarH- 
la-Tour. 

II., I. — HJth and I. — .'j7th could approach under cover; 
F, — 57th wa« le«H favorably Hituated. Xone but Bkir- 
miKherK nhould therefore have been thrown out on the ex- 
pOH/rd plane; in other rf-Hpef-t.s the artill^-ry Khorjld have 
maintained the action .f 

(f) F. — 16th an reserve at Marn-la-Tour. 

All thewearrangementH could have bf^r-n made, but they 

could not have been directed and watched by the brigade 

commander. In ca.se the enemy failed to come forward, 

I. — 57th might have been puHhf-d forward to the bank 

and hedge IfiO meters HOuth of the brook, and J. — 

Ifith might hiave been sent forward an e<iual distance to 

tWe know that 24 guns, under Colonel von der Goltz, were here 
posted. Compare page 13,-. 

"The Comj>anies 4th — 6th and 4th and 12th —.57th formed a second 
line, and were posted in rear of th*; companies underneath whose 
numbers they are placed. 



tho wtv^t undor oovor uloujr Oonlour 7S0: ihoso n»ovoi\\o>\is 

jjjuio vH>miuaiuior. but that was tho HtnJt. For as sooti as 
tho infantrv oan»o on tho phu<\\\u tho trattsmissiou of oniors 
wouKi Kvomo imi>o^bK^ and sdivrior dirtvtion would 
vHWso altv>jivthor. It was absolntoly uivt^siirv that tho 
brijfjido oommaudor shouUi ivtain a ix^orvo of iufai»trv. tho 
t\jihtinjj jHnvor of tho 1st l»uar\i Oraji\HM\s for such a pur- 
iH^so iHMUjr tiH> UntittHl and out'^sidtni. 

Tht^o lv\ttalions, having soino oo\or. inniM probablv 
havo hold this oxtont of jinMuid «non ajjainst unwt sii^tM-ii^r- 
itv of foriv. it\ }>r\>of of whivh wo mav aooopi tho ciotiou of 
tho SiVino tivoi^s ajr;iii\st ovoii 4i«\^\tor suporioritv at \»oauno 
la Kohmdo. whon tho bouos of thoir bi^t nion wort^ bloaoh- 
injr ot\ tho tlold of Marsda Tour, and whon tho nMt\oni bran 00 
of that dav stiU olung to thorn, a faot not oalonlatini to in- 
ortwst^ thoir tfK'>\ik. Tho supi^ortinir ooni|>;init^ shoisld 
havo Ihvu br\>ujiht nj> oKvso to tho skirtuishorjt. and with 
tho ojHm tiold of t\n^ of tho platt\iu in our fr\>nt. wo niiuht 
havo awaitiHl tho ovonts with oontldonoo. No division 
would havo iHvn jr;\i!UHl in that wav. l>ut it was tu^f /i> our 
oMr/HVvY to stvk it ; it was to our intort^t to tlijht a dolavinjr 
aotion and to i>rt^orvo our strtMiijth. In that oaso. »"> half- 
Ivittalions and a fortitunl villajiv would havo stotni whoiv 
now thort^ was a tiohl oovortnl with oorpsos. and no soldiors. 
Had tho att;\ok of tho X. Oori^s on this iv\rt of tho tlold btvn 
oarritHi out on that plan, its pri^ivtration. oxtvution, and ri^ 
suits would oortainly havo bivn mort^ in ktvpinir with tho 
j;ttnioral situation than it was now, whon tho loft of th? 
^<}N.<M? (irmit laokoii all supiH>rt and was doprivinl of in 
faiUry whi^o prt^sionoo to tho ond of tho battlo was 
indisiHM»s;\blo. 



SHliiarij IhA'/ric/tX Hludm. 1^7 

All ihcw- uicitum'tm would \f*: i'(\tiii\\y pratXn-HhU: with 

V/ //. 7'o.dU;al C^/Mmenf.M. 
'The, c.iiMc. will \t*', rar^'whffra a Wiy^mlc of 5 baJfbaf till ion « 
in rliar-jrwl with ;j duty Ilk*' that at Marj^laToaf ; »till rar^rr 
Jin- iuHtiiiU't-n whi'-h, lik<' fh<' ou*- Iti'foro »j«, afford an ojipor- 
tiinity for (■xntu'imuu, into th*.- xfjit^hilit^' of thj« or that 
im'i'u'A] form in th*; attar^k and drawing? f/nuAnnUmH. (hia 
thinj<, \u>WHVfir, which no power on (mrih, no i¥t\A\\nirj, can 
oxipuui!/'. from th<f pa(r^*< of Utnlory: the ''^th fJrijrarl^; car 
ri<'d Hi*' uWai-M {(nwnn] without ch*,'ck until it luUfrtfuu- 
\i\ci\ with Jifi *-ncrny douhly Mui^^frior in rirt*-** and doub- 
ly HUf><;Hor in ^unn. It accurat/;ly prtiw-rsi-A th^r dir^-c- 
tion indicat^fd by th«f division cornrnand^fr, «nd, a* a 
bri^ad*-, remained within th'f lirnitM of the Kj»a/r<' aMKi^ied 
lo it in the battle. Whatever may tx; a/lvanced aj?ain><t 
^ome minor matterH, the brigade did accomplish what 
on all other occai4ionH failed aj^ainut the imj^rrial army: 
il <:nrr'u-<\ o,n oMach cm ma.nii.c wc.r the, open fidd, thouj(h uniufj^ 
antirjuated forrnM, J vividly remember the wonln ad 
drenned by <^'olon<'l von ('r»ttn<h to the a«Hembb-d (tff'u.*rrn 
during? the mobilization of 1870. when urgint? them to prar:- 
tice their compani^^. Amon^ other thin^M, he said: "Ttie 
French are not goin^ to att^rk; they will wait for hh in lon^ 
lin^*«. Tliey will let uh come on before advancing? them- 
Ht-lvcn. They have abandoned th'-ir o/TenHive in/tt'icM and 
lay their nirf^n on tJre tiicticM. TlicAr fire-arm h^adx them to 
that. You Hhould therefore indu«triouHly practice a lively 
and vi^orouH advance, »^> that we may «/>mewhat counter- 
balance the inferiority of our arm by rapidity of move- 
ment."* The hint wax more significant than any one, the 

•On July 18, 1870, LJ^^nit.fmant-Cok/nel Count von WaldCTJtee, then 
military aWit-M at ParJ«, roadt full wrltt*!n Tfi\f(m to King William 



l^^S iHtiuirifs into tMf 7\jdic$ of the Futitrt. 

sijHakor not oxoopttnl. tbon susptvttHi. and wo woiv soon ti 
Iv oouvinoiHl of it* ooruvtuoss. Kvou bofoio the War of 
1S70. the opiuiou pnnaiKyl in ilit^ r«ein\au Aiiuv that our 
thou oou\i^w\>- oolmun taotios wort* no longvr applioablo 
whon oppo!5iHl to tho tiro of tho Ohaj*s5ov0>t. \Vhilo now 
forms wort^ boing studitHl. war was lioolarod and tho infant 
rv tiH>k tho t\old oousoioiis of tho inforioritv of its arm and 
of its lack of praotiiv in tho attack «»m m<}oJ>v. Wo woro snro 
that wo wonUi rtvoi\o oiTootivt^ iiifaiitrv tiiv at jiivat dis- 
tiuu^^ and had to bo propartni to cross that r.ono with- 
out replying to tho onomv's t\rt* and nudor oonsidorabU* 
lo$st\s, Uut howovor much tin* arms may bo imprv>vtHl. it 
rtnnains tvrtain that tho attaokor who dosirtvs to boat down 
tho dofoudor and to occupy his iH>sition must advance, and 
thri>u4rh a distance at which tho fnllost otYoct may bo oxpoct 
tnl fnnu his tirt^ — iHH^ motors and mort^ — iloponding on what 
maybt* tacticallxcorrtvt under tho circumstances to produce 
the des^ireil ettWt. The "how" of tho advauoe aa\d the "how" 
of the action at cU>so range have chaniitnl, but both continue 
to exist. Tho Frtntch won^ the tinjJt to systematically prac 
titv loug-raugt* tire, aud to apply it in the War of IJ^TO. The 
FrtMich infantry was traiutnl and skilUnl in it to a hiirh d(^ 
jrrtv. The Fnuich did not choose tho l>;utU^tield of the ItUh 
of Aujrust; they were forv'tni to jrive battle ajrainsi their 
wilL It was due to accidfnt, not to prtMutnlitation. that at 
most of the imiH^rtant points the battlt^tlold wasfavorablo to 
the otTtvi of tho ritU\ It rtxlounds to the jrlory of tho FriMich 
headers to have discornetl the advantages of tbe jxvsition frt^m 
Height S4(? to On\v^re Forme, and to have turntnl the same to 
immiHiiate account. The attack of the :>Sth Rrigjule, on the 

on tlie taotk*s of the French Army, which was printe<t and distrihuted 
iuucm^ the trooiv?, Everythins: turned out as Count von Walder^ee 
had predicted. tvij-ticularl>- in regnrxi to infantry tactic*, but the time 
was too short to modify our method of attack. 



uWii'.V h'AlA,, t;Oht^Uin UihtH HM Ut whfftUf^ in l,h/r friVir': k'lrU 

n ztfUh of tivh uiny txr f:r*fim*^ with/>ut Umt of all fizM^f-'^ 
<rflficj<fiirry, Tli'; t^n*mt.Uff$n am: t. Wan It rftsum tirt^ with 
whir;b <it*'.tt\tit'n i\t'.\t\o}'*^ 6'tvMfm arid tb^; nntrntmnafttly ijtti- 
\f\o\'\uv, rJ»vi«ion of •" 'zrtif^^rA *' ' r^iAftt* 2, CV/W 

th<f fir*; hav*; !/«;<?« . 'J a« r^jr- nurfi}f^ of rifl** 

hrofiiiUt to tt*:nr'! 'A, Uiny a \ttftUir diredu/n of fire SMd a 
r/w>r« *«tr<;r« and rn^rre effedhe fSrft \p(' <fXp^:l/nl fr<nn xtnAhni 
w«all'<raliUrf arrnx? 4, Wan th^r 'ASMukHt ivtSi-^nA with 
fir*; at /ort// rang**? 5, Ik th/; fir*; of utnm*iin *iff etctirn at 
%f(ti%.Uir rAnf/^frn than h/?r*f? 

To I, 2, .'{, 4, rny an«ir*fr j«, V*;»; t/» o. \o. 

In ord/fT to lUnnimlJi tb*; *;ff#;r;t of fftsum fim hy an ex- 
arripb;, tl»/; attarrk/^r dbould U; aiM»nwi/;d t/> t^ lal^orinj^ tiudhr 
tht'. njo#rt unfavorablfe eirfcttmHijanfjut, I bare »boirrj that 
tb<; fnt^ifuMl of (irnfAoymhnt of ih*-. ZHth IWiyLnAh wan annaita- 
bbr, y*'t that atfiick i« th*- MJo«t in«trrjrrtive a« tt^vAriiik 
■xtuAtmi tar;tic«. 

1. \\'h*:m tb*; .'{8th SWi'^uAc, d*fplov*^l for th^ att.a*;k at 
4, f>. ffj-, th*; ttut'irt', front froth Jf*;jj?ht 8^1*; to <}r*iyer(i Ferme 
(fully 2o(Xi mtftjirn} wan b*;ld by trr^opK of all arniM. Or*;- 
nier** (llvinUnt kUmmI in tUfjtloyfid liiw*, in two tieru, oiMr iii 
r^-ar of th*; oth^rr T' 7><() and %J^;;. Tlie ffrrmer wan 

erownwj by d/rn»</r - lin*-« (2 rfrnitnunU, Jitm. iZ and 

^;, the latt^ir by th«r remaind^ of th*f infantrj- and by the 
art'tlUiry of tbr? divi»ion, IVrtb fir*;d inc^f^Mantly, and an we 
nuij-hiTii ih*; Vionville — 3far»« la Tour r^/a/I both infantry and 
anUU-ry fire. r*fa*rh*fd rin, Hcvcr^tl ni*Ti fell on the road, and 

'Aeeordtoc to mr ofMi«^ati<nw, eonqMUiwnw, and intptMe*, 
)^r»» twdtes of ClAwr'f dfrtefon did not take part tmttl we had ero—ed 
Cont/>9r 740: np to tliat tine tbe fire we r<eefred from the dfreetion 
of c >nDe waji re«trl/:t>^ to the *«th Resfnieot, the 5th Cba*- 

•et. ri, nomerotM ArtlUtrr, and, ft would Mem, 2 mitrailletMe 

tiatj^r:'r'.. wooM pfewoee wa« •fsnified bjr tbefr tinguiar eraekUnt 

TOlt 



200 Inquiries into the I'octics of the Future. 

the leador of 4th — 57th, First Lioutonant von Itoroko, was 
woiuuhd thiM't\ At tlrst wo otuild distinjiiiisli tho rapiil llro 
of thoskinuishors from tho voUov tlrins; of tho chist^d ti'oops. 
V\^ {o Coniouv 7S0, 11., 1., F. — l(5th ami I. — .Mtli iDnml i't)vor 
in tho im^adow bottom. Imt tho tiro m>vor slacUom'il. 

L\ Tho front of l!r>(H) motors was o»H'n|>it>il l>> two divi- 
sions, all of ono and ono half of tho otlnM' IxMnjx doployod 
and tlrinu — i". (•., ll.!)L*5 ritios;* l»«Mwt>on tluMo T'J i^nns wort* 
in action, inolndinj; VJ mitraillousos. l.oavinu- Ki^iirand's 
cavalrv ilivision ont of lonsidtMation. wt> tind for tho 'JaOO 
motors. r> mon por vard in a dofonsivo position. 

.■^. A moro sovoro. hot tor dirootod mass tiro, and otio 
moro olYootivo. owini: to tlattor trajootory, jjroator ponotra- 
tion and aoonracy. than on tho l(>th of .Xniiiist. is prartioa- 
hh>. althoniih tlu'rt> was no panso whatt'viM- and tho liro ro 
taim>d its inttMisity np to tlu> miuntMit whon tho FrtMU'h 
infantry attaokod; wo conld disiiniinish. howovor, that thr 
v(dh\v tirinir booamo moro irroi;tilar, and toward tho ond bo- 
oamo irivijular rapid tiro. Tlu> lattor foatnro may bo ron- 
sidortnl tho rnio in fiituro. 

t. From tho timo whon mo orosstMl tho \'ionvilIo — 
Mars-la-Tonr road. tlu> rnomy maintainod an nnintorrnptod 
tiro. Tho distam'o from thoro to Oontonr ISO ^north of tho 
ravino) is ir>00 motors; to lloijiht S4t> it is ilotU) motors. It 
was thoroforo a mass tiro at lonir-ranjjro. n.^ we inulerafand it 
to-itoii, and tho atiaikor was oovonnl with tiro at 1500 — 
•JOOO motors. 

."■). Kvon with modorn arms, a mass tir»^ at greattM' 
rani^os is \\o\ to bo rtH'omnunuhHl. Tho followiiiir ironorat 
t'onsidorations aro statod in this oonnootion: 1. Tbo on- 



•In 1ST5 General Cissey stated to tho Chamber that hts entire 
division was engaged. It is not clear whether he therehy meant the 
fire action or the subsequent advance of the division. 



MilUaryJIiHU/rical Studies. 201 

tiro ih\i\ of fif; wjjlh HWffj^f, v\'it}j tho <:x<M\ti\<)U of th<; low 
ttKTiuhiWH (iXUituViui; arounrl th^f north of MarH-Ia-Tour (II., I., 
F. — Kith, I. — itlWi), othf;rwiw; wan inoKt Mujt^blo for (^tfftcA- 
ivc muMH tint at lonj^ ranj^o. 2. Of the* 2.'i — 25^K) mnUiVH of 
Hw<'j»t ground, th<? hrigad<; U'iiVtfin(;d: II. and I. — 10th, 
1000 timiern; F.— 10th, I.— 57th, F.— «7th, and 2d P. C, 
HOO iiKticr-H. 

All thoHC f;irr;ijinHtiinc<*K coml/iiitt to rnakf; it an attiick 
with grr*at nuni^rkral inferiority, with iufcrior armament, 
and on ground and in a general Htate of the battle without 
a parallel. 

We expeeted to take the enemy in flank, but were tak'-ri 
in flank ourwdve** and rolled up from left to right. 

^«y 77a« To/Mcal Vorran EmpU/ijeA. — H^i far ax J could 
aneertain, they were an follovvn: 
At 2500 meterh: 

II. — 10th. Conjpany eolumuH, 
I. — 10th. Comjiuny eolumnn ('.'A, 2dj; in rear the 

ha If -battalion 4 th— iHt. 
F. — 10th. ('jnii\niuy eoiumnn filth, l^Khj in rear the 

half-battalion 12th— 9th. 
I. — 57th. lOntire eompanirfH deployed! aw KkirminherH 
Hsf. 2di; in rh«-ir rear ilh, '.Ui — ^57th in 
half-battalion and, HubHerjaently, at 1500 
meterH, in company eolumnH. 
y. — 57tl!. liouble column on the center. 100 meterH 
Houth of the road Vionville — MarH la Tour 
change to half battalionH, 11th — 9th and 
12th— 10th. rin thiK battalion the le-aderH 
of the 0th and 12lh CompanicH were firHt 
lientenantB; of 10th and 11th, cajjtainH. 
In order to have each half-batalion com- 
manded by a captain, the battalion com- 

14 — 



*JOl* Inquiries into the Tactics of the Future. 

iiiaiultM- m;ul«> llu> t\»rni;Uioii lUh. SMh — 
r»7tli. I-lli. lOih- r»T(h. 

2d. 'M\ 1*. r. roinpauv <'i>hMuns ai laOO uuMors. 

Ad\MiH'«> in owv fri>nt. bolh rt^jjiuuMits siih* bv sido; on 
haltin.u in ilu> (Mumuv's front,* Slh— KiUi; •tth--l()th; 12th, 
JMh- Uilli; inii. ^Mli r»7tli: IJlh. lOili r>7(h wcro broujjht 
inti» (he llrsi line. 

Half o\' th(> romnanics of ilu> brijiado liad doplovod 
tluMi* platoons as skirmisluMs; tho ft>llo>vini; ronuiinod o1os(m1 
thronjihont \\w aition: rJth. !)(h— Kltli; Ith— 57th: :U1 — 
:.7(h: lltlu Sbh— ;)7th;t TJili. KMli :.7ili: "Jd. 'M V. C. 

(/•) Ihtration of the Attach-. I assnnio thai wtMnade lOOO 
nictors in \'2 niinntos. Tho av«>raji(> liriMind uaintMl to tho 
front bv all tlio conipanit^s was '2000 niottM-s.| tlioso on tho 
rij;ht liavini; lo «>\iond inor«^ and nun-o in that dirootion. 
The attack was brisk, ronntinii in ilio delav oaused bv the 

•Compare Sketch III. 

IThe entire front of F. — 67th was oovorod by \\w skirmisbors of 
lst--57(h. oxtoniUnj; ;»s far as tlu lUiis ilo TiMnviUo. Aoi'onling to 
Lioutonant SohroilHM-, thon adjiilant. tho two half-battalions of F. — 
r<7th joinoil tho skirinishors in litic. Thoy throw out no skirmishors 
througbotit tho action, an unhoard-of oaso. at any rato undor snob 
oiroumstanoos. wbioh roqniros oxplanation. Tho battalion oom- 
mandor wantod to jiot tho battalion noar tho ouomy as qulokly as 
possible. a.nd nuioh tinio bad boon lost by tho whoel. Tho minomout 
now was so aoooloratod that it was impossiblo to throw skirmishors 
to tho front, and as Major von Modon\ saw skirintsbors in his front, 
none woro thrown out from tho battalion. Half-battalion 1 1th. 
J>th--fi7tb thod two or throo voUoys boforo roaohing tho lino of skir- 
mishors. advanood with drums boatin.i;. and roaohod, liko Half-bat 
talion 12tb. 10th- 67tb. tho s,>iitlitTii odgo of tho ravino. Tho lattor 
did not tiro at all whllo advanoinj;. and only tlrod (( ftic sbots on tho 
rotroat. Tho two balf-bat'alions had baroly roaohod tho sonthorn 
odiio of tho ravino. whon tho Fronoh triXH^s. who woro lyitis on tho 
fnrthor odso. i(«c'.r;i(V/»^//i/ burst on thorn out of tho donso snuiko. 
Horo tho fusiliers soattorod. F.- r«7th was tho only battalion that 
found no oovor of any kind: It romaii\od but a briof nu>mont in tho flr« 
ing lino and lost 10 othoors and ;?Si'> mon out of 900, tbo 10th Company 
alone losing S oftloors and ISO mon. 

lOouuting from the starting-point southwest of Mars-la-Tour. 



' M ilitaryJI intorical Hindus. 20.^ 

iMiiovjil of Ww. otjHtacN.H in i\u: rnr-adow bottom, I rnakr^ it 
.'{0 rniniJtc*H until th*? coxxicr (F. — IfJth, f. — 57th; rcfuhff} the 
h<'<)^r^ and bank. In jwldition, 'JO rnjnntr'« for the entire line^ 
dnrint^ \vhif:ii ]Ki\()f] U\c action w«h Htationary, and .'{0 rnin^ 
nl^H for thf K-Uciil. I fhuM nuike the total duration 1^ 
honr-H. The remnantH of the brij^ade were probably aHHem- 
, I)i<d Houffi of th»- r-fjjid Ahirs la Tour — Vionville, uft'T 
5:1.1 p. ni, 

fcj I'Jxpendilure of ArarauidlAon o.nd Fire Eff eel. — The 
ealeulafion of the ammunition <x\nu(\t-<\ in very difficalt, 
HH I did not find /^liable data in thin reHfHjet in the reports 
an<l reoordH of the froopH. The opinion wan general Ihal 
v:e vere horH-de-cornhal before v:e fired a nhd. I fence, we Hhall 
havr- to content onrwdvcrx with a probability. 

The .*> batfalionH moved into battle with a Htrength of 
ti." ofTifrerH and 454(1 men,* 

The loMHeH until the eaMt-and-went ravine wan reached 
were jirobybly 20 ficj- cent; h^-rice thr- number of riflew at 
that point w{ji< .'iOJO; not a Hfiot uaH tired by 12th, 0th — lOth, 
4th — 57th, 'id — 57th, KHtimatinj? these organizationn at 
000 rillcH and deducting therefrom 20 per cent for loHHeH, 
there remained 2010 rifh-H in ii'tirm. According to the 
HtatemcntH of Hr-veral ofTir-erH, tiie companicH of F. — 57th 
may have tired between .'' and 5 rounds. Assuming 4 as 
the average and 10 for (he rather troops, we have 21,850-|- 
200K=2I.7.'^ shots. At this point we have a further dim- 
inution from losses which reached u?, per cent during the 
ar;tion, and since the f^rcnicr part of the same was inflicted 
rjn thr- retreat, further estimates become v<;ry unreliable. 
XeverthelesM the total expenditure of ammunition of the 
brigade may be f>laced at about 18 — 20,000 cartridgf^.f 

•Official Account, page 626, I. 

tMaJor MelBHner HtateB in the MlUtfir Wtxhrnftlatt of 1891 that 



204 Inquiries into the Tactics of the Future. 

The oxpoiulituro of nunminiiiou on the pari of tho on- 
emj could not be ascertained. But it must have been very 
great during that brief space of time, as General Tiadmir- 
ault (IV. Armv Corps) reports on the evening of the KUli 
that he is short of anununition. On the ITth ninny cart- 
ridges were found aUmg the French positions, which served 
to indicate the extent of the enemy's line. Some men of 
Grenier's division stated that they had tired as many as 
150 rounds> and that their rifles were so hot they could 
barely hold them. 

Assuming that the enemy expended but SO rounds ]>er 
man. the 11.025 ritles in action would have tired 054.000 
shots. According to this. 1 bullet out of 452 reached its 
billet* under the following conditions: long range, tlat 
trajectory, absence of cover, employment of closed columns 
and lines on our side: artillery aiul mitrailleuse fire not in- 
cluded in the calculation. To be sure, we must consider that 
many men were hit by more than oiu^ bullet: indeed, dead 
and woundeii with four ami five shot woumls were not at all 
rare. Of course, this calculation is but an estimate, but it 
is not saying too much, that the modern ritie. with its long 
range, its greater accuracy, tlatter trajectory, and greatly 
increased peiuM ration, would at many ]Hunts have trebled 
or quadrupled the losses, if the same tactical forms were 
used again. 

some men of the 5th Company fired 30 rounds. Admitting the state- 
ment to be correct, the total result is but little affected thereby. 

•This calculation is based on the figures in the chapter on losses, 
v.. (f1. page 1S7: 

Regiment No. 16. 4S otficers. 33S0 men; Regiment No. 57. 24 offi- 
cers, 653 men. among them one man of the 5th company: making 72 
otficers. 2033 men. Total. 2105 



Military-Historical Studies. 



205 



There were placed hors-de-comhat . 



Killed or Woundf-rl. 
Officers. Men. 



Mi8Hin«. 
Offic<;rH. Men 



Remarks. 



l8t— 16th 7 

2d —16th 5 

3rl _16th 5 

4th— 16th 3 

5th— 16th 2 

6th— 16th 4 

7th— 16th 2 

8th— 16th 3 

9th— 16th 5 

10th— 16th 4 

nth— 16th 4 

12th— 16th 4 

48 

1st— 57th 4 

2d —57th 3 

3d —57th 3 

4th— 57th 3 

9th— 57th 3 

10th— 57th 3 

nth— 57th 2 

12th— 57th 3 



423 



^ 



Cover as far 

as 
Contour 780. 



26 I Over open 
\ ground 
C b jth ways. 

J 



24 t653 



Total 72 1966 2 449 

Of those missing from the 16th Regiment (1 officer, 
423 men), 1 officer and 356 men returned from captivity on 
the 25th of August, 1870;$ the remaining 07 have to be 
added to the losses of the regiment in the battle, which thus 

♦Companies marked ? lost more than 100 men. 

IThe figures given In the first edition of the Abridged History 
of the 57th Regiment, by Capt. Hilken, have been correspondingly 
amended in the second edition of 1889. 

iPage 278 of the History of the 16th Regiment. 



'J0(> Inquiries into the Tactics of the Future. 

reach a total of 48 otticers and 1."'80 uhmi. It is piobaMy 
tho jiroatost loss sunVrod by any ivyinuMit in 1870-71. The 
total lossos of tho o battalions from tho enemy's tire there- 
fore amount to 7i! ot\toers and )l(y^'^ men, not counting 
prisoners.* 

The tirst reliable accoimt of the end of the battle I 
received throuiih a letter from (\donel von Cranach.f which 
had been written a few days after the battle with a view of 
being sent to von l^ernewitz. von Neree. von Rorcke. and 
to myself. It said, among other things: *'Tt was on tlu> 
succtHHling day that T fully comprehended what the regi- 
ment [57th] had done, and 1 must say that the men fought 
like lions; T am now all the ]M'ouder of being at the head of 
the regiment Urave Erhardt [com- 
manding the 12th Company] died soon after the battle, and 
the same fate seemed likely for brave Schreiber [adjutant ()f 
F. — 57th]," who was shot through the right temple, tlu^ 
bullet coming out on the left, destroying the right eye and 
severely injuring the left, ami he had another shot in the 
foot, lie was given up by everybody, but the Lord directs. 
Sohreiber was restored, is now captain on the retired list, 
and for the fourth time representing the district of Nord- 
liausen in the Diet. lie is the same man who was men 
tioned at Problus as ensign, and his wound is a case in point 

♦The singular ways of Providence are shown by the following: 
Among the killed was Lieutenant Weiuhagen. who was adjutant at 
Griifrath. On the completion of the mobilization he had taken a 
leave for the purpose of being present in at least one action, after 
which he intended to return. He joined the regiment on the 11th of 
August and was assigned to the l'2th Company of the Fifty-seventh. 
When we were marching to the battle of the 10th. he was full of 
happy anticipation: but the tirst action, by which he meant to satisfy 
his ambition, which we can easily understand, cost him his life. 
Oddly enough, warrants for his arrest, giving his personal descrip- 
tion, were issued for this brave man long after he was slumbering 
under the soil of Mars-la-Tour. 

tLives now at Berlin and is general of infantry. 



Military- 1 1 inlorical Hludies. 207 

in oonnocliofi with tho oxporimcntH mado by ProfoHHor 
iJi-uriH and otiiorH, to bo roform] to ialr-r on. Tha wound of 
entrance can barely be diHcerned to-day; that of exit, which 
waH Hornewhat larger, \h move conHpir:nonH. 

Tlu- n b;if<;iIioriH of the .''.Sth Hrif^ndf* went into battle 
with or, oHifeKij and 454(; rnen. They loHt 72 officerH and 
20;{:', men in kilh'd and wounded — i. e., 74^ per cent of riflfi- 
cerH, and 45 per font of men, not counting thoHe captured. 

The Frencli fV. Army forf»H iian Htated itH Iohhch on 
tlic HVth of AugiiHt, ;iH 200 ofTicerH and 2258 rnen. Thewe 
HgiircH we have rcdiucd on jtjige 190 to 147 ofTlcerH and 1722 
men, incluHive of f.cgnind'H cavalry diviHion ; thfw? lf>sHeH are 
great in vir*w of tiie brief fire action on the part of the 38th 
Brigade and of itH vary Hmall expenditure of ammunition. 
The greater part of fhf-Hf h>HHeH iH probjibly due to our jirfil- 
lery and to the Keventy-ninth. Jn order to elucidate this 
and other matterH, I addrcHsed mvHelf to rJeneralH Ladmir- 
ault, (irenier, and CiHsey; the tirwf jidlK-red to the ofTieial 
ttgureH, the other two failed to anHwer. 

It iH probably Hafe to annume that one-half of our Ioksch 
were incurred on the retreat; henee 5 battalions loHt .",0 
OfTicerH and 1010 men, while advancing 1,500 meterH, and 
before the rcU-cat. The brigade therefore arrived within 
then effective range of the enemy in good condition, not- 
withHtanding the long attack movement under the moHt un- 
favorable eircumHtanceH. The tactical formw employed— 
i. e., advance without halt and without fire, with nkir- 
miHherH and company columnn— proved ade(|uate undf-r 
long-range and nhort-range mass fire, it being moreover a 
frontal attack taken in flank by the enemy. 

The defeat of the brigade, at the same time, was due 
more to its numerical inferiority and lack of knowledge of 
the enemy, than to its tactics. The ground wan afl unfavor- 



208 Inquiries into the Tactics of the Future. 

ahlo to an attack as it posv^^iMv oouUl be. atul as suitablo for 
mass thv at lotiir ami slu>rt ranj^o as thoniih it had boon 
siHHMallv prt»v>arod; yot in tliis tlankod frontal attack np to 
tlio retroat tho lossos woro no un^ator than in othor niodorn 
battlos assnniinij tho tlguros handod down to ns to bo oor 
root, and OAon sniallor than in many a battlo of Fivdoriok 
and Napoloon wIumo tho th>oision liad to bo aainod by 
assanlt. 

Tho oironmstanoos oan thoroforo not bo oallod oxtra- 
ordinary. On tlio othor hand, do not the battlos of T^oanno. 
of Villiors, of l>apannu\ and on tho T.isaino 1:0 to show that 
tho opponent siilYorod similar lossos aijainst ns? To be 
sure tho Oormans wtro tactically mnch tho superiors of 
those troops of tho enemy. 

Tho picture 1 have presented of tho battle, and tho man- 
ner in which 1 have endeavored to analy/.e it and to explain 
its details, should ]>revont false conclusions. The small- 
caliber rities, etc.. have furnished the opponents of all 
closed formations with now arguments for their theories, to 
bo sure, but it is by no means certain that tluu'o will not be 
situations in the futui-o whore it will bt^ possible to advance 
in closed formation to within t> — 400 motors of the enemy. 

IX. ^Vhl/ Was the Charge of the 1st Guard Dragoons Successful? 

Evorythinir I have stHMi. heard, and read of the Austro- 
Saxon troops cajiuot but impress their friends atid enemies 
alike with respect for their discipline and for their behavior 
on the battk^tield. In ISOO tht^ Saxons, for instance, prt^ 
served their onlor and tactical formations under dostruct 
ivo infantry tiiv. and it was only the defeat that destroyed 
them. It also ap]>earod that wherever (hoy wore tem- 
porarily victorious, their spirit and discipline did not desren- 
orato into reprehensible and low outbursts of hatred or 



M Hilary IJiHUrrical Sttuiies. 2<i'.j 

oWtcr wil<l imnHiouH, oven wU<:u iiit- itit'it wr-n- not \nn\*'V con 
frol or rjrj(J<-r o!)wrv;itiori. T'.idK'.il ;<-;iko/i« n<-v<r cj'Hmni to 
(»r«<Jof/iinat<-, ;in<J fh'? itovtciU-yn, wourKl**! or rj/iwound'r^J, 
pfiHorKT waH Kure of kind treatrnr^nt. 

Our <'.x\><'y\i'n<H'n on fh^' baffUf-fi^jJd of Mar-K-laTour 
w^'f-r; diff'T'-nf, I jun t^hid to Jtrknow U'df('? that w<f thf^n hrfid 
our ofijjon'-nt in rnilifjirv uu<\ mora) n-wf^-rrt, knowinj^ that 
*th<- Vvt'\\<]\ nation r-onnifl'-r'-d itH<')f ;if th'- h^iid of ^iviliza- 
fion. JI<rif<*, v\f' ronid not w<ll ^nt'•rlain a j>oor id'-a of tho 
Hpiril, of Ml*' imperial frf>^>pH, and our diKafipointrnr^nt waw 
i\\*'it'Un'tt all thr^ t^rttnUtr. I would paxK fh'f rnatt'T- ov^t in 
Hik'riw were it not that it in iriHtnu'tiv*-. 

Kitfint? at the i!r<^-ti tabh- on^ lookn, at hu^Ij rnattr-iH 
diffr•r^ntly than wh^n lyin;^ wound'-d on the battle-field. 
l\ IK hut natural that in the latter eawe one rnav make min- 
takeM, hut even the <juiet of the Htudy, where reanon Ih ex- 
I>eete<l to manter paMHioii.iM no bar to errorH. There are th(m(t 
who think that the imjierial Freneh infantry wax taetic- 
ally Htjperior to the German; amon^ them are very influen- 
tial AuHtriari ofTi'^rH, and evr-n the (ifrrfiuriH do not deny the 
Frenf;h Kuj^eriority in the employment of fire and in village- 
fighting, where the Frenehmen can nhow hiH fine qnalitie«. 
In other rr^HpeetH, alKO, the German infantry committed 
many tactir-al errorn in the firKt period of the war, but what 
waH the courne of the French attack here? 

After the 88th Brigade had br-en Hwept away, it wa» 
followed firHt by a divinion. and then by half of another in 
Keveral lineH. Neither had effective infantry to encounter, 
Btill the advance waH clumKy and kIow, Firnt came a Hkir- 
miwh line, in which everybody commingled, in which every- 
body yelled, in which there waH no tactical order, and which, 
moreover, halted rcf^-atedly, although there wan no r^twint- 
ance. It wan fr»llovvrd by a Hecond HkirmiHh line, and tiio 



210 Inquiries into the Tactics of the Future. 

latter by battalions in lino, with tlioir eajjles. INIoro I was 
unable to obser\e. The artillery did not join in the move- 
ment and remained in its position, with the exception of 
one battery of Cissey's division, which followed as far as the 
northern edg^e of the frequently mentioned ravine and 
opened fire on Tronville. The first skirmish line fired, 
7nost]y from the hip, without aiming; both skirmish lines 
passed over us. and the battalions halted on the line where 
most of our dead and wounded were lying, 150 — 300 meters 
south of the ravine. The distances between their lines 
were very unequal, and during the advance portions of the 
first two lines became intermingled. The French had prob 
ably arrived within about 150 meters to the north of Con- 
tour 780, when they were attacked by the 1st Guard Dra- 
goons, and now there arose an indescribable confusion. 
Both skirmish lines rushed to the rear — throwing away 
ritles and equipments; other skirmishers laid themselves 
down alongside of and between us or endeavored to form 
groups; the men were firing in all directions and an irregu- 
lar fire came from the closed battalions. Considering their 
small strength and the unfavorable conditions of the at- 
tack, it sounds incredible that 3 squadrons of the 1st Guard 
Dragoons rode through three lines, threw two into flight 
and the third, closed one, into disorder, and staggered all 
three of them. TTere is the point, and however mucli has been 
written on that (jlorious event, not a single officer has tried to find 
the explanation. I shall give it; it is simple indeed. Had 
the French infantry been in possession of that which an 
eflScient body of troops cannot do without — viz., tactical 
order and discipline, no cavalry could have gained the least 
success under circumstances where the unobstructed view 
of the field pr(M'luded amjthing lilr surprise. Yet the sur- 
prise was com])lete: hence the confusion and stupefaction 



Military-Historical Studies. 211 

■of the enemy. That is what gave the dragoons success. 
How could they have surprised the enemy? Because the 
hostile infantry masked the greater part of their own rifles 
by an advance of the 13th and 4.3d Regiments from the left 
of Grenier's division in a sharp westerly direction toward 
Mars-la-Tonr. Forming an acute angle with the Fren<'h 
front, they prevented the latter from firing and lent their 
flank to us, and their rear to the Seventy-ninth, to portions 
of the Fifty-seventh in the Bois de Tronville, and to the 
artillery southwest of the latter. To these tactical errors 
are to be added other circumstances which tended to 
lighten the work of the 1st Cluard Dragoons: namely, the 
boundless disorder, the lack of discipline, the bad spirit of 
that infantry, the helplessness of the oflScers and the lack of 
heed paid to the enemy. When the skirmishers of the 13th 
Regiment joined those of the infantry in the first line — 
right over our dead and wounded — it was as though the 
happy meeting and victory wore to be celebrated together; 
there may have been cause for that, to be sure, but they 
were not yet masters of the battle-field. They shouted, 
called, and drank to each other, waved their forage caps, 
and occupied themselves exclusively with the unfortunate 
victims of the battle, heaping all kinds of ignominy on 
them. Whole groups stopped at a prostrate Prussian, and 
what did that infantry do? It polluted its name by inde- 
scribable cynicism or by brutalities with which it threatened 
our wounded. " The first greeting presented to most of us 
was the muzzle of a gun, the coats of most of us were torn 
open from top to bottom, most of us were robbed of our pos- 
sessions, and if that had only been the worst! Entire com- 
panies disappeared as tactical bodies, the men picking up 
Prussians that were not yet dead and carrying them off as 
prisoners, or unsaddling our officers' horses which were lying 



*212 Itujuirics into the Tactics of the Futttre. 

\\vvi\ and taking saddles and bridles to a safo plaoo. 1 niy- 
st'lf >vas spaivd any molestation, bocanso a FnMU'Ti otVioor 
took I'liarjio of mo; but while .liivinp; mo a drink from his 
rantoon, his luvu tapped hin\ on the shoulder in a most 
familiar wav, as thonjih to i>xpress their disapj>roval. That 
was the reason thev felt themselves masters of the battle- 
tield. and oeeupiinl themselves with thins;s whieh should 
not have been tolerated; order was destroved. and in the 
midst of this heedh>ssn»>ss burst our eavalrv; it was sueeess- 
ful and was bound to W. 1 would not. however, advise it 
to attempt the same thinj; aj;ainst sonu^ other infantry, for 
it would not eheek them for "10 minutes." This cavalry 
did not jiet fartluM* east than to the extreme rijjht of 
;U1 — 57th; thert> it wheeled to the left, rode throujih and 
oonfoundiHl the lines alonj: the entirt> front, and. passin,-; 
around the north of Mars-la-Tour. disappeared behind the 
villaiiv. (^ur front was now elear. and those who eould 
erawl to the rear saved themselves, as a perfectly nnid fire 
from the rijiht front was sweepinj; for some tinn' ovtM* 
the battle-tield. on whieh not an enemy was standiuir. The 
statement is not corrtH't. that the FriMU'h infantry did not 
auain advance, as luiiiht b»> inferred from all books dealini; 
with this evtmt. and as is expressly stated in the Histories 
of the KUh and 571 h Kejjinu^nts. whieh j::o so far as to assert 
that the hostile infantry recrossed the ravine in conse- 
quence of that attat'k. On the contrary, as soon as the 
dra,mH)ns had disapi>eared. it aiiain advanced fi-oni tln^ rij::ht, 
utilizinj; the time to police the tield. Tn this period falls 
the capture of the brave liorseless or wounded draii-oons, 
and of many ofticers and men of F. — Kith. I. — 57th, and 
F. — 57th. The ca]>ture of the drajroons in itself proves the 
accuracy of my statement. How could they have been cap- 
tured if the FrtMuh had run awav before iheui across the 



Military-Historical Studies. 213 

ravine? It wuh not until later that a general withdrawal 
to the original ponition took place in consequence of the 
appearance of lth(;inbaben'H Cavalry Division at Ville 
Hur Yron. The withdrawal wan made in the warne carelesH 
manner an had been the advance; the lin(;H were without 
any protection and nimjily faced about. On our extreme 
h'ft they w(;re i>receded by a lonj; dark column: it was 
our captured men. It iH therefore due to the bad Hpirit 
and the lack of diHcipline, in addition to tactical errorn, 
that the French failed to gain anything beyond the direct 
rcHultH of their fire. 



214 Inquiries into the Tactics of the Future. 



PART II. 

PSYCHOLOGY AND TACTICS. 

1. General. 
Tlu' will is tlu^ powor that diroi-ts tho masses, and dis- 
cipline is the niodinni throiij^h whioh the will is bronuht to 
bear on the men; a clear and determined will and rnthless 
exercise of discipline are in battle the most valuable quali- 
ties of the lower otticers. whose constant endeavor should 
be to preserve the ascendency over their subordinatt^s by 
means of their higher moral strength and their tactically 
trained intellect. The most perfect arms may moilify, but 
will never ahro(jate. that law, and those alone will travel the 
right road in tactics who keep in mind that many thousands 
of men are involved, who all. however ditVerent tht\v may be 
in other respects, have in common the natural egotism luhich 
aims at the safeti/ and preserration of one's life. By the side 
of the material egotism there is a transcendental, moral, 
national — in brief, a psychical tine, which may exert a ]>ow'- 
erful iufluenoe. The higher the development of the latter, 
the better will it rise above the im])ulses of material ego- 
tism. Mohammed showed himself the type of an army psy- 
chologist in teaching that the beyond is all. and the present 
life nothing. In any nation this moral egotism can only 
spring from conditions and causes germane to the indi- 
vidual; it cannot be imparted by influences operating from 
without. Tactics should be in keeping with it. should be 
national. There are times when the gn^t mass is im]>elled 
by the motive of the war. and such a time has been men- 
tioned (1870). Although this is an exception, still it will 



Psychology and Taciics. '216 

be necf^HHary in tacticH to reckon with a feature which for- 
merly waH not HO dominant as it may be expected to be in 
the fntnre — i. e.. the increaHe of the national sentiment. 
More than that, in the case of our prospective opponents, 
the Russians and French, there is a sj^ecial psychic aug- 
mentation in the shape of hatred which has been artificially 
^created and nurtured through a whole generation. On the 
I>art of the French the hatred arose from the defeats suf- 
fered in 1870-71 ; on the jjart of the Russians, from their dis- 
content with the results of the victorious \\'ar of 1877-78. 
Moreover, in both nations, the military spirit has grown 
much, because all their ho7>es are based on their armies. 
In Russia the x>olitical hatred is fed by the orthodox clergy, 
in France by the Roman Catholic clergy, and the Czar is 
not only the political, judicial, and military, but also the 
religious, head of the state. The moral strength of the 
army is bound to be benefited by both of these sources, and 
the future war is bound to be a national war. a war of the 
peojile. The armies of nations aiming at ends whose ac- 
complishment they believe indispensable for the mainte- 
nance of their political honor, are likely to be moved by 
more effective moral influences than the armies of nations 
which are politically satiated, so to speak, and merely bent 
on the defense of their possessions, their position among 
the nations, etc. 

This constitutes a matter doubly impjortant in tactics, 
where the personal influence of the superior can no longer 
exercise the sway it did in former tactics. Much will there- 
fore in the future depend on the moral strength jjossessed 
in each case by the soldier; indeed, the tactics of masses 
of skirmishers will be feasible, if at all, chiefly because 
grounded on this basis. The increased sense of x>^i'«'^nal 
honor and the principle of national honor are alone able to 



216 Inquiries into the Tactics of the Future. 

eounterbalauee to a certain degree the lessened personal 
inlluence of the leader over the masses. Armies will 
be opposed to each other more equal iu strength, condi- 
tion, armament, and training than ever before, and each 
army is bound to display those superior qualities which 
live and operate in its nation. National psychology thus 
becomes a true element in future war, and, naturally, 
also in tactics. Every officer should industriously labor 
to understand it thoroughly, and that opponent will have a 
great advantage, so far as tactics is concerned, who has 
secured for himself the superiority in moral influences by 
peace training. I am abstaining from a comparison be- 
tween these forces of the prospective opponents, because 
it is so easy to err; but everything should be done to 
strengthen the moral spirit. Tactics would have light 
work, if we should ever reach the stage where every man 
would regard the assailing of our national honor or the vio- 
lation of our territory as an attack in an equal degree, and 
where every one w'ould be urged, from his own inner motives, 
to demand satisfaction, and to offer life or limb to 
obtain national redress. This cannot be hoped for 
to-day, for in all modern nations a continuous and bit- 
ter struggle is waging between the material and moral 
egotism. The entire modern society is embroiled in it, and 
the discontent with the existing social, political, and relig- 
ious conditions absorbs a large part of the moral strength. 
Society and the people, the state and its institutions, are 
exhausting themselves in the mutual struggle and consume 
most precious forces. Some nations show a certain intel- 
lectual and political apathy, and it is doubtful whether 
their national sentiment can mature those advantages for 
tactics which are to be expected from healthy moral 
conditions. Even at times when flaming patriotism 



Psychology and Tactics. 217 

8\vays every man's heart, the enthusiasm of the great 
majority grows dumb at the door of death, material 
egotism gains the mastery over idealism, hodily weakness 
over intellectual strength, and the instinct of self-preser- 
vation over the spirit of self-sacrifice. A small minority 
alone preserves its enthusiasm, and among the many vex- 
mtions, fatigues, and deprivations of war hut few of this 
minority retain the same buoyancy of spirit and will-power 
and the same resoluteness in all dangers. In my own case 
I admit that these forces changed just as does one's dis- 
position, the condition of the body, and the atmosphere in 
which we live. The low egotism knocks many times, and 
man, clinging much to the material world, much more than 
is believed by non-penetrative persons, frequently becomes 
more or less the '^personal battle-field," where human weak- 
ness struggles against noble and sturdy impulses. Some 
acknowledge it; others are ashamed to do so. It should 
not be covered with silence; on the contrary, it should be 
particularly brought out. as it is only wiien every one under- 
stands it, that we reach healthy views and the means to 
conquer ourselves. Then collapses the current theory 
of the soldier's courage; it is a myth, and, as a rule, cannot 
be anything else; manful examples alone will hold a great and, 
according to my experience, calming, influence over men with the 
sense of honor. In the school of war man gathers warlike 
experience; there the leader continuously disciplines his 
mental, moral, and physical powers in reaching for higher 
aims and in looking upon war from the standpoint of the 
artist. It may be stated as a rule, that in war courage in- 
creases in few, not in the great mass, and these few, officers 
as well as men, are the soul of the troops. The most cour- 
ageous soldier is the one who has not been under fire, since 
peace habitudes maybe so strong in him that hewill for some 

16 — 



218 Inquiries into the Tactics of the Future. 

time move in battle as on the maneuver ground. But not 
always; it will only be so long as he does not know the 
danger into which he has been led. As soon as he becomes 
conscious of the danger, he is beset by uneasiness for his 
own self instead of finding in himself courage and strength 
for the cause and for the idea. When an advancing body of 
troops suddenly stops, it cannot be explained psychologic- 
ally in any other way but that the men have become con- 
scious of the peril of the situation ; these are decisive mo- 
ments which are overcome only by a few strong spirits of 
sufficient vigor to revive by their own will-power the falter- 
ing courage of the troops and to carry them over such mo- 
ments of w^eakness. Between these moments, however, and 
the phenomena arising from a consciousness of numerical 
inferiority, there is a vast difference. 

The brigade which carried out the attack on Height 846 
would hardly repeat it in the same manner now that it 
knows the danger. No human power could have made it 
rise and advance after it once lay dowm near the enemy. 
There are limits in tactics where will-power fails and w^here 
personal ascendency is no longer effective, and the appre- 
ciation of these limits on the part of officers and men is a 
purely instinctive one, springing, as it were, from the recog- 
nition of the enemy's materially superior fighting power — 
i. e., of their ow'n tactical inferiority. It cannot be explained 
in any other way, that in such moments leaders and men 
suddenly turn about without previous arrangement, with- 
out orders, without signal of any kind, etc.; that a closed 
body of troops which at one moment exhibits the finest of 
bearing, completely collapses at the next like a house built 
of cards. Passion, enthusiasm, and the courage of the in- 
dividual should not, therefore, be solely relied upon, but it 
should be borne in mind that as regards tactics, the major- 



Psycliologij and Tactics. 219 

ity of the men remain indolent — for anyone who acts not 
spontaneously, but merely upon exterior impulses, may in 
so far be called indolent. In keeping that in mind, despite 
universal liability to service and other assertions, we shall 
best serve our king, country, and nation, and be apt to take 
the correct steps in an emergency. What officer who has 
Jbeen exposed to destructive fire, is willing to assert that it 
did not cost him a struggle to rise from behind the cover 
and to rush forward over the open field where death and 
destruction were reigning? "NA'ho will deny that the same 
readiness of resolve cannot be the gift of the majority of the 
men; that, unlike the ofQcers, they do not act spontaneously, 
but in response to an exterior impelling force? Who has 
not observed that the signal of the whistle, though heard, 
was unheeded; that when the men were under cover, but 
few followed resolutely from the beginning when the officer 
rushed to the front, others slowly, others not at all, and that 
the entire advance came to a stop as soon, for instance, as 
the leading officer fell under the enemy's fire? We have 
musketeers behind us, not heroes. Under the modern 
destructive mass fire, it is not only difficult to cause the 
swarms of skirmishers to quit their cover and to carry them 
forward, but the combined leading of man}- small detach- 
ments is much more difficult than formerly, and on open 
ground it will frequently be found impossible. As striking 
illustrations, we have selected the two examples (Problus 
and Mars-la-Tour), separated by an interval of four years, 
which took place under circumstances resembling each 
other in many particulars. While in the former attack 
the army of the Elbe retained unbroken control over 
the divisions, brigades, and even some battalions and 
companies; while division, brigade, and regimental com- 
manders were from beginning to end with the skirmish lines 



220 Inquiries into the Tactics of the Future. 

or >vith their supports; and whiU\ for instaiu'i'. Major von 
Thiole, j^eueral staff oftioor of tho 14th Division, traversed 
the distance from the captured viUay;e of Problus (27th 
Brijjade) to the soutlieast and back in close proximity to the 
enemy's entrenched position, in order to deliver to tlu> 'JSth 
Brigade the order to attack the wood of Hriz; while the I'Sth 
Brigade executed a ditticult wheel under etlective tire for 
the purpose of attacking the wood; while the connecting link 
between leader and combatants never broke — at INIars-la- 
Tour the entire brigade quickly slipped from the hands of 
the superior leaders. What was practicable four years 
before on the same kind of ground was impracticable then 
within the zone of the mass lire of the breech-loader, and it 
will remain so forever under like circumstances. 

In all fire tactics the knowledge' of the fallings of 
human nature heretofore called for the longest possibh' ki>ep- 
ing together of bodies controllable by one hand; to-day the 
small-caliber ritie by no means relieves us from that i>rinci- 
ple, it com]>els us rather to ai>]ily it intelligently if there is 
to be any control at all. If the latter is detMued retiuisite, 
the meajis must be shaped accordingly, for whoever wants 
a certain end necessarily wants the means thereto. 

No tactician should contend against this principle, and 
it should be left to the artist to sha]>e the same into a use- 
ful and sufficient tactical means iinder the vicissitudes of 
the battle-field. It requlrc^s a clear, tactical eye, rational 
peace experience, a knowledge of the ballistic qualities of 
the arm (infantry and artillery), etc., matters not always 
found where modern conditions require that they should be, 
in the ranks of the subordinate leaders. Since even enthusi- 
asm fails to remedy the failings of hunmn nature, it follows 
that modern tactics requires on the part of all leaders Ji 
higher degree of knowledge and abilitv, of initiative and 



I'Hijt-holfxjy and Tactics. 221 

vi^^or, of innij^lil jiikJ jxTKcvcranoe than formerly; that, in a 
word, (adicH lias b<'(;oin<' nior*? pHijcliolof/ifMl. Ah ooinparod 
M'ilh tlic action in itH entiroty, attackn on poHitionH, an at 
I'l-obliJH, MarH-la-Tour, and Kt. Privat, will bo exceptional; yet 
wKli inteJlif^ent preparation Jind utilization of the terrain 
they might b(,' cani^-d out to day denpite Kniallcalibf^r rifleg, 
etc., without exjjosing ijh to annihilation; and rar<;r Htill will 
lie the caHe, an at MarH-Ia-Tonr, of a ningle brigade flinging 
ItKflf againKl an impregnable position without making the 
aftenipl of acfing wifh one of ifs baffalionH agjiinnt the 
enemy's flank or without being supported by such a flank 
movement on the part of troops engaged alongside. That 
whi<;h the .'{8th Brigade, on August 1«, 1870, the 1st Brigade 
of the Ouard at Kt. I'rival, and the various brigades at the 
Mance ravin<* on the 181h of August, wanted and were 
ordered to do, wjih Ijound to f;iil b('(;au»e based on a miscon- 
ception of the situation. It would have been equally disas- 
trous in the days of Frederick or of Napoleon as in 1870, be- 
cause not in kee{)ing with taclics. A frontal attack under 
such conditions will never lead to a decision; it will rather 
have to be bi-ouglit about by tlj<' troops on the right and left; 
and just as the '>8th Brigade was bound to succumb before 
sui)erior hostile forces in a strong position, so it is certain 
that under like circumstances, at St. Privat, the Guard 
r'orps would never have taken the village by assault had not 
the turning movement of the XII. Army Corps gained that 
decision on the flank which could not be obtained in front. 
What a hopeless situation for tlir- troojjH which are thrown 
against the front I No, not liopeless; as honorable as pos- 
sible, as demonstrated, not by the leading, but by th(; bear- 
ing of the Guards at St. Privat and of the 1.5th Division at 
fit. Hubert. They are called upon to bear the heaviest losses, 
and to hold out under a destructivr- fire; only to relinquish 



222 Ttiquirics into the Taciics of the Future. 

the palm of virtof.v propiM* (o others. TIkmt lanks ai'e 
thiuiKHl every miiuile; at Hu* seeiuiiifxiv opporhiiu^ uionuMit 
the eiuMiiv st>eks io ailvaiu't> in orihM- lo crush (he dross uiultM' 
his het>l; (htMi it is that troops show the stnlT th(\\ arc ina<h^ 
of and of what th(\v must l)e capabh'. Tlie.vshonhl not h)8»' their 
vu)rah\ and in this respect they can be materially assisted by 
the snpei-ior leaders taUinj; into consideration the phi/fiirnl 
streuijth of the men. >\h(Mi that is spent to the same d«\iiroe 
as that of the :>Sth Krijiade at INIars la Tonr. a man is no bet- 
ter than a stick of wood, and can be kicked out of the way 
us easily: he can no lonijer defend himstMf. It is not the 
size of the loss(^s that nu\isurcs tln^ valn(> of troops; it is 
their behavior notwithstanding; tlu^ loss(>s — /. c. the dciirt^e 
of their power of resistance and of their efliciency in action: 
in other words, their moral force is what ttMls. It in tnrn 
depends ou the i)hysical strenjjth, and what the Guards were 
able io accomi>lish at St. Privat, because their physical 
strcnjjth was not s])ent, was bound to be impt)ssibh> for the 
3Sth lirijjadeat ]\rars-la-Tour, even had tluMuimerical condi- 
tions been more favorable on both sidt^s. simply bccaust* the 
brij^ade ii'(},< phi/.^iicolli/ spent. 

11. MtLviins. 

From what has been said the followinj;- jiiMUMal maxims 
may ho dedncinl: 

1. K(\nar(l for hnman wt^iknc^ss, which set^vs cover 
rather than i^xposure. 

12. St'lcction of snch forms for tlu^ attack as olTci- to 
the (MUMuy the poorest possible tariitMs. and urantinji to the 
individual sntlicient freiMlom for the purpose of utili/inp: the 
terrain and his arrti, for fjaininji' a favorable tirinj; ])osition. 
jind for obtaining: there the sui)eriority of tire. 

.*>. The infantrv attai'k is a conllit'l of masses of skir- 



I'Hycholoffy and TacticH. 323 

TfiiKlifrH v*'(\\n\\\\\r, <'jirly and Hiifficifiit i\i'\i'\<>\>mc\\t of 
HkJrrniHhoiH and opportune' an-ival of Hiiflficient HupportH. 
For the movement, the fire, the attainment of the position, 
the reinforcement, and the ruHh from firinjij position to fir- 
ing? poKJlion, there can be but one formation — namely, an 
o[>r'n, HJngle rank line. There can b^' but one kind of fire; 
fire of skirmiHherH, That in the universal fighting method 
of infantry. 

4. liJHorder and intermingling of organizations become 
the rule. Jt is one of the foremost duti'-s of the subordinate 
leadr-rs to r;xercis<? such control as will best preserve the 
figJiting eflif-iency at each point; heme an increaiie in the 
number of subordirfate leaders is requisite. 

5. In carrying out the attack there will no longer be 
sucessive arrays (Treffen) down to include the reser-ves; 
there will be nf>thing but opened single-rank lines; even the 
term "e<helon" is antiquated. On the other hand, the 
"7V«/few" are indispensable, previous to \\\c deployment. 
The use of smokeless powder is presumed, of course, for the 
present generation will probably not fight with any other. 
The term ''normal attack" should not be used at all, and 
the tfrms ''long-range fire" and "short-range fire," in the 
sense of 1870-71, an* sirnply confusing rubbish, the dispute 
as to their admissibility having been settled, Movf^mont 
and fire are but the different forms of one act. As to the 
distance between supports, there is only a maximum limit, 
which may be deviatf'd from. dey)f'nding on the character of 
lli<; gi'ound. 

0. Deployment, forming for attack, and execution of 
the attack are thr^-e separate stages for which some r^gle- 
mentary prescriptions arc indispensable; otherwise, there 
would be no means of control in connection with a tactical 
division of labor, none for the organized action of the 



224 Inquiries into the Tactics of the Futttre. 

uiassos of sUirmisluTs. uouc U)v i'ouivolWuiX (lisordiT, 
Evory brijiiulo sliould strirlly cDiilino ilst>H' lo (lu- allot (i>d 
oxtoiil of front. Witliiu tlio bripulo fiout aiul ilopiMuling 
on tlu» tonain, doviations from tho ordinary oxtonts of 
front aro frotintMitly nnavoulablo. Thoy slionld thoroforo 
l>t> porniiittHl. N\ luMi lljihtinji' in deep formation ( "(U/.s* dcr 
Tiefe I'echtcn'^ ) tho brijijulo front may, in (ho pitcluul battle, 
bo oxtondod to 1 U)0 motors. 

7. I'rontal attacks ovor opon j;ronnd aro to bo 
avoidod as n\nrli as possiblo; if that is impossiblo. tho foroos 
omployod shonld bo so nnmorous that aftor sntlorinji; hoavy 
lossos, thoy still rotain sntliciont moral sironjith to hold 
out, and sntVu-iont moral and physical ttaotioal) stron»»tli to 
resist. IUmu-o pri>por apportitmmont of rt>sorvt>s, selection 
of a suitable pt»sition for tluMn, and sondinu thorn promptly 
forward. 

v'N, The aitai-k in-oper. the sciutir of the cnenuf-s position, 
will usually require fresh troops. I'uless a superiority 
of tire has been gained by the infantry and artillery, any 
attack is hopeless, and. nu>reovor, the particular moment is 
dirticult to recojiui/e, and ihcroforo also that for briniiitiii up 
fresh troops, a duty exclusively bcli>n,uinii- to tho hiuluM* 
loaders. 

!». Tho advanc(^ to be continued as lonu- as possible 
\Yithout halt, at tho same tinte utilizinsi- t^very cover, for 
protection, not for a pruhuKjcit stai/. This "vvlll in most 
cases bo found practicable for swarms of skirmishers \^^ to 
within (!l>0 motors of tho enemy; and at shorttM* distances 
and even in closed formations, when tluMV is cover. 

10. The tire action should be opened accordinjily, and 
so ns to cover the entire front allotted to tho brigade. 

11. All elTective means should bt> employed for the 
rush forward; tho best way is to carry tho uumi alonp: with 



pHycholof/}/ and 'luctu^a. 225 

fr*'Hh troojm, even if the latter Jx; ?>iit hastily gatherffd 
MfjiiafJH; it will be practicable in rnoHt eaK*^ to bring thern 
up at the rij^hi moment , if tbe field of fire i« 0[K;n, they 
Hhould move in HwarrnM of MlcirmiHherM only, flow many 
ruHh<m iL borly of troofm in capable of making; in very miu'MV- 
tain. We have no Huflicient rlat>i on that point, and 
nowhere i>*'rha|>H Hhall we meet with w> many rJi>iapj»oint- 
mentH an in tlie a/lvance by ruMh^fH, becaun^; it will be diffi- 
cult in moMt caH^fH to harmonize theory with the practical 
actual conditionH, J place no j^reat hofK-H on the a/lvance 
by ruHh^;«, particularly when begun at a great diKtance. 

12, Infantry in to be Hupported by a vigorouH artil- 
lery fire. 

l'{. Jf the enemy givf^ way, the victorn nhould follow 
him up rapidly, but all the engaged troopH which do not 
have an oppoH unity to fire, Hhould be rapidly re-forrnf^. 

14. If the attack failB, artillery will be called upon to 
offer the firKt reKiKtance. Hujifjorted by the r^-^^^rve of the 
variouK armn. 

The attacker winheK to conquer, and for that purjHXie 
he muKt advance to day aw much aH formerly, nkillfully util- 
izing the terrain i>reviouHly reconnoitered by the lea/lern, 
until at a range at which the fire can have the requisite 
effect. KeconnaiHHance and utilization of the terrain were 
formerly of great importance; that importance ha« b*^;i» 
materially increased by wmokeleHH powder, TheKe duti^*H 
have, moreover, I>een renderwl more difficult, and one 
Hhould rcHolutely face the unavoidable fact that every 
attack coHtH blood; the man Hhould be trained to that, 
nhould he hahituaied to that idea; and it nhould be t^ken into 
account in adopting tactical forrnn for battle. 

DoffH not military hintory tc^ach that attackn on Htrong- 



226 Inquiries into the Tactics of the Future. 

ly occupied positions, even before the introduction of the 
breech-loader, cost as many men as in the War of 1870? 
Compare Leipsic* 

Attacks by large bodies of troops over open ground may 
become necessary, and should therefore be practiced in 
peace. Even the knowledge that the attack will fail of its 
object should not be suffered to remove that necessity. 
The effect of an attack, though it be unsuccessful, may be 
very great. 

The smaller the losses, the better will the morale of the 
troop usually be preserved. But in every case of attack in 
peace the soldier should be informed of the great impend- 
ing losses and be psychologically (morally) trained on that 
point. Unless the soldier is possessed with a high degree 
of will-power, unless his training is such as to show him in 
everything and everywhere the necessity of self-control and 
disregard of danger, unless there is vigor and will — the 
will to advajice — all forms will remain artifices and fail 
to mature results. 

Not infantry alone, but artillery also has been pro- 
vided with improved arms, and both arms have become 
more independent and capable of resistance. 

Where the conformation of the ground compels the 
infantry to halt at medium range from the enemy and to 
hold out there (in first line, on open, swept ground), it will 
probably be practicable to carry on the action in combina- 

*The Prussians lost 40 per cent at Leipsic, 38 per cent at Zorn- 
dorf, 40 per cent at Kunersdorf; the French 30 per cent at Borodino, 
50 per cent at Aspern; the Germans 22 per cent at Mars-la-Tour, the 
bloodiest battle of the War of 1870-71. To be sure, the data of former 
days cannot be strictly authenticated. I cannot discuss that subject 
here. Those who wish to inform themselves are referred to the 
essays of Bleibtreu, von Boguslawski, and von Lettow in the Mili- 
Uir Wochcnhlntt of 1893. and of von Roloff in No. 69 of the 
DeKtsche Hcercszcitinw of 1893, and in the April number of the Preus- 
sische Jahrbiiclier for 1893. 



Psycholofjy and Tactics. 227 

tion with strong artillery as implied in the characteristics 
of that arm. Should infantry believe itself capable of 
fighting independently in the future, it will have to pay 
a heavy penalty in blood. The defense has gained in 
strength, and will jn'obably make more extensive use of pre- 
pared positions, and the. attack and defense of the latter 
will be materially modified. 

///. Inquiries into the Maxims. 

It requires no argument to prove that troops lying 
behind cover will not, without exterior impulse from their 
officers, rise in order to repair from a place of comparative 
immunity from danger to one of great peril, and every 
action in which the officers wore killed or placed hors-de- 
conibat furnishes examples. In such cases there is usually an 
end to further advance, and more cannot be expected of the 
troops than that they hold the [)oint they have reached. In 
carrying out something extraordinary, man requires extra- 
ordinary resolution and great will-power, which spring 
only from an absolute devotion to the cause. Devotion to 
ideals may in itself be able to suppress the impulses of 
material egotism, to enroll man in the service of higher 
aims, and to induce him to surrender his own existence. 
The soldier, like the artist, should therefore have an ideal- 
ism in which he believes, and for which he is prepared to 
sacrifice his all. This is a theorem, but it does not imply 
that its requirements could be fulfilled in the case of every 
soldier. Idealism may be as different as man; whether it 
bear the name of faith, fidelity, love of country, political 
creed, whether it may seek glory and honor, greatness and 
elevation, its action will be the same, and that is its import- 
ant point in tactics. iiTo one will deny that the risking of 
one's life is something extraordinary, likewise that the 



228 Inquiries into the Tactics of the Futtire. 

umsketeer, by himself, cannot, as a rule, have the jjift of 
devotion to the cause for which he is calhnl upon to sur- 
render his life; he should therefore be trained with j^reat 
care, and that is the duty of his officers in jx^ace. Should 
any military man decline to subscribe to this, I would like 
to ask him, whether that courage ever existed which is 
habitually spoken of in non-military and, unforunately, 
also in military accounts; whether cases did not occur 
within his own exi>erlence where not only a heroic per- 
sonal example was necessary to get the men to rise from 
behind the cover and to advance, but also something more 
which no one likes to mention — the gods know why — i. c, 
jtalpable aids? The majority of men will endeavor to 
avoid endangering their lives as long as possible, and in 
battle but few will spontaneouslif overcome the temptation 
to seek shelter in the ditch they are crossing; these few 
deserve the highest ]n'aise, they are the heroes of their 
fatherland. The remainder ultimately obey necessittf alone 
— i. e., discipline and the ascendency of their officers. It is 
well to keep this in mind even where the motive of the war 
has seized upon the great mass of the amny and has impas- 
sioned them more or less. We know then how^ much the 
men are apt to yield uj) spontaneously, and how much has to 
he extorted. This extortion, requiring for its most efficient 
application closed formations which are no longer practicable 
on open ground, has been rendered very difficult by modern 
arms. For, as we shall explain later, closed formations of 
any kind on open ground, beginning at a distance of 1500 
meters, are prohibited by the flat trajectory, the great 
range and penetration of small-caJiber arms and by the 
enormously increased fire effect of the artillery. Wherever 
the ground admits of their use, th^y should be retained as 
the surest means of getting the units to the spot where we 



Psychology and Tactics. 229 

want them; where that is impracticable, a sensible substi- 
tute should be sought for the formations no longer prac- 
ticable, and here we are decidedly favored by HrnokeJess 
powder. I have frccjuently seen the smoke of black powder 
so obscure the view that at a distance of 20— '{0 meters 
closed bodies of troops could be made out in ill-defined out- 
line only. In such cases — they were the rule in the decisive 
stages — closed formations in no way favored the [)ersonal in- 
fluence of the leaders, or but very little. That is worthy of seri- 
ovs considernlion. It was about the same as though we were 
in a dense fog. Smokeless y)owder has changed this; the 
leaders can always see their men and the men their leaders, 
other circumstances which may happen not prohibiting. 
The control of leaders over swarms of skirmishers ns com- 
pared with closed formations never was nil and is not 
now; it is simply less, and since the advent of smokeless 
powder, the personal exami)le can be more easily seen, be- 
cause the view is clearer. There are, moreover, two other 
means to strengthen the control over swarms. The first 
lies in a careful moral training of men and leaders; the sec- 
ond in an increase of leaders. The former is feasible at once; 
the latter requires an increase of officers and non-commis- 
sioned officers on the peace establishment. Although I do 
not believe that the leaders of swarms would thereby 
be relieved of all disadvantages, still these would bo 
greatly diminished and the troops would preserve a certain 
fighting power, which with the use of closed formations 
would quickly disappear, since with the collapse of these 
formations the fighting power is also lost. It seems to me 
to admit of no doubt that, on open ground and with the use 
of modern arms, closed formations are bound to collapse, 
even at long and medium distances. 

In view of the fact that, .is n rule, man exposes himself 



230 Inquiries into the Tactics of the Future. 

to daujicr only uiulor ooin])ulsioii. tl\o (ju'tiral forms should 
bo siu'h that tompulsion tan bo bronijht to boar on tho unit. 
Tbo oolumn tattios, old as woll as modorn. woro bost suitod 
to tho purposo. uoxt tho oloso lino, loast of all tho skirmish 
lino; tho tirst. moroovor. admits of livoatot- rapidity and 
prooisiou of niovoniont. 

Tho moro fXtondt>d tho swarms, and tho nioro thov aro 
ooYorod and concealed by folds of tho i;ronnd. (ho moro aro 
tontrol and oompulsion rostriotod. and tho jjroator is tho 
tomptation to whioh human woaknoss is oxposod, and it is 
/•(■(//// here uhoro a groator moasuro of direct compulsion is 
indispensable. It involves a taitioal ])roblom. To j;o bai'k 
to oloso formation for tho sako of this compulsion. ])orhaps 
by olosinj; tho mou toj^othor in a moohanioal way. would 
ontail unjustitiablo saoritioos for (ho sako of a priuoi- 
plo without any oorrospoudin^- irain. t\Mupulsion should 
thorofort* bo suppUMUontod by (raininj; (ho loadors to ijreafer 
actirittf, ami tho mon to (jreater attentiveness. Tho task of 
tho stdwriiinale loaders booomos moro diflfioult simn^ tlu\v 
booomo tho roal supports of tho tiro action in all its stages, 
and tho exercise of their trill should bo nu>ro an infellectual 
than a mechanical one in consotpionco of thoir trainiuj;, 
»'ducation. practice. mu(nal unih'rstandiuii of each other, 
tactical judjiuiout. and thoir uniformi(y of (raininji'. Dur- 
in«; the contiict modorn tactics chiotly rest on tho subordi- 
nate loaders and on tho qualities of the individual; such is 
their nature; tho morale should bo as hv^h as possible, so as 
not to nu^lt under tiro. The former should bo tacticians (o a 
jxroater t>xtont than formerly, and tho latter should bo able 
always to understand tho tacticians. Shrapnel (ire and 
torpedo shells of the artillery, which spread over tho tiold 
like the jots of a rose-head, make columns and close lines 
useless at considerable distances, small-ialiber rides pro- 



Psychology and Tactics. 231 

hibit them altogether at medium and short ranges, and a« 
infantry and artillery- may be expected to direct their fire 
Hkillfully, and as they moreover always fight in eonjune- 
tion, columns and close lines of any kind on open ground 
are barred from the battle-field altogether. The close line 
I>articularly is impracticfible. owing to the width of target it 
jiresents and its unhandinens. and there remains the single- 
rank swarm alone, as the most unfavorable target and as the 
best formation for movement under thesecircumstances. The 
H warms should not be too large; 'iO men in 3 groups of 10 
men each would probably be the most suitable limit for 
their control. 

But it should be kept in mind that with this fighting 
method troops will, as a rule, slip rapidly from the grasp of 
the higher leaders, and in many cases also from the hands 
of the subordinate leaders during subsequent stages of the 
action. It should also be remembered that it is not a ques- 
tion of controlling a battalion, but of employing brigades 
and divisions, no longer in the Napoleonic form, but in the 
Napoleonic spirit, as great problems — to which all struggles 
for decisive points belong — ran only be solved with masses. 
In order that they may be controlled from above to some 
df-gree at least, their leaders should know what they are 
expected to do and what they want to do; they should base 
their measures on thorough reconnaissance and be held respon- 
sible for their decisions and orders. Hence the scox^r* of 
their authority should be fully established and known. 

It is by reconnaissance alone that the leader can form 
an idea of his opponent and of the measures to be taken for 
overcoming him. This duty should never be left to the 
subordinate leaders; it should pertain exclusively to the 
superior leaders from the brigade commander up. Prepara- 
tion (deploymentj, and forming for attack are the exclu- 



232 Inquiries into the Tactics of the Fiiiurc. 

sive duties of tho latter; in the execution of the combat the 
hij>hei' and subordinate leaders both share, but even at that 
stag:e it is chiefly the superior leaders who take the ])roi)er 
steps for a prompt advance of the supports in order to gain 
an elfective firing position and, subse(]uently, the superior- 
ity of fire. Whatever the skill and self-activity of the 
subordinate leaders may be, it is ini])ossible for them to 
judge from the bearing of the firing skirmish line when the 
proper moment for advance of the supports has arrived. 
No one who has had war exi)erience will deny this, for in 
most cases the very first retiuisite, a good view of the whole, 
is lacking, and sufficient view and deliberation can only be 
expected on the part of the superior leaders: hence if tho 
execution of the combat is not to be left to chance, a 
proper scox>e must be conceded to the superior leaders dur- 
ing its execution, since it is in that way alone that a proper 
degree of combination and uniformity of the act — i. e., of 
the organized action of masses of skirmishers, can be 
secured. 

It is altogether erroneous to assume that the initiative 
of the subordinate leaders is thereby suppressed; they are 
rather restrained from license, and it is only thus that the 
brigades are enabled to preserve the assigned direction 
(spaces), that army corps are enabled to reckon with fight- 
ing spaces of divisions, and aimies with fighting spaces of 
army corps. These things are so simpU^ that they hardly 
need comment. If. however, platoons, companies, and bat- 
talions are at liberty to choose their direction (space) 
according to the ground (cover), lateral movements and dis- 
placements are unavoidable, which, beginning below, ulti- 
mately affect the highest units and block and render im])os- 
sible control on the i)art of the superior leaders. Avho bear 
the responsibility. It is only necessary to look at these 



Psychology and Tactics. 233 

thinf^H from the mechanical point of view to realize that 
they must not be allowed to happen. 

I am goin^ furllier and aHsert that in many cases the 
superior leaders will best be able, besides allotting the front, 
to desij^nate the principal firing station, and to make the 
same known before the deployment. It is in obstructed 
terrain alone — i. e., in all cases where the fighting will be 
all the more intense, that they will be less able to see than 
the subordinate leaders in front. It is quite in keeping 
with the law of control to designate the firing station 
approximately, without thereby either suppressing or re- 
stricting the freedom of the subordinate leaders. More- 
over, it stands to reason that in many cases this freedom 
will only be operative beyond the "approximate" firing- 
station, and will chiefly consist in "correcting" the approx- 
imate to the best possible firing-station. Huch are the 
facts. From the time when this "correcting" begins, the 
control in front passes more and more to the subordinate 
leaders, but the limits of space assigned to the brigade 
should be observed as much as possible. Any transgres- 
sion of these limits on the right or left is justified only by 
i m perati ve ci re u m stan ces. 

With the "correcting" there coincides in point of time 
the increase of the number of rifles — i. e., the arrival of 
sufficient sujiports at the main firing-stations to gain and 
preserve the superiority of fire. Probably none who has 
had war experience will deny that the superior leaders 
alone are in position to attend to these matters; hence it is 
their duty to provide, according to time and circumstances, 
for the arrival of supports (sustaining the fire). More than 
this is not to be required of them, until the time for the 
employment of the correctly posted reserves arrives. 

There can be no doubt that the effect produced by the 

16 — 



234 Inquiries into the Tactics of the Future. 

main firing-station can be better observed from the front 
than by the superior leaders farther in the rear, and it is 
therefore quite right that the impulse for seizing the 
enemy's position should come from the former. But even 
at that point — i. c, just before the decision, the relations 
betvreen superior and subordinate leaders should not cease 
to be reciprocal. 

In many cases, depending on time and space, it will be 
diflScult to define these relations; it will hardly be possible 
to maintain communication between front and rear, to 
promptly supplement each other's decisions and measures; 
at this stage the decision is left to the tactical intuition of 
the subordinate and higher leaders. These difficulties 
should be fully recognized. 

It follows that I am, as I always have been, opposed to 
the so-called ''normal attack," but I am an unreserved advo- 
cate of the fundamental law of control in action. In former 
times it was very important to properly gauge the deploy- 
ment as to time and place, and to promptly gain and hold a 
vantage-point from which to survey the ground. Accord- 
ing to the experiences of 1870-71, the entire leading should 
exclusively rest in the hands of the superior leaders ; it was 
found impracticable and we were in a tactical quandary. 
The ''normal attack" was abolished; it was well; but the 
control was also surrendered. We must regain the latter. 

Since the long-range, small-caliber rifles restrict us to 
a greater distance before entering into battle, the work of 
the leaders as regards the deployment, direction of attack, 
and the preparatory measures for lateral and longitudinal 
extension (forming for attack) is rendered much more diffi- 
cult. It is therefore all the more necessary to lay down 
some fixed rule for the action of the leaders of the higher 
grades at these stages. 



Psychology and Tactics. 235- 

The superior leaders will probably be to the front 
early, and as far out as possible, accompanied by suflBcient 
mounted orderlies, about 4 — f> to a brigade commander. 
There they will pass through several "stages of doubt," 
continue to observe to the front and flank, and to send 
orders to the rear. It will therefore happen that divisions 
sometimes complete their "preliminary" tactical deploy- 
ment far from the enemy, as has been described in the intro- 
duction in the case of armies. From that time on "correc- 
tions" of the tactical deployment will be found necessary at 
many points, perhaps while the advance guard is engaged, 
which will in turn require precision of marching on the 
part of closed brigades. For this purpose we must be pro- 
ficient in everything required in connection therewith, and 
we can do neither without columns nor without lines [Tref- 
fen), as there is no longer such a thing as passing from the 
"preliminary tactical deployment" to the marching col- 
umn; the units must make all the "corrections" while de- 
ployed. On this point, therefore, the Regulations should 
as much contain precise prescriptions as to the maximum 
width (and depth) of the brigade, the maximum limits of 
the supporting lines, and of the position of the reserves. 

These constitute the maximum limits for the scope of 
the brigade commander's activity in forming for and carry- 
ing out the attack. If the battle-field everywhere pre- 
sented the same conditions, if it showed the same character 
at all points, and if the action fought on it did likewise, a 
scheme for a normal attack would of necessity formulate 
itself. The great battles of the future will require a space 
25 — .30 kilometers square for the stages of deployment of 
both opponents, for forming for attack, and for its execu- 
tion; a great variety of terrain is thus of necessity encoun- 
tered, and it falls within the scope — in fact, it is the duty 



236 Inquiries into the Tactics of the Futvre. 

— of the superior loadoi's to make provisions oomj)ortinj; 
therewith. 

Ill carrying out the combat the troops will certainly 
arrive at a stage where they will act like "hordes." but there 
should nevertheless, or rather ou that account there should, 
be definite rules, because at any rate it is more ditticult to 
tight a controlled action than to learn the theoryofa"uormal 
attack." In the place of regulations which would endanger 
the control, we need such as will be its safeguard. 'riu> dis- 
tances of the supporting lines may vary; but the supporting 
bodies should be pro])erly fornuHl and suitably posted in rear 
of each other. The brigade commander alone is the man to 
give the orders for that. It follows that for the preserva- 
tion of control the latter must be conceded some definite, 
and at the same time indispensable, powers; that two bri- 
gades will never be formed for the attack in the same way, or 
that they will carry out the attack in an identical manner; 
hence controlled attack and normal attack are two ditferent 
things. St'herlT and his adhei-'Mits advocate the former, and 
their opponents alone construe it into a mechanical normal 
attack. Another proof of how readily the letter may kill 
the spirit. 

I have repeatedly spoken of "corrections" on a large and 
small scale. So far. I have nowhere heard this new feat- 
ure of tactics prominently mentioned, which modern arms 
render unavoidable. Modt'rn arms make uncertainty 
greater, increased uncertainty enjoins greater caution, the 
latter calls for more reflection for every emergency. In 
modern tactics, therefore, no leader can from the beginning 
be in possession of so much that is detinite on which to 
base his conception and arrangements as formerly. That 
basis can by no means be gained by mere observation and 
reconnaissance; an action will be necessary in many cases. 



Psychology and Tactics. 2'67 

From thin ^ifal, rolativo, and yjrotracted state of uncer- 
tainty followH the neeesKity of eonntant ''correction"; it goes 
through the entire higher and minor tactics; both are, in 
fact, nothing but "corrections from case to case," based, 
however, on the spaces provided for the deployment of the 
brigade in the pitched battle. It will be conceded that such 
"corrections" have a special object; that they should be 
made accordingly; that control is requisite, which should 
rest in the hands of the brigade commander without preju- 
dice to the freedom of the subordinate leaders in the front 
line. The function of "tactical corrector" is his to a much 
higher degree than could formerly be the case, and no one 
can solve the j)roblem better and more quickly by suitable 
subdivision of his brigade, by pushing forward subdivi- 
sions according to the tactical necessities. For these rea- 
sons I consider the brigade commanders the leading pillars 
in the pitched battle, and they should attach the greatest 
importance to a subdivision suited to the circumstances in 
each case. Fighting in a formation of great depth is to-day 
the universal task of leaders; it is maintained in its legiti- 
mate place by this continuous "correction," as "correc- 
tions" can best be ordered and made from the rear. While 
a normal system would be wrecked by the many varieties 
of the battle-ground, the difficulties of terrain which im- 
pede control should not be underestimated. Under fire 
any cover exercises ai>owerful attraction, as is well known, 
and though it may be possible to resist it, yet the tactician 
should look upon all cover also in its cay>acity as an obsta- 
cle to the forward movement and as a hindrance in the con- 
trolled attack. With respect to the attraction of cover, I 
call to mind the ravine of Mars-la-Tour, and the bank and 
hedge, and above all, Kt. Hubert, where a whole division was 
crowded together. As regards obstacles to movement, I call 



238 Inquiries into the Tactics of the Future. 

to miud the wive fences at Mars-la-Tour, the hop-tiekls at 
^y6l'th, the gardenlike character of the country around 
Orleans and Le Mans, with its innumerable scattered farm- 
steads, houses, and villages, the various hedge and wall- 
fences, the guttered vineyards, etc. To look upon un- 
broken skirmish lines as constant features of the controlled 
system would be to mistake the hitter's object and nature. 
Should the ground consist of short undulations, as at Worth 
and Beaune, it is unavoidable that the skirmish action 
should ninke unequal progress within the same brigade; 
that it will stand still at one point perhaps, and recede tem- 
porarily at another, though the attacker have the advan- 
tage at other points. None of these considerations should 
be allowed to invalidate the idea of control or be considered 
a sound objection. AVithout the initiative of the subordi- 
nate leaders the controlled system is inapplicable. Both 
belong together: they are but different forms of the same 
act. It is the subordinate leaders that should make up for 
the lack of personal observation on the part of their supe- 
riors; that should constantly look to the tactical coherence 
in the controlled system; that should maintain the action, 
or revive it when at a standstill, because the occasions are 
rare when such steps can be promptly ordered by the supe- 
rior leaders. In that connection the War of 1870-71 offers 
several typical examples, not only within the limits of the 
brigade, but within the limits of larger bodies, made up in 
some instances of two or more army corps, whatever may 
have been the deficiencies in the details of execution. Here 
belong, for instance, the systematic tactics of the XI. Corps 
at Worth, and its cooperation with the V. Corps, more par- 
ticularly the capture of Froschweiler by troops of four 
army corps encircling the hostile center. Here belongs 
the cooperation of brigades of two army corps at St. Marie- 



Pfsycholoyy and Tuctics. 2'6i) 

aiJx-Ch^iiC-t,, at Ht. Privat, and at IMi^ny. In the first 
ca«e both flankB were turned in connection with a frontal 
aHBault ; in the la«t two cai*e« the flank attack of con 
trolled hi'li^iuh^. an at Worth, gives the impulj^e for the 
frontal asBault and becomes the controlled, and combined 
action of several army corp»s. The battle of the VIII., VII., 
and II. Corps, at the Mance ravine constitutes a grand exam- 
ple of the reverfre, and at the capture of Bt. Quentin the 
commanding general failed to obtain the control he wanted. 
Here, as at the Mance ravine, it wai» found impossible to 
retain the desired degree of control over the battle act. 
because the control of the tactical act was lacking. Con- 
trol of the battle act imperativelv re^juires control of the 
attack of briga/les. and control is therefore equally indis- 
pensable from the point of view of the conduct of the bat- 
tle. Rtill the circumHtanf-es at the Mance ravine should not 
be exclusively jndged by the tactical features. The exam- 
ple shows that the greatest possible accumulation of troops 
within a fighting space for not more than a division neither 
constitutes a controlled system nor is it calculated to pro- 
mote control, because such concentration no longer j>er- 
mits of extension for battle; but if we imagine the com- 
manders of the 15th and 13th Divisions and several brigade 
commanders replaced by men like Treskow. Wittich, and 
Kottwitz, things would have taken a different course at 
the Mance ravine. There three evils combined: lack of 
control in the attack, incapacity of many superior leaders, 
and lack of control of the battle act. 

The companies and battalions forming the firing lines 
are no longer to be considered as under the control of the 
superior leaders; all these swarms are more or Jess lost to them; 
they fight simply straight to the front! It follows that the 
sui>erior leaders should understand from the first how 



24(^ I iu}uirii\< into the Tactirs of Ihc Fithtrr. 

miit'li tlu\v cjui s|>nr»> ft)r <lu' llr»» action, nnd how nuuh tlioy 
must U«>(>p back in onltT to Itc nblo to «Mujthiisi/.(> tlit> t\ro- 
aotion at llio docisiv*' nu>niont for biinjxin}; about tho (bu't- 
sion, or to uxovi tIumUs. Moiu-o brijiados can no lonpM* nso 
"'/'n/ZV/i" in the traditional sense, but onlv lines natnrally 
dilTerinji' in nnniber. str(M»«;th, distanct^s. an«l forms accord- 
iui;- \o circumstances. 

nissolntion is not bi'set by the dan^jtM's witli whicli its 
op|>onents would surround it. ^^>r. 1, the tMUMny is, as a 
rule, no bettiM* olT. except in |)rc|tarc«l positions; 2. infantry 
and artilitM'y always (iulil in combination: ;>, fire is very 
»>lT(>ctive at MH) nn>ters. .Vs reijards the decisit)n, it will in 
nuun/ ames itot Iw fotitut iinpossil)J(' in the latter phnsea of the hat- 
ih to hriug up {tiuall chK^ed bodies even over open (jround, hecauae 
the enemif^s fi<ihtin<j power diminiaheti from hour to hour. At 
8»ich moments, a con»parativ<>ly snnill closed body may jiain 
a dei'ision (\.i\ 'ruilerit>), wliiih could not have Wow «:;ained 
by mere fire. It follows, in turn, that the su[>erior leaders 
should from the first employ the fire-aetion of infantry and 
artillery with the sjn^atest enerjiy in order to «iain the supe 
rit>rity of \\n\ That onct\i;ain(Hl, the decision will in future 
differ hnt Utile from that of the past, and restM-ves must be kept 
in hand ft)r the purpose. Nor should frontal attacks sup- 
ported by turninj; n\ovements W shunm>d: they should not 
be undertaktMi. however, until the suptM'iority of tirt> has 
betMi ,i;ain»>tl. 

To day the ilistanc(> bt>twe(Mi the last flrini^-station and 
the point o{ attack is bimnd to bt^ much iireater, as a rule, 
than forn\tMly. and will hardly ever be* less (han WW mettM's. 
It constitutes a jiravi* disatlvanta,ue in die (inal rush. 
There have been rushes of 'JtK) — 24t) meters without stop, 
but th<^ conseqmMit exhaustion is diMrinuMital. Mort^ ditll- 
oult than (he accomplishmtMit of thai physical task is the 



I'Mt/ffiolof/i/ arid TaMicn. 241 

N'rrojrnition of fh'- rifrht inorrxnt for th<- t-u\\A<)\u\*i\\ of th^f 
rcHcrvcn, whioli oonHtif uffts thr- rnoMt rjjffjoult itrohlcm con- 
fronting thr; brigade? ooxumninXcv . I'ltUmn the rfmarva han 
moved forward in aeeordance with the Mtiite of the arjtion, 
it JH apt to be too Ijite for th^ 'amhumW and will be of no iK^Tje- 
fit. Again, it will be doi/btful in many r;aH*-*« whether the 
r«'Herve can follow without loHing itH fighting jx/wer. 

In analyzing the attaek of the 'i8th Brigade I have 
Hhown that a field of attack aH at MarH-la-Tonr Ik rare and 
<xe<'ptional; that notwithstanding the then (^defective) tiic 
tifral fontiH Tchiefiy company eoInmn« with a front of 'iO 
meterMj, controlled lejiding of the \)r\i[ii/\<'. wonld have br-^-n 
I>raetieable aH far aH Coritour 780; that notwithstanding the 
then tactical forms, and without losing all fighting power, 
the brigade appro()/:hed the Hhelkred enemy to within 150 
meters and closer, and '-ven intermingled with him, he 
being ultimately completely concealed by the increasing 
density of the smoke, which dung heavily to the ground; 
and that the brigade would not have b*f<fn defr^ted had 
ofher brigades been available in support as at Ht. I'rivat. 
A general tiictical inquiry should not be re«tricted to the 
action of a single brigade, to Jk? sure, but should cover a 
number of events taking place on a front of 12 — lo kilo- 
nxtf-rs and more, Kince battle-fields of such extent 'an 
hardly be fissumed to t>e devoid of cover, it may be tiiken 
for granted that iif> to 000 meters from the enemy the 
majority of the infantry will find more shelter from his fire 
than at Mars-la-Tour and Ht. Privat. Ifow a brigade 
should cross that spa/;e no one can determine in advance 
for every case and for every kind of troops, since the decid- 
ing circumstancf:rs — t. «., opponent, armament, enemy's tac- 
tics, and terrain — will differ in each case; the solution must 



242 Inquiries into the Tactics of the Future. 

be loft to the discretion of the brijjade commanders in con- 
ueotion with the initiative of the subordinate leaders. 

These retiections. though based on psychology, facts, 
and experience, are not meant to establish a universal 
law to be followed under all circumstances; they merely 
constitute considei'ations whose application is the business 
of the tactician. In unwise hands, and without theimi>ellini; 
force of the will, the best tactical doctrines remain a thing 
without life that had better be left in a pigeon-hole. 
Where they may or should be applied or deviated from can 
be determined solely by the individuality of the leaders, 
by their military talent (ability), but the fundamental prin- 
ciple of all tactics — ;'. e., aiming at the ascendency over the 
individual bodies with a view to their control, remains 
sound whether long-range and mass fire or not, and the 
prescriptions of any regulations should rest on that basis. 
It will not always be found practicable, but an endeavor 
should be made to regain control if lost, since those troops 
alone will conquer which can be led. IModern fire-action 
thus makes very high demands on the efficiencii of the indi- 
riitual sohh'er and on the lenders of many men. and the major- 
ity of them will be found wanting as in all unusual things. 

The fact that, according to the official reports, the sec- 
ond line of the Congressionals at Placilla in 1801 followed 
in close fornuition at a distance of 500 meters furnishes food 
for reflection.* 

As regards the movement, halts during the advance 
should be avoided as much as possible, as they may be con- 
sidered nails in the coflfin of healthy tactics. Up to this 
day the Fi*ench infantry constantly practice movements 

♦For details see "The Decisive Conflicts in the Civil War in 
Chili. 1892 " Vienna. Reichswehr. 1S92. and Hugo Kunz. "The Civil 
War in Chili." Leipsic. 1892, F. A. Brockhaus. 



Psychology and Tactics. 243 

in double time, and Cis.sev'8 division at Mars-la-Tour was 
enabled to take a timely part against the 38th Brigade, 
simply because it alternately marched and ran. The sol- 
dier, as a rule, carries his pack, which makes movements in 
double time very difficult and fatiguing; moreover, even a 
regulated double time will bring on unsteadiness and 
exhaustion of physical strength. For that reason I am 
ox>posed to the suggested use of double time in the case of 
small, handy bodies in all zones of fire. On the other hand, all 
troops must to-day be able to move more smartly than ever; 
precipitation, as at Mars-la-Tour, in taking a rapid gait, 
more running than walking, which uses up lungs and mus- 
cles, and whifh brings the troops in front of the enemy in 
an exhausted condition, should be avoided. 

After the War of 18G4, General von Moltke published 
a book, "Notes on the Effect of Improved Fire-arms on 
Tactics." in which he says, among other things: '-'It may 
be assumed that at a distance of a quarter of a mile (not 
quite 1900 meters) a close column will not be able to JwJd 
out under the fire of a rifled battery. The opponent is 
forced to deploy, and finds his only protection in the dis- 
persed order and in motion." 

In the same place we read aboiit the fire of the breech- 
loader: ''Under ordinary circumstances, and in the 
pitched battle, the decision will be gained not by fine marks- 
manship, but by mass fire at those ranges where the unavoida- 
ble errors in eslimating the range are neutralized." 

Who in 1865 would have thought of the perfection of 
the fire-arms of infantry and artillery which has been 
reached to-day, by all armies of the European powers? In 
the case of the infantry the improvement had so far pro- 
gressed by 1870 that, under circumstances as at Mars-la- 
Tour and St. Privat, the mass fire of the infantry produced 



244 Inquiries into the Tactics of the Future. 

a sensible material and great moral effect at almost the same 
ranges as artillery fire, and that will be still more so in 
future. It was bound to liaye a further effect on ''forma- 
tion" and "movement"; but the "dispersed order" should 
not be permitted to degenerate into a condition making 
leading impossible, nor should "movement" become a 
"chase," or "seeking of cover" a theory that paralyzes the 
will, the initiative, the application of compulsion, makes 
personal example impossible, and delivers tactics over to 
license. The modern fire-arms of infantry are more con- 
structed for a flat trajectory than for fine marksmanship — 
i. e., the greatest possible extension of the swept zone was 
sought and attained, and the fire is effective not only at 
short, but also at long-ranges. The soundness of the 
words of Count Moltke has thus increased with time; 
another bright mind (Captain May, who was killed at 
Amiens), who asserted in 1869 that with rifles with flat 
trajectory mere horizontal aim would ensure effective fire, 
became the object of derision and hostility.* His tactical 
suggestions, which have since been adopted in practice, 
were in part based on that theory. 

Where the defender has the choice of position, he will 
select one with a wide field of fire; he will not always be 
able to do so, because interfered with by the enemy. At 
Vionville — Mars-la-Tour we haA^e seen that the defender was 
able to do so although he was surprised; hence tactics should 
invariably reckon on the long-range fire, and the attacker 
should seek to minimize its effect by adroit advance and 
by rapidity of movement, while the infantry, thrown to the 

♦The idea of the horizontal aim did not originate with Captain 
May. As early as the wars of the Revolution the French generals 
converted the same into practice, because they had learned that in 
the excitement of battle the horizontal aim is one of the few things 
the soldier may be relied on to observe in firing. 



Psrjchology and Tactics. 245 

front for fire-action and gradually reinforced, will, in com- 
bination with the artillery, keep the enemy busy, shake 
and demolish him. I consider the advance by rushes prac- 
ticable only when the leaders are many, the units small, 
and the distances short; I do not believe that more than 
three rushes could be gotten out of troops in the absence 
of these prerequisites. How far do we get in rushing and 
where does the outer limit for the beginning of rushes lie? 
I do not believe that a large unit can advance by rushes 
without injury to their control; I do not believe in the prac- 
ticability of fire and movement as exemplified in the "rush 
tactics"; I do not believe in it at all, owing to the amount of 
freedom, akin to license, which the Regulations concede to 
the subordinate leaders in the "choice of the ground." I 
consider these tactics an office production. I would rather 
have the entire infantry creep on all fours in single rank 
lines; it would at any rate be approaching the enemy. 
Within the brigade, full authority should be given for the 
use of all means that will make it possible to reach effective 
distances. Dissimilitude and ridiculousness should not be 
permitted to constitute a bar. How many things matured 
by the battle-field would be ridiculous if they were not so 
serious! It should not be concluded that the infantry 
should be drilled always to approach to within 600 meters, 
indiscriminately; that would be a pernicious scheme. It 
should rather observe the rule of remaining as long as pos- 
sible in motion without stop. The force of that rule dates 
only from the adoption of the open single-rank line. In 
fact, it will be the losses that fix the time for making a halt 
and for advancing subsequently by rushing or creeping. 
I believe, above all, that the "attack by rushes" robs the 
spirit of the attack of much of its determination and dash. 
This subtilizing with the terrain is bound to make pedants, 



246 Inquiries into the Tactics of the Future. 

is bound to impair vigor; and those who deny that an' attack 
movement can be carried to effective range without stop 
are thinking more of the drill-ground than of the battle-field. 
On the latter we moreover stand in need of every moral lever; 
an attack on a large scale is something tremendously inspir- 
ing, it carries everything with it; rush tactics are wholly 
without such influences. They have not even been tried. 
Of the former we know at least what may be expected from 
it. The Congressionals are said to have advanced by rushes 
in the battle of Placilla, but I cannot believe it. That pro- 
cedure would require a state of efficiency such as troops 
which for the most part had but 2 — 3 weeks' training could 
not possess. The statement is moreover controverted by 
the arrangements for the attack, under which the reserves 
were to follow in close formation at a distance of 500 
meters, and the first line to reserve its fire until within 400 
meters (Placilla). We have there the same tactical features 
that are to be observed with militia troops. The victory 
of the Congressionals was due to superior leading, to 
superior armament, and to the enemy. There can be no 
doubt, however, that the fire was opened at such a. late 
stage because the experiences at Concon had shown its 
necessity in order to prevent the recurrence of a deficiency 
in ammunition. Those objects were not accomplished, how- 
ever.* In general, both parties expended 150 — 200 rounds 
per man in 2 — 3 hours. The reports show that the superior 
arm gave superior results. According to these reports, 
the Balmacedists lost 20 per cent at Concon and 30 per cent 
at Placilla, the Congressionals 10 per cent and 10 per cent 
respectively. The tactics of the side which possessed the 
superior armament were on the whole as follows: Ad- 

*See the reports of Tel Canto and KiJrner in the writings above 
cited. 



Psychology and Tactics. 247 

vance of the skirmishers without stop and without fire to 
within 4 — 300 meters; opening fire at that range; reserves 
follow at 500 meters. No conclusive deductions should be 
made therefrom, because Balmaceda's army was a very 
poor one. 

As regards the opening of fire on the part of the 
assailant, I am unable to change my opinion on account of 
the small-caliber rifle. The danger of running out of ammuni- 
tion is much diminished by the fact that every man now car- 
ries 150 rounds instead of 100, as he did up to 1890. That, 
however, does not free us from the danger of a consumption 
of all our ammunition which is invited by the magazine 
rifles. Although a late opening of fire does not protect 
troops from the danger of firing away all their ammuni- 
tion, still it constitutes an additional means for diminish- 
ing that danger. I advocate a late opening of fire on 
the further ground that an early opening of fire is the 
greatest enemy of a vigorous advance. I am not, of course, 
referring to the cases where volleys are practicable. Unless 
they promise unusually fine results, it is better to do with- 
out them, to seek to approach under cover, to save ammu- 
nition, and to engage in fire action at a range where the 
ballistic qualities of the rifle promise corresponding tacti- 
cal results, which, as a rule, is at 600 meters. Cases where 
fire at longer ranges may be of some value will probably 
not be exceptional, but in general the attacker will have 
to advance to about 600 meters, as at and within that dis- 
tance infantry will best be able to quickly gain the superiority 
of fire. The advocates of long-range fire suggest the open- 
ing of the fire action at 1200 meters with increasing inten- 
sity; it may be useful under certain circumstances, but to 
accept it as a rule would be to greatly handicap the offen- 
sive power of infantry and to diminish and even endanger its 



248 Inquiries into the Tactics of the Future. 

entire tightiug power with lospeot to later stages; the advo- 
cates of long-range fire (more than 1000 meters) are usiialli/ 
men who do not thinl- highh/ of the effect of arliUery, aud who, 
altliougU not saviug so iu so many words, are inwardly cou- 
viueed that the infantry can do the business alone. They 
are infantry-tacticians, not tacticians, as the latter always 
reckon with the three arms. 

If we would make it an invariable rule to open fire at 
600 meters, we would be foregoing the benefit of many 
moral and material advantages of the arm. It would be 
quite absurd to use a rille of great etficiency at 1000 meters 
in the same way as one which possesses the same qualities 
only up to 400 meters. 

In our army there is, unfortunately, an excessive reli- 
ance on iiifanlri/ hi/ itself. In battle the latter is no longer 
the principal arm in all stages up to the decision; without 
artillery it will frequently be unable to advance or to hold 
its ground; it is therefore dependent on the artillery, and 
the latter in turn on the infantry. The artillery has made 
gigantic progress by the improvements in the gun, in the 
projectile, in training, etc. In consequence of smokeless 
powder and increased elfeet of fire the artillery has become 
more independent and capable of resistance, and can now 
carry on the action until just before the decision without 
interfering with its own infantry, while in 1870-71 the 
troops were much endangered by the artillery when firing 
over them. The view remaining unobstructed, artillery can 
always see, always aim. always observe, and make better 
practice. For the same reason such direction of fire as 
meets higher demands has become practicable and the 
fire may now be coiicentrafed on the decisive points, which was 
im]>ossible heretofore. Nor should the tests and experi- 
ments be considered as concluded in this respect. For all 



Psychology and Tactics. 249 

these reasons tlie firo action at ^reat distances should, as 
a rule, be left to the artillery. There will be exceptions, 
of course, and infantry had better abandon the idea of 
initiating?, carrying out, and deciding the battle. It has 
cost us bitter lessons and many lives, and has brought us 
little or no result against the breech-loader. In looking 
over all the imjiortant actions against the Imperial French 
Army in 1870, we find Sedan the only instance where the 
artillery is employed in a manner in keeping with modern 
tactics; there its fire destroyed the enemy, and the infantry 
relying on its effect could be held back. 

At Worth, Vionville, and (Jravelotte fMir infantry was, 
as a rule, employed too soon and the artillery too late; but 
even then (III. Corps at Vionville, Guard at St. Privat, 
VII. and VIII. Corps at (iravelotte), the artillery, whenever 
it acted in large bodies, took charr/e of the fire action at lonq 
range. In view of the unfavorable conditions at Vionville 
and St. Privat, its action was moreover of great general 
significance tactically and of incalculable effect on the 
situation of the infantry of the III. and Guard Corps. 
Infantry should, as a rule, leave long-range fire to the 
artillery. 

If artillery delays its fire until the main body of the 
infantry is thrown into the action, it cannot suflSciently 
shake the enemy by the time when delay means destruction 
to the infantry, and when the latter must seek to hasten 
the decision as much as possible. Tliis law is of greater 
force to-day than formerly, because, according to human 
calculation, the increased fire effect may under certain 
circumstances perhaps bring about the decision even before 
that moment. No body of troops will to-day be able to 
stand a well-directed combined infantry and artillery fire 
as long as was possible in the past. Hence the artillerv 



260 Inquiries into the Tactics of the Fufure. 

s\\o\\\{] ho (h'irlopcd (If! carlii otuJ in ofi ijrcat aircnijlh as possible. 
If it sm'ooeds in j;<>ttiiij; in pt>sition witlioiit drawing ftre 
and in antiiipatinu; (ho tMuuny in «i(>((inj; \\\o ran<2:(\ ono 
principal povlion of tlio work is done. All ils (MTorls shonld 
he bi'ut to (hat end. '1\) ho snro. artillorv should ho pro- 
ttH'tod (0(hjv from (ho tirst by infan(ry (hrown sonio 500 — - 
(iOO n\o((M*s (o (lu> front; odiorwiso it niijiht bo provtMit(>d by 
(ho ontMny's infan(ry tir(» froni ooninjj into action at all. 

How in ( ach cast> \ho h>adinu; of iho Wwos. in roar is (o 
bo r(\i;nla(od depends on (ho si(na(ion. and in (hat con- 
no('(itin (ho nso of prtH'iso points of dirocdon and (ho obsorv- 
anci> of (ho aljo((od spaco aro indisponsablo. If tho 
irronnd is opon, (ho distanoos bo(wo(>n (ho linos shouUl 
bo incroasod: if tho jrronnd is nioro covorod, tho distanoos 
may bo diminishod. dt^ptMidin*; on tho amount of covor. On 
opon ji'ronnd (horo will bo no ihoict^ bnt (o nso singlo-rank, 
oponod, linos with jiroat dis(ancos. Sinco tho lii.i>:lu>r 
ballistic qualitios i>f (In* ritlo t'onftM' on tlu* skirmish linos 
incroasiHl powors of rosis(anc(>. thor(> will bo no risk in 
inoreasinjr tho dis(anc(>s. Hut ox<'rcisos of lari;t> nnits in 
closo formation in [ho terrain shonld not. on that accoimt, bo 
dispensed with, and in travorsinji' woods particular stress 
shonld bo laid on tattical cohesion. Woods play a great 
role in battle; 1 will merely mention (hat of ^laslowod and 
tho Rois dos (^(''nivanx; (heir ns(* for covering (ho approach 
in (ho manner of (ho *JT(h l>riuado a( Problus will probably 
be frot]uen( in the future, when opportunit i(>s will be atVord- 
ed to (ako advajitajio of closo forniations and to cover the 
enemy at a comparatively short ranjje with a crushing 
tire. Tho very thing tho 27th brigade did at Problus for 
mnsking its approach will, under similar circumstances, 
be practii'ablo in the future. no(withs(anding tho small- 
caliber arms. 



Psychology and TurticH. 251 

The diBruption of units Bhould also be avoided as much 
as possible. The intermingling of troops within a certain 
space, however, which is inseparable from the eombat of 
masses of skirmishers, should not be confounded with 
divergence of troops in different directions and transgres- 
sion beyond the allotted battle-space, whereby fractions of 
different units become intermingled without having a com- 
mon object. That lies chiefly within the power of division 
and brigade commanders; a sufficient reserve must be pro- 
vided at all events. For those who have observed the condi- 
tion of troof)H thnt have ber-n unfortunate in battle will ad- 
mit that in the hands of men physically exhausted and mor- 
ally spent the best rifles are no better than none. In 1870 
battalions, regiments, brigades, divisions, and even army 
c(U'7>s, were mixed in wild confusion; at the first shot every- 
bodyrushed to the front as though it were a signal that there- 
after no orders need be given or obeyed. For hours battalion, 
regimental, and brigade commander did not have a man in 
hand; the soldier was fighting the battle, in fact. Divi- 
sional generals did not have even companies at their dis 
posal — not even in defeat — because their brigades had 
crumbled to pieces at the most heterogeneous j>oint8. 
Corps commanders had two or three little reduced battal- 
ions under them, while in the front the fate of the battle 
was hanging in the balance for hours. With such tactics 
we need only lieutenants and soldiers, but they will 
accomplish no great result; the latter will invariably 
require superior, well-planned leading, the employment and 
( ontrol of masses for a definite object, and, within these lim- 
its, control on the part of the infantry brigade commanders. 

In capturing the enemy's jjosition, its increa.sed distance 
fiom the last firing-station will form a distinctive feature 
as compared with former conditions. Any one, however, 



253 lnqtiiri$s into the Tactics of the Future. 

who has visitiHl tho battlo iiiomuis oi Kissinji'en aiul 
Worth will oome to tho oonolusion that in i\\v strujiiile tor 
tho koy of a }H>sition tho samo phononioiia whioh ai>pt»artHl 
horo will froquoutlv room* in tho fntnrt^ — i'. t*.. that it will 
bo jKussiMo to appioaoh within S(> — 100 nnMors. Tho 
oaptnro of Fiosohwoilor is tvpioal for tho ailvanoo of tho 
rosorvo (StarkloiY's Wiiitoniborii lU-iuatloV for tho impulso 
to tho tinal rnsh. for tho intonninjiling- of troops of four 
ditforout arinv oorps in tho oaptnrotl villajro. and also v>n 
aooount of tho rapidity with whioh thov ro-fonnod. This* 
oxaniplo absolntoly illustratos all tho lossons and is a jjood 
reforonoo for any snooossfnl attaok. It is approxiniatod 
among- tho important aotions, by tho attacks on St. Trivat 
(north). Loigny. and t^t. Qnontin: bnt in fntnro tho tinal 
nssanlt >Yill probably bo dirootod moro against artitioial 
keys than against villagos. This doos not modify tho prin- 
ciples of oxooution in any ^^•ay. 

In tho oaso of an unsnooossful attai'k tho dofoatod 
troops will hardly lind immodiato snpport fiom infantry in 
their rear; the support will oome exolusively from the artil- 
lery. On that aooount T atu opposed to having tho artillery 
aooompany tho attacking infantry, t^hangos of positions, 
being easily visible, should bo avoided as mui'h as possible; 
excepting moral grounds, theiv is no reason why artillery 
should accompany tho attack, for the use of smokeless 
powder makes it protitable for artillery to remain \v, ono 
etTectivo tiring position, and tho improvement of tho prin- 
oijnil projectile ishrapnob admits of groat etfoct at dis- 
tances which render it wholly unnecessary to accompany 
the attack. Yet it may bo useful in some cases. Kut the 
rapid occupation of a captured position by artillery is im- 
practicable per se on many grounds. 

At the moment of tho defeat of an infautrv attack cav- 



•a\v\' will find t>\t\Ktr\nuit'u^ tor fraining hrWVmni. ¥,niAA')m, 
<-Hj><'<'jaIJv if it. ¥>\u\i\('%i\\ nAvamj-n from *:oin'J:ii\m*fUt <fHt, 
(■itufutinf. Vai'JoiJM IntMentM at VumviWti t^^faeb tlwi? iMiine 
U-%%tm. ('avalry niiouM th^T^'for^' K<^'k favorahUt ]tfmilUmn 
for Kijch t'%u('%'i[t'Ut''U'%. i'la/rJJJa nhown iYmt a titu;*-^nfn\ 
iufauxry aiiiuk i-uiinufj-n mifcjinti to an unF^/uud'^l d^^tp"*:^. 
TUitr*'. \n mxu'h to U^r U^ruttd from fiial ttsamxA*^.. 

I V, Of itc4! Mf/ral Trainiruj of Trwp». 
\t in not alway« <;ai*y to rtti'My^'v/M tht^ ta/rticaDy rt/>< 
UihUioiit. Tlj<- <'n<f«iy rnay <i*^:H\v*i un m t>iat rei<jM^;t.- an be 
^JJ<J at VionvilJeand (irn\'<i\otUr, and. «j^>f*^>v*;r, one may be 
rni«titken on one's own j^art for other niOMimn. In that 
caw*' the %r<K)\m niunt hold their trround, for e%'ery conqof^ed 
t>it of i'arih njii>»t h<' held on jj^^fwr^i] principles; here it i« 
where the moral strength of \roti\tv, shows itself. At Ht. 
Privat the Ouard« held out f^>r three botirs nnder a destnjct- 
jv*' fire, though, to tMf sure, th^'V were nr^ calUtl ufK>n to meet 
a ttountcraU^-.k; the 'J8th brigade held out 'i'i minute* 
within 8^J — loO meters of the tftufmy without the support of 
other infantry or of sufficient artillery. I state tbiu in 
reply to the a^s^^rtion that "no body of troo\m will remain 
halted under sww^ping* fire; that it will crowd either for- 
ward or to the r^iiar." That is a pernicious doctrine, par- 
ticularly to-^lay, when the continuous danger sf/ace extend* 
f^'Mi meters from the muzzle. It thus be^romes incumbent 
on infantry to hold out; otherwise- an action could not be 
fought within the continuous danger n\fa('M. I doubt that a 
Kujx^riority of fire. ><nfficjent for a de*fisioD, can be gained 
at a greater range tlian fXK) meters. 

*Tb6 aatbor tues the t^m "raiemt," meaning tbat ao part of tlie 
trajecv^ry exceed* the beifdiit of a marj. We hare no eo r re^ondtog 
technical term. In the abtsenee of anytbinj? better, the term "sweep- 
ing" haJ5 been premsed into »«^ice. — TrnrusUitvr. 



Soi Inquiries into the Tactics of the Future. 

Losses will have to be put up with. ;uul tlu' resolution 
to bear them should be injiraiued in tlii> troops bv peaee- 
training:, for that moral foree is the most precious jiit't the 
soldier and subordinate holder ean ])ossess. '1\) develop it 
is the work of the ps\ehoU>.irieal education of troops in 
peace; we should take care not to mistake exttM-ior matters, 
such as a smart manual, tirm step, loud auswiM's. etc., for 
the spirit, or to judiie the moral (MVicieucv of a rejiiment by 
its display of these thiniis. Tht^ moral efficiency of troops 
is not so much the result of practical exercises as oi intel- 
ligently and judiciously conducted instruction. 

At the time the 08th liriiiade employed in part the most 
dangerous tactical forms; yet it advanced without sto]> until 
intermingling with the enemy. What does that teach? 
That the moral (i^sychical) education of the troops should be 
looked to above all. because it outweighs everything else, 
and it is the point to which I constantly recur. 

The last few wars do not show a single instance of a 
devoted and deadly attack that can at all be compared with 
that of the :?8th lirigade. 

Kottwitz's brigade at Loigny and Skobeleff's attack in 
the third battle of Plevna approximate, but are not equal 
to this instance, because in either case the circumstances 
were more favorable to the assailant. 

The feat of arms culminated in a horrible disaster, but 
it is instructive as showing what stout-hearted regiments 
can do. 

And passing to the nniterial side: if losses constituted 
the greatest glory, the 3Sth Brigade would be entitled to it. 
Of all the Gernnin troops it sutlered the greatest losses 
in the shortest time as compared with other units. 
The occurrence is therefore equally singular and notable 
both from the psychical (moral) and tactical ])oints of view. 



Psychology and Tactics. 255 

It iH rnoro difficult to ooutrol many small dotachm^ntn 
than few largo oneH; it Ib moro difficult yet to control bri- 
gadoH fighting entirely as BkirrniHherH, which will be the 
rnh'. ThiK undeniable disadvantage of the superior leaders 
should be nullified as much as possible by the tactical train 
ing of the leaders and the moral training of the troops. 

Conceding the control on the part of the higher leaders 
within the zone of destructive fire to be i>erforce restricted, 
how can that deficiency be compensated for? I have men- 
tioned in this connection: 1, careful training of the sol- 
dier in skirmishing and in firing; 2, development of the 
feeling of self-reliance based on the confidence in the arm 
and on the training of the skirmisher; '.',. higher tactical 
efficiency of the subordinate leaders of all grades; 4, in- 
crease of the number of the lower leaders; 5, clear and pre- 
cise orders regarding the object to all officers down to the 
captains before entering the action, and the endeavor to 
prevent misunderstanding during the action. All these 
requirements are of purely mechanical character or addr^^ss 
themselves to the intellect alone, and remain without effect 
if both fail. It should therefore be endeavored to prevent 
that failure; the means thereto are purely moral. It 
is hardly necessary to refer here to the officers, as they are 
all more or less imbued with an idealism for the sake of 
which they are pr(?pared to surrender their all. That is 
not sufficient, however; it should be endeavored to develop 
some degr(? of idealism among the great mass of the com- 
batants. In the case of more highly developed men and 
strong characters (^officersj this may spring from very different 
groundSjbut in tlie caseof thesoldier it should be basedon the 
most natural grounds. They are faith, national sentiment, love 
of country, esprit. The entire training of the soldier should 
be systematically built up on the basis of these four qualities, 



256 Inquiries into the Tactics of the Future. 

so that he may learn to distinguish between virtue and 
wealcness. It is by no means easy, because the development 
of culture, intellect, and moral sense of the men differ very 
much in degree, aud it requires no small amount of time, 
patience, and devotion on the part of the officers. The 
choice of the means will therefore very much depend on the 
character of the troops, and they should be so chosen as 
to enlarge the soldier's conception by instruction, to rouse 
and increase his susceptibility for the sublime; in a word, 
the man should be subjected to moral training, keeping the 
enlargement of his intellect in view at the same time. 
The best means to insure progress in each one of the four 
qualities consists, in the first place, in rousing the men's 
interest, inclination, zeal, and love for the profession; in 
making intelligible to them the sublimity of the duties to 
which they are called; in strengthening their hearts by 
numerous examples of how the heroes of the Fatherland, 
whether carrying the marshaVs taton or the nmsl-et, have con- 
ceived these duties and have surrendered their lives for 
them. That can always be done, opportunity for it is never 
lacking in military life, and even in practical exercises this 
or that example may be interwoven and enlarged upon. 
The chief work will, however, have to be accomplished by 
instruction by such oflScers alone as can speak in a compre- 
hensible and stirring manner on such topics. What may in 
this way be gained by the right kind of officers may easily 
be undone by less able officers, because a man's feelings are 
very sensitive and should be touched only by a careful and 
gentle hand. While the powers of the intellect and feeling 
are thus being roused, kind treatment, such as will make 
the man aware that he is profiting hy it, should be used to 
rouse his ambition, because we need that for everything and 
always, and because the entire training must rest on the 



Psychology and Tactics. 257 

sense of honor; in it the soldier's aims and life should cul- 
minate, and he should be unable to separate his own honor 
from that of his corps, of the army, and of the country. It 
is always the sense of pride and shame which in the case of 
the soldier — because with him everything takes place pub- 
licly — are of such great moral effect on the whole character 
of the army and its behavior in battle, and not a day should 
be allowed to pass by without the officers thinking over it 
and acting accordingly. It is true, part of the men to-day 
are indolent in Frederick's sense, but the remainder are 
easily susceptible to a higher and nobler conception of the 
duties of their profession. That fact should be judiciously 
and strenuously taken advantage of, and hours of instruc- 
tion are worth more than days of spirit-killing drill, al- 
though I would not have one iota abated from the custom- 
ary rigor and precision. Although a taste for the sub- 
lime and heroic is far from making heroes, still, once roused 
and refined, it furnishes us with a means to act on the pride 
and shame of the men and to quicken their sense of honor, 
their will-p6w^er, and their sense of responsibility toward 
God and man, toward their king, their fellow-citizens, their 
families, and toward their own wordly goods. There are 
plenty of means available for this end, but I omit them 
because it is not within the scope of this work to enumerate 
and discuss them. 

If the soldier can be made susceptible to honor, pride, 
and shame, courage may also, to a certain degree, be trained 
into him; history shows instances where injury to their 
honor has driven men not in themselves courageous to 
heroic resolves, to great vigor of action, and to a remarka- 
ble degree of devotion ! But we find them invariably men 
of but one faith, however singular that faith may have been ; 
hence I am convinced that a careful moral training of any 



iJ5S Inquinfit into the Tactks of the Future, 

tivu>ps will lu^ toll on tho battlo tii>Ui. juul ihat troops sua- 
ivptiblo to uoMo impulsos will alono oomo up to tho iviiuirt^- 
uitMits luaiio on iho unni In (ho modorn tlrotlnlu. This 
boiuii I ho oiilv moans, all (-duciition and triiininij should be 
bastHl i>n it; anil havinii loarntnl, bv a oloso sorntinv of my 
o>vn uaturo, thai sv>UlitMlv courajio admits of otiltivation. 
1 fail to stv whv tho samo shouUl uoi bo pi>ssibU» with tho 
bt^ttor I'lass of tho mon. 

Tho ivsnlts aooomplislunl will not bt^ unit'orm : n portion 
of tho mtMi will iiivo no proof whatt^vor of thoir poaoo- 
traiuinii on tho battUMiold. Thov aro a class of boasts; 
with othors will and woaknoss will t'lMtttMid ajjainst oaoh 
other, tho struuiilo onditiii' in favor of tho lattor: tho third 
(smallest^ part will stantl tho tt^si. Tht\v art» ilu> proilmi of 
iiiberittHi qualitit^ juui subsonuont training in tho school, 
in tho homo, and in sooioty ; thov aro tho hoart of tho troops, 
and with thom and with tho otYorts of tht* ot^U'ors it w ill bo 
possible tomakt> tho sooond i-lassstand to thoir uiins. Wo aro 
duly appreoiatinii' the evil otVoets protlneod on human nature 
by the skirmish tijiht. but it would be wronu to rejeet that 
method of tightinir on account of their existenoe. It is 
only ntvessary that ovtM'y one should be eoijni/.ant of the 
weaknesses and dark sides of his profession, the ot^U'or ot 
those of his taetiis. in ordtM- to oonnteraet them intelli- 
jjently. They will m^tu" bi> oompletely oradit'attHi from 
taetios. as that would mean to eradieato human nature. 
Stout hearts are moreover found everywhere: Nature does 
not piek out a special class of men for that, and the loaders 
should honor thom suitably where they come to the fore; it 
will inviiTorato the military spirit and stimulate all wtMl 
disposiHl characters. 

Every battlo-tiold roiiuiros special measures! Obsta- 
cles of all kinds exert their otVov't and cause delay, displace- 



i/i.'/i»H, ;j.»,rj vrrf,<iuU,.riiu».. Jf. jm fjj«; aim .,/ //,« ///^-^ior// /mimn,^ 
»l IM UafkrH lo ov«'ir;oHi<^ thctti anrj to k^^jp in i\ut utUUt of 
<Uti:M\(t itui\ uuirx\H'MUti\ itt,uti\\'u,un an oj><fTJ <'y<; on fh«; 
ro;irJ« which h^J to Uit'XUMl nuiHirlorU.y; iu.nt jh wUant thn 
^liU-n-nrM hcXwi.,.u tmritUuulr.il m-Mon and iUtt Una iMWMp- 
Hon of Uiir Hitn:i.iion, IM vo.hiH of p^ynonaX rMroAUridwH, which 
wiiJ i-yi,v U: of /j/yi Jn/,,orfanw, will b^^corn*. uvauSU^X. 

W'*- niaj^ H^fioct any innovation and any flrdrj imu-Mi-A 
f/j I he Hunie; in fhr-ir aj^pli^af ion nia/i r-aKily ovcrHh^K>fH fh*^ 
nja/k, anrj i/, (Joinj< Mr, inflin on hiniH^if morr, or h^M painful 
wounriH. Thoot'ht antidpat.^ fa.;t ^^jK^ciilativrr th.^orvj. 
;in(J cxj,r.H..nr:c alone can dcnionHlraf/; what th« riw^rit** of 
Wi*- j/inovafion n.aijy arc. Trnc, war alone oflTcrn fhc f„|J 
nica>.urc of that cx/x-ricncc, hut ninch can he done in jxrace 
in the way of i;re,,aratio«, if the innovations are followed 
in(elliKenf ly and wUhoiif hian for principlr^. On no field im 
(he p.iniHhnM-nt of faJn*; speculation k<^ fafal aj< on that of 
tactics, and nowhere shorjid wrf be more careful rhan th^-re, 
Whr-n one of the lar^e anni^-s bad adopt/-d lon^^ range 
/JrearnjM, oUier ronjpetinj( arnilr^s could not afford to re- 
main behind, and hji/i to <'nter on the path of progrr:««. If 
not on others, it was necessary on moral grounds, as they 
are all imj/ortant in baffle. It should be kept in mind, how 
ever, thaf fhe rmn who shoots is more important than the 
f<hol,htul that m fur as n</i?/ra/ -?/7/>^wm and the m Uhh irddivfihU 
irukknce iutt I'.otKtarinu}, man remains the same df^pit*- sujx- 
rior education and a higher moral level. /fence fhos*? 
troopH alone will comjmr wkick ar". led. It is certain that 
under many circumstance^ leading will rin\n'mt gn^ater 
Hiu:ni'Kj-H fhan fornierly; who falls, di*;s for his country, 
for his profr-sMJon, and also for his— in this instance, noble^ 
egotism, 

Ifj war the most sublime is to be looked for in the soul. 



2l>0 Inquiries into the 'I\ictics of the Futuir. 

On it tlio tiii'htinsi: prinoii^los should Ih^ Inisod and Tho iiuid- 
inji' idoas (ov iraininji and Icadiui:; bo built u]>; with the holp 
of oxporitMU'o. tho tii;ht views will tluMi bo lakou. Tho 
attaokor ivaohos all too earlv tho point whoro ovoi\v rule is 
shattered and supplanted l\v irre«;ularity, and in the chaos 
whiih is utuivoidabU> bef(U-e. at. aud afttM" the deeisiiui, uutn 
should stand above disorder aud confusion, still capabU^ of 
exertiuii his will-power, uiiided bv the intellect, to bend so 
niauv unchained forces under his swav; to briuj; them for- 
ward auaiu under control is the second part of this ditVicult 
problem. If sm-h men cHunmand in battle, tuir baniuM's 
will continue to wave over captured heiiihts. There sluuild 
be constant tMult>avor io reduce the numy ai'cideuts of bat- 
tle which tan not be wholly eliminated. To transfer the 
battle to the niuht.iu luder to estape the moral and material 
etTects is to formally invite these accidents, and no wise nuiu 
will coui'ur in that proposititm. 

1 have frctiuiUitly sought Un- the rt^ason of our "phil- 
osophy of losses." Is the same justitled bei-ause we no 
longer look at things in the right way, or have we become 
weaklings as compared with our progenitors, or does the 
superior nuiterial of uumi constituting nunleru armies cause 
that wail to go up after every battle, or is it the nu)ral 
effect of the breech-loader that has set so many springs in 
operation? 

Many theories might be adv;nu'iHl on this point; I 
refrain from advancing any, because wt> art' already laboring 
under a pletluua of them. It is certain, however, that a 
particular degree of civilization also engenders effeminacy, 
aud strengthens that egotism which culminates in personal 
comfort or craves high living, thus sapping virile strength 
and self-sacritice; also that the stuptMying lire of the breech- 
loader produces an overptnvering niornl imju'ession on by 



Fnycholofjy and Tactics. '^^Bl 

far fh<- groat majority. We kw*, therefore, that taetieally 
the greater portion of warfare falls aH much within the 
Hi>here of the will an huH always been the case strategically. 
'Jo lliose who would charge rne with lapsing from justi- 
fied psycliological requirements into psychological reveries, 
1 make this brief re[)ly: ''^'onsider that all we have — all we 
enjoy — has been gained by long p(;riodH of suffering on the 
j)arl of our- forefathers. They liavr- given us all. They ask 
as much of us. They gave us the body, protected it, and 
fonned and united our soul. They ask our body and soul for 
themsrdves. However freely we may spread our pinions as 
individuals, we remain a(;countable to these creditors for the 
use of our [towers, even if such accountability make legiti- 
mate demands for both body and soul." A military system 
that does not constitMle a training sdiool in virtue, fails in 
its duty to the state; and the uninterrupted cultivation of 
all the ethical qualities of the men will ultimately inure to 
the benefit of tactics on the battle-field. The great mass is 
not converted; that is not necessary, liut we shall convert 
some, and that sufTicf-s for f>ur jtiupose and is worth the 
labor. 



'202 Inquirit\< info the Tocfica of the Fiihur. 

PART 111. 

TACTUW L DKDrcn^ONS. 

/. Iic marls on 'J'arlical 'reiuJt'ncics. 

Had tho ballistii' iiualitics of (he chassopAt beon geiior 
ally known in our army bt^foro 1870, tlio (lornians would 
not havo ontored nj)t)n llio war with any doubt as to what 
was in storo for thoni. Tho authoritit^s (h>aliu,<; with such 
nuittors niijiht havo readily asoortainod tho ballistic quali- 
ties of that rillo, since it had been in their possession, 
tojjether with the retiuisite aninnmition, since 18(58. Instead 
of spreading;' c(U'rei't notions of that rille. the error was 
('onunitted of concealiuy; from the students of the tirinj; 
school and from th(> army at lar^e the ureat superiority of 
the (^hassepot over the needle liun in ballistic (lualities.* 
Hence it is not the troops and the otlicers on practical ser- 
vice that iwc to be charji'ed, in the lii'st place, with the iireat 
losses, which might have easily been avoidt>d. and which 
freiiiuMitly failed of any j;ood result \vhal(>V(M'. Still tlu> 
troops had learned a jiood vleal of the truth by other means; 
but as nothingwas done to I'onform their traininiiaml tactics 
to that truth, the infantry was in a very unfavorable posi- 
tion in 1870, which was aii'.iiravated by th(> fact that the 
correct ideas advocated in the "Tactical l\t>trospt>cts" (open 
lines, liorizontal aim) were prom])tly smotlu>r(Hl by the 
(alh^jjed) "official" reply of l>ronsart and others. Arnu'd 
with an inferior ritle and aware that the cnstonuiry tactics 
were inapplicable ai;ainst the Chassepot, the troops at the 
sudden outbreak of the war were suspended between heaven 
and earth, as it were, and it was only after the saiijjjuin- 

*See page 3-5, •■Wintertagswirklichkelt"("Wintei-day Facts "), 
Berlin, R. Felix.mllltary publisher. 



Tactical Deductions. '2fi^ 

uvy t-xitcv'iciK<-H of t[i<' Auf/uHt h<)ltl<K tfijif th<- infantry 
b<'^an to toiJ<;h f hut tar;tioal j^round wliich iniKht hnvc bof;ri 
(•anily found bf^forff th(? war ha<l th<5 balliHtir (pjalitirfH of 
tlu- CbnHHr'pof boon rnad(? HufWcutuWy known. Thin, too, 
alfhoij^'l) two yt'itvH liad clapHod Hinoo tho "rniracIeH" 
wroijj^ht by tho ]'r<-n<li ri/lo at Montana! Wo can 
hardly Kpoak in truth of nuix-rior ta<;tioH on i\n- part of 
thff Oorrnnn infantry in tlio Au^'UHt battlon; Uu- Oer- 
rnanH oon<|uorod abovo all throuj^h Huporior Htrato^'v of Huoh 
firopond^rant w^itrht that victory foil to tho (iovuinn loadorH 
notwitliMtandirij^ thoir antiquiitcd tuoticH. ThiH provJ-H inoi- 
dontjilly how much Huporior Htrato^y aHHJHtH in tho HUOOffMH- 
fuj iHMuo of a war. 

Mcanwhilo a now loaf has boon turnod ovor in Oorrnany, 
and it may bo Htatod that tho Hupronio authoritioM and mili- 
tary writorH havo dono ovrfrythinj? to Kjjrf^id tru'- and oor 
roct idojiH of tho r-ffcrt of modern armn, inKuffi^iontly por- 
ha|>H, amon^ tho infantry and cavjilry an ro^ardH knowlrf<Jgo 
of the offect of artiJIory firo. ft now romainH with the 
troopH to digoHt what haH br-cn pr^wontod i<, thcrn by the»e 

HOUroffH. 

Whorovor wo may turn in th'- Hnnaln of war, ij^no- 
ranoo and arrogance have invariably boon tho chief cauHen 
of dofoat, and it iH a Kin^nlar fact that th<*«o two aro always 
found in combination in ovory nation. In that particular, 
thoy are aH alike an two poaK. It Ih not HufTiciont to HprcnA 
knowlodgo;it \h ne^.-OHHary to drawfrorn f h'- roKultK of experi- 
montH practical and tjictical d^ductiouH for tho roj/ulationg 
and fi^htinj^ rules wliich aro ho very variable; for tho rjuan- 
titioH determined in Hcientific wavH offer in time of peace 
imjiortant HupportH for a Hound development of ovorything 
that haM roforonco to tho mutable Hide of tarrticH. Tho true 
corrigent, however, of thoretical roHoarchoK and practi- 



ctt\ ex|>*^rlm<MU» Ih (ho oxjhm'Umuv of [\w l>a(tloi\oU< It 
«iihouUi ovor Ih^ oousuUtnl. i\( oinlor to jjuaiti against uu^uikt^v 

Kvor siuoo Moltko o«moou( with hi?* bo*>k,* (ho tuviioal 
aw«trt>vo»^^\ h«?» uoYor »"tv>»l<H\; thinm^h Mav*H "Taotlv^ttl 
Koti^Ksj^vl**" tho q\u^(iou>» ut l«t*»o >i»U\uHl ^nmuil \\\ k\\\ 
^vrwi anouv^, hut it U woU kuo\v»> {\u\t ta^tU-al luuovatlo»>H 
I'xNIuitv a KMiji timo to ^^^^^aiU In Uoituauv iworo than two 
thviuhvs \^\Hs<Ht aftor tho puhUoutlou ot MoUkoV book ht^f\M*t* 
uow \V4i»»lat\ous f^u* iufiu\tn taotios >votv I^siuhU uotwith- 
stamiiuji tho faot that tho war of lS7tV7t hail oxpostnl tho 
uti\vhoh\s\uoou<\s!4 of tho tliou taotio?*, aiui that tho iv 
anuamout with tho Ma«soi' ritio lM\uan i\un\»HUatolY aft«>r 
tho war! 

Was uot that au inoousistonov? 

lu ISTtVTl tho i^onuau iufautrv kuow »>o normal 
attaok; it ha^l almnvhM\»Hi tho thon lino ( t*»v/^>M) taotios, b«t 
faihnl to t^^rthor Uovolop tho oon\|><\nY oohmm taotios in 
tho s^M»5»o of tht^ sikirmishinu of inasst\>4; at tho onthrr^jik of 
tho war it hail t»o svstotn of attack of anv kitul and ouo 
was fornwihu^Hl Uurinjj tho war, insutWoiout, of iH>nrst\ as it 
was bound to bo, and not a noin\al svstom i»\ tho tru«^ stM\s«v 
llonw tho shovtov»nuniis obsorvabh^ in n»\>ulv all attaoks 
ou a larjiv soalo should not bo oharjjtH^ to traitdn^is \\\ a 
normal attack. Om tho ^vntrar^w U mav bo assun>tMl that 
had tho it^fantrv btvn in possession of. and skilhnl in. a nor 
mal sYstom. it would haYo foujiht to much btMttM- advantaijo. 
Tho rt^^j^on why tho attack tactics wtMt^ such a faiUu>^ lit^ 
in tho fact that tho uifantrv did not know how t<> tljiht 
t^attack^ in mass*^; it did not know, b»va»ist* it had not boo»> 
tn\intH\ d\irinu \h^\iV in u suitable sYstom. and btvanso tho 
actual sYstom was rt^triotv^l YYithin tht^ linvits of dotach 
mout tactics, i^till wo havo thrtv jirt^U attacks during:: which 



tuiht'^ !., J,.. ''.'■■"■" .„. ...- ., .;,.,-.... '- ?-i- ?.*** 

%%w HffX/fftn; H4*A flMr mtM Wfnt tMt4^ Iff th^ Imifft^^ *A Hf^lr 

wt' fir*' U4^*'f,ffitt/'tuM) vn^U Uif- 

*^f'Utn'i¥t4f, Wyff^M" fh^ iufsoftrf tt^tit*^^k*A *rt$ rlMr nAiUt ^4 

in t- '- - ' - ' - ■ " .■ -■ ■ '^^^ t4 

Su'/ *• 

W^/ftl» flMr UtfMttrf t4 fliMr %\, Army iUtr\m nU*m*^\ 

nfii,tp$m hi \\,t' ^Hf in ;,..> ./ . ,/- f// t$t^ -.-.,,.>>. ^ ,.,.: ,r,tmf 

''''$< - .: - - < " ' ". 

n*rw r"iinhfUmn in f^mltrrttti^y witt$ fh^ r*rfinir*^t*^fin *4 

fSl.U.' ■ .'■• ' • ■ ■ ''.^t9^,¥f,^iU(■ 

WAM fi'nU'4 in ifm tntp^fff Urtt/U^Mf pttt4 %\mft^ wtm n ^/m- 
ntnttt ftwiif'ft^i wfH4tfiUr \t*^wtr^t iU^ n*i\p*^Ufr ttJttA itfi*<t^tf 

fjffftftffir ■' -:'■-' '■-- ■-■-■'-- - - -• -..-^ .* :.. '-^^ fj,^ 

itfTttttf Jt, HttA 

tim ffifiif^ f'H4tHi ItfT fi4jnntfft*<fft^ whif^h ws4m ttr^/mtp\Mt*r4 

hy fU*' .'' '/r»« fff ik^. Ut ff tun: ■<-. imp*'. 

v\tff c/m ■. ,hftMtun^',h ftn rt»^ ' '" ' ,..,,'*af wttM 

t^tirttn^i'A to tit*' iuitititivk tA fttU\ *^*fry 

^'\%im*'jf, *4 cjimtftA wfiM imrrf*fuA*tt'A, 'Htitt \n nifttpiy to jmt 

How *U/\ vft' f(H to thftt if^Atff! 

T\itr ttumt ffr*ftftift*f$t chfuu^Afftm t4 imirahi*' f*r%nWti^ffmt 
t» 



266 Inquiries into the Tactics of the Future. 

in so far as they have committed themselves to the press, 
are successively Moltke, May, Boguslawski, Schlichting, 
Liebert. The oldest and most prominent opponents, not so 
much in regard to principles as to specific suggestions, are 
Bronsart, Scherfe, Meckel. Recently the former current 
was joined by Honig and Kleim, but Malachowski has gone 
far beyond the pretensions of this category, and so has the 
Militdr Woclienhlatt during the past few years. 

All concurred in the opinion that new regulations were 
necessary and the greater the improvements in fire-arms, 
the more urgent became the necessity. 

In the course of time several fusions and reactions took 
place. Shortly before his death, the late General of 
Infantry von Bronsart, the man who had for a long time 
thrown the weight of his voice in the scales against new 
regulations on May's plan and whose public expressions 
marked him as the chief advocate of a system of control, 
joined May's colors and rejected the normal attack; in this 
case the system of control, though normal attack and con- 
trol are usually two very different things.* 

Meckel, in following up the important moral princi- 
ple during the execution of the combat, went so far as to 
demand the closing together of extended lines; he became 
reactionary.! 

Boguslawski long and strenuously championed a suita- 
ble training and tactics in various writings and numerous 
essays; his demands were so far outdone in the Regulations 
of 1888 that he also appears reactionary, though he never 
was; for that general neither changed nor modified his posi- 
tion. It is likewise with Honig, Keim, and probably with 

*See "Betrachtungen iiber eine zeitgemasse Fechtweise der In- 
fanterie," E. S. Mittler, 1891. 

tSee "Sommernachtstraun-!," E. S. Mittler. 



Tactical Deductions. 267 

Liebert. They are all opposed to a normal attack in so far 
as it is understood to mean a fixed, reglementary scheme 
for the execution of the combat that is not to be departed 
from. All are agreed that deployment, forming for attack, 
and execution of the combat constitute three separate 
stages succeeding one another in time and space, for which 
some reglementary provisions should be made in order 
to render possible the control of masses in attack. All 
demand but one formation for movement, the single-rank, 
open line; but one formation for fighting, the swarm of skir- 
mishers; but one kind of fire, skirmish fire. Boguslaw^ski 
and Honig also recommend fire while in motion. 

The Regulations of 1888 intensified the dispute because 
the task system was formally adopted, the fullest freedom 
of the subordinate leaders in the execution of the action 
was invested with the force of principle, and the princi- 
ple of control in action was surrendered. In view of the 
improvements of fire-arms. General von Scherff, the old 
and tried champion of control in action, modified his regle- 
mentary requirements in the course of time and his propo- 
sitions ultimately fused, in so far as that is possible, with 
the views held by Boguslawski and Honig. He contrasts 
the task system with control in action, not with the normal 
attack.* 

Until he wrote the book mentioned under 3, Von Schei*ff 
did not employ the deductive method in his expositions, 
since up to that time he did not base his writings on the tac- 
tical phenomena of the battle-field; he was battling for prin- 
ciples w^hich he absorbed from his war experience in gen- 
eral, and had evolved from them his system of control in 

*1. "Reglementarische Studien," Berlin, 1891-92, A. Bath. 
2. "Praktische Taktik und Taktische Theorie," 1893, R. Felix, Berlin. 
S. "Unsere heutige Infanterietaktik im Spiegel der Augustkiimpfe, 
1870 urn Mete," 1893, R. Felix, Berlin. 



268 Iiiqiiirli's into the TacHcs of the Future. 

action. As loiijj; as noitlun* Si'Ium'IT uov his adherents 
addni'od ])i'oofs, based on facts, for the soundness of that 
system, Seherll's opponents — /. c, the advocates of our ]>res- 
ent refjuhitions — were free to charj^e them ^^ith beinj; mere 
theoretical specuhitors, whereupon opinion stood against 
opinion and princii)le asiainst ])rincii)le. In this dispute 
Lieutenant (\)lonel von JNIahichowski joined witli the most 
radical demands.* He rejects all nt)rninl action (c'ontrol in 
action), and carries the "principles" and points of the task 
system to the extreme: according to him, the execution of 
the combat is a "horde-like" combat of masses of skirmish- 
ers conducted by the subordinati' leaders. He thus con- 
curs in the views of Oeneral von Sehlichting. and these two, 
in their writings, are the nu)st radical advocates of the 
task system. 

Having in view his "Inquiries into Tactics," Honig was 
meanwhile basing himself on the phenomena of the battle- 
field in his "24 Hours of Moltke's Strategy" and the "Strug- 
gle for the Quarries of Rozerieulles, ' and deej) research led 
him to the conclusion that all actions fought in 1870, by the 
troops of all army corps in the sense of the modern task 
system, failed, and that nothing could be gained by these 
tactics. 

(leneral von SchertV fo\ind in these expositions welcome 
material for substantiating his own views,and by employing 
Honig's method in his own way in his subsequent studies he 
was able to prove the soundnessof his views to the last detail 
in his "Unsere heutige Infanterietaktik." Whatever may be 
the opinion entertained by the authorities on this point and 
on the Regulations of 188S, I believe that the ''task battle,'- 
which was found wanting in 1870, has been adopted in these 

*"Scharfe Taktik und Revuetaktik," E. S. Mittler. 



Tady-al Deduciions. 209 

Regulations, and with it a normal HjHtcni, which it had been 
the intention to aboliwh aH sonietliing perniciouH. I am 
convinced that the tank HVHteni is not in keeping with the 
times, that it should be relin(|nished — i. e., that the Regula- 
tions should be revised and that we should return to the 
system of undivided authority, if the execution of the 
action is not to be left to the license of the subordinate 
leaders. 

Closely connected therewith are the questions of long- 
ynd short range fire, of the advance to effective range, of 
gaining the superiority of fire, and of turning movements. 

In the Regulations of 1888 the task system simply 
becomes a normal system, since the German infantry 
attacks now on the task system alone. The freedom con- 
ceded to the subordinate leaders is too great, it is bound to 
lead to tactical license, and it has done so. It was bound 
to impair control and the practicability of an early develop- 
ment of strong firing lines. The necessity of seeking cover 
has sensibly dulled the recpiisite keenness and destroyed 
the observance of normal sjjaces. Things cannot remain 
that way and the signs of a revulsion have from year to 
year become more apparent. It would not do to wipe out 
whatever good there is in the task battle, and to advance 
some normal scheme; the question rather is one of restor- 
ing to the superior leaders the ways and means of control. 
Such initiative as is requisite on the part of the subordi- 
nates and can be exercised by them alone is perfectly com- 
patible therewith. The opposing tactical tendencies are 
not, as formerly, "task system or normal attack"; thorough 
investigation has reduced them to this: controlled system, 
and within the same, beyond certain variable limits, task 
system or horde-system. 



270 Inquiries into the 2'actics of the Future. 

By means of a sauaoions comparison* Oouoral von 
SohortY has donionstratod that in 1870 tho Oiormans gainod 
the suporiority of tho only ^horo tho attaoktM* opposed to 
tho assailant a broadtM* front of tiro. Whoro that was sno- 
oossfnlly done, a strong dovolopmont of front somotimos 
rolioYod tho attaokor from tho necessity of an assault 
altoirother. In proof he cites from the battle of Oravolotto, 
the events at St. Marie. Konconrt— St. Privat (north\ and 
St. Herbert, and it would not be ditlicult to multiply the 
instaaices. On the other hand, all the nndertakinsrs in the 
center and on tho ritrht at Oravelotte faiUnl. because the tire 
front did not overlap the eneniv : the ireneral iniuht belter 
have said: because there was no infantry tire front at all. 
And this, notwithstanding; the conctMit ration of an enor- 
mous numerical superiority at the Mance ravine. Here the 
task system collapsed completely, not the slightest advan- 
tage wa^ derived from the great numerical superiority be- 
cause in ma.ny cases lateral deveU^pment ^ravine theory), 
having btHMi neglected in t]\e beginning, became inipt>ssi- 
blo altogether, notwithstanding that every "task leader" 
sought to enforce it. If sui>eriority of tire is desired, the 
broadest possible front is necessary from the beginning, as 
well as an advance in that formation to otYoctivo range. 

On account of the "ravine theory." neither frontal 
development nor a firing-station was attained at Oravelotte 
preparatory to the attack! At St. Marie and St. Trivat 
(north) we gained both, despite the then not very ideal yet 
controlled system. Again, with the ravine practice we 
sutlVred much greater losses than with an early develop- 
ment of front. Oeneral von ScherlT moreover demon- 
strates that when not in themselves strong enough for the 
assiiult, troops brought forward on a broad front and under 

♦Pages 192-194 of "Unsere heutlge Infanterietaktik." 



Tactical iJeduclions. 271 

control ((UiiirdH at Ht. i'rivat, 8th KifloH and thfi Kixty- 
Hovonlli at St. Ifnlx-it) \v<.Tr; ablf to maintain t]\ftmH<i]\<-H on 
Iho ground tlioy had gain^^d, wh<iioaH thoy invariably lackf^l 
pow^^r of roHiHtanco whenever there waH no frontal develop- 
ment from the Htart (Point du Jourj. Th<*«e roKftarcheH are 
imporlniit in d^oiflinj^ what infantry tiu-AicH Khould ha; ihay 
muHt be baK<'d on unrlividr'd authority and control und thiiH 
it will ever be. 

In examining the mapH of the battle-fieldB of the 28th 
Brij^ade at ProbluH, of the .''.8th Brij^ade at MarH-la-Tonr, 
and of the iHt Guard lirij^ade at St. Privat, any one will ad- 
mit that under modern conditions and with a judicious use of 
the ground, open lines could be moved forward without stop 
to within 000 meters of tlie enemy. Troops will hardily ever 
have to faf:e a more unfavorable situation. At Problus as 
well as at Mas-la-Tour and St. Privat the combat in front 
would, according to modern ideas, be chiefly carried on by 
the artillerv', which would be quite able to perform that 
duty; in all thref^ casfts sufficient cover could be found for 
the infantry to approa/;h by various methods to within effect- 
ive range (000 meters), and, advancing thence by rush^fS, 
to gain an a^lditional 150 meters, if greater fire effect may 
there be expected. Notwithstanding the difficulty of such 
situations and despite modern fire-arms, entire brigades, led 
and conlrolkd, could in this way be brought to within 000 
meters of the enemy; when at that point they are flung into 
the destructive fire action, superior leading ceases, the fur- 
ther conduct of the action rests with the subordinate leaders, 
with the efficiency of the individual soldier and in the timely 
employment of sufficiently strong reser-^'es on the part of 
the superior leaders. I do not believe that much sound 
argument could be advanced against this. 

At any rate, we must rigorously adhere to the basis of 



272 Inquiries into the Tactics of the Future. 

the whole — namely, eonsideration for man's frail nature — 
and for that reason most of the men should be kept as long 
as possible under the eye and will of the leaders. The prob- 
lem of bringing the greatest possible number of rifles to 
within fiOO meters of the enemy is therefore not to be 
entrusted to the task system, but is a matter of brigade 
leading, and is best solved by skillful use of the ground and 
by a smart advance. That will remain true despite all improve- 
ments of the rifles. In advancing to the first firins-station 
the infantry would of course have to be vigorously sup- 
ported by the artillery. The latter will be able to do so only 
by anticipating the opposing artillery in getting the range. 
If the enemy's artillery is not thus anticipated, the advance 
of the infantry will soon reach its limit, and infantry will 
be restricted to fire-action at long range. 

//. Besults of Surgical and Ballistic E.rperiments. 

According to page 50of "Die Geschosswirkungder neuen 
Kleinkalibergewehre" ("Effects of the New Small-Caliber 
Rifles"), by Professor Dr. Paul Bruns, Tubingen, 1889, H. 
Laupp, one and the same bullet goes through 4 — 5 ranks at a 
range of 100 meters, even when it strikes the heaviest bones 
of the human body; through .'? — 4 ranks at 400 meters, and 
through 2 — 'A ranks at 800 — 1200 meters. Experiments 
with the Lebel rifle in France and with the ^lannlicher 
rifle in Austria have given similar results, so that, as regards 
the ballistic qualities of their rifles, the opponents will in 
the future be about on an ecjual footing. 

Since the appearance of the Third Edition of this book 
these data have been confirmed by further experiments in 
many respects, with which the tactician should be familiar. 



Tactical Deductions. 273 

I shall therefore mention them briefly, and in doing ho fol- 
low Dr. Johann Habart.* 

With the assistance of the Austrian military authori- 
ties, Dr. Habart conducted a series of experiments on live 
animals and comparative experiments on human corpses. 
In addition he made examinations of suiciders, of men acci- 
dentally killed on the target-ranges and at labor riots, and 
took account of the phenomena on the various theaters of 
war from that of 1870-71 to include the Chilian War of 1891. 

Near Hermannstadt a rifleman was mortally wounded 
by a shot through the occipital bone from the Mannlicher 
rifle at a range of 2700 paces. 

On May 20, 1890, a platoon of 10 rifles at Nurschau 
fired 5 volleys into a mob of workingraen at a range of 
30—80 paces. It is stated that 10 bullets made 32 hits, 
making 3 — 4 and perhaps 5 hits for 1 bullet. Seven were 
killed on the spot, G died the next few days of their wounds, 
19 wounded recovered. The propor-tion of the killed to the 
wounded is therefore 1:3.5; almost the same as at Biala, 
where, out of 18 hit, 4 were killed. The destructive effect of 
the bullet at short range is thus proven beyond a doubt. 

The loss of the Dalmacedists at Concon was about even 
in killed and wounded, at Placilla the proportion is reported 
to have been 1 :2.o7. 

At Cilli a man in the act of aiming was hit by an 8 milli- 
meter bullet (Mannlicher) which had passed through a butt 
of earth 140 centimeters in thickness. The projectile 
remained in the body. The man died on the sixth day. 

At a range of 3000 meters, a bullet entered the thorax 
of a woman and remained there. 



♦Fragment of an experimental study and lecture delivered at the 
Austro-Hungarian Army Firing School at Bruck on the Leitha, July 
1, 1892. 



274 Inquiries into the Tactics of the Future. 

At Rosenkreuz three of Witboi's men were killed by 
one bullet (German mod, 88). 

The results at Concon and Plaeilla I have already men- 
tioned; the losses of the interiorly armed defender were 
almost double those of the attacker, one-third of whom at 
the most were armed with Mannlicher and Gras rifles. The 
moral effect of the superior armament on the Balmacedists 
must have been such as to shake them; these troops, how- 
ever, should not be regarded in the same light as good 
European troops. Hence the tactical importance accorded 
to these various phenomena in Chili should be a quali- 
fied one. 

Among the experiments here enumerated, those made 
at the firing schools of the various armies should also find 
a place. The results of these experiments have not become 
much known publicly, and in Germany particularly pro- 
found silence has been observed in that respect. But, on 
the one hand, we can draw very conclusive deductions from 
the German Regulations on these points; on the other hand, 
they are confirmed by experiments in Austria and France. 
Here should be mentioned in the first place the valuable 
data given by Lieutenant-Colonel Regenspursky.* We 
read there: 

"Recent firing experiments have proven that a closed 
platoon will suffer sensible losses at 1600 meters (15 per 
cent); that the small company column forms a good target 
at 2100 paces (44 hits out of 215 shots), and that a battalion 
in the act of changing from column to a broader formation 
received 56 hits out of 400 shots (18 per cent) at 2000 paces. 

*"Studien iiber den taktischen Inhalt des Exerzirreglements fiir 
die k. u. k. Fusstruppen" ("Studies on the Tactical Contents of the 
Drill Regulations for the Austro-Hungarian Foot Troops"), Wien, 
L. W. Seidel und Sohn, 1892. 



Tactical Deductions. 275 

"It was found at the same time that at medium ranges 
troops in double rank suffered four times, and in single rank 
double, the losses that troops in single open line, with 1 
pace interval between men, did at the same distances. The 
results of these peace experiments make it advisable to de- 
ploy the platoons at long ranges (1500 — 1600 paces), to group 
the companies designated for the fire action in skirmish lines 
and company reserves when 3000 and 2000 paces from the 
enemy, while battalions and larger units will have to relin- 
quish the deep column on entering the zone of infantry fire 
(about 3000 paces)." 

Comparative experiments were next made in Austria, 
based on the prinicples of the reglementary frontal attack on 
one hand and on those of K. v. K.'s battle attack.* "The 
reglementary attack," says Regenspursky, "lasted 26 min- 
utes and 38 seconds, of which 12 minutes and 18 seconds 
were fire pauses and 14 minutes and 20 seconds were taken 
up in firing. Total hits, 27,7 per cent. The so-called battle 
attack (two ranks, beginning at long distances, constantly' 
passing each other in double time and delivering a rapid 
fire, are to reach the enemy as quickly as possible) lasted 
only 18 minutes and 40 seconds, of which 7 minutes and 40 
seconds were pauses and 11 minutes were consumed in fir- 
ing. Total hits, 20 per cent. The reglementary attack 
came within 200 paces, the battle attack within 100 paces of 
the enemy. Alternate rushes, passing of the front line, and 
firing, was done between the distances of 1400 and 600 paces 
from the enemy, the battle attack scoring 49 hits out of 700 
shots, or 7 per cent, while the reglementary attack at the 
same distances scored 117 hits out of 700 shots, or 16.7 
per cent. 

*"Wie sollea wir im nachsten Kriege angreifen?" K. v. K., 
1890, R. Felix, military publisher, Berlin. 



270 Inquiries into fhe Tactics of the Future. 

The battle attack thus provod itself inferior in tire 
pinver. and the men >vere exhausted and uutit for further 
service for the time beinji'. 

iMMween (\0{) — lt)0 paces from the enemv the battle 
attack scored 4."v> hits out of 1(572 shots, or '2T\.{\ per cent; the 
rei;lementary attat-k betwtHMi (500 — 100 paces T^iVA hits out of 
1582 shots, or .'h~».(5 per cent. 

The procedure was no\v reversed, the battle attack and 
the rejrlementary skirmish line beinir shot at bv the defender 
from l.'iOO paces on. 

"lietwtHMi l.'UX) — 700 {tai'cs the defenders scored on tlu' 
ta-rj;ets of the battle attack 2;n hits out of 700 shots, or 
3J> per cent, and ou the targets of the rejxlementarv attack 
only 128 hits out of 1400 shots, or 1>.2 per cent; bet ween (500 — 
200 paces the targets of the battle attack ret'eived 500 hits 
out of 5>r)8 shots or (51.5 jhm- cent, the targets of the rejjle- 
mentary attack (540 hits out of ir>l4 shots, or 45.8 per cent. 
The averajje number of hits received by the target of the 
battle attack was 51.2 per cent ; of thivse of the reglementary 
attack. :>2.2 per cent." 

In all armic^s the question of tiring while in motion is 
btMiig agitated, because during the tire pauses of the attack 
no etTect is produced on the enemy at the very time when the 
latter can produce his greatest tire eftVct. With a view to 
having the tire in motion ottiiially adopted. (^leneral Tiuisson 
invented an attachment to the ritU>s. which 1 shall not dis- 
cuss here.* Firing experiments lasting two wt>eks were then 
made at the camp of Ohalons-surMarne with detachments 
of 20 men each of nunlium firing proficiency. The average 
results were: 



•Formation und Taktik dor franzosischen Armee. Berlin. 1892. 
R. Eisenschmidt. 



Tactical JJeductionH. '^77 

1. Inrontrollcr] firo at Iho oharKiriK {<ait from 200—100 

ijKffx'fH; 18 [XT <;onl. hitH, 

2. (JncoritrolN'd fire at the frharj^lnj? gait from 100 — 50 

m<'tfrH; .'iO per f:enl hitK. 
.'',. I'nf'onfrolN-rl fin- ijt donhW- lirrif from 200 — TOO ificii-VH; 
18 per r-ent liitH. 

4. I'neonlrolled tint in double lim*- from 100 — oO meters; 

42 per cent hitH. 

5. Firint.' by command, firMt at Ihe eliarginj? gait, next 

in double timr-, from 'iOO — 50 nieterH; 21 per cent hitH.* 
The rapidity of firf waH 10 shotK i>er minute; the targeth 
were 2 meters in heiglit, pont^d on a front of 20 meterH, equal 
to the front of the platoon. 

The fear k^t the men might hit <'iic]\ oUx-r [proved 
groundleHH, According to liuiHHon, the attack vvilh fire Hhould 
begin 400 nu'lern from llie on^my at the charging gait, the 
firr? being kei>t u{> until within 100 met(,'rH from the enemy. 
Fifteen paccH in rear of the first KkirmiKh line folIowB a 
Hecond line to promptly fill the gapH in front; 15 pacen in 
rear of the Hecond line donr-d bodies are to follow to give 
the atta(;k energy and momentum. f 

According to the Firing Inntructions, the German rifle 
model 88 has an initial wlocity of 020 meters, and a range of 
'',800 meters with an elevation of 'i'Z"^. Its projectile will 
pierce 45 centimeters of pine at 400 meters, and 25 centi- 
moters of pine at 800 meters, and jienetrates 50 centimeters 
into fresh sand at 400 metern and 'i5 centimetern at 800 

♦Charging gait, 140 meters per minute; double time, 180 meters 
per minute. 

lAs is well known, bullet-proof uniforms have been suggested 
a« protection against modern fire. I do not believe in them. F^or 
defensive purposes, however, thf "Holsteln shield" might be taken 
lnU.> eonsideration, which has been made part of the Danish equip- 
ment. The Idea may be susceptible of Improvement, and for pur- 
poses of defense, Is not without advocates in France. 



278 Inquiries into the Tactia> of the Future. 

nu'tci'H; lliin brick walls jirr iiisiinici<'ii| prolcclion, as tlicy 
arc ]>('fl()i-al<'(l wlicii several sliols sh-ikc (lie saine spot. 

The averaj;-e onliiiales of I lie Imllel in iiielers above 
and below the horizon hil lino of wight are 0.2 at 2(K) motors; 
0.5 at 400 meters; 1.0 a( 000 meters; e(c., a( SOO, 1000, 1200, 
1400 meters. 

The vertical dispersion a.t 200 meters is 25 centimeters, 
the horizontal dispersion 2t) centimeters; at 400, (100, 800, 
1000 meters these tiKuroH are 70, 42, 140, 04, and 200, 112, 
208, 100 centimeters, roBpoctively. 

With the lixed sight all objocte representing a target 
CJin to 2.0 meters in height lie within the dangorons space; 
with the small leaf all targets O.S.'"» to 2.0 meters in height; 
with the 500 meter sight all targets 1.70 to 2.0 meters in 
height; with the (JOO-meter sight and witli targets 0.85 
meters, 1.20 meters, and 1.70 motors in height th<' dangerous 
spaces are 48, 72, and 111 meters; with the 800 motor sight 
and the same height of target those spaces are 25, .'58, and 54 
meters, reH])octively. 

When the arm is properly managed, every shot may be 
expected to hit : all objects within 250 meters; single kneel- 
ing enemies np to .'>50 motors; a kneeling file (men close 
alongside each other) uj> to 500 motors; a standing file (men 
close alongside each other) ajid single njountod men up 
to COO motors. 

With regard to distances, it is stated that up to 000 
motors they are short, thence U]) to 1000 medium, and beyond 
1000 motors long ranges. 

The point-l»lank range of the Itxed sight is 250 motors; 
of tlie small loaf, ;?50 meters. 

Moreover it is roijuired that the men should be export 
in judging distances u]) to 000 nutters, and otlicers, non- 
commissioned oHicors, and bi-ighl men up to H)00 meters. 



Tfuiical DeAv/iionH. 27'J 

"L()(t\n'j\ at pur*.'Jy from 1h<' point of th<; theory of bal- 
IJHticM," Kay Hid Firiiij^ l/iKtruotiouK, "colurnriK will he rriuoh 
jnof; vulnerable at diHtanccH of more than 1000 UK'Xarn than 
tr^XipH of ^Hjual Htrenj^th forrnr^iJ irj line." 

It would he inHuJTicient to consider the (-A^t-jX of the rifle 
alone, Hi'nee the effeet of the artillery projectile ha« likewiHe 
attained an efjual augmentation, under certain circum- 
Kfancen. We will not jro into detailK here; a ^"neral refer- 
ence in KufTicient to reniove any douht in that r^^Kpect when 
taking into account the improvement in the effr^rt of the 
Khrapnel. While the cone of dii«fK;rKion of the hurKting 
Khrapnel HpreadH the hulletK forward and Kideward only, 
Htill the cone Ih of Kuch dirnennionK that, if the range in eHti- 
mated with apf^roximate accuracy, it partak^^ of the char- 
ar;teriHticH of the former can inter even at the Umi^ant ranges. 
On that m:(:(tuiii it ha« become the principal projectile of the 
(idntian field artillery, which may h<' naid to have fought the 
War of 1870-71 with the common Hhell only. Tiie efTwt of 
common nh^'ll han alHO been much iri*rt'Hii(ti] at all rang^^^, 
and then th'-re Ik the effc^;t of high-exploKive KhellH to be con- 
Hidered, but in the cane of the latter it in necr^Hary to deter- 
mine the time and height of burnt with gn^at accuracy. 
Ifigh-exploHive KhellK Hcaiicr their fragments, not only to 
the front, but in all directionn — i. e., forward, laterally, to the 
rear, and downward ThiH Hhould be kept in mind in con- 
nection with poKitionn in r^^r of wallB and similar cover. 
The high-exploKivr* nhell ban thuK to a certain degrf:;^^ Holved 
the fjucKtion which pr^ticnted great difTJculti<-K in act- 
ive field operation H and could not bf Holved except by 
Indirect fire. Hut an the exact CKtimation of the range 
\h difficult, and a« the fragmentH of the high-explo«ive 
«hell up to date are Ux* many and too ineffective, the 
hopew at fi rnt ba>ied on the torpedo nhell have not been 



280 Inquiries into the Tactics of the Future. 

completely fulfilled; this question of projectile mar not be 
considered as closed. The defender's first endeavor will be to 
beat down the enemy's artillery, and the attacker will pursue 
the same object with regard to the defender's artillery. In 
this endeavor artillery alone may not always succeed and 
the cooperation of infantry may be required. It is also quite 
plain that modern field artillery should possess a very high 
degree of mobility. Field artillery is not to destroy forti- 
fications, its effect is to be produced by the large number 
of its fragments; it is therefore possible to make it light and 
mobile. It should be capable of covering long distances at 
a trot in large bodies, of passing marching columns, and 
of deploying en masse. We do not propose to inquire as to how 
far the German field gun meets these requirements. What 
has been stated of the German field artillery applies equally 
to the French; the state of the Russian field artillery cannot 
be fully determined at this time; but the Austrian and Ital- 
ian field artilleries may be assumed to be on a level with 
the German. 

The sum total of these expositions is that the armaments 
of infantry and artillery are everywhere on about the same 
level. No one is likely to possess a notable superiority of 
armament, and superiority of power nmy be gained only by 
training and leading. 

III. SmoTceless Powder. 
Of all the inventions made since that of gunpowder, 
none probably has exercised such great influence on tactics 
as has that of smokeless powder. Aside from other ballistic 
properties, the new powder imparts to the projectile a much 
higher velocity, which should be fully appreciated in tactics; 
it is not necessary here to go into details, because the prac- 
tical results are alreadv laid down in the Firing Regulations 



Tactical Deductions. 281 

for Infantry and Artillery. It is requisite, however, to briefly 
review the optical and tactical sides of the question for 
all arms. 

AVhile the use of smokeless powder has not done away 
with all smoke, either in the case of the rifle or of the gun, 
still smoke has been so much diminished that it is alivays 
transparent; it may be discerned b}^ a close observation, and in 
S. clear, humid, and calm atmosphere the smoke is greater 
than in a warm, dry, and agitated atmosphere. No matter 
how lively the fire, the smoke never obstructs the view of 
the rifleman or gunner; they can follow the projectile with 
the eye, as it were, and the rifleman and gun are themselves 
exposed to view unless otherwise concealed. Before they 
can be seen by the enemy, the latter is delayed by enterprises 
necessary to gain a first glimpse of the outlines of the 
position. This would seem to render reconnaissance more 
difficult and to facilitate the execution of the combat. The 
former is generally admitted; the latter cannot be suffi- 
ciently determined in peace. 

Unobstructed \iew in combination with the great range 
of the small-caliber rifle gives a much greater importance 
to infantry fire. To-day infantry is always able to see and 
sometimes to see far, and to take advantage of both by the 
lo7iij range, fat trajectory and great peneiration of its arms. It 
will be able to observe the movements of large bodies of 
cavalry from their inception and to take them under fire at 
such ranges as to diminish the value of that arm as against 
infantry, because in human judgment surprise must be pre- 
sumed to be possible only in very exceptional cases. Cavalry 
patrols will rarely be able to discover individual riflemen 
promptly. The reconnoitering powers of cavalry are there- 
by much impaired. 

The new powder and the new arm likewise confer a 



282 Inquiries into the Tactics of the Future. 

great advantage on infantiy, when opposed to artillery, 
unless the latter has reconnoitered the gi*ound in front and 
has protected itself from effective infantry fire by skirmish- 
ers in its front. In such a case artillery might be suddenly 
subjected to so great a loss of horses and men that part of 
it may be unable to come into action and that another part 
may not get the range as quickly as it should when opposed 
to artillery. In 1870-71 our artillerymen feared the enemy's 
(long-range) chassepot fire more than that of his artillery, 
and the German artillery suffered in fact much more from the 
former than from the latter, which, however, is to be attrib- 
uted in part to the inferiority of the opponent's gun. Since 
guns and their effects are now approximately on the same 
level everywhere, and since the opponent possesses a rifle 
more perfect than that of 1870, it is to be inferred that in 
future our artillery will encounter much greater difficulties 
than in 1870-71, while our infantry will oppose to the 
enemy an equally good arm and is now better off in that 
respect. I believe, therefore, that (1) before coming into 
action artillery should make a more thorough reconnais- 
sance than formerly, and (2) that it should make it a rule to 
protect its flanks and front by considerable skirmish lines 
thrown out in front. If either or both are omitted, artillery 
may at first find itself in much more serious difficulties than 
was the case, for instance, with the artillery of the IX. and 
VII. Army Corps at Gravelotte. Both instances enjoin cau- 
tion in this respect. 

On the other hand, when artillery has made a thorough 
reconnaissance and has protected itself against hostile in- 
fantry fire by infantry skirmish lines thrown not less than 
500 meters to the front — things which have ever been re- 
quired by tactics — then the artillery can draw extraordinary 
advantages from the absence of smoke, and, when skillfully 



Tactical Deductions. 283 

handled, its action may become decisive, provided it knows 
how to shoot, provided it comes into position with as little 
exposure to the enemy's fire as possible, and provided it 
anticipates the enemy in getting the range by means of 
correct observation and direction. Instruction in firing is 
imparted in peace, and it may be expected that in future our 
artillery will know how to shoot. Against this it may be 
stated, with much truth, that the firing in action is not equal 
to that on the firing-ground, and that dead gunners cannot 
be replaced, or not without difficulty; that, however, should 
not be allowed to divert us from what is rational — i. e., from 
getting the range quickly. That accomplished, the artillery 
at once gains great power, since the absence of smoke 
makes laying and observation always possible, while, on 
the other hand, the diminished recoil permits of greater 
rapidity of fire, and all these causes combine to dispropor- 
tionately increase the effect of the improved projectiles. Not 
only that: up to this time the so-called concentration of fire 
against the decisive points was more a theoretical idea than 
a tactical possibility. The great amount of smoke soon 
enveloped long lines of artillery, so that laying, observation, 
and control of large bodies of artillery were impossible; the 
effect was correspondingly diminished. That has been 
changed. Moreover, the masses of artillery may now be 
posted closer together or in tiers, and can always develop 
their full fire power. That may not always be advisable, 
still it may offer advantages in certain circumstances; for 
instance, after gaining the superiority of fire. If the artil- 
lery has been well trained in peace, if it has learned how to 
shoot and how to observe, it cannot be denied that the effect 
of artillery will be increased to an extraordinary degree. It 
is but necessary to realize that to-day 36 guns emit 3000 frag- 
ments per minute! When artillery possessing such efficiency 



2S4 Inquirits Into the l^aciics of the Future. 

jrains tho raiijro iiioiv quioUlv than tho oiiponont. tlio oxist- 
oiuv of tho latter Nvill bo liiuitod to a vory briof spaoo of time 
and one main part of the work has boon aooom]>Hshod for the 
assaihtnt ! To bo snio, artiUiM-v w ill not bo ablo to dispose of 
j::ood infantry onsoonotHi in skirmish lim^s in the folds of the 
jrronnd. and it is and will bo the duty of infantry to drive 
them aA\ay. Neither will oovtM- niuhM' oiM-tain conditions be 
of any avail to the eitemy's infantry, eavalry. or artillery, 
sinee tield artilUMv is now ablo to attat'k any kind of troops 
under oover. thoni^h this (|nestion eannot as yet be considered 
as clost.Hl. The artillery pt>ssesses the additional irrt^at 
advantage of being able to di>termine the distance by means 
of its appliances, which the infantry is unable to do at 
lone: range: it has to depend on getting the ranges from the 
artillery. 

It may be conclndtHl that well trained and well-led 
artillery has btvome ///(• lon(]-niiu;c iirni jhir rxcelJencc and muter 
all cireumstance^^. and that according to theory the (/jtjVio/j will 
be brought about more quickly than formerly. if artillery and 
infantry concentrate their action on the same object, which 
was impossible before the introdn«'tion of smokeless ])Owder. 

!Sn\okeless powder has S(nne disadvantages, inastnnch 
as it will be more ditVicult to make otit the position of the 
hostile infantry, but the disadvajitages are common to both 
sides and may be greatly diminislntl by the use of gomi 
glasses. Against this it may be nuMitioned as an advantage 
that the cor>p(M'ation of infantry and artilhMy. the hading, 
is facilitated. the more as thesonnd. though it has not become 
weakiM". has beconu^ shorter. Since stUMng and nndi^rstanding 
are the prerequisites for all intelligent hnnian action, it must 
be admitted on the whole that the advantages of smokeless 
powder far outweigh its disadvantages, and that it is only 
now thai tlu' two principal arms possess the prtM-eqnisit<>s for 



Taxlicoi UfAwAxona. 285 

powerfully prepanng an attack in a brief v>\)?iu(At of time. 
Heretofore exiKtinf^ taetleal rulen are not abolinhed by thiK 
invention; on tlir? contrary, it is only now tijat they become 
ajiplicable in tii'-ir fiill extent. 

In an oiJtflani<in^ attack, even a^ainHt a prej^ared pOHl- 
tion,ri j the defender will HufTer much more from the comhined 
fire of artillery and infantry than heretofore; (2) breaHtworku 
'and trencheH do not by any meanH afford the requiHite cover; 
hence i'A) the inventionH more than ever eall for outflanking, 
and (i) outflanking iH bound to be more prrxiuctive of rf^ultH. 
The concluHion, therefore, would be that the pro8j»ect« for the 
HucceHH of an attaz-k are rather increawed than diminished. 
ThiH iH from the theoretical Htandpoint! 

If J be permitted to reeall here the example of ProblnH, 
wherr' on one side the wood of I'ofiovvitz enabled large b^xliea 
to be brought to within 000 meters, and where on the other 
side LVieder J'rim) a covererl approach to within 200 — 'iOO 
meters was pra/:ticable, and if we imagine thf^HC positions to 
be held by troops with uuxlcrn annarnent, we might conclude 
that the role of the attacker has not become so very much 
worse, since battle-fields of like character will rather be the 
rule than the exception in the future. More stress would in 
future be laid on outflanking by taking more ground by way 
of Nieder I'rim, but even against the front, the space Pro- 
bluH — Xieder J'rim, strong skirmish lines could be brought 
up unobserved to a similar distance through the fields of rye as 
tall as a man, so that the Jtoslik artillery could not see these skir- 
mishers or ohserve their progress no longer hetrayed hy smoke, and 
that, approadiing thus under cover, the skirmishers vjould render the 
position of the artillery nntenahU hy their fire at a range of J 000 
meters or less. The conditions will not always be similar; 
still the example shows that they did exist, and why should 
they not recur? It follows that in similar situations the 



2SG Itiquirii's inlo the Tactics of the Future. 

defondor >vouI(l have io burn (lio no lu'ld to a dislanci' of 
2000 motors; ovon simple liodjios and ssliiiht folds of tho 
jiTonnd may booomo voi y troublosomo to artillory. 

Tn any ovont tlioro aro two roasons why the tactical om- 
jtloyuuMit of artillery should bo modified: the first lies in the 
improved rillo; tho second, in the incroai^od fire elToct of 
artillory. lioth become noticeable in tactics, in the first 
place, by the greater range of the }>rojoctilos. The German 
Infantry Drill Eegulations state \ery correctly: "In action 
against artillory it should bo observed that that arm has the 
superiority of tiro at ranges greater than 1000 meters, and 
that the chances only become etpial at ranges of less than 
1000 meters. Cases may be imagined, however, where the 
action of infantry may be effective against artillery at greater 
ranges, but it will I'all for tho oxptMidituro of a considerable 
amount of ammunition." 

T a.ju inclined to believe that in many cases it will be pos- 
sible for infantry to direct such a fire against artillery ex- 
posed to view, at ranges greater than 1000 meters, that it will 
be impossible for tho latter to rcMuain in action, provided tho 
exact rang(^ is found ami the fire is t'ontrollod. This advan- 
tage will i'hietly accrue to tho infantry of the defender, be- 
cause it may bo assununi that in most cases it will be able to 
lie in wait for tho artillery. The defender's artillery will 
also probably prepare to greet that of tho attacker with 
mass fire at known ranges. From both of those suppositions 
I conclude that tho artilleries of tho attacker and defender 
will try to fight it out at long ranges, but will find a natural 
limit imposed on themselves by the optical conditions of the 
battle-field. At any rate, artillery should learn in peace how 
to deliver an otYoctivo fire at long range, and bo traiiuni in 
one kind of mass fire that can bo controlled. In combating 
the dj'fondor tho artillerv of tho attacker will tluM'oforo 



Tactical Deductions. 287 

strive to develop as many guns as possible, to gain a favora- 
ble position, and to take it up without exposing itself ; during 
the action it should make as few changes of position as pos- 
sible. In most cases 1 deem it neither useful nor advisable 
that artillery accompany the infantry attack. The positions 
of the artillery will vary between 3500 — 1200 meters;the prin- 
-cipal distance will probably be 2500 meters, the fire of shrap- 
nel at these distances being efiective — nay, annihilating, 
if the artillery promptly gets the range. It may therefore be 
assumed that the artillery battle will under certain circum- 
stances be of brief duration and of increased severity, and 
that there will be pauses in the artillery fire; at any rate, it 
seems to me tliat such would follow theoretically from the 
endeavor to promptly get the range and to develop masses 
of artillery, in combination with the greater effect of fire. 

Artillery, however, is a rather complicated arm, and at 
equal distances will be more endangered by the enemy's 
proximity than infantry. It becomes the duty of the infantry 
to keep the hostile infantry as far away as possible. 

It is thus necessary for artillery to be protected by infan- 
try in front, and to take as good cover as possible. At any 
rate, smokeless powder calls for much greater proficiency in 
firing than black powder, and for greater circumspection and 
prudence on the part of the leaders, in order to select a posi- 
tion so close and so effective that the fewest possible changes 
of position may become necessary. 

The greatest change in tactics has beyond doubt been 
brought about by the element of uncertainty resulting from 
the use of smokeless powder. It enables infantry to conceal 
its weakness and to mislead the enemy to enterprises that 
require much time. The defender in particular will strive 
to conceal his real position as much as possible and to 



288 liKjiiirirs iiilti the Tdrlics of (he Fulurc. 

iMiiitlov his jirtillt'i'V iiccordiiifilv. I'^or liis :irl illci'V one*' 
r('\ cjilcd. Ills I'cnl |»(>si(i()n is (liscloscd, wliicli would iiuilc- 
rijillv riitililnlc llic (iisk of llic Mtliickcr. .Iudj;in}i,- li-oin 
]»(»;u'(' (>x|)('ri(Mi<'('S. I believe il \vv\ iiii|trol>;il)l(' lliiii cnvMlry 
pMlfois :ind rccomioilcriiiu olliccrs will evei- he iible It) 
lU'onipl Iv ascci'lnin I lie eiieiiiv's position. Tliese iiieium 
may help (o hx-ale the enemy's Hanks, and 1 place no j^reat 
expeclalions on (he caidiNc lialloon in Held operalions. 
lOvei'v (hin^- else will hav<> lo be I'onnd onl by li.uhlinj^', and 
tliis is the new leature, parlicnlaily tor artillery. 

II is my opinion that this arm is bonnd to become a 
"i-econnoiterin^- arm" lo a hiuh dejii'ee; that instead of 
(lepi'ivinu- the ad\ance .<;nai(l of artillery, the same slionld 
b<> made very stronj; in that arm; and that, as previously 
(Mn|»hasi/.e(l. artillery should j)ossess ijreat m»)bility. The 
mounted soldier can no longer approach sutVicienlly near for 
correct and sutlicient observation. Should he attempt it, 
the chances ai-(^ 100 to I that he will not return, and his 
obser\ aliens, if any, will be lost. The deploynuMit of strong 
infantry, in order to ^ain information by nu>ans of its action, 
reijuires much time, and there is nothing left for that pur- 
])ose but a skillful and viii'orous employment of artillery. 
In such a cas(> the defender, when his main position is 
involved, must show his hand, if he do(>s not wish to suc- 
cumb at once; if it is uuM-ely an advanced j)ositiou, he will be 
unable lo hold il and will betray the main ])osilion by his 
withdrawal. Tlu' place of the artillery in the marchinii- col- 
umn should thereftu-e fnllill two renuirennMits: 1, vi^-oious 
reconuaissam(>; L', to advance* from the preliminary deploy- 
uu'ut with the ^realest possibl(> snpeiiorily in point of liuns 
to tlu» pi'incipal deployment fm- subduins;' the enemy's main 
])ositiou, II is uum>cessary lo state that tii'eat ditlu'iilties 
will ha\ (> to be overctune in doinu' so. 



Tactical Deduclions. 280 

liijl it will no u\()V<' ]>(' possiblo for ar-tillery to effect the 
reconnaJKHaricr' alone than it would be adviBable for it to 
lake up itH priri'-ipal firirifi station without having infantry 
thrown out in ilK front. It Ik unable by itself to do either; 
it reipjirr-H in either case the protection of infantry against 
the enemy's infantry. 

It thus follows from smokeless powder, as a general 
result, that infantry and artillery are tactically rendered 
more interdependent, and that tactical reconnaissance will 
have to b«^ effected chiefly by these two arms. Smokeless 
powder does not facilitate that kind of work in any way; it 
rather makes it more difficult in many particulars through 
ihf element of uncertainty. 

Every discharge of the field-j)iece shows a very bright 
flash, and if the gun is on loose ground, the flash is accom- 
panied by a very conspicuous cloud of dust. If the gun 
stands on sod, grass, etc., or along the edge of a wood, the 
dust is replaced by vapor plainly visible against the green 
ground. Artillery will thus betray its position in a very 
conspicuous manner. Its fire will not only betray the 
general location of the battery, but will make it possible to 
count approximately the number of guns, which was never 
the case heretofore. Artillery should therefore more than 
ever be bent on concealing its position from the two firing 
branches of the enemy, and indirect fire should not be con- 
demned outright as an artifice. 

The absence of smoke has made artillery an arm whose 
total victory or destruction lies close together; its fate may 
depend on a moment, on a single steji, but chiefly on the 
action of the opposing artillery. It became thus necessary 
for artillery' to adopt an entirely different tactical spirit, 
which, as we have stated, it has done. It was reserved 
for smokeless powder to make artillery an arm capable of 



ii5H) Inquiries into the l\jclics of the Future. 

doalinji' ;jbsolulo destruction; but, tlu)n};h tho technical 
arraufivnu'iits are complete, much remains to be done to 
derive from them the ultimate tactical advanta}»es. It is 
not opportune to enter into these details. 

Mass etl'ect ilirout;h individual elVect is to-day the tacti- 
cal huv of artilUM'v as \vi>ll as of infantry. The latter knows 
noAV only the action of masses of skirmishers, and all it had 
to do was to modify its principles. Smokeless i)t)wd(U- has 
not detracted from the vaJue of cavalry, but has relejjated 
its action to other phases and modified the form of the 
action. If cavalry knows how to utilize these moments, 
it may enhance the value of the victory enormously, but it 
will no Kui«;er decide battles! 

The moments of "tactical doubt" will increase in num- 
ber and duration, caused by the element of uncertainty 
imparted to tactics by smokeless powder. 

/v. Tactkal Deductions Rvi/anlint/ the Attach-, from the Expori- 
mcnts of Bruns, from the Ballistic Properties of Small- 
Calihcr Fifles, and from the Properties of Smokeless Powder. 

The stated experiments of Professor Bruns, of Dr. I. Ha- 
bart, of Professors lUisch, Kocher, Kejjer, von liillroth, and 
von Bardeleben, and of iheFrenchmen D«.^horme,Cha.uvel,Ni- 
mier, Breton, a.nd Pesme.*and the prescriptions of the Infan- 
try and Artillery Firing Regulations are not only of surgical 
and ballistic, but of high tactical importance in several w^ays. 
The fact that one and the same projectile pierces 3 — A ranks 
at 400 meters, 2—3 ranks at 800—1200 meters— the distance 
of 100 meters, at which 4 — 5 ranks are iiierced, is disregarded 
because I believe that the attacker will rarelv reach that 



♦"Recherches expi'rimontjiles sur los effets des arms nouvelles 
et des balles de petit calibi'e a eoiveloppe n^sistante." Ardiir (ji^nt^ral 
<f-«> HI ('(/.. Octobre. 1888. 



Tactical Deductions. 291 

range before the enemy ha8 abandoned his position — simply 
signifies when translated into tactir;s that formations four 
ranks deep at 400 meters and three deep at 1200 meters 
would receive 4 or .'J times as many hits as a single-rank for- 
mation. These results were obtained on level ground, but 
that does not diminisli their value, and it would be foolish to 
contend that such level ground will not be encountere<l in 
fact, and that firing on the battle-field differs in result from 
that of the firing-grounds. 

With respect to level ground, an inspection of the 
maps of Problus, Mars-la-Tour, Kt. Privat, and particularly 
Loigny, will show that battle-fields 15 kilometers and more 
in extent do show extensive j.lains, and it would not be dif- 
ficult to multiply the number of examples if it were intended 
to do HO in this book. Military history shows that excep- 
tional features of ground are not so uncommon, and it is 
quite natural that he who remains on the tactical defensive 
on account of his numerical inferiority, or who perhaps 
intends to remain on the defensive at the beginning for 

other even purely tactical— reasons, or for other reri^sons 

springing from the general situation, will select positions 
with an open field of fire in order to make the task of the 
attacker difficult and to take full advantage of the proper- 
ties of his own fire-arms. It may also be expecte<l that at 
points which may be approached to within 000 meters or 
less, the defender will construct entrenchments enabling 
him to increase the effect of his fire against such points by 
a concentration of fire at short range; nor will he disdain 
entrenchments on his flanks and fronts where there is a 
wide field of fire, (1) to break as much as possible the force 
of the cross-fire of an outflanking enemy, and (2) as protec- 
tion against artillery, the true representative of long-range 
fire. Incidentally it may be remarked that modern shrap- 



292 Inquiries into the Tactics of the Future. 

iiel fire makes this indispensable for the defender. Antici- 
pating somewhat, I will state that the width of front covered 
by a shrapnel is about GO meters. The distribution of the 
hits is almost in accordance with the law of dispersion — t. e., 
counting from the center, it amounts to 25, 16, 7, and 2 per 
cent. This pro])ortion is the same at all ranges. After 
regulating its lire, a battery will make 78 hits with every 
shrapnel — i. e., it will score that number of hits against 
a detachment of infantry with a front of (JO meters. It fol- 
lows that between 2500 — 1200 meters the subordinate 
leaders of infantry should be at liberty to diminish the front 
by every possible means while crossing that space. I am 
here following the statements of the Journal des sciences mili- 
taires and abstain for obvious reasons from making other 
statements. At any rate, between 2500 and 1200 meters the 
advance should be regulated by ditfereut considerations 
from what it is at shorter ranges. 

In all cases where tactical reasons demand the advance 
of infantry on an extended plain, 800 — 600 meters from the 
enemy may be assumed as the nearest distance, and in no 
case should it be less than 400 meters. The 3Sth Brigade 
has demonstrated, at ]\Iars-la-Tour, that with good troops 
and poor formations it is possible to rush forward over open 
ground until intermingling with the enemy and under a fire 
which cannot be much exceeded by the small-caliber rifle, 
though I do not by any means recommend this exhibition of 
bravery as a standard example in tactics. The 1st and 3d 
Infantry l>rigades of the Guard have demonstrated, at St. 
Privat, that it is possible for the attacker, if sufficiently 
strong, to hold out for hours on open ground and under 
extraordinary losses notwithstanding the use of antiquated 
forms that should long have been discarded. Both exam- 
pies are to be condemned from the tactical ])oint of view. 



Tactical Deductions. 293 

but are worth takin}^ to heart, though that resistance, when 
closely examined, does not seem to constitute such a great 
feat of bravery. The 'M Infantry l^rigade of the Guard 
possessed sufficient fighting power to repulse about six vig- 
orous counter-attacks, and both brigades took part in the 
last acts of the victory, right on top of an action which was 
not quite in the ordinary, to be sure, and which had con- 
sumed almost all their fighting power. Therein is where 
the extraordinary lies! Where the open plain cannot be 
avoided, there is but one form of movement and combat under 
the enemy's fire, the single-ranl- skirmish line. The leaders 
should endeavor to continue the forward movement as long as 
possible, because every halt takes from the vigor of the move- 
ment. To deny this is to deny human nature. In view of 
the ballistic xjroperties stated in the Firing Regulations, 
infantry may in such cases be expected to do what can rea- 
sonably be expected from it at ranges from 1000 to 000 
meters — namely, to keep the enemy under an uninterrupted 
skirmish fire. If broad columns or closed lines were used 
between 2500 and 1200 meters, the losses would amount to 
annihilation according to the figures quoted. The Regula- 
tions should therefore indicate the best formations for 
advancing under infantry and artillery fire, because the 
zones of fire differ considerably. It will be rare indeed that 
shrapnel fire will have to be feared at 1200 meters. This 
difference in the method of advancing again calls for 
control. 

The proportion of killed and wounded of the .^8th Bri- 
gade on the loth of August, 1870, was 3:4. This singular 
fact, which has heretofore not been closely examined, may be 
explained in this way, that the brigade moved within the 
zone of explosive effecl of the T'liassepot until intermingling 



294 Inquiries inlo iltc I'adics of the Future. 

with the enemy aiul back again — i. e., 400 -f 400 = 800 
meters.* 

Still another i)oint is to be mentioned hero: the experi- 
ments of Beckf and of Bruns (pages 4;)-52)havedenu)nstrated 
that down to 300 meters the wounds inflicted by the small- 
caliber rilie will be relatively less dangerous, because the 
penetrative force and hardness of the bullet make clean 
wounds without dangerous splintering of bones. Men hit 
elsewhere than in the head, heart, throat, bladder, etc., may 
in most cases count on recovery. The man is merely placed 
hors-dc-comhat, and crippling and mutilation are not to be 
feared so much as with the former infantry bullet. The 
action of the many, but small, fragments and balls of the 
artillery projectile is similar. But wounds inflicted at 
ranges between 300 meters and the muzzle of the rifle are of 
very severe character on account of the explosive effect, and 
here the proportion is reversed. All clases of the army 
should be familiar with these things, especially the officers, 
as salvation or destruction may depend on whether they take 
them in account or not. In view of the modern method of 
fighting with swarms of skirmishers, the scientific and moral 
forces, particularly of the common soldier, should under all 
circumstances be strengthened in the first place. In addi- 
tion to other things, the modern officer should be expert in 
physics and psychology; otherwise he is nothing but a cor- 

*Billroth and Bardeleben are of the opinion that the proportion 
of killed to wounded on the battle-field will in the future probably 
be rather increased than diminished. The mortality among the 
wounded may, on the other hand, be expected to diminish consider- 
ably. It was almost 26 per cent among the Russians in 1877-78, 
12 per cent among the Germans in 1870-71, 6.6 per cent among the 
Austrians in 1878; in 1888 it rose to 9.5 per cent, and fell in 1885-86 
to 2 per cent. The latter flgiu'e closely approximates the experiences 
in Chili. 

IB. von Beck, "Ueber die Wirkung moderner Gewehrprojektile" 
("The Effect of Modern Rifle Projectiles"), Leipzig, 1885. 



Tactical Deductions. 295 

l>oralora tradesman. None wants to be that; his pride would 
rebel against it. The moral strength of the ordinary man— 
and the great majority are ordinary men — is increased in the 
same deyree as he knows that the dangerous character of wounds 
from infantry bullets is dirtvinishal. Men knowing themselves 
exposed only to temporary injury will act with more dash 
than if they expect death from every bullet with more or 
less certainty. This is the state of affairs, and what the 
above named scientists have ascertained should be dissem- 
inated throughout the army. It is not merely a surgical mat- 
ter; it is also a tactical one, for the simple reason that the 
efficacy of the small-caliber rifle is such between 000 and 400 
meters that it is not necessary to go nearer unless it can be 
done under cover, or to enter that zone where the wounds 
from the small-caliber rifle are of terrible severity — i. e., 
from oOO meters on. 

If it is possible to avoid that zone without sensibly im- 
pairing the efficacy of our own fire, then it should be made a 
law in tactics which should be ingrained in every one, leav- 
ing the matter of human nature entirely out of considera- 
tion. For mere selfishness and the motive not to destroy 
our material fighting forces ourselves senselessly through 
ignorance and want of judgment and not to render ourselves 
incapable of fighting demand that these matters be made 
known, that they be thoroughly weighed and taken into 
account. War cannot be attractive except as an art; art 
alone will carry us over its vexations and will lead us to vic- 
tory. If it degenerates into senseless butchery, it becomes 
repulsive and loses everything noble that science and art 
may impart to it. It sinks to the level of a brutal trade; 
brutality stifles all that is beautiful in any art. Unfortu- 
nately, great artists are not always found in the [jlaces they 
ought to fill, in consequence of the fact that officers are 



296 Inquiries into the Tactics of the Future. 

almost systematically trained to contemn the sciences. 
When war breaks out after a peace which, though affording 
many leisure hours for study, has been idled away, many 
"leaders" find themselves as unfamiliar with their own 
branch as though in a strange world I Some do not know 
how to act, others lose their heads; they have not learned to 
understand what intellectual power may accomplish, and their 
ignorance and lack of tactical skill put thousands iu the 
grave and rob the fatherland of them. 

In the Firing Instructions ranges up to 600 meters are 
called close. It follows that at that point there occurs a 
palpable restriction to the ballistic properties; that up to 
that point the effect is fairly even (though increasing up to 
300 meters so as to amount almost to annihilation); hence 
we are justified in demanding that, as a rule, the zone of the 
explosive effect (less than .300 meters) be only entered when 
there is cover, when the enemy is shaken, when his strength 
is gone, and when he is ready to withdraw. As regards 
results, it makes no difference in the conduct of the fire 
action, assuming, of course, a good field of fire, whether the 
fire is delivered at 400, 500, or 600 meters; on the other hand, 
the explosive effect, the power of penetration, and the flat 
trajectory make it well worth while considering whether 
the increased losses and the increased severity of the 
wounds should not, as a rule, forbid an approach to within 
300 meters and over. In my opinion it is impracticable In 
the pitched battle on purely tactical grounds. 

People warning others against orthodoxy ought them- 
selves to be the first to fight shy of it. The explosive effect 
of the old Chassepot extended over a distance greater by 
25 per cent than that of the modern Lebel and Mannlicher 
rifles — i. e., 400 against the present 300 meters (Bruns, page 
51); yet I witnessed a case myself where we advanced over 



Tactical Deductions. 297 

a free field of fire (Mars-la-Tour) until we in part inter- 
mingled with the enemy and the rest reached an average 
distance from the enemy of 100 meters. Other cases I wit- 
nessed in the January actions at Chateau Renault, where 
I succeeded in an early morning action (January 6th), not- 
withstanding the apparently level characterof the ground, in 
conducting a half-battalion divided into two company col- 
umns, under cover, to within 250 meters of the enemy's skir- 
mish line, after showing the same road to a horse battery 
and to a squadron of the 3d Cuirassiers, all of which used 
it on their advance and on their return without notable 
losses, although the hostile bullets rattled like peas against 
the tile roofs of the village of Vilthion, which was one kilo- 
meter in length and ran parallel to this road for some 
distance. Lieutenant de R^ge and I never dismounted in 
traversing that distance under a very severe rifle fire, and 
neither was hurt. Subsequent to our retreat, in hunting up 
a company, 12th — 57th (Lieutenant von Kehler), which had 
been forgotten, at the southwest exit of this uncanny village 
defile, I again galloped throughout the length of the village, 
whose southern side had meanwhile been occupied by the 
enemy, and pointed out to that company a road around the 
north of the village by which it effected its retreat, likewise 
without much loss. On meeting Mr. von Kehler (now com- 
mander of the 71st Regiment), at Berlin, in 1889, he again 
expressed his thanks to me. On the morning of January 7th 
I witnessed an assault on the village of La Garionni^re by F. 
and II. — 57th, where the attack movement was elegantly car- 
ried out in close formation by two companies of the II. Bat- 
talion, notwithstanding the good field of fire and the firm- 
ness of the enemy, while the major part of the fusiliers, who 
were fighting in skirmish lines, did not gain ground as 
rapidly as those two companies. It should be stated, how- 



298 Inquiries into the Tactics of the Future. 

ever, that the fusiliers had borne the brunt of the action in 
front, and that the II. Battalion was able to approach from 
the flank under fair cover; the enemy defended himself from 
house to house. I purposely cite these offensive actions 
from the pitched battle as representing actions with suc- 
cessful and unsuccessful issue, and simple village fights, 
because they show the possibility of advancing in the face 
of Chassepot fire, provided the ground was utilized. I 
abstain from other quotations. The Chassep6t possessed the 
properties of the present small-caliber rifles, though not to 
the same extent. It approximated them in range, but was 
considerably Inferior in power of penetration and flatness 
of trajectory. According to the present state of research, 
the wounds it inflicted at ranges from the muzzle up to 400 
meters exhibited the severe effects of the small-caliber rifle 
without the corresponding beneficial effects which the lat- 
ter possesses from that range to 2000 meters — i. e., the 
wounds inflicted by it both at short and long range were 
severe, because it fired a lead bullet, which on striking the 
bone became much deformed and caused most severe splin- 
tering of bones and laceration and contusion of soft tissues. 
The fact that these things have been considerably remedied 
by the modern small-caliber rifle is due- to the use of bullets 
cased in hard steel or nickel, which up-set but very little.* 
It thus was the hard lot of the Germans to fight against the 
(from the humane point of view) most detestable rifle that 
ever was used in war — a perfect fiend of a rifle, particularly 
at the ranges from 100 — 400 meters. They had a thorough 
taste of all kinds of its fire, and having preserved and 
handed down their experiences, the Germans would, in case 
of war, suffer far less surprise at the hands of the Lebel 

*The latest projectile, the so-called "hollow hiillet," besides 
other things, shows these same attributes. 



Tactical Deductions. 299 

rifle than may be in store for the French (knowing the effect 
of the needle-gun only) if they were confronted by an equal 
or superior rifle; for instance, our rifle model '88. This is an- 
other moral point with which officers and men should be 
made acquainted in the course of their instruction. 

From what has been said, it may be assumed that,partic- 
jilarly in independent actions, it will be found possible to 
advance to close range (GOO meters), in order to bring about 
the decision, and still closer by taking advantage of the 
ground, fog, or darkness. For meeting such conditions the 
troops should be well trained in those formations which are 
requisite and whose front and depth ever depend on the 
ground. At any rate, the difference between Chassepot and 
Lebel is not so great for us as is that between needle-gun 
and rifle model '88 for the French. What the Germans 
accomplished against the Chassepot is known; what the 
French are going to accomplish against the rifle model '88 
remains to be seen. 

The power of penetration of the small-caliber rifles is so 
great that trees no longer constitute good cover, unless they 
are very big, which is the exception, and in many respects 
it is the same with masonry. There is really not much left 
for the attacker to use as cover, and all the men should know 
that, not to mention the officers. The fire action will fre- 
quently take place between 1000 and 500 meters, and in 
view of the data given in theFiring Instructions, the greatest 
skill in the use of the spade becomes indispensable for in- 
fantry. In many cases the enemy's fire may make such work 
impossible, but, on the other hand, it may succeed, particu- 
larly in the frontal action. A bank of earth of 35 and 50 centi- 
meters does not require much work where it is at all practi- 
cable. Trenches of that cross-section, extending for many 
kilometers, were "scraped" out by the Americans with great 



300 Inquiries into the Tactics of the Future. 

rapidity. I use the term "scrape/' for they were not sup- 
plied with our spade, but did the work with their hands, 
using their side-arms, their cooking utensils, etc., for, being 
practical soldiers, they knew how to help themselves. But 
the stupid "Michael"* nowhere becomes more conspicuous 
than when called upon for such work. To compel an active 
person to watch the clumsiness, slowness, indifference, and 
laziness of some German tribes in such work amounts to pun- 
ishment, and, unless energetic steps are taken in these mat- 
ters, they will exact heavy penalties. Nor would it do any 
harm if the o£0cers would look upon this "scratching" with 
less sovereign contempt, and if they would learn more and 
accomplish more in that field — but, great heavens! every- 
thing that bears the slightest reference to that "unmilitary, 
plebeian work" is hateful, as though it were to be considered 
more military to be killed on a level plain than to save one's 
fighting power by "scratching." 

The Instructions for Field Entrenchments of April 6, 
1893, are based on similar grounds. It is laid down there in 
Section 1: "In the attack the entrenching tool may also be 
used to advantage for holding and strengthening conquered 
ground"; and in Section 45: "If the work has to be done 
under the enemy's fire, those men of the skirmish line who 
carry spades put down the rifle, construct cover for them- 
selves, and then pass their spades." Not much could be 
gained by that procedure in an attack, yet enough "to pre- 
serve sufficient strength to repulse any counter-attack"; it 
may be possible later on, under favorable circumstances, 
to push these trenches to the front and thus to gain a much 
more effective firing-station. To be sure, military history 

*"The German Michael" is a term used by the Germans them- 
selves to characterize their own apathy and conservatism. "Michael" 
is supposed to be sleepinn^ most of the time with a nightcap pulled 
over his ears. — Translator. 



Tactical Deductions. 301 

does not furnish an example of attacking infantry succeed- 
ing in entrenching itself under fire at close range, in holding 
out in that artificial firing-station, and in taking part in the 
subsequent assault. The most effective work in that respect 
was done by General Skobeleff on the ''Green Hills"; but 
the work was difficult, owing to the stony character of the 
ground; the infantry was not skilled in the work, and there 
"was a deficiency of tools ; the work required much time, the 
troops suffered great losses, were not supported, and had 
to withdraw. None of these difficulties is likely to be 
encountered in future, but it will nevertheless be difficult 
for the attacker to entrench himself under the enemy's fire. 
In the first place, there should be a strong second line in rear 
of the entrenching troops to prevent any interference with 
the work. I am nevertheless of the opinion that with suffi- 
cient skill and preparation and with good judgment an 
entrenched firing-line might have been established at the 
Mance ravine about GOO meters from the enemy, and the 
effect of such a line garnished with modern rifles would 
have been no small one, even if the attacking infantry were 
compelled to keep at a distance of 800 meters. Under such 
conditions the fire may be very effective against the skir- 
mishers as well as against the enemy's artillery and reserves. 
Much, of course, will depend on the relative elevation of the 
opposing lines. It would be foolish to reject entrenching 
and long-range fire under such circumstances. The letter 
should not be permitted to kill the spirit, and I have stated 
above that it would be foolish to possess a long-range fire- 
arm without using it in that sense. 

It is not my intention to give here detailed data on the 
results obtained from long-range fire, in so far as they might 
be established from German firing experiments. One fact 
I will mention. In France the question of long-range or 



302 Inquiries into the Tactics of the Future. 

short-range fire is much more hotly debated than in Ger- 
many, where the maxim of long-range and short-range 
fire, according to circumstances, has been adopted long ago. 
In the summer of 1893, in an experimental firing at Grenoble, 
50 hits were scored out of 300 shots at 2000 meters. Though 
but one-tenth of that result may be expected in war, still, if 
the fire were continued for some time, it might demonstrate 
how dangerous infantry may become to artillery at very 
great distances; the more as the above results cannot be 
called very good shooting. If this be accepted as indis- 
putable, it constitutes one more proof of the soundness of 
my opinion, that the deployment of skirmishers along the 
entire front is necessary from the beginning in order to use 
our rifles against every suitable target, however briefly it 
may be visible. Whether or not fire should be opened at 
long ranges depends to a great extent on the manner in 
which the targets present themselves to the attacking in- 
fantry. The difficulty of firing with high sights is somewhat 
of an obstacle, to be sure, but in this direction the tactician 
may expect great improvements before long. 

It is further laid down in the Firing Regulations that 
every shot may be expected to hit any target at 250 meters, 
a kneeling man at 350 meters, a kneeling file at 500 meters, 
and a standing file at 600 meters. This, in connection with 
the power of penetration and explosive effect of the bullet, 
both of which we have elucidated, seems to me to fix the lim- 
its (namely, 600 meters) to which it will ordinarily be possi- 
ble to approach. We should remember that the ballistic 
qualities of our model '88 rifle surpass those of the needle- 
gun three or four times in every respect, and that the zone 
of destructive fire extends now to 600 meters, while that 
of the needle-gun was 200 meters. 

The men are also expected to be proficient in estimat- 



Tactical Deductions. 303 

ing ranges up to 600 meters; greater stress is laid on the 
training in field firing, and the accuracy of the model '88 
rifle has also been greatly increased, all of which seems to 
indicate that the fire-action will ordinarily be restricted to 
between 600 and 300 meters. Surgical investigations and 
ballistic experiments with small-caliber rifles — all, without 
a single exception — lead to the same conclusion, which is 
confirmed in every particular by the smokeless powder. 

The Firing Regulations also say "that, looked at from 
the purely theoretical standpoint of ballistics, columns 
would be much more exposed at ranges greater than 1,000 
meters" (than UneB.— Author.). The Regulations do not draw 
that conclusion from the greater penetration of the bullet, 
but from the form of its trajectory, the angle of incidence, 
and from the dispersion. It would certainly be foolish to 
leave that question open in future and to say that these 
are peace experiments, are not results gained in war, and 
are of no, or of little, value. In 1870 the army did not have 
the benefit of all these private and official researches which 
we now have, and it is not to be expected that the authori- 
ties are making them known, and in the same breath 
renouncing their observance and consideration ; nor do they 
do so, as appears from the spirit of the Firing and Drill 
Regulations! Moreover, these things are not mere "peace\ 
experiments"; on the contrary, the researches with the 
new rifle made in a scientifically empirical way have con- 
firmed to a high degree what we experienced in 1870 at the 
hands of the Chassepot, without at the time recognizing the 
causes, or gaining a satisfactory insight into the true inward- 
ness of the ballistics of that rifle. It is thus the ground of 
war experience on which the present state of science, and 
consequently of tactics, has grown up ''post hdlum." This 
is the state of things! For the study of small-arm ballistics 



304 Inquiries into the Tactics of the Future. 

was not generally taken up until after 1870; it was based 
on the phenomena of that war, and the information thus 
gained has since been accruing to the benefit of tactics; it 
would be plain stupidity to possess information and to dis- 
regard it; it is on account of that very information that 
training, leading, and all scientific moral forces retain their 
value in applying the results of research to the tactics of 
the battle-field. 

If, on the one hand, experiments (Firing Regulations, 
Kegenspursky) ascertain that, at ranges greater than 1000 
meters, columns will be more exposed; and if, on the other 
hand (Bruns., etc.), the same bullet will pierce two or three 
ranks at a range of 1200 meters, we can but draw the con- 
clusion that, for this double reason, columns should not be 
used at smaller ranges than 1000 meters at any point where 
the enemy hjis a field of fire of that extent. Moreover, if the 
researches, on the one hand (FiringRegulations), teach that at 
600 meters every shot may be expected to hit a standing 
file, and if, on the other hand (Bruns., etc.), it is shown that at 
ranges of 300 to 400 meters the same bullet will penetrate 
3 to 4 ranks, and that at about 300 meters the wounds begin 
to be very severe, we may conclude from both conditions that 
coluransare inapplicable at these rangesbecause trebling and 
quadrupling the losses. No data are available in this respect 
for ranges between 600 and 1000 meters, but it is safe to 
assume that they are similar, and that movements of columns 
and closed lines are things of the past at all ranges, and the 
better we take that to heart the less will be our disappoint- 
ment. Within 1200 meters but one formation remains ap- 
propriate for movement, the single-rank, ojien lines; and it 
should also be the endeavor not to incur the disadvantages 
of the open column, since open lines, unless they fol- 
low each other opposite the intervals, are in fact nothing 



Tactical Deductions. 305 

but open columns with a considerable distance between 
ranks. It is not expected that these things can be done in 
war just as is demanded here; but every officer should be 
fully informed about them before going to war, and then 
he will at least try to help himself with sensible means as 
best he can. All difficulties cannot be removed in this way, 
nor should the military man strive for that, as it would no 
longer be war, but a mechanical arrangement governed by 
Regulations. 

V. Of the Extent of Ground in Battle, of Control, and of the 

"Treffen." 

No maxim established by experience is so much sinned 
against in peace as that applying to the extent of front of the 
various units. The peace exercises with units of compara- 
tively low strength, and our detachment tactics assisted by 
the task system, minister to this evil, which, however, is 
common to all armies. This evil harbors grave dangers, since 
we do in war what we have practiced in peace, and if every 
leader, from that of the division down to that of the com- 
pany, were accustomed in time of peace to extend his front 
according to circumstances — i. e., ''at pleasure" — to use the 
terrain as he pleases in order to escape a frontal action by 
means of turning movements, overlapping and outflank- 
ing, we could not be certain that the prescribed limits of 
front would be observed in pitched battle, that the troops 
would be at the spot where the leader wants to have them. 
The resulting conditions would be much like those at Grave- 
lotte (right wing and center, etc.) — i. e., there would be no 
development of front. But, in the pitched battle, the allotted 
spaces are the only conspicuous bounded posts for all 
troop-leading of the higher and lower kind; they should be 
strictly maintained in order that tactics may not be at the 



306 Itiqtiiries into the Tactics of the Future. 

mercy of boundless license. It follows as a simple logically 
tactical and juditial sequence that in such an event no 
leader caji be held responsible for the accomplishment of 
his task. 

Task, space, ground, and strength of troops are closely 
connected — /. c, a battle order should invariably harmonize 
>Ni(h the three last i)oints; and leaders and troops should 
be practiced in lighting itfraight to the front within the 
assigned space, and in fully utilizing all existing cover. 
Lateral displacements may be made, but only within 
the limit of front of each unit, not within the space 
allotteil to the whole fon-e, or beyond. The evil resembles 
a disease; and the disease has si>rung from fear of the 
frontal action. We must relearn, in the lirst place, how to 
tight the frontal action with masses; which is impossible 
unless the proper extent of front is observed, as otherwise all 
tactical landmarks, as regards space, distribution of troops, 
and tlie direction within that space, are wiped out. 

The front of the brigade should never exceed 1400 
meters except under urgent necessity — i. e., when it is in- 
tended to outtlank the enemy or nuike a turning move- 
ment; and since we are here concerned only with the pitche<l 
battle, such cases will be exceptional. It is not necessary 
to sjHH'ify the maximum depth of the formation, because 
that depends chietly on the ground, which varies greatly. 
Assuming a maximum distance of 250 meters between the 
supporting lines, the average depth of the formation of a 
brigade will be about 1200 meters; under certain circum- 
stances it may be much less; all battle tactics have to 
reckon with that amount of front and depth. 

The modern task system leads to non-observance of the 
limits of front and depth; the troops are thrown into the 
fight in driblets, the tactical object is placed in jeopardy. 



Tactical Deductions. 307 

hence also the control of the action; the combination of 
these diHadvantagcH may render the task system fatal, and, 
in the absence of prompt readiness for action, the system 
may be instrumental in preventing the desired tactical bene- 
fit from being derived from the initiative of the subordinate 
leaders. It will not always be practicable to evade all dan- 
ger, but the most effective remedy no doubt \\c^ in the con- 
trol of brigade action. 

In the formation by wings the regiment has a front of 
700 meters, the battalion of 'ioO meters, 4 battalions being 
required from the beginning for the firing lines and sup- 
ports, and two in reserve. This nee<l not necessarily 
yxt BO, however; it is merely one of the possible cases, 
but may be recommended for all frontal actions. Circum- 
stances due to the ground, the object of the action, or 
the tactical object, may make a departure from the rule 
advisable, though it will probably be rare in serious frontal 
actions. A battalion may find it advisable to deploy at once 
an entire company as skirmishers covering its front, though 
it probably would ordinarily deploy a full platoon each from 
two or three companies; never from all four companif^, 
because, aside from other obje<;tions, the initiative of the 
subordinates, which up to the assault manifests itself chiefly 
in the skillful use of the ground, would thereby be consid- 
erably restricted, if not renderft<l wholly impossible. Two 
or three comi>anies will ordinarily be best, each company 
thus having a fighting front of 175 and 115 meters respect- 
ively. This space is somewhat large, but, for the sake of 
the initiative of the subordinate leaders, it is expressly 
insisted upon in the controlled system. With three com- 
panies we would have three open lines; the second and third 
lines would not be restricted as to distance Cmaximurn, 2.50 
metersj, nor as to formation (^open lines, small, closed, dou- 



308 Inquiries inio the Tactics of the Future. 

ble-rank column of files or soetions), nor as to pace (walk, 
double time, rushes, stoopinjx, creeping). In all of these 
things the subordinate leaders should be given full freedom 
and the bfittalion commaiidei*s should chiefly look to the 
observance of the allotted spaces and to the unity of action 
— not uniformity of means employed by their companies — 
and see that their companies do not transgress the limits 
assigned to the brigade. It is not necessary to state that 
there will be a limit even to these arrangements. 

The means to be adopted for maintaining unity of 
action and for gaining the object of the action will vary 
with the ground. How the 4th company of each battalio^n 
is to be employed, whether in open line or in two or three 
lines with full distances, depends on circumstances and 
the question as to where the company is needed. The 
same may be said of the battalions in reserve, for the employ- 
ment of which the tactical object is chiefly decisive. To give 
them the right start and to lead them is more difficult than 
under former tactics, but the steady forward movement is 
still characteristic of the attack; to be sure, not an uninter- 
rupted advance, as formerly, for the final assault, but by 
many stages, successively, as illustrated by the beautiful 
example of Colonel von Wechmar (see Kunz, "The Action 
of Nuits"). However difficult it may be to combine an 
early development of a strong firing line, sufficient freedom 
for the subordinate leaders in utilizing the terrain, the sub- 
jection of the enemy to fire along his entire front, unity 
of action within the limits of the allotted space, and the sup- 
port of the firing line from the rear by detachments suitably 
formed for delivering their fire and escaping that of the 
enemy (open line), still, this method would guarantee at 
least some degree of consideration for all these points. We 
thus would preserve the initiative of the subordinate lead- 



Tactical Deductions. 309 

ers and unity in the actual battle within the brigade; the 
control would lie with the sui>orior leaders up to the moment 
of the final rush, and would not pass to the subordinate 
leaders until then. 

I consider the mixing of platoons within the company, 
of comjianies within the battalion, and of battalions within 
the regiment, so self-evident and (to-day) so unimportant 
a matter that, although some attention must be paid to it, 
it can never be decisive. All men of the regiment should 
know how to fight within these limits, no matter where they 
stand or who commands them. In frontal actions it may 
happen that the brigades of one and perhaps of two divi- 
sions will have to fight on about the same ground; even then 
the mixing of several regiments should not interfere with 
unity of action. The chief consideration in every attack 
is a prompt development of the heaviest possible fire, or. 
in other words, the greater part of the unit should from 
the beginning be properly proportioned for that purpose, 
thrown into the fight, and kept in sufficient numerical 
strength for completing the action. To-day the firing line 
of the infantry is much in the same position as the first line 
of the cavalry. What the first line fails to accomj)lish 
will hardly be accomplished by the second or third; ITence 
the first line should be made as strong as possible; for 
the decision of the infantry action rests to-day to a cer- 
tain degree with the firing line; the stronger the latter, the 
better. Kifles not actively employed are useless; and the 
small-caliber rifle calls for a tactical use differing from 
that of the flintlock. 

The statement that it is wrong and impracticable to 
assign to a company a front of 175 or 115 meters, because 
it would not admit of observation and control by one man, 
may be met by the reply, that since the introduction of 



310 Inquiries into the Tactics of the Future. 

smokeless powder it does admit of sufficient observation, 
the ground also permitting, which was not the case for- 
merly. In that respect, therefore, the small-caliber rifle is 
instrumental in enlarging the extent of ground for suh- 
ordinate leading. As regards leading under fire, we should 
rather place our expectations too low than too high. Ac- 
cording to my war experience, the term "leading" is justified 
only for the group; in so far as the latter is to do what is best 
at the time. Every larger unit will naturally get beyond the 
pale of its leader; he has no influence beyond his immediate 
vicinity. Cooperation of groups is practicable only through 
the cooperation of their leaders with platoon leaders; coop- 
eration of the platoons is practicable only through cooper- 
ation of their leaders with the company leader; beyond 
which nothing is to be expected in the firing line. Every 
attack movement therefore requires in the first place effi- 
cient group and platoon leaders. It is not impossible that 
several platoons, abreast, may move together, if they have 
learned in peace how to do it and if front and direction are 
fixed for the particular case, which is not a difficult matter. 

I believe, however, that these tactics will make it nec- 
essary to increase the extent of ground allowed for a bri- 
gade, and I have therefore assumed a front of 1400 meters, 
and that the ground allowed to a division will be somewhat 
diminished, while that of the army corps will remain as 
it now is — i. e., 1400, 2100, 4000 meters. It is simply due to 
the absolute necessity of fighting in deep formation, to the 
great losses of the firing line, and to the endeavor to pre- 
serve the strongest possible frontal firing line. 

How many of their own men did the company com- 
manders have with them at the final rush on Froschweiler, 
St. Privat, Loigny, notwithstanding the tactics then pre- 
vailing? Perhaps 10 or 12! All the rest belonged to other 



Tactical Deductions. 311 

companies. Why should we strive for something which 
exi)erienee has proven to be impracticable? Cohesion and 
cooperation are two different things. Organization by divi- 
sion, brigade, regiment, battalion, and company is needed 
for the deployment and forming for action; for the actual 
conflict we only need groups that can be led. They are 
restricted to the space of the regiment; their unit is the 
regiment; no formalities are required for closing them 
together, the sole consideration being the faculty to gain 
and exert suflScient power for the assault. This is regu- 
lated by the distribution of the leaders; the soldier obeys 
the nearest leader, no matter whether he knows him or not. 

It is not necessary to point out the difficulty of preserv- 
ing unity of action, because every case will require a 
particular method. The difficulty and difference lie chiefly 
in the variety of ground of a battle-field, and here lies 
the strongest objection to the so-called "normal attack." It 
will indeed be the exception when the leaders have acquired 
sufficient information of the ground, about to be entered 
upon by their units, by personal observations; still the infor- 
mation will enable the leaders to form a general idea and to 
give sufficiently clear orders to their subordinates. The 
enemy's action also increases the difficulties of unity of 
action, for it may bring surprises, as the conformation of the 
ground on which the action is to be fought sometimes does. 
The "finer work" in preserving unity of action therefore rests 
on the leaders of all grades below the brigade commander. 

We are thus using a combination of the task system 
and of the unity-of-action system and fixing the maximum 
limits alone, in order to have the conditions requisite for 
the initiative within a space which is still quite considera- 
ble. Between the mere ditch and the steeply sloping hill, 
between the hedge and the dense wood, there may be a great 



312 Inquiries into the Tactics of the Future. 

variance that will naturally affect the advance. The differ- 
ences of elevation may be very great and the heights may be 
near together or far apart; obstacles and concealment of the 
most various kinds and unknown to the brigade com- 
mander will be found on the ground, and yet under the 
unity-of -action system it is one of the foremost duties of the 
initiative of the subordinate leaders to seize and utilize 
them. The formations for the movement which are to 
secure unity of action will therefore vary greatly, and in 
that respect absolute freedom should be conceded to the tac- 
tical judgment of the subordinate leaders. It is immate- 
rial whether it will look well and whether it will result in 
a precise geometrical figure or not, so long as the irregular- 
ity of formation is adapted to the momentary tactical im- 
portance of the terrain, I use the term "momentary" inten- 
tionally, in order to make it understood, that for the various, 
sometimes very prolonged moments, corresponding meas- 
ures are required from the same troops. Every tactician 
should ask himself, in the first place: Can I see? — i. e., see 
a piece of ground as it ought to be seen by the tactician. A 
clever critic once characterized the art of painting of some 
great nation as defective, because the nation no longer knew 
how to see. The antagonism against unity of action springs 
perhaps from the fact that the terrain is too much looked 
upon as uniform and its level parts only are considered. 

But the unity-of-action system should never go so far 
as to demand uniformity of formation. According to my 
observation, this uniformity has been developed by the 
task system to a degree that is inharmonious and was not 
contemplated by its former advocates, of which I am one. 
There are no definite prescriptions laid down; it is perhaps 
for that very reason that a normal svstem has been formu- 



Tactical Deductions. 313 

lated. I conclude therefrom that the subordinates are either 
not conceded the freedom required in the skirmish fight of 
masses, or that they do not know how to use it. Tac- 
tical individualization of the men is not suflScient; indi- 
vidualization of the leaders, particularly of the subordinate 
leaders, should be more cultivated than heretofore. It is 
^Iso clear that when the brigade is formed by wings, as laid 
down in the Regulations, the wing should in turn be given 
that tactical freedom within the suggested maximum limits 
of space which the circumstances demand; never, however, 
neglecting to strive for the best cooperation permitted by the 
terrain. The movement will therefore take place in many 
different forms. 

I am aware that my ideas on the extent of front will 
provoke a dispute, since therein lie-s the germ of everything 
that is of importance for the infantry attack. Some will 
say that the front is too extended and will reject the result- 
ing "thin" skirmish line; the advantages and disadvan- 
tages of "thin" and "thick" skirmish lines will be further dis- 
cussed; some will say that my suggestion promotes the mix- 
ing of units and that the celebrated "closing together" (Zu- 
sammenschliessen) is impracticable. I reply: That is theory 
grown gray, and I appeal to the judgment of men with war 
experience who have witnessed stubborn fire-actions. 

In carrying out the action — i. e., in all stages from the 
opening of fire to the final rush — none but line formations 
are practicable, except in case of the reserve: there we do 
not reckon either with platoons, companies, or battalions; 
knowing that mixing of units is unavoidable, we should from 
the first make every preparation for fighting with mixed 
units, and by carrying this rule to its logical conclusion we 
shall learn how to control the disorder when everything is 
intermingled. This is the character of the horde system. 

21 



314 Inquiries into the Tactics of the Future. 

It calls, in the first place, for space — space for keeping the 
enemy's front busy and for concealment of the lines in 
rear; space for the freedom of subordinate leaders in utiliz- 
ing the ground; space for passing from a'^thin" to the ''thick" 
skirmish line; in one word, for bringing up the supports 
before the final rush to the principal firing point. 

This is best accomplished by using from the first de- 
ployed companies abreast of each other. To permit proper 
freedom in the attack, the companies should from the begin- 
ning have that extent of front which is assigned them in 
the subdivision of the brigade space. After that, we may 
take up the consideration of initiative in the method of 
advancing (creeping, rushing, double time, accelerated pace) 
and of the use of the ground; space is the prerequisite for 
the indispensable freedom of the subordinate leaders. If a 
different method be adopted or the front be diminished, the 
use of the ground will under certain circumstances be 
reduced to zero. How could utilization of the ground be 
expected, if there were no room for permissible lateral dis- 
placements? I have conceded that a company deployed as 
skirmishers cannot be controlled by one man. But all men 
and all leaders may be assigned a preliminary objective of 
attack toward which to w^ork. The idea of having the skir- 
mishers advance in a well-dressed line should be scouted. 
To enable the subordinate leaders to utilize the ground and 
the situation, there must be a difference of level in every line 
throughout the depth of the brigade; and some portions of it 
will be able to advance more rapidly than others. Nor will 
it be possible for one man to lead a whole platoon as by a 
string; its front is too extended for that; but it may be done 
with groups of not exceeding ten men, particularly when it 
is practiced rigorously in time of peace and when the leaders, 
from that of the company down to that of the group, keep 



Tactical Deductions. 3 1 5 

up some alignment on each other — like markers, as it were. 
More than this cannot be implied in the term "controlled" 
advance. It is necessary, however, that in peace exercises 
the flanks of the brigade be conspicuously marked. 

The same freedom which I claim for the first (open) line 
must likewise be conceded to every line in rear. The latter 
may find it proper to change from the open line when cir- 
cumstances make it advisable. Within certain limits it 
should also be permissible to accelerate the movement tem- 
porarily and to make the line denser in order to quicklj^ seize 
favorable points in front, without regard to the alignment of 
the whole line; I am convinced that every maneuver offers 
opportunities for demonstrating the practicability of this 
method of attack. 

Assuming the front of a brigade formed by wings (i. e., 
the two regiments side by side. — Tr.) as 1400 meters in round 
numbers, and limiting the maximum distances between lines 
to 250 meters, the depth of the formation would be 750 
meters. Adding to this 600 meters as the distance from the 
enem}', the total depth of ground would be 1350 meters, 
which is not too great for the brigade commander to keep 
under observation. 

Again, we should have the right idea of the so-called 
leading on the ijart of subordinate leaders. What we see 
in time of peace will in most cases be found impracticable in 
war. When black powder was in use, it sometimes hap- 
pened that the influence of the subordinate leaders was re- 
stricted to the men in their immediate neighborhood; smoke- 
less powder has brought an improvement in that respect, 
but the best guarantee for the leading is not to be found in 
the mechanical delimitation of the distances; it rests in the 
tactical education and training of the subordinate leaders 
and of the men ; and particularly in a courageous though pru- 



310 Inquiries into the Tactics of the Future. 

dent advaiu'o with strict imitual attonlion of loaders and 
men. In the fii'st place, (he develoinnont of stronj*- skir- 
mish lines from the start makes it possible to lake the 
defender's entire front under fire, and not only will the 
assailant ])roduce a jjreater elTect from the bejiinninj;-, but 
when companies and battalions become mixed, a certain 
degree of evenness in the distribution of the leaders along 
the entire firinjij line can be arranjjjed from the rear. With- 
out such a. distribution of the leaders — not according to 
units, to which they belong, but according to tactical require- 
ments — no superiority of fire will ever be gained. We can- 
not dispense witli this disposition of the subordinate lead- 
ers, and it cannot be arranged except from the rear and with 
the help of an advance of fresh troops. 

The ease will indeed be rare when all four brigades of 
the army corps will be ranged side by side with a front of 
1400 meters for each. These limits become somewhat dimin- 
ished inasmuch as the divisional command becomes to a 
certain degree a regulator within the army corps. As a 
general rule, 2100 meters would be assumed for the division, 
including its artillery; on the flanks the front will probably 
become extended, but we cannot give figures here; the force 
of circumstances decides all that; but the extension of the 
front should be a limited one, and an army corps should not 
occupy more than 4000 meters. 

In fixing the space for it, a company is assumed 
to number 200 rifles in round numbers. It will thus find 
numy o]>portunities for exercising a freedom in the use 
of ground, but above all, the relatively large front makes 
it possible for the supports to follow opposite the gaps 
Avhere they are later on to come into action; this is very 
important. 

We recommend 250 meters as the maximum distance 



Tactical Deductions. 317 

for the 8uj>porting lines; it may be possible, however, to 
shorten the distance, which would be the duty of the leaders 
of the lines, and to relinquish the sinj^le-rank, o[>en line, 
where the ground permits. Kince the distances for close- 
range fire between the opponents has become much greater, 
and lies ordinarily between 000 and 300 meters, and since, on 
the other hand, the firing line has derived increased powers 
of resistance from the improvements of arms and the greater 
effcH:t of artillery, the maximum limit of 250 meters can- 
not endanger the promptness of SJipport from the lines in 
rear. Good troops are not going to run when a counter- 
attack develops; by the time the counter-attack does take 
place, we may be sure the foremost supporting lines will be 
up before the distance between the hostile yjarties has been 
r(:^luced to 300 meters; in most cases the second line of sup- 
ports would arrive in good time, and sometimes the third. 

The real difficulties begin at GOO meters from the ene- 
my's skirmish line. The principal work will then have to 
be left to the subordinate leaders, the superior leaders at- 
tending chiefly to the employment of the reserve. The lat- 
ter may be held as far as .oOO meters in rear of the rearmost 
line of supports. In the course of the action it may be 
brought up closer, but only by order of the brigade com- 
mander, and when advancing to the decisive assault it 
should traverse the distance witiiout halt and in suita- 
ble formation, as did Htarkloff's Wiirtemberg Brigade at 
Froschweiler. 

The demand for such development is basf^d on three 
grounds: 1, in order to have the enemy's entire front under 
fire from the beginning; 2, in order to fix the direction of the 
attack beyond doubt; 3, in order to bring up supports, insert 
them in the front, and redistributethe leaders in thf-most nat- 
ural way. which will, as a rule, be straight to the front. The 



318 Inquiries into the Tactics of the Future. 

open formation and great distances are necessary on account 
of the low trajector}^ and great penetration of the bullets. 
It may not always be possible to prevent two men from being 
directly in rear of each other somewhere in the space of 1350 
meters, but in most places there will be but one man as a tar- 
get. - On large battle-fields and within the depth of formation 
assumed, much cover will befound that will have to be utilized, 
although it will not guard the lines in rear from all loss; but 
who would expect that? This fighting with great depth of 
formation has the further great advantage, that the indi- 
vidual lines may be developed for action, undisturbed, be- 
yond the great danger zone and in the order best suited for 
their subsequent employment. No other method permits 
of this, least of all the ravine theory. Unless the fire-front 
is from the beginning equal in extent to that of the enemy, 
a successful opening of fire and promoting it to superior- 
ity of fire are impossible. These reasons combined call 
imperatively for a full development of front from the begin- 
ning. This method, moreover, safeguards to the brigade 
commander an indispensable control in action without 
depriving the subordinate leaders of the freedom to take 
their detachments farther to the front under certain circum- 
stances — i. e., without depriving them of their initiative. 
It is unavoidable that the firing line when halted should 
be more open in some places than in others, but by no other 
means than those stated can the entire front of the enemy be 
continuously and early brought under fire. The single-rank, 
open line is therefore to be the formation for movement as 
well as for fire, whenever other forms are inapplicable. 
Unity of action would thus be preserved, and it should be 
preserved, at least until the several subordinate leaders 
make their initiative more and more felt from the first firing- 
X»oint, which will ordinarily be 600 meters from the enemv, 



Tactical Deductions. Bid 

and until the brigade commander in turn makes preparation 
for the decisive moment by correctly timing the advance of 
the reserve. 

It is not to be denied that advancing in such open lines 
has its disadvantages, but thej may be minimized by mak- 
ing the swarms within each platoon as small as possible, not 
to exceed 10 men, and by training subordinate leaders and 
men to advance straight to the front without stop, so as to 
preserve the general direction by means of unremitting 
attention and mutual intelligent cooperation. The further 
disadvantage of the mixing of units of different battalions 
(reserve included) should not deter us. It may be somewhat 
diminished by a suitable deployment, depending on circum- 
stances, but beyond that the men of the same regiment should 
have lio difficulty in fighting although completely mixed from 
the first firing-station to the princii)al station. Every man 
is to obey the nearest leader ; these leaders are not restricted 
to certain places or troops; they should distribute themselves 
around, should mutually observe one another, and see to it 
that the thread between the men and their leaders does not 
break. Such training will moreover lay the foundation for 
the subsequently indispensable spontaneous action of the 
subordinate leaders. 

There would be some danger in this method of advanc- 
ing over long distances, if the advance were made by rushes. 
The number of skulkers — i. e., of rifles lost — might become 
considerable; hence it is sound to remain as long in motion 
as possible, and not to make the first halt farther than 600 
meters from the enemy as a rule. 

What has been stated suffices to show that the pre- 
ponderance gained by the defense from a previously occu- 
pied, selected, and specially prepared position vindicates 
Clausewitz, who has been subject to much attack on that 



320 Inquiries into the Tactics of the Future. 

point. It is nevertheless necessary to add the tactical fo 
the strategical offensive in order to conquer the enemy. 

"An attack pushed home with determination will 
always succeed," say the Regulations. 

This cannot mean the attacks of single isolated com- 
panies and battalions under favorable circumstances; such, 
for instance, as covered approach as far as the enemy's 
position or concealment by fog, II. and F.— 57th at La 
Garionni^re January 7, 1871; I., II. — 57th at Reaune on 
the afternoon of November 28th; II. — 56th at La Tuil^rie 
on the evening,* or the numerous attacks on advanced posts; 
the context indicates that the attack of large units — i. e., 
of brigades — in the pitched battle is meant. In that case 
control is all the more necessary, because without it an 
attack cannot be "carried forward with determination." 
Since we were unacquainted with any "suitable method of 
control" in 1870-71, many attacks failed (Worth, front; 
Mance ravine). 

At Spicheren the attack was carried to the enemy's 

line at several points by companies and platoons, which 

were fighting a kind of soldiers' battle; they labored for 

hours through the cut-up ground with great perseverance 

and disregard, and gained the victory by their superior 

morale. Nor is this controverted by General Francois' 

attack, because, after it once started, it also degenerated 

gradually into a soldiers' battle, the general succeeding in 

getting but one battalion to the spot where he wanted his 

whole brigade. We might also quote some very fine attacks 

of fresh brigades in the pitched battle; for instance, the 

attack of Starkloff's Wiirtemburg Brigade on Froschweiler 

♦The prevailing account of the capture of La Tuil^rie is 
Incorrect. The position was actually captured by 3d and 4th — 17th. 
It was only after its capture that Captain Montbard arrived with 
II. — 56th and informed the leaders of 3d and 4th — 17th. First Lieu- 
tenant Casimir and Captain von Reichenau, that "his orders were 
to relieve these troops." 



Tactical Deductions. 321 

(Worth, August Gth), that of the 33d Brigade on Loigny, etc. 
(December 2, 1870), and of the Saxons against Ste. Marie and 
St. Privat (north) on the 18th of August. Here also belongs 
the attack of the 3d Division on the second day of Villiers, of 
the 38th Brigade at Mars-la-Tour, and that of Colonel von 
Wechmar at Nuits. 

The statement is therefore fully justified, since any 
troops may be called on for such service; hence the will to 
close with the enemy should be developed in every indi- 
vidual soldier by peace training, and the same thing is nec- 
essary for various onslaughts in the course of a battle. 
Wherever the attack succeeded, the brigades had developed 
their full fronts from the beginning (Worth, XI. Army 
Corps, Starkloff's Brigade; Ste. Marie, St. Privat (north), 
Loignj). Wherever the attack failed the ravine theory 
(VIII., VII., II. Army Corps) prevented deployment or the 
troops were employed on the modern task system (IX. 
Corps). It may be assumed that in future as many attacks 
will be unsuccessful as have been in the past; hence the fol- 
lowing should also be demanded: ''When the attack fails 
to reach the enemy at once, it is the duty of leaders and 
men to hold the ground gained, and as long as the troops 
have ammunition they should, in such situations, success- 
fully repulse the enemy's attacks." Unless the attack is 
made contrary to tactical requirements as regards time, 
objective, and strength, the foregoing may justly be required 
of all troops, as illustrated by many of the examples 
from 1870. 

In Sections 96 and 130, Part I. of the Reprint of 1889,* 
it is stated that at ranges of 900 and 1000 meters fire may be 
opened on columns and on artillery; and in Section 130: 
"At long distances it may happen that the objective will be 

♦Infantry Drill Regulations. — Translator. 



322 I iKiiiirIrs liilo llir Tdclics of llic Fill lire. 

viHibIc oiilv by Hie use of ^liisscs, .-uhI not ;il :ill lo (he skir- 
luislicrs lliciiisclves. TIm' IjiI(<m' slioiild in lli:il case be 
(Urcch'd (() :iini ;i( ccrlMin points of llio lerriiin." 

II is riiiMicr sI;i((mI in SccHon i:>."{: "In liu' conrsc of 
the ju'lion a. lull diicclion of (he lire will fr('(iiH'nll.v be iin- 
poHsiblc. To mcol (iuil condUion skinnislicrs should have 
i\w I'ulc iuiprcsscd <vii (Iumu in their jmsk'c Ifjiininjjj, (hat in 
tlu» absence of lire (liicclion ail objecis williin (JOO inelers 
iiui.v be (ired a(, belvveen (»()() and 1000 nu'leis only hij^h and 
broa.d larj^els, and thai, as a rule, lirin<; beyond 1000 nielers 
is in'oliibitod." 

The nolions of close ran<jjes have been much modified of 
lale. Willi the needle-}»un shoi-l ranjje was 250 paces; with 
the Mauser 71, 84 — 400 meters; and wilh I he rille model 
'88 — as wilh all sniall-calibei- rilles il is (JOO melers. None 
will deny the (>tTects of lon^- i'an};-e lire; on the other ha.nd, 
every (Uie will be fully juslilied in ever ])ointin}i lo the dis- 
a.dvanta.}?es of lonj;' ranj^c lire (over 1000 melers), which «'on- 
sist in this, that the visual ])ower is too small lo ]>ermit ^ood 
aim, and that the lonfi-ranjic lire, parlicniarly wilh the mod- 
ern multiloaxhM-, ^^^ll lead to waste of ammunition; a}j;ainst 
the latlel" none of the nice expedients ado])te<l in peace is 
of avail. In connection with the flattcM' trajectoi*y it nuiy 
Im' mentioned that th<> swejd /one is diminished if the eleva- 
tion of tlu^ lirer and that of the !j:round he is lo sweeji is not 
the same.* 

On tluil account it is i^erfectly correct foi- tlu' lvep;ula- 
tiona to prescribe "that in the course of the action a. full 
direction of tlu» flro will frequently be imi)ossiblo, and that 
the soldi(M' is not to fire over 1000 meters." 

The conlroversv over lou<;:-ran}j:e and shoi-t ran<j;e fire, 



•For details, see "Lottrcs d'un cavalier," FobruaiT. March, 
April. 1893, of the Ifvnie de Oarahrh: 



Tactical Deductions. ':i23 

hovvovep, will nevor ccMm, nor will theomploymerit of oitluT 
rrif^Uiod of firo. Mijr;b rnij^lit bo jHlvancofl /vro anr] on. In 
conKorjur-ncf; of u\y itxpcrutnci'M in war I am an advfx;ato of 
Hhort-raiige fire, and there are i>robably not many who have 
had more experience in uetion. In the ca«e of well-trained 
and wr-ll-diHoipline<l troopH I would invariably — and 7>ar- 
ticularly on the df-fennive — decide for whort-range fire; an 
opponent who Ih compelled to retreat under Hhort-range fire 
iH no longer to be feared. It in Hnre death for him. I ha/1 
to undergo that trial niynelf. Jf any one were to Heek for an 
InHtance of Hhor-t-range fire, he conid find a perfect type at 
lieaune la Kolande,* and I doubt whether the Imperial 
French v\rmy could hIiow anything HUperior in the way of 
long range fire. Today troopH Hhould be able to fight and 
to fire in all zones of fire. Any one who will reflect and 
aHcertain by actual trial what it meanH to deHignate certain 
pointH in the terrain will find, in 90 caw^ out of 100, that 
unlcHH thewe pointH in the terrain are farmnteads or Home- 
thing Himilar, they cannot be found or Huccewnfully taken 
under fire. 

The cauH^j of the ob.stinacy obHervable on both Hides in 
all actions in 1870-71 lay in the method of fighting, itself 
the rcHult of improved fire-armH, and no material change in 
this renpect will result from nmokeleHH powder and nmall- 
caliber armH. An attack can no longer be made as formerly 
by flinging the brigades into the fight in order to rapidly 
win the deciHion at the point of the bayonet. The small- 
caliber rifles make swarm tactics with nkirmish fire the uni- 
versal method of fighting. The proficiency of the indi- 
vidual soldier in skinriishing thus gains in imy»ortance and 
the course of a battle will consist of a series of swarm 



•Compare H?>nlg'8 "The National War on the Loire," II , Chap 
ter V. 



324 Inquiries into the Tactics of the Future. 

attacks more frequently than in 1870-71. On that account 
the control of the action should firmly rest in the hand of 
the brigade commander. These attacks admit of ready 
explanation. Both opponents fire at each other; the one 
believing himself in the superiority advances, and either 
succeeds or fails. In the former case the repulsed party 
redoubles its efiforts, for that onslaught is not decisive; it 
merely confers a tactical advantage. When the repulsed 
party feels itself strong enough to push the enemy back, it 
advances and perhaps drives the opposing swarms back. 
The latter fall back until assisted, either by the ground or 
by troops in rear, or by both, to put a stop to the enemy's suc- 
cessful onslaught. The enemy is now brought to a stop at 
least; sometimes he may face about, for he will not always 
be able to hold out under greatly superior fire. At that 
moment the party which so far has been driven back re- 
sumes the offensive and regains the tactical superiority. 
This is the course of the modern action, this is the "surg- 
ing to and fro,'' which is so apt to confuse the heads of those 
who have never beheld it. The number of such rushes made 
on either side may vary greatly, and will depend chiefly on 
the use made of the troops in rear and on how frequently the 
swarm line gains new strength from the accession of fresh 
troops. Hence the importance of the disposition of the rear- 
ward lines, their distance, number, and employment, and the 
necessity of great care in dividing them, holding them in read- 
iness, and bringing them to the front. That problem cannot 
be eliminated by smokeless powder, but it may be modified, 
and in manj' cases it may be made more difficult. The 
future action will be a skirmish fight consisting of rushes; it 
will show a certain variableness, acontinuousdisplacementof 
the opposing lines, and the variableness will be characterized 
by great persistence, it has its cause in human nature, 



Tactical Deductions. 325 

which is excited by the fire so that men feel inclined to with- 
draw themselves from its effect. There will ever be cases 
where a strong and determined rush will secure permanent 
possession of the captured position from the beginning to 
the end of the battle and against which the enemy's attacks 
are shattered; but, as a rule, the decision will be brought 
about gradually by a number of rushes, by gain and loss of 
ground, and that side will be best assured of success which 
provides a superiority of force for these rushes. The supe- 
rior leader alone can see, observe, judge, and calculate all 
this. This character of the action will not be denied, how- 
ever unsympathetic it may be to some, and if we keep it 
before our mind, we shall make few or no mistakes in the 
choice of our tactical means. This fighting method, insep- 
arable as it is from the small-caliber rifle, should not be 
inveighed against because it "is not decisive," is "difficult 
to watch," and "still more difficult to control." To be sure, 
the rush of a swarm decides nothing, but what enormous 
fighting power did we not repeatedly observe in swarms of 
skirmishers, which, though for six or eight hours engaged 
in the materially and morally destructive fire action of high- 
est tension, yet ultimately rushed the key of the enemy's 
position! Where has there ever been in tactics such a 
fighting power! These are some additional reasons why I 
remain opposed to any normal attack! 

In connection with the character of the conflict and its 
duration I wish to recur to the question of ammunition. 
The more rapidly the man fires, the more quickly will he 
expend his ammunition. This rapid fire, which has been 
reintroduced by the Reprint of 1889 in place of maga- 
zine fire, disturbs me, and, in view of the properties of the 
modern rifie, I deem it necessary to definitely discard it. 
That word should not be given space in the Regulations; on 



326 Inquiries into the Tactics of the Future. 

the contrary, on every page we should find the words ^'econo- 
mize your fire." When the man is trained in rapid firing, 
there is danger of his making freer use of it than if he had 
never known it. Rapid fire was proper with a rifle where 
the time for accurate firing was limited to about one minute ; 
but to-day, when the fire is such that its accuracy is perma- 
nent within 600 meters it does more harm than good, be- 
cause leading to a waste of ammunition. Experience has 
moreover taught me that the greater the danger, the more 
unsteady will the soldier become and the more rapid his fire. 
Why then have rapid fire laid down in the Regulations? 
Instead of rapidity of fire, I want economy of fire. 

A few words about 'Tre^m." In discussing the execution 
of the combat I have declared myself against their retention 
and mentioned open lines alone in that connection. Still we 
cannot dispense with '^Trejfen'^ for the deployment, for form- 
ing for attack, and in all tactical problems where a surprise, 
a sudden attack under cover of fog, of favorable ground, and 
of darkness is contemplated. We should therefore know 
how to move in "Treffcn'^ and, if necessary, to fight in them. 
On level ground 1200 meters from the enemy the swai*m 
should be the usual and only formation of the "Treffen,'^ 
though, depending on circumstances of terrain and battle, 
line and column may also be used. This matter and the 
distances between lines are the most important questions 
and have therefore been thoroughly discussed. Maximum 
distances and maximum fronts alone should be laid down; 
never normal distances and normal fronts. 

Any fear lest the rearward lines be too late for the 
attack or for the rescue in case of defeat should be obviated 
by a strong firing line; the distances are not so much deter- 
mined by the element of time as by the range and flat tra- 
jectory of the rifle. At the time when the latter had the 



Tactical Deductions. 327 

same effect at 200 meters that they now have at 600 metere^ 
the lines were ranged at correspondingly closer distances. 
It follows logically that to-day they should follow farther 
apart. 

As regards number and strength of the lines, it may be 
stated that they should be so constituted as to be able (a) to 
gain the superiority of fire at the range of about 600 to 
300 meters, and, (h) reinforced by fresh troops, to deliver 
their blow, which owing to the considerable distance, is 
likely to take the form of a threat rather than of actual 
assault. Here lies the problem in the assault. It will, as 
a rule, be impossible for the firing line to aj)proach closer; 
and, on the other hand, muscles and lungs are unequal to 
crossing the space in one rush; hence the position will be 
found evaluated by the enemy and the act of its capture 
will merely consist in stepping into it. In this connection I 
would again refer to Elsasshansen and Froschweiler, as 
instructive examples, and also in part to St. Privat. They 
may be taken as types for the future in so far as we may 
speak of types. 

VI. Of the Defense. 

There is a saying that troops who know how to attack 
will also defend themselves well. This is confirmed in many 
respects by history; but it does not show many instances 
where troops good in defense w^ere also good in attack. For 
this reason our previous expositions have treated of the 
attack alone, but it seems necessary to me to point out some 
features as regards leading, which will inure to the benefit 
of the defense more than heretofore. 

In the first place, in regard to the leading of armies, it is 
quite likely that in future several armies simultaneously 
operating on difierent theaters will have to accomplish dif- 



328 Inquiries info the Tactics of the Future. 

ferent objects. Situations may ociiir whero tho temporary 
and permanent strategic and tactical defensive r61e may 
have to be assumed. In the war against the republic in 
1870 the Germans took the strategic and tactical offensive 
within certain limits: yet thei*e were two cases where the 
armies were forced on the strategic and tactical defensive, 
and fought resolutely in both. 

I mean the II. Army with the Army Detachment (army 
of the Grand Duke of IMecklenburg. — Tr.) on the Loire at 
the end of November 1870, and Werder on the Lisaine in the 
middle of January, as his corps is to be considered an army 
for our purposes. 

In both cases the defender passed subsequently to the 
strategical and tactical offensive in the sense of combined 
operations of two armies; and notwithstanding certain errors 
in the execution, the defender successfully solved on each of 
two theaters, and in widely different ways, a problem which 
is rightly considered most difficult, and in each case with 
great results, in one case even destroying the hostile army. 

I believe that such things will recur in a more marked 
degree; I believe that the war of the future will closely 
approach the "position war" with all its peculiarities and 
drawbacks. To this we have to reconcile ourselves, whether 
we are pleased or not; for it lies in the nature of future 
war, in consequence of the remai'kable rdle which technique 
— and under that heading the improved arms are to be 
classed — is destined to play. Hence both the general and 
his troops should be familiar with all means of defense. 

Cases are likely to happen where the general, though 
recognizing the general direction of the operations (end of 
November, 1870), will have great difficulty in ascertaining 
Xiromptly where the attacker's main body is and where the 
attacker means to deliver his main blow. There is but one 



Tactical Deductions. 329 

means for meeting him prompth' — namely, concentration 
and prepared positions on the line of the probable direction 
of the operations. The II. Ar-my recognized the latter some- 
what late, prompt but insufficient measures were taken jfor 
concentration, and nothing whatever was done to make 
a good selection for the jjrobable battle-ground and to 
strengthen the same promptly. 

General von Werder, although rather taken unawares 
by the enemy's operations, suceeded in concentrating every- 
thing for the defense, in promj)tly occupying the position 
(selection of the battle-fieldj, and in preparing the same in 
so far as permitted by the xavy troublesome winter season. 

It certaiul}' would have been in keeping with both these 
defensive tasks to devote particular attention to the left 
flank on the Loire and to the right flank on the Lisaine; it 
was neglected in both cases, though the strategic situation 
plainly showed the necessity therefor. It follows that cor- 
rect strategical understanding is requisite for the selection 
of the space and of the points within that space where the 
defender means to accept battle — i. e., strategic laws deter- 
mine the selection of the ground and the extent of the posi- 
tion (product of trooi)S and distance). 

The leader of the army will also be cognizant of the 
line to the rear of which he must not permit the operations 
to pass. That line depends on the object to be covered by 
his operations and on the distance of his general line of 
reconnaissance from that of the enemy, who may withdrav? 
his line sooner or later. A proper selection of the position 
should not, as a rule, be difficult, provided the connection of 
the strategy in the particular case with the general situation 
is properly understood; it will thus be possible to determine 
in a general way the points where works should be promptly 
planned and constructed. 



330 Inquiries into the Tactics of the Future. 

The worst thing, for instance, that could have happened 
to General von Werder was to be pushed back in the angle 
Belfort — Switzerland. That strategic consideration should 
have overruled all others; hence the right flank should have 
been made strongest and the reserve should have been 
posted as near it as possible. 

The worst thing that could have happened to the X. 
Corps at Beaune was to be cut off from the II. Army 
and to be pushed in a northeasterly direction. The 
maintenance of the touch with the II. Army should have 
been the decisive consideration in the selection and forti- 
fication of the position, and hence the right wing should 
have been made specially strong. These are but two situa- 
tions, but the defender will, as a rule, be able to determine 
the point where he means to meet the attacker long in ad- 
vance, and to begin the preparation of the position accord- 
ing to strategic considerations alone. The rest — the com- 
pletion of the position — can be done later. It is not neces- 
sary to construct a regular fortress; it is only necessary 
to securely hold important points with small numbers, in 
order to have sufficient forces available for other points 
and objects which might be of an offensive character. In 
most cases it will be possible to have a skeleton promptly 
designed and constructed which in itself may confer a tacti- 
cal advantage, as at Gravelotte and on the Lisaine. 

In order to promptly reach the position (occupation of 
the position and setting apart a force for other service), the 
troops should be kept assembled at their stations, which 
may be done without danger if the cavalry, in combination 
with other arms attached to it, reconnoiters and guards the 
front and flanks. 

To enable him to see ahead and to follow the events 
from their beginning, the defender should be especially 



Tactical Deductions. 331 

strong in enterprising and suitably armed cavalry with artil- 
lefy. Without it any defensive undertaking will in future 
be highly jeopardized. 

It is therefore the function of the army leader to deter- 
mine the general outline of the position. He is best in> 
formed, has familiarized himself with the task before him, 
is best able to fix upon the points of support on which the 
framework is to be erected, but he should know the ground 
not merely from the map, but from inspection. The lat- 
ter may not always be possible. As the matter passes from 
the army commander to his inferiors of the several grades, 
the details of construction gain more and more in precision, 
dependent on subsequent information received; the road 
leads from the whole to the details, from large considera- 
tions to smaller ones. 

It follows that the authorities of the various grades and 
arms, particularly the officers charged with the trace of 
the works, should have a full understanding of the strat- 
egic aspect of the problem— t. e., that they should be aware 
of the object and grasp it in all its details; and that 
within the outlines determined by the superiors all tac- 
tical advantages should be turned into account. Barring 
some exceptions, marked feats in both of the foregoing 
respects have been rare, but instead of complaining and 
instead of anticipating nothing better in future, the insep- 
arability of strategy and tactics should be kept in mind, 
which, considered from the ideal point of view, blend on the 
battle-field (position) in every essential aspect. When we 
are accustomed thus to think, to reflect, to observe, then the 
works will rarely be constructed at the wrong points and 
the prejudice against them will vanish because no one can 
deny their effect. We had not learned to think thus; imag- 
ination was lacking; the fault was that the education of the 
young does not address itself to the nerve of all intelligent 



332 Inquiries into the Tactics of the Future. 

mental work; it fails tiist to formulate an idea, a conception 
of what is to be accomplished. We cannot dispense with 
book knowledge, but not every one need be a scientist. 

The defender sometimes succeeds in deceiving the 
enemy, as evidenccni by the great exami)les of Konig- 
grjitz, Gravelotte^ — St. Privat, and the Lisaine. In the last 
two named cases the extent of the front was greatly under- 
estimated, and in the first case a proper idea of the strength 
of the defender and the trace of his position was lacking. 
In the execution of the same idea, Frenchmen, Germans, 
Austrians, unintentionally, caused the enemy a good deal 
of uncertainty; success followed in but one case, that of the 
Germans on the Lisaine. The Austrians ultimately fought 
in front of their position, and succumbed chiefly on that 
account and because the position was not occupied and did 
not remain occupied as ordered. We also note there the 
harmful inlluence that may be exercised by an advanced 
position (Maslowed wood). Although the Germans were 
greatly mistaken as to the extent of the position, the French 
were nevertheless defeated, because the strategic tlank was 
in the air and was crushed — crushed all the more easily be- 
cause not artificially strengthened, thus rendering all the 
other works which should have begun at St. Privat of no 
value. The facts show, however, that the defense was 
not complete, because at Koniggriitz. as well as at Grave- 
lotte, a great leader was lacking. In both cases we observe 
the same objectionable feature. At Koniggriitz the left is 
posted at Popowitz; at Gravelotte, the right at Verneville. 
Both were the strategic flanks, and it was only due to the 
efforts of the corps commanders that the better positions 
of Problus and St. Privat were occupied! 

Thus, even before the introduction of smokeless powder, 
the defense was in possession of certain features difficult 



Tactical Deductions. 333 

to r(Monnoiter and greatly embarrassing the assailant, ahd 
it may be admitted that they constituted part of the strength 
of the defense. I advocate the offensive, notwithstanding 
the fact that smokeless powder brings the effect of that 
strength of the defensive — i. e., the uncertainty in which 
it is able to keep the asKuilant — home to the latter much 
more severely; but the favorable aspects of the defense 
should not on that account be undervalued. 

The defender can determine the general trace of his 
position by the map,and the assailant may likewise itifer that 
trace or the range in a general way from strategic consid- 
erations. Events may happen, however, which are contrary 
to the sjurit of strategy, as, for instance, Bazaine's with- 
drawal into the position of August 18th, which had first been 
selected by mai> and was given its real shape subsequently 
after an inspection of the ground. 

The assailant's uncertainty could even in those days be 
very great, depending on whether right or wrong strategic 
conceptions prevailed in both camps; smokeless powder, 
however, renders it much more difficult for the assailant to 
promptly make out the defender's position even in case he 
has hit upon the enemy's strategic line of retreat. 

The great range of modern rifles and artillery projec- 
tiles, taken in connection with the absence of smoke, 
makf>s it diflicult to lof-ale the enemy. Tlie weaker oppo- 
nent will usually be compelled to resort to the defensive and 
entrench himself; but the defender is able to-day to greatly 
increase the assailant's uncertainty, to force him to delay 
while employing means to deceive him, and to employ his 
own countf;r-measures in such a way as to swure the numer- 
ical superioritj' at a certain point notwithstanding his gen- 
eral numerical inferioritv. 



334 Inquirifs into Ihc Tactici< of the Fulurr. 

AdvanoiHl positions aro uood moans to (liis v\u\, ami a 
(.'ousiilorntion of tho battlo of (^iravolotto will show what 
groat ailvantaiios tlu\varo apt to oonfoi- on iho dofonso t«> dav, 
and whioh wo will loavo \o tlu> roadiM- io dolormino. boianso 
militaiv history is iisod by dilToriMit poople to provo dilVoront 
things. It is my opinion that it is sniokoK'ss poAvdoi* alono 
that in great battlos will onablo tho oommandor-in ohiof of 
tho dof(Miso to promptly tako his moasuros whiU> his id»>as 
aro still of bnt agonoral I'haraoti^r.booanso smokoloss powdor 
givos him an amonnt of timo not formerly possessed, should 
he oontemplate a taotioal oountor-otVensive. In that ease 
time is gained by tho nse of advanoed positions, and it may 
be asoertained by raUiilating tho ratio of the breadth and 
depth of the line of defense to the depth of ground oom- 
luanded by the advaneed positions up to the line of defense. 
This, eonibineil with rei'onnaissanee. 1 doom the prineipal 
moditioation introduoed in grand tactics by smokoh ss 
powder, and also the chief advantage which the conunandei^ 
in-chief of the defense may dori\ o i'voin it. 

Lack of space and other reasons prevent nie from going 
into details of results to both defender and assailant. I wish 
to point out. however, the opinion of tlu» French Colonel Lan- 
glois. who approves of tho advancetl positiorsT — SkiUmieters 
in front of the main position, ajid refer the reader to Nos. 17, 
18. 28, 58. :>«>, and (JO of the M Hi far WochniMatf of 18!);?. 
While I coueur in general in the ideas expressed in the last 
three numbers of that periodical, I think that a vigorous 
counter-otTonsive should be the first consideration in select- 
ing tho main position, and that advanced positions cannot 
then be dispensed with. Skill is roipiired in selecting and 
utilizing advaJictHl positions and in promptly rendering 
them harnUess bv a vigorous method of attack. Tho strug- 



TacUcal Uedudions. 336 

j^lf for iIkiii uiiiy ut. llio Harno tirru; HufTioifjnf.ly din^rhjHe 
tlif tiijiin pohilion, if tlioy are about 1000 mcXc.Yn in front 
of Ihf lalt<-f; tlio farttjf-r Ih^fy aye to th(; front tho more arc 
th«-y aj^f to iriiHU^ad tlio jisKailant, and the g^reater wouUl 
he the FifjK'fit deriver] from ifi'-rn hy tfie commander-in-cbief 
of the defence. It is unnec<'8Hary herr- to quote unfavorable 
inntanrteH from Korum^ri'iiz, ete., or to point out that the 
French derived little advantage from their advanced pOKi- 
tionH on the l^th of AuguHt. We are simply face to face 
with an important qneHtion, which it iw nece-WHary to <lft<UU' 
before committing onrH^iveH to battle; and I believe that 
maneiJverH might be ho arranged as to be of great benefit 
in thiH rcHpect, In this way we would ]><■ more apt to select 
the right means for defense and attack ; which must he found, 
for I do not believe that any defender harboring great de- 
signs would relinfjuish the advantages offered by advanced 
j)OHitions. 

Tiie main circumstance of benefit to the defender and 
deceiving the assailant is the latter's uncertainty, which will 
cause him much delay. On that account it is not unlikely 
that several deployments of the army and of the battle units 
of the assailant may become necessary; for grand tactics to- 
day confer on the dffr-nder the power to keep his ar^nies sepa- 
rated at distances and in combinations suitable for the 
oflFensive employment of one of the armies, depending on the 
amount rjf information and time gained by the strnggbfS. etc., 
for the advanced positions. Xot only should the s'-h-ction of 
the main position be considere<l from tliaf [joint r,f view, 
but also the relation of the advancer] jK>8itions to the main 
position and the strengthening of the latter; if it results 
in a I'levna, it will have to be invested; if in a Gravelotte, 
it will have to be attacked, as heretofore. The only 
technical-tactical point to be consid^Tcd is that the advanced 



336 Inquiries into the Tactics of the Future. 

positions should no longer consist of farmsteads and villages, 
but should be located in the general terrain and as -incon- 
spicuous as possible; woods may prove very useful for that 
purpose. When deciding on the use of advanced positions, 
it will be necessary to extend the front as much as possible 
and to give it an irregular shape, wherein the improved 
arms will be found of great assistance and will much en- 
hance the effect. 

Section 13 of the Field Entrenchment Regulations 
states: "The preparation and occupation of advanced posi- 
tions is not to be recommended as a rule, because it may easily 
lead to the defeat of the advanced troops and mask the fire 
from the main position. It is therefore better to concen- 
trate all available means for the fortification of a single 
line." I might concur in the preparation, but not in the 
occupation. To be sure I am assuming here that the army 
will be boldly led and that small technical-tactical consid- 
erations and inconveniences will have to give way. 

It may generally be said that the defensive is the 
stronger; but it rarely matures great results, unless they are 
brought about by other means (Manteuffel-Werder); for so 
has it ever been and will ever be. Worth, Gravelotte (we 
purposely quote only field battles where both sides had full 
room for development), Beaune, Loigny, Lisaine, St. Quen- 
tin, etc., all point to the strength of the defensive. In case 
of an equality of arms the relations between attack and 
defense may at best be slightly shifted, and it is advisable 
to adhere to the attack, not, however, without always striving 
for early and strong development of fire and for the greatest 
possible numerical superiority. The long-range arms con- 
fer many advantages on the assailant; he has greater free- 
dom of movement than the defender; he can develop a 
greater fire effect, though at first by progressive stages only; 



Tactical Deductions. 337 

to-day he can take the rearward positions of the enemy 
bj' fire action much sooner than formerly, because the arms 
carry farther. He has, above all things, greater freedom of 
decision. The attack will be more, difficult to initiate and 
to carry through; it will require more time; and, in some 
places, it will entail greater losses, which result must be 
accepted; but when crowned by success, it will mature 
results never before dreamed of. 

It will not be often that the defender's position will ful- 
fill all requirements; he will have to concentrate his troops 
at various points; if the defender wishes to escape sensible 
losses from artiller^^ fire from the beginning, his position 
to-day should be like a great artificial enclosure protecting 
the trooxjs, which would never accord with simplicity and 
rarely with troop-leading. The defender will be compelled 
to remain much longer in a condition of readiness, which is 
not calculated to increase the morale; and in order to pro- 
tect his artillery he will have to deploy a large part of his 
infantry on the slope toward the enemy, in most cases 
without cover. He will concentrate the full force of his fire 
on certain points, but at the point or points of attack the 
assailant will be able to develop a superior fire, particularly 
if he succeeds in promptly locating the enemy's flanks. The 
defender will, in many cases, have to shun farmsteads and 
villages, and construct trenches in a comparatively short 
time, which, while useful for purposes of concealment, per- 
mit at the same time of greater fire-effect. Kecently the 
plow has been the subject of frequent experiments in the 
construction of hasty entrenchments ; and in France, in 1898, 
Genera] Morin, in particular, is said to have been very 
successful with it. I have omitted technical details, as 
to-day there is no appreciable difference to be found in the 
French, German, Austrian, and Russian regulations regard- 



338 Inquiries into the Tactics of the Future. 

ing the value, design and construction of field entrench- 
ments; and it could not be otherwise; the same ballistic quali- 
ties of the arms were bound to lead to the same conclusions 
in field fortification. On that account heavy calibers will 
be brought in the field by both sides. Thus it was stated in 
the French Instructions of March 23, 1878 : ''Field entrench- 
ments have at all times been of great importance; since the 
introduction of the rapid-firing arms they have become a 
power and an expedient on the battle-field which is always 
useful and frequently indispensable. They permit the de- 
fender to make up for his numerical inferiority at certain 
points, and enable the assailant to destroy the former's de- 
fensive positions or to turn them against him. They also 
enable one to entrench on captured ground and thus to 
hold it." 

All investigations, in whatever direction made, point 
toward position warfare, though, on account of the great 
warlike energy of the spirit of the times, its course will be 
different from what, it was in the past. Rifle and spade, 
regulations for fire and field entrenchments (field pioneer 
regulations for the infantry), to-day form the component 
parts of one and the same means, the greatest possible 
development of fire. It is in fact the culmination of the 
entire fighting act I I deem it probable that the selec- 
tion of suitable covered positions of the local and general 
reserves will prove one of the most difficult problems of 
the defender, especially if he intends to pass from the 
defensive to the offensive. In future the reserves will una- 
voidably be more exposed to danger than formerly. They 
will sometimes suffer very much from echelon shrapnel fire, 
and it may be accepted that the former manner of massing 
reserves and of bringing them up to the main position are no 
longer applicable. But to be able to pass to the offensive in 



Tactical Deductions. 339 

order to gain the victory, it is necessary to hold masses in 
readiness in the vicinity of the line of direction the offensive 
is to take; and the undoubtedly impending great expenditure 
of ammunition, not to mention losses, will compel the de- 
fender to have local reserves all along the rear of his line of 
battle if he wishes to exert his full fire power. In pre- 
pared positions both requirements may be more or less met 
by artificial cover; in other cases not at all, or but rarely. 
We concede that, particularly at the opening of the battle, 
the defender will usually be able to develop a greater fire 
power than the assailant, but whatever may be the extent of 
ground covered by his movements and measures, the defender 
will be cramped by the law imposed on him b}^ the assailant, 
who, having more freedom, can paralyze the fire and ulti- 
mately exceed it, though it may require more time and entail 
greater losses at some points; but the ultimate prize of vic- 
tory will be all the greater. 

VII. Of Beconnaissarice and of Preparation hy Artillery. 
It is odd that so much should have been written about 
losses suffered and to be suffered in future, and how they 
might be avoided, without ever getting at the root of the 
evil. For two decades w'e have been on the wrong trail; we 
have been circling around the "guiding motive" at greater 
or less distances; we have done much that is bound to lead 
to effeminate ideas; we have looked for the causes where 
they do not exist, and we have not looked for them where they 
are. In this way we have deceived ourselves in order to 
spare others, and we have likewise deceived those who do 
not know w^ar from personal experience^ and those whose 
positions forbid them to see anything outside of their own 
troops, for the same purpose of sparing others! Instead of 
admitting outright that 90 per cent of the causes of our 
losses in 1870-71 are to be found in the perfunctory character 



340 Inquiries into the Tactics of the Future. 

of the drill-ground in time of jjeace; in our defective training 
and in our lack of knowledge of the enemy's army; in the 
tactics and in the incapacity of numerous leaders of various 
grades; and instead of making a thorough investigation of 
the causes, we have attributed the losses to the positions, to 
the terrain, to the ballistics of the rifle, etc.; we have failed, 
however, to convince a single thinking mind, because those 
were not the causes. If we review the series of peace errors 
between 1871-88, we find that the true cause was probably 
concealed because we did not wish to probe our own ideas. 
It has ultimately brought us to the point that we are seri- 
ously thinking of transferring the battle to the night, in 
order not to be seen — i. e.,in order not to be shot at or hit. If 
it had all been a mere waste of labor, it would not be so bad; 
but that a whole generation has had an opportunity to imbibe 
wrong ideas is unfortunate and cannot be remedied at once, 
smce the men thus affected remain among the living! In all 
the great powers of Europe, re-armament called forth new 
regulations for the various arms, new firing regulations, 
new regulations for field entrenchments and field ser- 
vice, in all of which Germany led the way, and by 1889 
France, Austria, England, Russia, and Italy had followed 
suit. The year of 1888 gave to Germany the small-caliber 
rifle, and the following year the smokeless powder, things 
which in 1881, when this book was fii-st published, were in 
part matters of aspiration, and in part had not been given 
any consideration whatever. These technical improve- 
ments have made the defensive the stronger, but success- 
ful defense does not ensure a successful issue of the war; 
the attack is required. The defensive being the stronger, 
it follows that the attack is necessarily more diflScult and, 
at the decisive points, bloodier. This is the reason why 



Tactical Deductions. 341 

tactical rules and forms are being sought for the attack 
which would tend to diminish the assailant's losses. 

In reviewing the battles, etc., of the War of 1870-71, we 
find that, throughout, two main rules were ignored, and 
that these neglects were the causes of our "great" losses, 
one of them is the total neglect of or insufficiency of recon- 
naissance on the part of the commander-in-chief, and of all 
leaders down to the division and even brigade commanders, 
whenever they had a separate task; the other is the lack of 
preparation by artillery before the main forces of infantry 
were thrust into battle. 

There is, for instance, the defective reconnaissance on 
the IGth of August, notwithstanding that the German cav- 
alry was on the battle-field that was to be, before the arrival 
of the X. Corps, and had been for hours in close touch with 
the enemy. Closely connected with it was the further 
shortcoming, in that the system of reporting was not suita- 
bly organized, so that reports were late in arriving, or 
inaccurate, or were not rendered at all to that leader who 
on account of the situation should have been first informed. 
On the 17th and 18th of August we are met by the 
equally surprising fact, that the large forces of our cavalry 
failed to promptly locate the extent of the French right, 
notwithstanding our intention to give decisive battle. 

On the 1st of December Bernhardi's brigade acted even 
more unskillfully than the 5th Cavalry Division at noon on 
the lOth of August. Reconnaissance and the organization 
of the system of reporting must go hand in hand. 

In both of these respects Napoleon 1. still remains our 
never-attained ideal, and however much he may have served 
the Germans as an instructor, they have learned little from 
him in that respect. Any one loth to believe this should 



342 Inquiries into the Tactics of the Future. 

inform himself of Napoleon's mobility before battle, his 
reconnaissances on horseback, his exertions and bodily 
fatigue (at Jena, Dresden, Borodino) in order to gain all im 
portant information of the enemy by personal inspection, 
before committing himself to battle. Having acted in this 
manner before the arrival of the reports, and having on 
these rides familiarized his staff with the situation, he made 
his last dispositions, which never failed of their effect I 
must here state in vindication of the Germans in 1870, 
that of the most important battles fought against Imperial 
France, but three were fought with the sanction of the 
commander-in-chief — Gravelotte, Beaumont, and Sedan; all 
the others, as regards time, object, and forces, were without 
that sanction. However imposing may be Moltke's feat of 
assembling 9 army corps and 6 cavalry divisions on the 
evening of August 17th, ye,t it is not to be imagined that 
Napoleon would have issued the order of attack on the 17th 
without being approximately sure of the enemy's position 
and of the extent of his right ; that information was, in fact, 
only gained after the battle had begun, and we found to our 
sorrow that the enemy's line was twice as long as had been 
supposed. To obtain better results, there is need not only 
of a proper employment of the cavalry, but also of a nimble, 
mobile commander-in-chief, who makes a personal inspection 
before the dice are cast and after the cavalry has sent in 
its reports. Little of that kind is to be found throughout 
the war. We learn that the positions were visited on horse- 
back after the battle, but never before that event; and as it 
was in great things, so it was in small affairs. As a conse- 
quence we were always in doubt, and as soon as the subordi- 
nate leaders encountered the enemy, they flung themselves 
against him, though ignorant of his position and strength, 
and without taking time to reflect how he might be attacked 
to best advantage. There is but one general who in 



Tactical Deductions. 343 

this particular acted like Napoleon; it was General von 
Herwarth, at Koniggratz. Hence also his splendid suc- 
cess without appreciable losses! All events which I wit- 
nessed took such a course as to firmly convince me that the 
species of men who know how to reconnoiter in Napoleon's 
way no longer exist, just as the species of cavalry leaders 
a la Seidlitz seem to have vanished from the earth. Will 
either ever return? 

An evil must first be located; the proper remedy for it 
is selected afterward. The chief cause of our losses is to 
be sought in the lack of reconnaissance preceding the col- 
lisions, in connection with the brave but unplanned rush of 
infantry in insufficient numbers. Keconnaissance should 
extend to the ground, to the strength and position of the 
enemy; with the information thus gained his intentions may 
be inferred with fair accuracy, and the ways and means for 
carrying out our own intentions are thus pointed out at the 
same time. All officers down to the field officer should be in- 
formed in a few words of the intentions in each particular 
case (it is now required by Regulations), so that they 
may know what is expected of them; and if it be objected 
that there is no time for it, I reply that in the principal 
case (Gravelotte) there was time, and that it was easy to do 
it, owing to the enemy's complete inactivity, the like of whicli 
is hardly of record, had only the superior leaders realized and 
taken to heart that time-saving measure. But what was the 
rule? Brigades and divisions arrived and were thrust into 
the fight: it was "Forward!" without deploying them in the 
direction of the action. This was all the information vouch- 
safed their commanders; in some cases the objective of the 
attack Was pointed out. •'Forward!" That was all that the 
officers, down to the field-officers, learned, and it was even 
frequently communicated by signal. That was the actual 



344 Inquiries into the Tactics of the Future. 

rule. The troops attacked from the point where they stood, 
straight to the front, though adjacent ground offered plenty 
of opportunity for a covered approach. Thus it was in 
many cases at Worth, and along the entire line of battle 
at Gravelotte, with the exception of the XII. Army Corps; 
in the latter battle the consequences of the omission of 
reconnaissance and artillery preparation pile up mountain 
high. Neither suitable formations, nor suitable methods, 
nor control in so far as practicable, are to be found there. 
What is spent, is spent! The imprudent and precipitate 
rush of columns over open ground was one of the chief 
causes of our losses! Had the action suited the circum- 
stances, military history would know nothing of a Mance 
ravine, St. Privat, etc., as they are; our literature on losses 
would not have existed. We can record but few attacks of 
large bodies which were satisfactory in preparation and 
execution. Either they were not made, or failed, or barely 
succeeded, as at St. Privat and Worth, etc. The conceal- 
ment of the true evil became the further cause of our many 
tactical errors in peace, of the entire confused literature on 
losses, and who knows whether the controversy over long- 
and short-range fire would ever have arisen, if our troops had 
been properly led, if we had had tacticians and tactics? 
Whenever the evil is looked for at the wrong place, it will 
invariably result that the historical tactical truth is buried 
under a legion of errors, that erudite sophism obscures the 
simple demands of reason. Sophism was the prevailing 
disease from 1871 to 1888; sophism as regards toying with 
forms, the kinds of fire, direction of fire, short- and long- 
range fire and fire effect, fire with counted cartridges, 
swarm volleys, suspension of fire, supply of ammunition, 
etc., although the whole business could have been set- 



Tactical Deductions. 34-5 

tied with few words, if the truth had been disclosed. 
We have not always adopted the right ways since 1888, but 
the purification of the atmosphere since that year has had 
a refreshing effect. 

To the principal fault, lack of reconnaissance with its 
flood of resulting evils, there is to be added the second one, 
insufficiency or total lack of artillery preparation. It is 
odd that the artillery finds so little sympathy in the German 
Army, has so little popularity, and finds so little under- 
standing of its employment. Prince Hohenlohe himself has 
not hesitated to attack the honor of the artillery. What 
could there be worse than to raise and spread against one's 
own arm the charge of cowardice and laxity in its sense of 
honor?* 

Before Sedan the effect of artillery was not, or but lit- 
tle, appreciated by the generals; after that event opinions 
changed. In not a single one of all the August battles can 
we speak of a preparation by artillery, and if at Amanvil- 
liers and St. Privat we had taken the time to subject the 
points d'appui to the fire of available artillery, I am con- 
vinced that both places wonld have fallen sooner than they 
did, and with much less loss, notwithstanding the faulty 
attack formations of the infantry. Moreover, had we had 
tacticians to take acount of the inviting conformation of the 
ground and to promptly drop closed formations, the capture 
of St. Privat-Amanvilliers would not have been difficult, or 
costly in time and blood; as regards tactics, we should have 
gained clear conceptions and ideas, while, on the other hand, 
the false conclusions drawn from faulty measures have 
spoiled the tactical views. Thus the art decayed through 
the fault of the artists! 

♦Compare "Die Feldartillerie in ihrer Unterstellung unter die 
Generalkommandos," Berlin, E. S. Mittler, 1889. 

23 



346 Inquiries into tlic Tactics of the Future. 

l.ac'k of i-t'coimaissaiu'c and of pi'oparatioii by artil- 
lery are the two roots of our discoinlitures and of our "scien- 
tific" errors. The second result in i)art from the first; 
Avhen ^Ye do not even approximately know where the enemy 
is and what his position and strength are, the first requisite 
for an intellijient and retTsonable preparation by artillery 
is. of course, lackinri:. The best of artillery is then unable 
to fulfill its task; it is hauled here and there. ]>articularly if 
the system of transmission of orders is faulty or not used at 
all, or it is assigned too many objectiACS and has neither suf- 
ficient time nor power against any one of them and accom- 
plishes nothing, because groping in the dark. Unless these 
evils are rigorously counteracted, we shall be subject to 
further numerous disappointments, which will produce fur- 
ther tactical evils of secondary character, and because that 
should by all means be prevented, we have here called the 
child by the right name without ''giving names." Neglect 
of the siiui>lest tactical rules, faulty measures in many 
forms, neglect of the ground, ainilessness and lack of in- 
sight in attenij)ting the same impossible thing by the same 
impossible method until disgusted, the employment of anti- 
quated forms, ignorance of the ballistics of the enemy's wea- 
pon, all of these are some of the points that ])roduced our 
losses and our subsequent tactical errors, and the appear- 
ance of the ''Summer-night's Dream" was ])erfectly intelligi- 
ble, although I find much in it to disapprove and consider 
as downright incorrect and harmful. Troops do not con- 
(pier unless they are led. The war artist (tactician) is not 
served with a scheme. The pu]nls distort the master's 
good ideas into the radical: the radicals, declaiming against 
the one-sidedness of others, are themselves preaching one- 
sidedness in all its polypic forms, until the reality of war 



Tactical Deductions. 347 

applies the correction that can not be made in peace. 
Unfortunately, the same is, as a rule, of a trist character. 

If the enemy is thoroughly reconnoitered, if the leaders 
know what they are fo do, if, in a word, there is tactical lead- 
ing, if the moral and destructive effects of artillery are util- 
ized, then frontal attacks are practicable after infantry and 
artillery have gained the superiority of fire. 

The faulty lessons frequently drawn from attacks ruth- 
lessly undertaken, have found their generic term and expres- 
sion in the word "Schneid" (smartness, keenness.— Tr.) ; it 
is to be feared, however, that the term may lead to overesti- 
mation of one's self and to underestimation of the enemy. 
Without stoutness of heart, courage, and determination, 
nothing can be accomplished in a perilous situation, but the 
advocates of "»S'c/meir/," which is now so prevailing, are 
moving on false ground because they are nearer to the drill- 
ground than to the battle-field. We may rest content if in 
war 20 per cent of the "Schneid" observable in peace, par 
ticularly with the cavalry, materialize. I only fear that 
the first great action will prove a considerable corrective. 
The "Schneid," that may spring from erroneous ideas of war. 
that is based on mechanical forms, and seeks to force a deci- 
sion by a ruthless rushing in, represents an unthinking ten- 
dency which is bound to lead to bloody defeat if put into 
I)ractice; it is like the mad rule of brute force, which has 
never accomplished anything. The "Schneid'' that we need 
should be the result of careful education and training, the 
intelligent guidance and framing of moral qualities, intelli- 
gence, and knowledge, in reasonable tactical rules and ideas 
of battle. It should have its seat in the man's breast; other- 
wise we shall constantly relapse into lifeless and inefficient 
mechanics. The "Schneid" of the First Infantry Brigade of 
the fJuard convevs a terrible lesson. Not until the attack had 



348 Inquiries into the Tactics of the Future. 

failed was it remembered that the artillery should prepare 
the attack, and what should have been done long before was 
done only then. In this one example insufficient reconnais- 
sance and insufficient preparation by artillery exacted cruel 
penalties; such instances occurred repeatedly afterward, 
though not to the same degree. Le Bourget, on the other 
hand, shows how we had profited by experience; there recon- 
naissance was sufficient and the "Schneid-^ manifested was 
of the right kind, because resting on a rational basis and 
directed into a. proper system for the particular circum- 
stances, etc. Reconnaissance has been rendered much 
more difficult by smokeless powder, a cogent reason for 
devoting particular care to it, in order not to fare worse in 
future. As a result the preparations for the action will per- 
haps take up much time. It being probable that an army 
may have to make several deployments, it follows, in the 
first place, that the independent cavalry should gain supe- 
riority over that of the enemy by its strength — i. e., by bat- 
tle. It is employed, as it were, only as an element of grand 
tactics — i. e., it is its duty always to locate the enemy's flanks 
as soon as possible and to maintain uninterrupted communi- 
cation with army headquarters by means of a well-organized 
system of reporting, and to send direct reports to the nearest 
corps commanders also. Unless the enemy's flanks are 
promptly located, cavalry fails of its task and adds to the 
difficulty of the superior command in devising its further 
steps. Reports may be transmitted by good riders, by tele- 
graph, or by cyclists. In the maneuvers at Beauvais and at 
Oiins in 1893 the brigades had communication with the 
divisions within two hours after the cavalry reached its posi- 
tions. In applying modern practice to Gravelotte we may 
say that the laying of the field telegraph could easily keep 
step with the advance of the II. Army, and that there 



Tactical Deductions. 349 

should never have been any sensible interruption of com- 
munication between it and grand headquarters. 

Though the flanks may have been ascertained, much 
remains to be done, before the pitched battle, that does not 
appear at once from the map with respect to the flanks. 
The practice of riding boldly up to, and through, the enemy's 
advanced troops, as we see it in peace, is impossible in war, 
and the results of the reports from patrols will be insuffi- 
cient; the captive balloon may under certain circumstances 
be of great service, but is not a reliable means of reconnais- 
sance in field operations, though nearly 100 years (since 
Fleurus) old; it should therefore not be looked upon as a 
remedy for the uncertainty caused by smokeless powder. 
The captive balloon in all its trials has disappointed its 
most ardent advocates. Fastened to the ground it is sub- 
ject to sudden, troublesome, and dangerous jolts, when 
there is the least wind; complete calmness of the atmos- 
phere is very rare, many times the soaked ground may make 
it difficult or impossible for the wagon to follow, and thick 
atmosphere may prevent any great range of vision. 

The observation ladders also are mere palliatives. 

From a favorable point an army commander armed with 
good glasses may have a good view for 8 kilometers on 
either side — i. e., in all directions; but such points are rare, 
and points permitting sufficient view to the front are still 
rarer. 

The onl}' other remaining means of tactical reconnais- 
sance is to engage the enemy in such a way as to compel him 
to develop his forces to an extent that will allow inferences 
to be drawn. The very best, and best led, bodies of cav- 
alry no longer possess the fighting power necessary for that 
purpose. Infantiy may not be able to deploy and produce 
effect fat long range) as quickly as may be desirable, an3 



850 Inquiries into the Tactics of the Future. 

thus the artillery, protected by cavalry, alone remains for 
long-range fire for these purposes. The assailant will then 
experience the disadvantages advanced positions may 
entail on him to-day; they cannot be taken without fight- 
ing, and the final reconnaissance cannot be made until they 
are taken. It is therefore not improbable that in a case 
like that of Gravelotte an entire daj^ will be spent in recon- 
noitering actions. 

Intimately connected therewith are the questions of or- 
ganization of the system of transmitting orders, and of the 
distribution and emploj-ment of artillery. The former we 
have suflQciently discussed; about the latter a few more 
words are necessary. Experiments have been made in the 
maneuvers of recent years in not attaching any artillery to 
the advance guard so as to avoid the danger of being prema- 
turely forced to deploy in an undesirable direction. That 
fear implies a prior commission of errors. Full information 
cannot always be promptly gained by the use of patrols, offi- 
cers, and other means that have been referred to, but enough 
may be ascertained for forming a general idea. What infor- 
mation is lacking will have to be supplied by fighting on the 
part of artillery and infantry'. At this stage infantry will 
hardly be able to compel the enemy to show his artillery; 
artillery is needed for that purpose, and in considerable 
strength. It is not easy to skillfully lead artillery without 
information beyond the general result of previous recon- 
naissance, but we have to learn it; the artillerist should 
therefore be a far-seeing man and competent to judge the 
situation. Provided the advance guard cavalry does its 
duty, I can reach no other conclusion than that an "Ahthei- 
Jung"* of artillery should be attached to every advance 
guard of a division, and that the remainder of the divisional 

*A battalion of two or more batteries. — Translator. 



Tactical Deductions. 35 L 

artillery be inserted in the column of the main body. By 
means of a good eye, of sudden appearance in force, quick 
ranging, and continued accurate observation, artillery 
will in the future be able to accomplish feats that could 
not heretofore be expected from that arm. Nothing should 
be left undone to develop the tactical judgment of artillery 
officers. 

Moreover the commanders will frequently have to make 
the reconnaissance for their own work in person, or, depend- 
ing on the strength of their command, they may despatch 
officers of judgment on fast horses, who, accompanied by 
3 or 4 well-mounted despatch riders, will approach the ene- 
my as much under cover as possible to gain an insight in the 
state of affairs from elevated points by the use of good 
glasses, or to survey portions of the enemy's position from 
a flank. What I emphasize in this connection is judgment, 
excellence in horsemanship, and delight in daring. Without 
that combination of qualities these officers will never be 
able to accomplish their task in a satisfactory manner. 

As a type in this respect I have in mind the present 
commanding general of the XVI. Army Corps, Count von 
Haseler, and I know all will agree with me who know what 
that one officer accomplished in peace and war by just such 
a combination of qualities. Well, Haselers are no common- 
place men, and should for that reason be emulated; without 
such men an army will be poorly advised where the variable 
situation on the enemy's side is concerned. That leads me 
back to the statement I made in the Introduction, and which 
I meant to elucidate and vindicate in this chapter — namely, 
that great care should be taken not to employ general staff 
officers too much in duties of a bureaucratic tendency, and 
too little in active, practical employment. The two, as a rule, 
do not go well together; those who incline to the former 



352 Inquiries into the Tactics of the Future. 

as the aim of their lives will dislike the bodily exertion 
required for practical work. I acknowledge that it may be 
difiScult always to find the right road, but the latter should 
never be lost sight of, because too much depends on it that 
would not follow as a natural result in time of war. Field- 
marshal Moltke demanded good horsemanship and daily 
reading of good newspapers. It may perhaps not be out 
of place to point out that newspaper reading, as handled by 
Moltke, does not seem to prevail to-day, and I would also 
like to point out that there is no better means of preparing 
for the general work of the general staff officer than the crit- 
ical reading of newspapers. The news contained therein 
is in a sense reports and accounts of doubtful matters, and 
is frequently contradictory. It offers a fine opportunity for 
the officers to constantly exercise and test their powers of 
conjecture, to distinguish the correct from that which is in- 
correct, and to discover by their own judgment the "true 
inwardness" in the labyrinth of inaccurate statements. In 
this respect there is no position that so much resembles the 
work of the general staff officer in peace and war as does 
that of an able editor.and the great Moltkeknewexactlyhow 
to point out everywhere the means that lead up to the great 
aim of the general staff officer — namely, to gain by personal 
examination and judgment a more or less correct conception 
of the truth and of the facts from a mass of inaccurate 
and uncertain statements, inferences, and paraphrase. All 
cannot accomplish it by mere work — much depends on nat- 
ural gifts — nor is it possible in every case to point out the 
methods; the proverb ''Practice makes perfect" applies 
here; nay, daily discipline in such matters is the bread of 
the general staff officer, because it requires all the powers 
of the mind to be concentrated on one point, which psychic- 
ally, bureaucratically, and tactically, is the vocation of the 



Toxtical Deductions. 353 

general staff officer. These things enlarge and sharpen the 
judgment; they are to him daily mental and moral gym- 
nastics, not only in the military, but still more, in peace, in 
the political field. The general staff officer should there- 
fore be master of the latter; it will save him from false, 
bureaucratic bias, since in tactics variation alone is con- 
stant, while war and politics are one in character, insep- 
arable and indivisible. The change in the direction of 
the mai'ch toward Sedan shows how difficult it is to discern 
the truth among contradictory newspaper statements or 
reports that seem improbable. We here have the same 
requirement again in the strictly military field; reconnais- 
sances (in the strategic sense) are frequently made in conse- 
quence of newspaper and other reports; the character of 
reconnaissance is always the same and should always be 
most extensively practiced in doubtful situations of large or 
small import. It may be said that the general staff officer 
is not always available for such duties; I do not insist on it; 
care should, however, be taken that reconnaissance be dealt 
with in a way befitting its present and future importance, 
and that nothing be undertaken without thorough reconnais- 
sance in order that we may not again witness such a 
lamentable occurrence as at Gravelotte, not to mention 
other things not quite so bad. General staff officers will, as 
a rule, be the only ones sufficiently familiar with the ideas of 
the superior commanders to carry out a reconnaissance with 
skill.* Every action entered upon without thorough recon- 
naissance is a game of chance; every attack undertaken 
without proper artillery preparation, an indiscretion. 

♦Compare the role of Captain Seebeck in "Die Gefechte von Bois- 
comiinm nnd Lorcey am 24ste nnd 2<iste Xnvembor, 1870" ("The 
Actions of Boiscommun and Lorcey on the 24th and 26th of Novem- 
ber, 1870"), Berlin, 1893, R. Felix, military publisher. 



354 Inquiries into ike Tactics of the Future. 

VIII. Of Turning Movements.* 

Turning movements are as old as war, tactically as well 
as strategically, and many great leaders, conscious of their 
superiority, have so planned their operations that the tac- 
tical turning movement followed as a natural sequence from 
the continuation of the strategical movement. Thus, for 
instance, Cromwell acted at Worcester, Napoleon I. at 
Ulm. in 1805, and at Jena in 1800, and the Allies did the 
same at Leipsic; on the part of the Prussians, we find it in 
1866 at Koniggratz, and in 1870-71 at Worth, Gravelotte, and 
Sedan; on the part of the French at Coulmiers, Beaune la 
Eolande, Loigny-Poupry, Bapaume, on the Lisaine; again, on 
the part of the Germans, at St. Quentin, and in Manteuflfel's 
operations against Bourbaki, etc. 

In all these cases the initiatory measures are of strate- 
gic origin; in their highest development they result in a 
complete surrounding, of which Ulm. Metz, and Sedan are 
good examples. 

In order to study military history and apply its lessons, 
it is necessary to thoroughly investigate the causes in each 
case, which in turn requires full knowledge of the meaning 
of terms, of strategy and tactics as a whole, and of their 
details. A certain tendency unfortunately seems to be 
formulating, which, if prevailing, should be counteracted by 
every available means, because bej-ond doubt leading to con- 
fusion and to a decay of the art of war; it is the tendency no 
longer to respect any boundary between strategy and tac- 
tics. Judging by what comes to our ears, that tendency has 
many adherents, but we fear it would merely furnish us 
with ^'routiniers'' lacking in appreciation of the finer aspects 
of the art, and who would ever remain superficial imitators 



*The term here used by the author is "Vrnfassung," a general 
term for overlapping, outflanking, and turning movements. — Tr. 



Tactical Deductions. 355 

and who can never lay claim to a thorough understanding of 
the nature of things. I have no intention to write a dis- 
course on strategy or tactics, in order to convert men mis- 
led in their intellectual conceptions. Those who have 
preached such doctrines have burdened themselves with a 
heavy responsibility. I will briefly say that a person, for 
instance, who is incapable of appreciating the difference 
between one of Beethoven's symphonies and a rhapsody by 
Brahms is to be pitied, because Nature has denied him the 
faculty of recognizing, discerning, enjoying, and of survey- 
ing the vast field lying between the two in all its gradations 
and of understanding all its fine distinguishing shades. To 
such men it is all simply music, to such soldiers strategy and 
tactics are simply war, and war merely tactics. Their place 
is in the barracks. Because the spirit, mind, and emotions 
of such men are insensible to all the finer shades, these fine 
distinctions, which are a source of real enjoyment to supe- 
rior minds, do not therefore disappear, nor do the gradations 
of art; art is simply beyond the comprehension of those piti- 
able men and soldiers in whom an understanding of it has not 
been cultivated. Though some people may be unable to dis- 
tinguish between bright and faint red, and though they 
may deny any difference in them because they do not per- 
ceive it, that difference of shade nevertheless remains, it 
is simply beyond the grasp of their uncultivated eye; it is 
the same in the science of war with those who deny a differ- 
ence betwen strategy and tactics! Whoever fails to com- 
prehend that the measures resulting in the closing of the 
ring at Sedan are of strategic origin should keep at a long 
distance from the art, for to him the art of war is a closed 
book. 

However foolish it would be to deny the fundamental dif- 
ference between strategj^and tactics,it would be equally fool- 



356 Inquiries into the Tactics of tli^ Future. 

isli to keep them ever pedantically, schematicallY separated. 
Just as in the highest product of art of any kind the sum 
total of artistic effect is brought out so that it is impossible 
to say this line stops here, that one begins there, so in the 
highest product of military art, in battle, the strategic lines 
merge into the tactical, and then to go to work and seek for 
a difference would be to betray the instincts of the artisan. 
It is a perfectly logical phenomenon in military history that 
all great generals, of whatever nation, have been men of 
aesthetic tastes, with a love for the fine arts, men of fine sen- 
sibilities, of sharp discernment, of bright and powerful 
mind; they all had the make-up of artists, if I may express 
it in this way, and in our military education nothing is more 
to be deplored than the total lack of everything that tends 
to develop and refine the taste for art, the {esthetic taste, and 
all finer sensibilities. For that reason many do not strive 
for the highest, their conception of their vocation is super- 
ficial, they never reflect on its artistic aspect. Their intro. 
duction to a:»sthetics, particularly in connection with ra- 
tional lectures on philosophy, would be of a thousandfold 
more benefit than many other things to which half a lifetime 
is devoted, which merely touch the outlines, and which ai-e 
matters of course! With such a system of education, tactics 
and strategy would never have been thrown in the same pot 
and there Avould be more of spontaneous effort to become an 
artist. It ma}- not be inopportune to say so, since it appears, 
from what has been stated, that the bounding lines between 
strategy and tactics have been somewhat displaced by re- 
cent inventions, and that in the position warfare, which will 
certainly ensue, the position-battle will be a normal feature. 
A decision can hardly be expected in such cases without 
turning movements. 

It is natural that the numerically superior should use 



Tactical Deductions. 357 

his superiority for turning movements, but up to within 
recent times those who employed turning movements did 
not invariably possess a great superiority, nor has their vic- 
tory been due in every case to the turning of the enemy and 
to the tactics of the superior number of combatants em- 
ployed. Other important causes are therefore bound to 
exist which bring about the real decision after the material 
object has been accomplished. Moreover, there can be no 
doubt that if anything at all were normal in tactics, turn- 
ing tactics might be said to have been the rule; in modern 
times, on every occasion, in the insignificant action as in 
the great battle, there must be some reason for it. On the 
other hand, generals have made turning movements with 
inferior forces even before the introduction of the present 
improved arms, and have conijuered whenever that minor- 
ity was conscious of superior fighting power. It is plain 
that we should not, either here or anywhere, content our- 
selves with reducing such phenomena to rule, with explain- 
ing them in a purely mechanical way, and with measuring 
them with the dividers, which seems to be the favorite occu- 
pation of our peace war-artists; military history is useful 
only when the causes in each case are investigated and 
understood. 

Notwithstanding his considerable inferiority. General 
Davout flanked the Duke of Brunswick at Auerstadt, and 
could do so without danger, because the fighting power of 
the Trench Army was much greater than that of the Prus- 
sian Army, or because the French tactics were better, to 
express it differently. Davout did not at all act as the 
"lucky soldier," but as a man fully cognizant of the supe- 
riority of the French tactics on account of the superior lead- 
ing and greater effect inherent in them, and what to the 
uninitiated did, and does, appear as very hazardous, is in 



368 Inquiries into the Tactics of the Future. 

fact something very natural, something intended and well 
considered, I do wish to call Davout's resolve something 
extraordinary, but I desire to point out that, particularly in 
view of Davout's unfavorable strategical (the "collectors" 
will, of course, insist on calling it tactical) situation, the 
example furnishes a standard for all times of what a gen- 
eral may risk without speculating,if he knows both sides and 
is thus aware when he may deviate from those rules which 
"tacticians" are wont to consider inviolable. To be a tacti- 
cian is not to cling to rules, but to adapt reasonable means 
to the circumstances in order that all the fighting power 
there is in the troops may be utilized. Davout acted thus, 
and is entitled to one of the first places among tacticians on 
account of his intelligent action. I know of no other exam- 
ple of flanking at all comparable with this one, considering 
the great inferiority of numbers and the victory gained de- 
spite that inferiority; the firing power of the French infantry 
and artillery was certainly not superior to that of the Prus- 
sians. The example goes to show that given two opponents 
armed with like weapons, they will by no means produce 
the same effect with them, and that the effect depends on 
the use made of the weapons. It is exactly so to-day! 
Fighting power and firing powder are two different things, 
and we should not only declaim against those who would 
recognize but one tactical example as regards forms, but 
also combat those doctrines which rely solely on firing 
power. Firing is but a part — the material part — of the 
fighting power, of which the other components are to be 
sought in the field of morale, of intelligence, and of disci- 
jjline, all of which qualities should be subordinate to it. If 
firing power had been the decisive factor in Davout's resolve, 
he would have been guilty of a piece of stupidity, as it is 
plain that 40,000 muskets can project more bullets than 



Tactical Deductions. 359' 

25,000, provided the qualities of the arms are the same on 
both sides. 

Auerstadt furnishes proof that, notwithstanding great 
numerical inferiority, and with equally good fire-anns on 
both sides, flanking may produce great results, if the flank- 
ing opponent employs superior tactics. 

While it cannot be denied that the ballistic qualities of 
all arms are incomparably superior to-day, still, when look- 
ing at both opponents, we have to acknowledge that they are 
about on the same level as regards armament. Hence there 
has been no change in the essential chracteristics; the im- 
proved arms simply extend the limits of movement and 
of fire more or less, thus rendering the dispositions for, and 
the execution of, turning movements, and the success of any 
kind of enterprise, much more difficult. I shall endeavo^ 
to prove this. 

When, after the establishment of the republic, the 
French had gained superiority of numbers, it was the 
rule with them, not the exception, to seek strategic turning 
movements, and the resulting tactical flanking, in the same 
way as did the Germans in 1800 and 1870-71, not only when 
the numbers were equal, but also when they were inferior or 
superior (compare Trautenau June 28th, Gitschin June 29th, 
Koniggratz July 3d, Blumenau July 24th, with equal or 
inferior numbers; Worth August 0th, Gravelotte August 
18th, Sedan September 1st. with superior numbers ; Le Mans 
January 10th and 11th, St. Quentin January 19, 1871, with 
Inferior forces). The very first action fought by the republic 
against the Germans at Coulmiers on November 9th was 
planned strategically as a turning movement and tactically 
as "Umfassung,'' as was Beaune la Rolande on November 
28th, Loigny-Poupry on December 2d, Bapaume January 2d 
and 3d, 1871, Lisaine 15th, IGth, 17th of January, 1871, Le 



360 Inquiries into the Tactics of the Future. 

Mans on and after Januai'y 5th; all of these instances are 
taken from field operations. As regards position warfare, 
Noisseville (first day), Le Bourget, December 21, 1870, were 
planned as "Umfassungs" battles, but Coulmiers was the 
only one where some success was gained, chiefly because the 
German cavalry, which should have acted decisively on the 
right flank, failed in its task. In all of these cases it must 
be admitted that the French plan for each battle provided 
for an effective strategic turning movement, that in every 
case the French had a considerable numerical superiority, 
and that on account of their superior armament they should 
also have possessed a great superiority of fire power. That 
they nevertheless failed was due to the fact, 1, that battles 
vvith turning movements are very diflScult to direct; 2, that 
they require an excellent system of transmission of orders; 
3, clear judgment and initiative on the part of the leaders; 
and 4, a high degree of mobility ; in brief, a higher degree of 
training and efficiency on the part of the troops than is pos- 
sessed by the enemy. Armies devoid of that combination 
of qualities ai*e unsuccessful, as is strikingly illustrated by 
the battle on the Lisaine. There the French commander-in- 
chief, in planning the turning movement, was as much mis- 
taken with regard to the extent of the German line as 
were the Germans on August 18, 1870, about the French 
position. It is well known that in both cases the front of 
the position proved to be twice as long as was anticipated. 
In both cases the turning movements were planned on 
wrong premises, and in both cases the error was only found 
out when the turning movement was under way. By dint of 
the higher efficiency of their armies the Germans repaired 
their error, in the main, within three hours, and gained the 
decision and victory on the 18th of August by means of 
the turning movement as planned, whereas the French 



Tactical Deductions. 361 

East Army, whose corps were closely concentrated on 
the right, accomplished no more in three days than to 
disentangle them! The turning movement ultimately as- 
sumed the right direction, but by that time the fighting 
power of the entire army was broken, and instead of conquer- 
ing, the army suffered a defeat which culminated in a 
catastrophe. 

A turning movement therefore requires, in the first 
place, an eflBeient army with efficient infantry of superior 
fighting power. Wherever these requisites were combined, 
there the turning movement with equal numbers, and even 
with inferior numbers (Auerstadt, St Quentin, and lastly Le 
Mans) led to success; where that combination is lacking, 
neither superior number of combatants, nor the greater num- 
ber of rifles, nor superior fire power will ensure success, 
for a stout opponent is not driven off by fire; even in the 
"Umfassungs" battle the tactical point has to be carried by 
assault, and after a protracted fire action the infantry must 
still possess sufficient fighting power for the final onslaught. 
Such was the case on the part of the Germans at Worth, 
Gravelotte, and St. Quentin, while Sedan is less entitled to 
mention in this connection. Chanzy's operations against 
Vendome (January 5, 1871), where he meant to turn the Ger- 
mans, show, on the other hand, that of the two opponents 
meeting on the offensive the numerically weaker Germans, 
who were to be turned, themselves turned the French as the 
operations progressed, and that on accomplishing the turn 
ing movement (La Tuil^rie) the battle was decided by the 
bold action of a few companies. I do not believe that modern 
arms and the new powder greatly change the nature of the 
"Umfassvngs^' battle; that the decision on the turned flank 
for flanks) requires an assault as the last act ; that the latter 
cannot be much more difficult than it was in 1870, against 

24 



362 Inquiries into the Tactics of the Future. 

the Imperial Army witli the Chassepot, since the fire power 
cannot become much greater than it was at St. Prlvat, 
for instance; that the side undertaking turning movements 
is better able to solve the tactical part of the problem than 
was the case then ; and that, on account of the unobstructed 
view, the turning movement can be much better directed 
than formerly. The decisive blow will be equally required 
in future; it may even be delivered by swarms intermixed 
with small and more solid bodies, the swarm being of neces- 
sity the prevailing formation as heretofore. 

In that connection we cannot dispense with successive 
lines (Treff en), and they should not be condemned on general 
principles because wrongly used heretofore; it is only neces- 
sary that they be properly used in certain situations and 
phases, the formations to be employed in each case being left 
to the judgment of the leaders. Owing to the unobstructed 
view, great skill is indispensable in bringing the troops for- 
ward — i. e., in utilizing the ground for the approach, which is 
a prime requisite in such matters. It goes to show that suc- 
cess requires the cooperation of many essentials, and that 
turning movements to-day make higher demands on the 
superior leaders than on the troops. The leader should 
therefore make a thorough personal reconnaissance and so 
inform himself of all important matters as to gain a clear 
insight into the situation while the troops are on the march, 
and to be able to instruct and dispose them intelligently on 
their arrival. It requires great mobility, personal observa- 
tion, and a tactical eye on the part of the leaders. 

Turning movements having gained in favor since the 
notable increase of fire effect in 1866, it is to be expected, 
and it is unavoidable, that they should gain still more in 
future. As regards any fear for the front entertained by 
the opponents of turning movements and the swarm tactics 



Tactical Deductions. 363 

inseparable therefrom, we believe that our expositions from 
military history show that what is usually called a weak 
front, because of the relativeh' small number of infantry,has 
invariably proven sufficiently strong to guard the front, pro- 
vided the infantry was good, i)rovided its tactical employ- 
ment on the part of the leaders was correct, and provided 
it was supported by a numerous artillery, A good infantry 
is what is specially needed to-day for a turning movement, 
and it will be well to keep a few battalions in hand for emer- 
gencies. If their morale is good, the troops, armed as they 
are with 'modern rifles, may be expected to develop suffi- 
cient jjowers of resistance if superior forces should turn 
on them; and with greater probability, as it is only since 
the introduction of smokeless powder that leaders are able 
to lead in a manner approximating the ideal in so far as con- 
cerns the employment of large bodies and their common 
object. Again, in the turning movement, infantry and 
artillery are now able to concentrate their fire on the most 
important point and just about treble the effect as compared 
with the past, firing from various points, perhaps from the 
front and flank, which neither infantry nor artillery could 
formerly do on account of the smoke. This possibility of 
common fire direction of infantry and artillery against the 
decisive point, and the fact that the long-range rifle and the 
shrapnel echelon fire are bound to reach the enemy's re- 
serves from the front and flank, will, in my opinion, make 
the attack and the habitual use of "Umfassungs'^ more expe- 
dient than ever. This should not provoke the friends of the 
defensive; facts Mall prove it as surely as it is better to have 
eyes than to have none. 

In the future attack we have to distinguish between 
two cases: the assailant can either approach under cover, or 
he can not. It is unnecessarv to state that in the latter case 



364 Inquiries into the Tactics of the Future. 

the assailant labors under a great disadvantage, but it should 
be pointed out that, in consequence of the absence of smoke, 
it will be much more difficult to subdue him than formerly 
whenever he is able to open the action from covered 
positions. 

Stupid measures on the part of the '^sub-tacticians" may 
cause the best planned turning movement to fail in the exe- 
cution; St.Quentin is an instructive example in that respect. 
Although inferior in numbers, Goben intended to turn the 
enemy's right, to push him away from his line of retreat, and 
to destroy him. It resembles the case of Davout at Auer- 
stadt. The stupid action of the IGth Division and the delay 
of the 15th Division in coming into action destroyed Goben's 
l)lan, and the decision was brought about in the front, ex- 
actly the point where he did not want it! But even while the 
decision was being made, and after it was enacted, the mass 
of cavalry on the German left remained inactive, though its 
leading troops had the enemy's line of retreat within their 
grasp and their opponents were troops of inferior quality. 
In order that harmony might not be lacking, the cavalry on 
the right flank acted in like manner, though confronting a 
shaken and defeated enemy. Coulmiers, Beaune, Loigny, 
and St. Quentin utterly condemn the German cavalry lead- 
ers. In the first case the enemy's turning movement suc- 
ceeded on account of the inactivity of our cavalry; in the 
other cases we failecj of our object for the same reason. 

Prussia's and Germany's opponents in 1866 and 1870-71 
never succeeded in piercing the German front while the lat- 
ter were turning their opponent's flank. At Gravelotte, 
where there was a splendid opportunity between noon and 
o p. m. for breaking through our IX. Corps in the direction 
of Verneville, the enemy failed to perceive his advantage; 
while it would not have been impossible after 4 p. m. to 



Tactical Deductions. 365 

break the German front at some point there, it would not 
have amounted to more than a temporary success, because 
at that hour a secoud line (III., X., and II. Army Corps) was 
forming in rear of the first. The various frontal attacks of 
the French at Worth brought but transient advantages and 
ultimately shivered against our artillery. The six attacks 
against the 3d Infantry Brigade of the Guard at Amanvil- 
liers were repulsed, but they were intended as mere forward 
movements, and not meant to break our front. On the other 
hand, there are two very instructive cases where the supe- 
rior enemy, who undertook to turn his opponent, was not 
only not able to defeat the latter, but was himself defeated 
and had his line of battle pierced. They are the remarkable 
battles of Beaune la Rolande on the 28th of November, and 
of Loigny-Poupry on the 2d of December. In both battles 
the situation bears a certain resemblance; at Beaune the 
enemy meant to turn the three brigades of the X. Army 
Corps with his XX. and XVIII. Army Corps, while portions 
of his XV. Corps were to support the French left and reap 
the fruits of the expected victory; at Loigny-Poupry the 
enemy intended to do the same thing with his XVI. and XV. 
Corps supported by the XVII. In either case two separate 
battles resulted: 1, Beaune and Juranville; 2, Loigny and 
Poupry. In the first case the 38th Brigade was very suc- 
cessfully turned on three sides, but the turning movement 
of the XVIII. Army Corps failed against the 37th and 39th 
Brigades at Juranville, both of which maintained them- 
selves between the two hostile corps in such a way that 
the latter could not join hands effectively until very late. 
The very much inferior Germans held out in that situa- 
tion, and finally, at 3 p. m., when supported by the 
heads of the III. Corps, they turned the enemy them- 
selves, notwithstanding their numerical inferiority. There 



366 Inquiries into the Tactics of the Future. 

was no intention on our part to break through the enemy's 
turning movement; yet, looked at from the tactical point, 
the offensive taken at Juranville practically had that effect. 
At Loigny-Poupry the French meant to turn the Germans 
on the East, but a promx^t change of front on the part of 
the 22d Division made the movement impossible, while at 
the same time the capture of Loigny by the 17th Division 
pierced the enemy's main position in front. The French 
center was successfully pierced in this manner. We have 
dwelt on these two instances at some length because the 
latter particularly is almost unique in military annals on 
account of the numerical inferiority. It is one of the cases 
that mark the culmination of the tactics of the Germans as 
regards the leading, as well as the endurance and fighting 
power of the troops. In both battles (at Beaune and Loigny) 
the swarm intermixed with small bodies in close order was 
usually employed on the offensive. That the lines of the 
French, who were making a turning movement, were pierced 
is chiefly due to the high degree of offensive spirit still 
extant in the German troops after the heavy losses of the 
war (I. Bavarian Army Corps and 22d Division), and to the 
clumsiness of the French leading and of the French troops. 
No army should make the "Umfassungs^' battle its rule, 
unless its leaders and troops are fully equal to the task; 
where such is not the case, it is all the more necessary that 
the army corps be so formed and disposed before the begin- 
ning of the turning movement that the resulting line of 
battle will show no gaps, where the enemy may penetrate, 
maintain himself, and pierce the hostile front. The French 
invariably endeavored to dispose their troops in this man- 
ner before the movement, but did not succeed even in that. 
It need therefore not be specially stated that they would 
never have been successful in launching a turning move- 



Tactical Deductions. 367 

ment direct from the march. Xor did they ever attempt it. 
The diversity of ^^Umfassungs" battles and actions as 
fought by the Germans — notwithstanding a number of 
errors — thus constitutes the most eloquent proof that a 
highly efficient army alone can develop such diversity and 
gain success, while the French, on the other hand, never suc- 
ceeded in carrying out a grand turning movement — notwith- 
standing their great numerical superiority, not even at 
Coulmiers and Bapaume, both places being evacuated by 
the Germans of their own accord after repulsing the enemy. 
All turning movements partake more or less of the char- 
acter of great "combined movements," which are very diffi- 
cult; an army not thoroughly efficient had better avoid 
them. The fact that certain tactical fanatics declaim 
against the "Umfassungs'' battles of the Germans simply 
goes to expose their inferiority as "tacticians," and if one 
side is invariably successful and the other invariably unsuc- 
cessful in the same thing, the proof that superior efficiency 
won, in spite of our opponent's superior fire power, is so con- 
vincing that it is superfluous to say anything about it. It 
follows with certainty that, in consequence of the superior 
fire power (small-caliber arms, increased fire effect of artil- 
lery, absence of smoke), the Germans will more than ever be 
partial to turning movements ; and that in doing so they will 
be the more protected from the danger of having their line 
pierced because our fire power has been at least trebled since 
1870-71, while that of the French, in comparison with that 
of the Chassepot, has merely gained in strength. We should 
therefore preserve our composure, base our calculations on 
facts, and give no more room to the play of imagination than 
is rational ; then, not only shall we be able in the future to 
carry out the same things as deliberate designs, but we shall 
<;arry them out much better, because we can give more empha- 



368 Inquiries into the Tactics of the Future. 

sis to our intentions; and, for the latter purpose, a proper use 
of the artillery is requisite above all other things. That done^ 
there is no reason why, after the superiority of fire is at- 
tained, the final onslaught should not be made with hurrah 
and beating of drums just as in 1870-71; at that stage the 
enemy's fire will not be as dangerous as at the beginning, 
and formations may then be used which would have been 
inapplicable for purposes of fire action up to the attainment 
of the superiority of fire. I can only repeat that there 
should be legitimate freedom and no orthodoxy, either in 
favor of or against any particular method. One considera- 
tion, however, it is well to point out — namely, that the side 
making a turning movement will probably never have suf- 
ficient artillery (i. e., efflcient artillery) to batter the ene- 
my's front. Where the enemy selects wide, open plains 
for the battle, the artillery question becomes the main ques- 
tion, and that arm will never be pressed for space. Two 
instances of defense remain to be mentioned where, in conse- 
quence of the conformation of the ground, the Germans, 
though on the defensive, flanked the enemy — namely, at 
Villiers on November 30th and December 2d, and in the bat- 
tle of Mont Val^rien on January 19, 1871. In both cases 
the enemy had a considerable numerical superiority and his 
intention was to turn us; but all attempts to gain any 
imj)ortant advantage by combined front and flank attacks 
failed because outflanked by the defensive position of the 
Germans and of the manner in which the Germans turned 
their advantage to tactical account. 

A few words about the "Umfassuiu/s'' action at Le 
Bourget on October 30th. The three columns assailing the 
village from the north, east, and south had about one-half 
of their troops formed in close order, the other half in 
swarms. All three columns advanced simultaneously and 



Tactical Deductions. 369 

resolutely in that formation by companies, and for tlie most 
part without halt; it was about 8 o'clock in the morning, and 
the enemy's infantry could fire 1000 to 1500 meters, in three 
directions. It was not a real surprise of the enemy, since 
all three columns were still 800 to 900 meters from the vil- 
lage when our artillery fire called the enemy to his lines of 
defense.* None of the columns suffered itself to be em- 
broiled in a fire action; all accelerated their advance. The 
loss of 450 men suffered here by nine battalions can surely 
not be called excessive in view of the Chassepdt fire, and the 
hostile garrison, which numbered about four battalions. 
Le Bourget was an advanced post, but the action is never- 
theless instructive, and what could be done there will be 
possible in the future, though the columns would not be so 
disposed in the north and south as here, because, on account 
of the long range and power of penetration of modern rifles, 
they would inflict losses on each other. In other respects 
Le Bourget remains the standard for similar cases, of which 
there are bound to be more in the future than there were in 
the past. 

The unobstructed view, the long range, and the in- 
creased effect of infantry and artilery fire make it necessary 
to begin all preparatory measures for a turning movement, 
either against an advanced post or in the pitched battle, at 
a greater distance. In this respect the consideration of 
unobstructed view will affect us more thaa the range of the 
enemy's rifle, wMch, in comparison with that of the Chasse- 
p6t, has not so very much increased since 1870-71, It fol- 
lows that the superior leaders should precede their troops 
in order to divert them from the column at the proper time. 

*For details, see Von Kries and Von Besser. History of the 
Empress Augusta Hrenadier Regiment and of the Rifle Battalion of 
the Guard. 



370 Inquiries into the Tactics of the Future. 

This is an important duty for the division and brigade com- 
manders and still more for the commanding generals, as it 
is the only way to avoid crowding, crossing, and delays. It 
is the more indispensable, as the improved fire-arms will 
naturally impel the fighting troops to exert their fire power 
— i. e., to extend toward the flanks. At this point supe- 
rior leading encounters diflSculties which cannot be deter- 
mined in advance and which can be overcome only by early 
reconnaissance, by the prompt diversion of the troops as- 
signed to the turning movement, by circumspection and un- 
derstanding, by good organization of the system for the 
transmission of orders, and by a sufficiency of means 
for the same, etc.; to avoid and overcome them all will, 
of course, be impossible. That these difficulties will be 
very great is evident from what was intended and 
what was accomplished at Gravelotte, and what had 
to be done to gain success at all. In forming a concep- 
tion of what the course of the battle of the future will 
be like, Gravelotte is and remains tacticallj' the most 
instructive example on account of what the tacticians 
failed to do, and on account of the many critical tac- 
tical situations they thus invited. In all military history 
there is hardly a battle where not only the subordinate but 
also the superior leaders made so many tactical blunders 
as did the Germans at Gravelotte. In my opinion, the con- 
centration of the .armies before the battle was the greatest 
strategic feat accomplished, while in tactics the Germans 
did their very worst; tactically Gravelotte is a perfect night- 
mare. Considering the excellence of the generals present, 
we can hardly expect to have better ones in the future. As 
the best are apt to commit errors, it is the more reason why 
we should learn to see things in the right way; we note but 
two exceptions at Gravelotte — namely, the commanding 



Tactical Deductions. 371 

generals of the XII. and VIII. Army Corps, since the short- 
comings of the latter corps cannot be charged against 
General Goben. 

Cases will probably be more rare in future where, as at 
Worth and Koniggratz, the last march before the battle 
"converts the more or less intentional turning movement 
into tactical flanking. I also believe that, as regards con- 
centration before the battle, Gravelotte is also the strategic 
standard of the future battle in so far as it is at all proper 
to speak of standards — i. e., marching and concentrating on 
the first day, and fighting on the second. The second day 
may perhaps be lengthened out into two. As regards infor- 
mation of the enemy gained after the concentration, Grave- 
lotte is not a good example, to be sure; and in view of the 
present nature of the employment of cavalry w^e may 
assume that there will be no repetition of such things ; also, 
that it will be the rule to concentrate the armies before the 
battle, as was Napoleon's method, and that the assailant will 
not issue his orders, particularly for turning movements, 
until after the concentration. The opposing lines of battle 
will probably not often be closer to each other than the two 
opposing armies at Gravelotte on the morning of August 
18th were in the center, on the line from Montigny la Grange 
to Verneville and to our IX. Corps. It may thus be further 
stated that, assuming information of the exact position of 
the enemy to have been gained, the turning movement will 
have to be initiated 5 to 6 kilometers and more from the ene- 
my. It entails great difficulties for the direction of the 
concentrated army. The Germans overcame the difficulties 
at Gravelotte, and since turning and flanking will be the 
rule in large and small actions, we should study the disturb- 
ing elements in the course of that battle. In that way our 
modern "war scientists," who no longer acknowledge any 



372 Inquiries into the Tactics of the Future. 

difference between tactics and strategy, may perhaps be 
brought back into the right path; it will show them how in 
the dispositions for, and in the execution of the pitched bat- 
tle, the strategic consideration prevails and is decisive, and 
that on that very account the task of the tacticians from the 
beginning and through all the phases of the battle has be- 
come one of graver responsibility. If they do not know, or if 
they fail to understand, the strategic motive, the troubles 
of Gravelotte will be repeated in an aggravated form ; owing 
to the necessary extensive measures, it will result, not in a 
Gravelotte such as it turned out after all, notwithstanding 
all the blunders, but in a Lisaine battle, such as it was fought 
by the French — i. e., there will be no turning or flanking, 
and the result will be defeat. In such a case the Napoleonic 
method of piercing the opponent's line will have as much 
prospect of success as in the days of Napoleon himself. If 
the tacticians know the strategic motive, if they assist in 
its execution, then Sedan shows what skillful turning move- 
ments, resulting in a complete envelopment, may accom- 
plish; if the strategists have "lost the thread," the battles 
of Beaugency-Cravant (8th, 9th, and 10th of December) ex- 
hibit the anomaly of a frontal battle, which certainly has 
nothing in it to invite its repetition: firing on both sides for 
three days, without other result than expenditure of much 
lead, is not indeed an elevating spectacle for an anny whose 
successes had heretofore been chiefly due to turning move- 
ments and flanking. Flanking may sometimes not have the 
expected result; a frontal battle may have none at all! 
Frontal battles should be altogether expunged from the 
military dictionary ;it is not fire alore that gains theobject,it 
is the flanking combined with proper direction of fire. When 
the opposing forces are equal, modern arms remove any dan- 
ger there may be in outflanking the enemy; the assailant will 



Tactical Deductions. 373 

therefore make it a rule to turn his opponent, and all tacticians 
should be fully imbued with that rule. The many instances 
quoted of far superior opponents on various theaters of war: 
Noisseville, first day; Bapaume, North Army; Le Bourget, 
December 21st, Army of Paris; Lisaine, East Army; Baune 
la Rolande and Loigny-Poupry, Loire Army, etc., all under 
the most varying conditions prove the same truth, that turn- 
ing the enemy calls for more than ''a good plan" — namely, 
jsuflScient reconnaissance, proper disposition of the troops, 
careful regulation of the system of orders and reports, and, 
above all, an army equally good in all its parts, and excel- 
lent infantry. That militia armies are unequal to outflank- 
ing operations is strikingly show n by the campaign against 
the republic, and as the "Umfassungs^^ battle will be the 
rule in future, wise army leaders will more than ever insist 
on good infantry. What Davout demonstrated at Auer- 
stadt was repeated in 1870-1871 in various ways — namely, 
that superior tactics proffer the greatest safety in outflank- 
ing; superior tactics are impossible without superior edu- 
cation and training — i. e., without an army of superior 
quality, superiority of numbers being of less importance. 
Armies without training (republic, 1870-71), and armies mis- 
guided by drill-ground fancies (1806), are equally impotent! 
As regards the forces to be concentrated for battle, the 
approximate limits are also indicated at Gravelotte; other- 
wise direction would become more difficult than it is al- 
ready. The latter should not be misunderstood, and impos- 
sible things should not be expected from it, so far as the 
commander-in-chief is concerned; for, as regards leading, he is 
merely a strategist ; he cannot do much more than assign to 
battle units their directions and objectives, and keep in hand 
a reserve; everything else is the business of the tacticians 
— i. e., of the commanders of battle units. In that respect 



374 Inquiries into the Tactics of the Future. 

the conduct of battle bas been much modified as compared 
with Napoleon's methods; divisions and army corps once 
engaged can no longer be diverted at pleasure, but, from the 
strategic point of view, Napoleon I. is and remains never- 
theless the great master in conducting a battle, and whom 
the Germans have equalled but once, at Sedan. As com- 
pared with Napoleon, they failed above all in reconnais- 
sance, in the use of artillery with its sequences, and in pur- 
suit. Koniggratz and Gravelotte approximate the Ulm 
and Jena of Napoleon. If the outflanking opponent is 
equal or slightly superior in strength, he may outflank on 
one flank; if superior, as at Worth and Sedan, he may turn 
both flanks, and in the latter case the battle should invaria- 
bly result, and has resulted, in a catastrophe. While the 
commander-in-chief can do no more in the way of leading 
after the battle is opened, than expend his battle units as 
he intended, he is compensated for this shortcoming by the 
fact that he is able to prepare from the beginning for out- 
flanking the enemy in the most effective (strategic) direc- 
tion, and by the fact that he is at the same time able to take 
care that the cavalry shall be on hand for pursuit after the 
turned flank or flanks have been defeated. The practica- 
bility of turning both flanks will depend on the character 
of the enemy's position (negative at Gravelotte, positive at 
Worth). The foregoing goes to show the extraordinary 
preponderance of strategy over tactics, because, according 
to human judgment, outflanking tactics must be the rule in 
battle for any one who wishes to attack at all. 

I have frequently cautioned against any kind of ortho- 
doxy, and desire to do so again at the end of this chapter, as 
regards leading in battle. As there is no rule without 
exception, so the exception of Loigny-Poupry teaches that 



Tactical Deductions. 375 

under certain circumstances a battle may yet be directed 
as were those of Austerlitz and Liitzen by Napoleon. 

IX. Of the Frontal Action. 
Various events of 1870-71 go to prove the soundness of 
my opinion that with proper dispositions, when the enemy 
has been subdued by the fire action of infantry and artil- 
lery, the attack of a brigade is not only practicable to-day, 
but also successful. I call to mind the determined assault 
-of the 33d Infantry Brigade under General von Kottwitz on 
Loigny with part of the troops in close order. Three bat- 
talions of the Seventy-sixth and one battalion of the 
Seventy-fifth shared in the assault, and not until they had 
penetrated the town from the northeast and east — i. e., 
from the flank — did the swarms of the Bavarians enter from 
the front. I am convinced that without the assistance of 
the former the skirmishers of the latter would never have 
succeeded in getting into the town. When the attack is 
preceded by the proper tactical preparation, as in this in- 
stance, the defender's fire power will be so reduced in the 
end that the controlled attack is the quickest and least 
bloody way of deciding the conflict. An indispensable 
prerequisite is, of course, that there be tacticians and that 
the several arms be logically employed, for there is such a 
thing as logic even in tactics; another prerequisite is that 
the ground be utilized during the advance, which, in that 
case, should be resolute. Our large attacks failed almost 
without exception on account of their inopportunity, of the 
selection of the wrong tactical moment, of the disregard of 
the situation of the battle and of the ground, and because 
the troops were flung into the fight by driblets. After the 
capture of Loigny, General von Kottwitz brought up his 
two fresh battalions of the Seventy-fifth, which drove the 



376 Inquiries into the Tactics of the Future. 

enemy from Villours at the point of the bayonet, captured 
the village, and thus decided the battle. Such instructive 
examples are rare, Fate is chary of them; but when we do 
have a few, we should turn them to good account. 

It may not be out of place here to state that where the 
terrain affords points of direction as at Chilteau Goury, 
Loigny, Villours, there is no difficulty in announcing them 
to the troops beforehand; they can direct themselves by 
them without further misunderstanding. In spite of this 
precaution, part of Kottwitz's brigade swept past Loigny 
toward Fougeu. When on a perfectly open plain, or when 
emerging on open ground from a defile, it is easier to select 
a point of direction in the terrain some distance in front, 
than among the troops themselves, which, under such cir- 
cumstances are availing themselves of cover. 

A nice parallel to Kottwitz's brigade at Loigny is Stark- 
loff's Wiirtemberg brigade at Worth. It reached the 
battle-field after the enemy had been shaken; crossed the 
Hauer by the bridge at the Bruchmiihle, took the direction 
of Elsasshausen and then of Froschweiler, passed the line 
of battle of the V. Army Corps after a brief fire action, and 
was the first to get into Froschweiler, its troops at that 
instant being chiefl}^ in close formation. The advance of the 
three groups of the brigade with flying colors exercised an 
animating effect over the other troops, part of whom joined 
the Wiirtembergers, Daring the march requests for 
assistance reached the brigade from Elsasshausen as well as 
from Froschweiler; it approached Froschweiler under Gen- 
eral Starkloff in the following order: Third Rifle Battalion, 
in its rear the First Battalion of the Fifth Regiment west of 
Froschweiler; First Battalion of the Second Regiment, 
south ; and on the east of the village Second Battalion of the 
Fifth Regiment, and the Fifth and Sixth Companies of the 



Tactical Deductions. 377 

Second Regiment. The advance having been skillfully con- 
ducted and proper preparations having been made, the con- 
trolled assault was as successful asat Loigny,and it is really 
the simplest, shortest, and least bloody way to success under 
such conditions; nor is it any different if the preparations are 
made in the early morning, as at Le Bourget. How about the 
losses? The four battalions (minus one companj^) of the 
Twenty-eighth Brigade lost at Koniggriitz 10 officers, 190 
men; the 9 battalions of the Second Division of the Guard at 
Le Bourget lost about 450 men; the U battalions of Stark- 
loff's brigade at Worth, 17 officers and 3^9 men; and Kott- 
witz's brigade at Loigny, 21 officers and 423 men. Are the 
conditions of rationally conducted attacks so very much dif- 
ferent now? I should say, no! Of course, when the prere- 
quisites we have named are not there, there will be no such 
success; I refer to Maire's brigade at Worth, to the assault on 
Loigny led by General de Sonis, and to the various attacks 
by the brigades of Vivenot, Brissac, and Durochat at Beaune. 
Outflanking, or turning without engaging in front, 
is inconceivable, and, however frequently I have warned 
against orthodoxy in this or that direction, I must do so 
again. I have frequently stated that it is really the supe- 
rior command, not the man, the company, or the battalion, 
that fights an "Umfassungen^' action, since these units al- 
ways fight a frontal action. It follows that the conflict will 
always be along the tactical front, since there is nothing that 
could take its place; its execution, however, should be suit- 
able and tactically correct. Conflict along the tactical front 
being inseparable from the conduct of battle and from the 
decision, it would be foolish and anomalous to banish every 
frontal attack from the battle-field; the faulty ones should 
be banished and the good ones retained. Military history 
teaches, in the first place, that in case of a very strong front 



378 Inquiries into the Tactics of the Future. 

the frontal attack promises no success against the muzzle- 
loader. The frontal action of the I. Army at Koniggratz is 
a case in point ; the same thing recurred at the Mance ravine 
at Gravelotte. In the first case the "tacticians" did not seek 
the decision in the front, and it was well they did not; in 
the second case the ''tacticians" did want it and piled blun- 
der on blunder without notable result. But at Koniggratz 
the result of the frontal action of the I. Army was neverthe- 
less enormous, and so was that of the frontal action of the 
V. Army Corps at Worth. The attacks on both sides were 
frontal, and most of them netted more or less success. Thus 
will it also be in future. I call to mind the counter-attacks 
of the Austrians in the wood of Maslowed, the counter- 
attacks of the French at Worth and against the Mance 
ravine, etc. In all these cases both opponents fought purely 
frontal actions, yet the enemy's lines were completely 
driven back. On the other hand, a number of frontal 
attacks of Prussians and Germans, quitting the defensive 
position to assail the enemy, were successful, even that of 
the II. Army Corps on the second day of Villiers, and of the 
Wiirtemburgers on the first day of the same battle, and that 
brings me to the salient point. Wherever the ground is in 
any way favorable, good infantry should keep on charging 
the enemy in front; fire alone does not suffice to subdue 
him, and from this resulted the typical character of the 
offensive battle in the front at Worth distinguished by the 
surging to and fro of the various charges. Who will deny 
that the charges of the Germans did not net a great result, 
notwithstanding many defects which will in future be reme- 
died by greater unity of action? It is the vigorous charges 
alone, in connection with fire, that enhance the severity of 
the action to the maximum limit of endurance on both 
sides. This should invaviablv be the course along the tac- 



Tactical Deductions. 379 

tical front, so as to enable the flanking troops to deliver the 
decisive blow. To neglect it and to engage in a frontal fire 
action at long range would be to suppress the offensive 
spirit of our infantry, to diminish its tactical value, and to 
lose the battle! Frontal attacks should not be discarded, 
but they should be better organized and undertaken with 
larger bodies under single control. They may entail losses, 
disorder, and indecisive surging of the troops, but they are 
highly instrumental in preparing the decision. 

In the front, the action of infantry assumes the form of 
a series of onslaughts while the commander should seek to 
gain tlie decision by outflanking — i. e., pushing the attack 
home. I am thus distinguishing between onslaughts for the 
purpose of wearing the enemy out along the tactical front and 
the attack for gaining the decision on the tactical flank; 
neither should be made before the superiority of fire has been 
gained. To be sure, we did not always take sufficient time 
for it. This rule should never be deviated from ; otherwise we 
are apt to return to the indecisive position warfare. The fact 
that infantrj' — for instance, the Fiftieth Regiment at Worth 
—after being engaged all day on the tactical front, retained 
sufficient power to rush the key point, Froschweiler, should 
silence those who deny the necessity of frontal action as a 
general principle.* To malce concessions to human nature 
in such questions would be to betray weakness and timid- 
ity. It was fresh troops, as a rule, mostly closed squads or 
companies, that carried the swarms with them in a charge 
(Worth), and it was the closed bodies on which the worsted 
swarms rallied; it is not expected that it will be the same in 

*0n rallying in the wood near Elsasshausen, Captain von 
Bnguslawski had about 20 men, and on entering Froschweiler about 
25, of the Third, Sixth, and Twelfth Companies of the Fiftieth 
Res:iinent. (Pages 243 and 248 of the History of the Fiftieth Regi- 
ment, by Von Boguslawski.) 



380 Inquiries into the Tactics of the Future. 

the future. After a success or repulse, the leaders are 
endeavoring (Boguslawski) to rally their men in order 
to lead them forward again; that constitutes the true 
^'Schneid," because it is coupled with good sense and brings 
about that high degree of resisting power and of stubborn- 
ness in the modern fire fight. To relinquish one iota of 
this would be the very worst thing we could do, for I repeat : 
the action of the troops is always a frontal one. It should 
be conducted rationally and in a manner in keeping with 
modern arms. By beginning rushes at more than 1000 
meters, I say we would deprive ourselves of the possibility 
of making those successful, though bloody, onslaughts. 
The advance by rushes in combination with long-range fire 
paralyzes the offensive spirit. The advance should be made 
without pause, with fully deployed front, and successive open 
lines, depending on the terrain. Opportunities for long- 
range fire should, of course, be taken advantage of, but it 
should be left to the discretion of the leaders, as should the 
choice of formation during the advance, and of the direction 
of the advance within the sphere of the brigade. From what 
has been stated it is plain that the difficult question is not 
settled by the mere statement that the troops in rear should 
be formed either in line or in column. The defender would 
indeed be foolish not to select positions permitting of the 
full efl^^ect of improved arms. In the case of such positions, 
stretches of ground may be encountered where neither line 
nor column can be maintained in close formation when the 
assailant enters the medium range. Thus in the maneuvers 
of 1893, for instance, the XVII. Army Corps employed open 
lines, the VIII., XIV., XV., and XVI. Corps promptly devel- 
oped strong skirmish lines, followed by closed bodies at a 
distance of 300 to 400 meters. I consider the latter wrong, 
for it is a normal attack. 



Tactical Deductions. 381 

The assailant's troops invariably fight a frontal action, 
whether they flank the enemy or not. The effect on the 
enemy of this frontal action against his front and flank iS 
best understood by a reference to Worth. In the same 
degree as the French felt the clamps around them tighten- 
ing, they sought to disembarrass themselves by frontal 
charges of infantry and cavalry. The clamp was thus some- 
times bent outward, but was immediately contracted by 
the offensive spirit of our infantry. There was a constant 
repetition of this at Worth until the end of the battle, when 
the enveloping flanks came together in the center at Frosch- 
weiler. Though the flanking troops are thus fighting a 
frontal action, still, the unobstructed view, the great range 
of the rifle, and the practicability of intelligent cooperation 
of infantry and artillery combine in conveying to the indi- 
vidual soldier the impression that he is fighting an envelop- 
ing action, and that is a decisive consideration, because ad- 
dressing itself to the individual! The flanked opponent, on 
the other hand, has the impression that he is seen and fired 
at from two or three directions, which is bound to lessen 
his morale at the very time when that of the assailant is in- 
creased by what he is seeing and effecting. The "Umfas- 
sungs'' action should therefore become the normal form of 
battle, as it were; but to make it feasible, the flanker must 
undertake a series of frontal onslaughts, under whose pro- 
tection alone, in combination with fire, the flanking move- 
ment can be effectively carried out. The improved arms 
cannot abolish the frontal attack. Frontal actions will be 
indispensable for assailant and defender in the future as 
they were in the past; it is by flanking the enemy that the 
full effect of which the new arms are capable may be real- 
ized; thus the sum total of moral and material effect is 
accomplished! 



382 Inquiries into the Tactics of the Future. 

These expositions will explain the extent of mv concur- 
rence in the suggestions of the book"Der gegenwartige Stand 
der Gefechtslehre und die Ausbildung zum Gefechte" ('The 
Present State of Tactics and Training for Battle").* 

X. Of Village and Wood Fighting. 

We frequently hear the statement that the role played 
in battle by villages, farmsteads, and woods would in future 
undergo many modifications. I have to be brief on this 
point, because a thoroughly satisfactory inquiry would 
take too much space. The reader will be able to form his 
own opinion, and it will become plain whether and to what 
extent these statements are justified. 

It is assumed that the destructive power of modern 
infantry and artillery fire in connection with unobstructed 
view, and the practicability of concentrated mass-fire of 
both arms, will make the obstinate defense of villages, 
towns, and farmsteads impossible in future; that on this 
account it is better not to undertake a direct defense of such 
places, but to use them rather as protection against obser- 
vation and fire of the enemy. It is further recommended to 
employ infantry in front of these places, ensconced in 
ditches and other natural and artificial cover. Such also 
is the drift of the German Kegulations. 

Three questions are evidently involved: 1, the loca- 
tion of the village; 2, its extent; and 3, its construction. 
It has already been explained that villages and farmsteads 
will no longer be found useful as advanced posts, and in that 
particular the conditions have actually undergone material 
modifications. Ste. Marie-aux-Chenes, for instance, and St, 
Hubert would no longer play the same role as on August 
18,1870; still less would an isolated advanced post, as Worth 

*By Keim, Berlin, 1890, E. S. Mittler. 



Tactical Deductions. 383 

and Le Bourget, even if of the dimensions of these two lat- 
ter places. In that respect the question is settled and it 
only remains to say something about villages and farm- 
steads in the line of battle. I am well aware that Worth did 
not gain its importance until the French decided to capture 
that post in front of their position. 

We have seen that on an Austrian target-range a rifle- 
man posted behind an embankment of a cross-section of 
140 centimeters was mortally wounded by a Mannlicher bul- 
let at a range of 200 meters, but this point merely involves a 
question of earth cover, of rifle-trenches. Villages do not 
everywhere bear the same character; a French village and 
one in Poland, for instance, are greatly different, and on ac- 
count of their situation, construction, and extent, the former 
may be, under certain circumstances, as suitable for defense 
as formerly, though it was equally faulty in former days to 
restrict the defense to the place itself. To defend Baaeille, 
for instance, it would be necessary to include the adjacent 
heights in the problem. 

In future many villages and localities will be found 
within the battle-field, and it is necessary to make up one's 
mind whether or not their defense should be undertaken. 
I believe that in France the answer will in many cases be in 
the affirmative, because chateaus with extensive parks, sur- 
rounded by walls half a meter and more in thickness, are 
frequently situated in the vicinity of villages. The Ger- 
mans did well to defend the castle of Montb^liard and those 
of Villiers and Goury with their parks, and to convert them 
into the chief points d'appui of their positions. I fail to see 
why we should do otherwise in future. The French de- 
fended Froschweiler and St. Privat with great stubborn- 
ness; the Germans could not be driven from Beaune by the 
enemy's fire, in spite of his ten-fold superiority, and notwith- 



384 Inquiries info the Tactics of the Future. 

standing the fact that f requentl}- the attacks almost reached 
the stage of a haud-to-hand conflict. The obstinacy of the 
defense of Froschweiler and St. Privat was chiefly due to the 
fact that much of the defending infantry was ensconced 
under cover in front of the villages. Special advocacy of 
that sort of defense to-day raises no new issue; it merely 
tends to give the force of principle to a feature that has 
proved effective. It would, nevertheless, be an error not to 
make places having the location and extent of St. Privat 
and Loigny the principal supporting points of the position, 
either on the flanks or in the center. I have already pointed 
out the solid construction of French villages, among which 
some may be found that will give some protection even 
against the destructive power of field artillery. We cannot 
therefore, expect to simply reduce such places to ruins or to 
destroy them completely by conflagration. They are too 
extensive for that. Though a great part of Froschweiler, 
St. Privat, Beaune, and T.oigny were in flames, they were 
not abandoned on account of either the conflagration, or 
the enemy's fire, or the hail of fragments of stone and 
of projectiles. Froschweiler, St. Privat, and Loigny suc- 
cumbed only to assault. We omit the singular street fight- 
ing at Bazeilles, because not typical either for defense or 
attack; but St. Privat, Froschweiler, and particularly Le 
Bourget and Loigny, show how obstinately the defender may 
hold on after the edge of the village has fallen into the 
enemy's hands. The street fighting at Le Bourget and 
Loigny, for instance, lasted several hours, and would have 
given the French ample time for the arrival of considerable 
reinforcements. This consideration alone should be suflS- 
cient reason for not expunging village fighting from tactics. 
The exterior reserves and the troops fighting on the 
flanks have at all times been of prime importance, and a dis- 



Tactical Deductions. 385 

cussion of tbe defense of a village in the main position is 
inconceivable vvatliout giving them due consideration. 

I believe it would be well to reckon in the future on 
village fighting, chiefly on account of smokeless powder, 
in all cases where the fire may be arranged in tiers as at 
St. Privat and Loigny. If it was difficult formerly to see 
the infantry posted under cover in front of the village and 
to take it under fire (St. Privat, Froschweiler), it will be far 
^more difficult in future, which, particularly in the case of 
extensive villages, will make the defense of villages more 
feasible than formerly. We may be sure that the struggle 
for the ground in front and for the edge will be more pro- 
tracted and obstinate than formerly; which is due to the 
character of smokeless powder when the defender has a wide 
field of fire. Owing to the long range and sheaf-like form 
of artillery fire, I should consider it an error to restrict the 
use of villages chiefly to that of shelter for reserves and 
large bodies of troops, because heavy losses are hard to bear 
for inactive troops thus posted; on the other hand, I hardly 
know of an instance of good troops being driven from any 
defensive position by mere fire. It might rather be recom- 
mended to post the reserves at points where the assailant's 
means, usually known to the defense, will make him expect 
them least. I do not desire to go further into details ; I be- 
lieve, however, that the more conspicuous isolated farm- 
steads are, the less their value. 

The principal defense of villages will probably be made 
in the foreground. The reserves will probably be posted 
on one or both flanks; as their employment will be as hereto- 
fore, for increasing the fire power, in counter-attacks, in en- 
trenching and holding rearward positions and in covering the 
retreat. All these duties are inseparable from village fight- 
ing in battle. Since favorable localities offer such a variety 



386 Inquiries into the Tactics of the Future. 

of means to the defender for the defensive as well as for the 
offensive, it follows that, owing to the attraction exerted by 
such objectives, both sides will exert their full power when 
struggling for these points. The superior destructive power 
of modern fire, the greater range and fire effect will not 
change this much. And in what way should the new 
method of fighting — the result of new arms — change the 
fighting in the interior of the village? Since it is not pos- 
sible to remove objects like villages from the position, it is 
better to utilize them for the battle; infantry should no more 
think it impossible to victoriously hold a village than to 
carry it by assault. It should be able to do both, and it is 
able if it wants to, and if it possesses the tactical qualities. 

Although we shall ever find extensive positions devoid 
of localities and farmsteads, but few will be found devoid of 
woods, which may be situated in the position, in front or in 
rear of it, and at different points; they may vary much on 
account of the character of the trees and of the ground, 
their character depending on these features as much as 
on their extent in width and depth, and on the shape of 
their edge. In battle a wood may serve as cover for the 
approach, it may be the objective of the struggle, or ft may 
serve to cover the retreat, in all of which phases it is of first 
importance to know whether the wood is practicable for 
troops. We are dealing here mth tactical considerations. 

I cannot go into the details of the many and great 
differences of woods. The handling of a French wood 
is based on different principles from that of a German 
or Russian one, and it is necessary that the officer under- 
stand the tactical differences springing therefrom. Every 
officer should therefore be well informed on these subjects, 
which are fundamental in tactical training. In general it 



Tactical Deductions. 387 

may be stated that the French as well as the Russian (Pol- 
ish) woods make higher demands on leaders and troops than 
the German variety, and that smokeless powder has greatly 
facilitated the direction of an action in them. All woods, 
even small ones on dry ground, possess a considerable 
degree of humidity. In combination with the moist air, 
the smoke used to form an impenetrable stratum, which 
obstructed the view and made control of the action impos- 
sible. That is one of the reasons why woods used to be 
avoided. The smoke is not in the way to-day, and the young 
officer has no idea of the former difficulties. In the ab- 
sence of other obstacles, the fighting in a wood may in- 
deed be controlled to day, though the echoes of musketry 
discharges and of words of command are even now very 
troublesome in woods of small extent. The more extensive 
the wood, the more difficult is the control, which in large 
woods is, even to-day, only practicable to a certain degree at 
particular and favorable spots. Aside from the fact that 
artillery and cavalrj- cannot be used in them, woods have 
grave disadvantages, since extensive woods frequently 
obstruct the view of the commanding generals and other 
leaders. Owing to the increased power of penetration of 
infantry projectiles, trees will rarely prove effective as 
shelter; the great dispersion of artillery projectiles also 
deprives the wood of most of its character as cover from 
artillery fire; moreover, woods, and particularly pine woods, 
will be more apt to be set on fire. On the defensive it is 
most important to hold the edge of the wood; when that is 
lost, attackers and defenders are about on even terms, and 
it is only at clearings that the defender again has the advan- 
tage (wood of Maslowed, July 3, 1866); farmsteads may 
serve to revive resistance, as strikingly illustrated by the 
action at Ladon on November 24, 1870. ^^'oods are, as a 



388 Inquiries into the Tactics of the Future. 

rule, poor supports for the flanks, and are most useful when 
of moderate extent and situated in the front line. Thus, 
for instance, the little fir copse of Colombey on August 14, 
1870, and the Bois de Tronville on the 16th of August, 1870. 

After these general remarks, we have to discuss the role 
of woods somewhat in detail, because they can hardly be 
wholly avoided on the future battle-field; and it should 
be remembered in this connection that it will be more diffi- 
cult to ascertain the strength of the defenders, that by a 
suitable distribution of his fire the defender may greatly 
deceive the assailant, and that in the future the latter will 
have to fight for the sake of reconnaissance, and cannot 
make his principal dispositions until afterward. 

Among the woods used as cover and traversed on the 
advance we may mention the wood of Popowitz (July 3, 
1866), the wood of Maslowed (Swiepwald), the Bois de Vaux 
on August 18th, and the wood of Beaumont on August 30, 
1870. The first and last of these woods were turned to 
such excellent account by the Twenty-eighth Brigade and 
by the IV. and XII. Army Corps respectively, that the subse- 
quent successes may be ascribed to it. Deductions: After 
sufficient reconnaissance has furnished a correct idea of the 
wood, it should be entered unobserved, and traversed quietly 
in close formation ; on reaching the farther edge, the deploy- 
ment should be made simultaneously upon preconcerted 
signal, in order to open the action from as many points as 
possible. In the second case, the Swiepwald at once as- 
sumed the character of extensive wood fighting; it became 
an advanced post, and the advanced post became the main 
position : ultimately two Austrian army corps were fighting 
here against a Prussian division; they quitted their pre- 
scribed main position, and thus rendered our victory at the 
main position comparatively easy. Both the assailant and 



Tactical Deductions. 389 

the defender suffered great losses in this wood fighting; 
both lost their direction, especially the Prussians, so that 
ultimately they in part faced to their original rear. The 
direction is more easily lost in woods, especially when fight- 
ing in extensive woods, than in villages. We find it every- 
where to be the case more or less. Practice maj' somewhat 
diminish the evil, but it is well to state right here that it 
can never be entirely removed. In the third case, the pene- 
trable wood furnished a means, though a difficult one, for 
covering the approach, the deployment, and the develop- 
ment; but all designs in this respect miscarried, owing to 
lack of experience on the part of the leaders and troops, 
and to lack of uniformity of design. But one condition 
was here fulfilled: sheltering the repulsed troops, which, 
however, could not be promptly rallied and re-formed. All 
these lessons are contained in this sketch. All four exam- 
ples are highly typical for the future, the success or miscar- 
riage of the plans. 

The Niederwald and the wood of Langensulzbach 
(Worth, August 6th), and the Stiringwald (Spicheren, Aug- 
ust 6th), play a different role, inasmuch as they could not he 
traversed without fghting, and thus made still higher demands 
on the leaders and troops. None of the three woods served 
to cover the flank of the defender effectively. Owing to 
various influences, the Second Bavarian Corps failed to 
utilize the wood of Langensulzbach as intended; the XI. 
Corps overcame all the difficulties of the Niederwald; of the 
five battalions of the Twenty-seventh Brigade (at Stiring), 
the battalion led by General von Woyna in person was the 
only one to reach that point of the Stiring- Wendel wood 
where he wanted them to be. 

In traversing a wood while fighting, the considerations 
of order, steadiness, maintenance of direction and com- 



390 Inquiries into the Tactics of the Future. 

munication, and of division into several columns, should 
receive strict attention and be the subjects of frequent prac- 
tice in peace.* 

In addition to the previously mentioned fir copse of 
Colombey (August 14, 1870), the park and wood of Goury 
(December 2, 1870), the Bois de Tronville (August 16, 1870), 
the Bois de G^nivaux (August 18, 1870), and above all the 
group of woods of Poupry (December 2, 1870) played an 
important role in the conduct of the battle in the main posi- 
tion. The phenomena attaching to them, though varying 
much, coincide in several particulars, particularly as re- 
gards the stubbornness of the struggle for the edge of the 
wood, the losing of the direction during the struggle (G^n- 
ivaux and Poupry), the intermingling of troops, and the 
impossibility of leading large bodies of intermixed troops 
(Poupry). The latter case, where the wood consisted of sev- 
eral separate, irregular groups, is one of the most instruct- 
ive instances of wood fighting for the future, inasmuch as 
the conflict was partly waged at dusk, and because the dis- 
positions for the final French attack, very properly directed 
against the northern angle (tactical point) because the 
frontal attack did not promise success, decided the posses- 
sion of the wood. We have the additional example here of 
cavalry attacking successfully in one of the open spaces 
under General von Colomb. 

Skillful use of woods for the protection of the retreat 

was made in the following cases: by the Saxons (wood of 

Briz, July 3, 186G); by the French (Reichshofen, August 0, 

1870), and again by the French (wood of Jaumont, August 

28, 1870). 

*To avoid repetition I refer the reader to "Die Kampfe una die 
Steinbriiclie von Rozerieulles" and "Viorundzwanzig Stunden Molt- 
ke'scher Strategic" ("The Struggle for tlie Qiianies of Rozerieulles" 
and "Twenty-four Hours of Moltke's Strategy"), Berlin, R. Felix, 
military publisher. Both l»y Fritz Honig. 



Tactical Deductions. 391 

Lastly we come to the operative and tactical aspects of 
large wooded districts, their possibilities for covering the 
deploj'-ment, for traversing them, for battle, and for cover- 
ing the retreat as exhibited by the typical instances of the 
forest of Orleans and that of Marchenoir. 

Unless large as well as small bodies in any kind of wood 
scrupulously observe the simple laws of order, of keep- 
ing direction, and of control, confusion is bound to quick- 
ly ensue. In crossing a wood, painstaking care should be 
exercised by sending men ahead to mark the direction, and 
others to reconnoiter. If the edge is to be taken, the greater 
part of the assailants should be at once re-formed upon its 
capture, follow the skirmishers, and envelop the flanks of 
the wooded district. The important rdles heretofore played 
by woods are more apt to be enhanced in future than the 
reverse, and it is interesting and useful to consider each case 
in connection with the efl'ect of modern arms. In general we 
are taught by military history that woods as well as locali- 
ties gain their highest significance only from the quality of 
the troops; it is particularly true of woods. Thus the forest 
of Orleans was largely instrumental in the defeat of the 
French, while the Germans remained masters of the varying 
and often perilous situation, although they were themselves 
unable to maintain the desired communication for some 
time during the action. Under such conditions the struggle 
assumed the character of march encounters. The latter 
may in future, under similar circumstances, be expected to 
be more obstinately contested, since wood fighting will in 
such cases approximate that of defiles. 

Village and wood fights render general control diffi- 
cult, give rise to uncertainty, and easily lead to precipitate 
steps and wrong movements. 

The leading of troop units is difficult, the units are eas- 



392 Inquiries into the Tactics of the Future. 

ily disrupted; hence the great number of dispersed men 
in village and wood fights. The delivery of fire is restricted 
to short range. Since the troops deployed in wood fighting 
are usually beyond the control of the leaders, suitable 
employment of the reserves is all the more important. 

XI. Of Night Battles. 

The philosophy that has been formulated on the sub- 
ject of losses, half of which might have been avoided by 
intelligent leadership, notwithstanding the employment of 
wrong formations against the Imperial Army in 1870, has 
been the cause of part of the "tacticians" desiring to trans- 
fer to the darkness of night what they no longer dare to 
undertake in broad daylight; and, as is usual in cases where 
knowledge, experience, and reflection are called for, the 
great majority, neither possessing the one nor liking anoth- 
er, have accepted the preaching of these false prophets. If 
one method is not suitable, another is; the example is easily 
settled that way. While I consider the tendency repre- 
sented by the "Summer-night's Dream" as an unhealthy 
excrescence of a healthy idea, and criticize and reject the 
same only in its consequences and forms, the tendency of the 
"night tacticians" deserves the sharpest condemnation as 
being the expression of an unhealthy idea. I say purposely 
"darkness of night," not "night," for there are nights that 
are not dark, and these tacticians wish for darkness, which 
they think will protect them from being either seen or hit. 

In order not to rest tactics on a wrong basis, we should 
ever start from a consideration of man; a serious-minded 
man can best study human weakness by making a serious 
study of his own nature. In making the study of himself he 
can easily ascertain that whatever he may be doing in the 
dark, he is acting with less assurance, and consequently 



Tactical Deductions. 393 

with less determination and effect, than in daylight. Any 
kind of human, intelligent, ijractical work requires the sense 
of sight; otherwise the Creator would not have given us 
eyes. By their means we control the action of the other 
senses and are enabled to make full use of them. The latter 
purpose requires light; in choosing darkness we relinquish 
one of the decisive means of action. Every tactical act is 
based on movement; every movement of the individual in 
' the dark is unsteady, even walking, which is the simplest 
requisite for every conflict. Every phenomenon perceptible 
to the senses in the dark acts at first as a surprise, and 
frightens; no one will gainsay this who remembers how fre- 
quently one thing or another at night "made his heart beat." 
I could cite hundreds of cases from my own recollection ; the 
terrifying vision only disappears upon the return of the 
mental faculties, usually styled presence of mind, which is 
somewhat incorrect, since the "presence" is subsequent to 
the vision and dependent on time and circumstances; nor 
does the vision then invariably disappear at once. If the 
use of his mental faculties enables man to recognize at once 
all the causes of terror, he will, if possessing will-power, re- 
main master of the situation. This "orientation by means of 
intellect" presupposes certain conditions — above all, famil- 
iarity with the surroundings; for, if such is not the case, the 
intellectual powers do not triumph over the imagination <as 
quickly as is desirable; and experience teachers that under 
unfamiliar circumstances and in the dark the imagination 
develops such power as to conjure up phantom after phan- 
tom, and to fetter the intellect completely. Man then has 
lost the equilibrium of his senses and powers, and is a being 
whom his excited imagination leads to acts of the greatest 
folly, precipitation, etc., which in tactics furnishes the most 
fruitful soil for panics. These simple truths have kept all 



394 J^iqiiiries into the Tactics of the Future. 

generals of renown from night enterprises (we speak here of 
great and decisive operations alone), and Cromwell is the 
only general who acted differently, though under justifiable 
circumstances. His first exploit was in the decisive battle of 
Dunbar on September 3, 1650. Cromwell was thoroughly 
familiar with the terrain and with the enemy's position, he 
approached during darlcness, deployed at dau^n, and fought 
and pursued in hroad daylight. The march did not, however, 
exceed 2 kilometers, his forces did not exceed 12,000 men, 
and the roads, crossings, direction — everything was well 
known. His second example is the crossing of the Firth of 
Forth, but here also the preparations had been made to 
include the most minute detail, and with astounding care, 
and there was no real darkness during the crossing (ap- 
proach), as it was a starlight night. 

That all generals have shunned the dark night for deci- 
sive battle is due to the fact that they were acquainted with 
the human heart, an indispensable requisite of a general. 
It is unintelligible why ^'tacticians" who consider all close 
formations inapplicable to battle in daylight, should recom- 
mend night battles. Believing themselves unable to suffi- 
ciently control the troops in swarm formation, they choose 
the night so as to be able to use close formations and act 
intelligently. We fail to see where the intellect comes in, 
if the same men want to transfer the battle to the night, 
which renders all acts and aims difficult or wholly impos- 
sible, since they all require mutual vision and recognition. 
The man is unable to see his leader in the dark or to follow 
his example; at best he can hear his voice. If the night is 
light, it gives no protection against fire, and protection is 
what the "tacticians of darkness" want. That protec- 
tion is the hobby of their theory. The splendid action of 
Laon on March 9, 1814, took place at night under similar 



Tactical Deductions. 395 

conditions as at Dunbar, at least in so far as familiarity with 
the terrain is concerned; but the night was not dark; it was 
so lit up by a clear starry sky and by the burning village of 
A this as to afford fair marks by which to direct the move 
ment; but in other respects surprise is an essential require- 
ment of effective night battles, they bear the characteristics 
of the unexpected attack. It follows from the foregoing: 
(1) that under certain circumstances night battles may be 
very effective if the state of discipline of the troops makes 
such an undertaking feasible, if there is prospect of surpris- 
ing the enemy, if terrain and enemy are well known so that 
the troops do not miss their objectives and the task is a sim- 
ple one; (2) that the body of troops should not be greater 
than can be controlled on the march. In order to surprise 
the enemy it is necessary to approach quickly, quietly, and 
without fire; to march in battle formation and thus to 
strike the enemy, as deployment takes up too much time and 
diminishes the chances of surprise. Small units alone are 
capable of rapid and surprising movements, the distances 
to be traversed should be relatively short, and to assign dif- 
ferent directions to the troops is to jeopardize combination 
as at Chenebier. (3) An army needs many roads for its 
march; it cannot move in the dark in battle formation; it 
cannot traverse great distances in the dark, the army corps 
cannot keep themselves mutually informed, they cannot be 
controlled; hence it is unlikely that a decisive battle will be 
fought in the dark. We should keep in mind the conditions 
on the 17th and 18th of August before the battle of Grave- 
lotte. It would have been easy to gather full information 
of the terrain for the march, to start the troops in the right 
direction, and to maintain them on the march. Next con- 
sider the difficulties actually encountered in the movements 
of the two armies, the march of the Saxons and of the 



396 Inquiries into the Tactics of the Future. 

X. Corps in battle formation, and then imagine sucb a task 
in future accomplished in the dark by 8 or 9 army corps. 
I believe that events would have been quite different from 
those happening in daylight! Daylight will be needed for 
the decisive battle in the future as it has been in the past, 
night actions will be exceptional, night battles are out of the 
question; night actions are therefore relegated to the domain 
of minor operations and of position warfare, where they 
have always been. 

It is not unlikely that fine night actions like that of 
Podol on the 27th of June, 1806, might be repeated under 
similar circumstances, and it is even advisable to give lead- 
ers and men some training in that direction; the situation, 
however, was very simple: Assaulting a bridge and main* 
taining the captured bridge against attacks on open ground 
are very simple tactical problems, wiiich, on a bright June 
night like this one, require nothing more than determina- 
tion and discipline. When matters are more complicated, 
as they were soon afterward at Gitschin on June 29th, the 
disadvantages of night actions become at once apparent, 
even after a victory and with relatively small bodies of 
troops. 

In the movement of an army corps a distinction is to 
be made between the march on the roads, the deployment in 
the terrain, and the continuation of the latter up to the col 
lision with the enemy. The march of several army corps 
at night on roads as good as those in France presents no 
insurmountable difficulties for well-broken troops, and con- 
trol and communication can easily exist and be maintained. 
I have taken part in night marches in the heat of summer 
and cold of winter. At the end of the first very long march, 
lasting from 1 p. m. until H a. m., the troops, not yet broken 
in, arrived with much straggling (4th and 5th of August, 



Tactical Deductions. 397 

1870). At the second and third night march (August 10, 13, 
1870) we were marching by brigade through night and day 
with the same facility as in daylight; the night marches 
from Blois to La Chapelle (December 31st), thence to Ven- 
dome (Januai-y 1st), and from Chateau-Renault to Blois 
(January 15th), were no trouble at all, notwithstanding that 
the last named march was through country deeply covered 
with snow. If the night is starlight and if the ground is 
covered with snow, the only real disadvantage is the loss of 
sleep on the part of the men. The difficulties for large 
units only begin after the deployment, which would have 
to take place not less than 5000 to 6000 meters from the 
enemy, if w^e wished to escape observation as much as pos- 
sible, and even that distance might prove too small when 
opposed to a watchful enemy. It is unlikely that such 
distances could be covered by several army corps in battle 
formation in unknown ten'ain without confusion, with which 
result night battles would fall to the ground. 

So far we have onlj^ dealt with night actions begun and 
ended or broken off in tlie dark, the approach being made 
in the evening or at night. There are other actions, in 
which the march to the battle-field was made in daytime, 
which were arranged and carried out in daytime, and which 
were not decided until dusk or dark. Foremost among such 
actions is that on the 3d and 4th of December, 1870, in front 
of Orleans; next is La Tuil^rie, and a number of other 
instances from the battles of Le Mans, of lesser tactical and 
strategic import; and here I come to a point which I deem 
of the greatest importance. Night enterprises may fall to 
the lot of any troops, which is sufficient reason why they 
should be trained accordingly, in order that the leaders at 
least may have an idea of their difficulties. It is moreover 
to be expected that many actions, and even battles (Grave- 



398 Inquiries into the Tactics of the Future. 

lotte, Orleans, Le Mans, Beaune, Loigny, St. Quentin), v/ill 
be continued until late in the eA'ening — i. e., until dark, and 
it is there that sagacious tacticians and good troops may 
gain success. If, for instance, after the French withdrawal 
from St. Privat, the III. and X. Army Corps had been mar- 
shaled to the assault on Amanvilliers, they might have 
gained great results. If General von Goben had even been 
slightly supported by his cavalry, or if he had had some 
fresh infantry on the evening of January 19, 1871, the ene- 
my's retreat would have been converted into a complete 
route. A few companies, boldly led, decided the battle of 
Le Mans by capturing La TuiMrie, for the possession of 
which the battalions had been contending in vain since 
noon; at dusk, single companies and small battalions daily 
took the enemy's points cVappui at Le Mans, all of which 
entailed but small losses, and even greater results could 
have been gained with comparatively small losses. Such 
tasks require strict discipline and an efficient corps of 
officers; it should also be borne in mind that many of 
these successful issues occurred in the last phase of the war, 
when the troops had naturally lost much of their fresh- 
ness and efficiency. Decisions which could not be gained in 
daytime by swarms of skirmishers were thus gained by 
close columns not only at the end of the battle, but at the 
end of the war. They do not desert e to be styled "night 
actions"; the situation became approximately known with 
the assistance of snow, a starlight sky, conflagrations, and 
the action just preceding. We should not cling to names, but 
endeavor to understand the true inwardness of things, and 
in doing so the moral power of the troops will regain its full 
importance as a decisive factor. It is certain that im- 
proved arms will make the attack in daytime more difficult; 
and it is, on the other hand, not unlikely that by evening the 



Tactical Deductions. 399 

defender's strength, though he may still hold his position, is 
for the most part consumed by the exhausting struggle dur- 
ing the day. This is naturally the moment for hurling 
closed troops against the enemy's broken strength under the 
cover of dusk or darkness, and in such cases these troops 
must and should be expected to gain the position by their 
onslaught. The charging pace is most suitable for the occa- 
sion, and moral grounds will usually by themselves suflSce 
to decide the success of a blow delivered with determination; 
and if any one desires to call this a night action, well and 
good, I do not cling to the letter; but I am convinced that 
night actions are very proper here, because based on human 
nature in tactics. Care should be taken that fresh troops be 
on hand at the decisive point, that they have stout hearts, and 
that the leaders have that "Schneid^^ which is indispensable in 
such enterprises. It is thus not impossible that battles which 
have remained undecided throughout the day may be de- 
cided in the dark ; that, at any rate, is the import of the sins 
of omission and commission in the battles of Gravelotte, Le 
Mans, Loigny, St. Quentin, and even Villersexel. Thus, 
though our roads may diverge, I join my opponents at the 
goal. The future will show who is right, and if we cannot 
have the best we should content ourselves with the good. 
These decisions after dark, as recommended by me, have the 
grave disadvantage that, as a rule, there can be no pursuit; 
at least, with the exception of Waterloo, I know of none. 
That is certainlj' bad, but the suggestions made by the other 
side have the much graver disadvantage that in the dark 
large bodies cannot be led with the requisite surety. In the 
former case the decision will, at any rate, be gained ; in the 
latter case we do not get as far as that. 

In the Russian Army, General Kuropatkin is one of the 
advocates of night attacks. His arguments are, however, 



400 [nquiries into the Tactics of the Future. 

chiefly based on the Tekinzeu campaign and are inapplicable 
to European armies. Yet the reference to the moral power, 
which is so much emphasized both by Kuropatkin and 
Dragomirow, should not be underestimated. The soldier 
who knows only ''victory or death" may generally be con- 
sidered a myth. ]}ut even if that were not so, night actions 
would not lose their dangers, so far as the higher command 
is concerned. 

The French have also recently dropped night battles, 
once 80 much recommended by Boulanger. The maneuvers 
at ChA-lons-sur-Marne in 1891, as is well known, ended in a 
grand attack at dawn, but it is doubtful whether in war an 
army could be suitably concentrated and disposed for the 
purpose. 

Among the older French generals, Marshal Pelissier, 
who took Sebastopol by assault, was greatly opposed to 
night enterprises. He stated with emphasis that the chief 
cause of the failure of his first assault (June 18, 1855) was 
that it was made at night. This experienced soldier also 
stated that at night the men are sleepy, that many lie down 
and hide, and that confusion is unavoidable. If a general 
of the French Army then existing expresses such an opinion, 
what are we to expect from modern iroo]>s, who cannot lay 
claim to the appellation of veterans? 

In America, General Early expressed himself as follows 
on the subject of night actions, in connection with Gen- 
eral Jackson's death, who, as is well known, was mortally 
wounded by his own men in a night action in the Wilderness: 
"The fire directed on General Jackson's staff, however 
lamentable in its results, was simply due to an accident, or 
rather to the confusion Avhich is unavoidable in all cases 
where troops have to be maneuvered in the dark. I have 
perhaps been as often under fire as any living person, and 



Tactical Deductions. 401 

my experience and observations lead me to believe that, if 
the enemy is watchful, offensive movements at night, par- 
ticularly at their inception, do more injury to one's own 
troops, through mistakes and accidental meetings, than to 
the enemy; I also believe that all experienced leaders agree 
with me. The danger is increased if the movements have 
to be made in a dense wood." (Wilderness.) 

It is well known that it has never been determined at 
the hand of what troops General Jackson received his mor- 
tal wounds, and the battle of the Wilderness was won as 
General Jackson was about to relieve Rhodes' Division by 
that of A. P. Hill in order to pursue the enemy. Even under 
such conditions, night operations are therefore not to be 
recommended. 

XII. Conclusion. 

At the time of the introduction of the needle-gun it was 
the general opinion that, owing to the greater rapidity of 
fire of that rifle, a section of skirmishers could accomplish 
as much as a platoon heretofore; and it was also believed 
that by employing three or four times as many combatants 
from the beginning, the battle would be proportionately 
shortened. Though this was several times the case in 1866, 
yet the wars of 1870-71 and of 1877-78 showed that when 
both sides were armed with breech-loaders, battles were not 
more quickly decided than formerly; that, on the contrary, 
the struggle had become more obstinate; that the fighting 
power of skirmishers armed with breech-loaders was extra- 
ordinary and surprisingly great. In seeking for proofs 
among the prominent examples, we cannot find better ones 
than those of the V. Corps at Worth, and of the ITT. Corps 
at Vionville, notwithstanding many checks in the battle. 

Though the use of smokeless powder does away with all 
obstructions to view from smoke, and though the efficacy 



402 Inquiries into the Tactics of the Future. 

of rifle and gun has been greatly increased as compared with 
1870-71, it would be j^remature to conclude that a more 
rapid course and (luicker decision will be the rule. That is 
in itself sufficient to convince those who have studied the 
operations preceding battle that an absolute shortening 
of great battles cannot be expected. Masses of 8 or 9 army 
corps are not killed off in a few hours. It is, moreover, 
beyond doubt that skirmish tactics endow the soldier with 
greater fighting power than any other tactics. It may, on 
the other hand, be assumed as fairly certain that in future 
the superiority of fire of one side over the other can in many 
cases be gained more swiftly than heretofore. It will 
chiefly depend on which of the opposing artilleries will first 
shatter that of the enemy, and it seems to me beyond doubt 
that superiority of training and leading may accomplish that 
end with great swiftness. It may therefore happen that 
shortly after the opening of the battle entire batteries Avill 
be disabled, to a much greater extent than the foretaste we 
had at Verneville (IX. Corps) and at St. Hubert (VII. Corps), 
and it is not too much to say that on the 18th of August, 
such as the situation w^as, the entire artillery of the 18th 
Division should simply have been captured by the French 
infantry advancing from both flanks, in the very first hour 
of the battle. At Worth, on the other hand, before the at- 
tack of the corps on the flanks, the massed artillery of the V. 
Corps was the rock against which the billows of battle 
were again and again broken, and constituted the firm sup- 
port of our infantry. These two examples are simply 
typical as regards the superiority of fire and the continua- 
tion of the action, in a negative as well as a positive sense; 
hence the artillery should be employed in large bodies 
from the beginning and covered in front and flank by 
infantry posted at some distance. The superiority of fire 



Tactical Deductions. 403 

may thus be gained step by step, and when it is accom- 
plished, we may perhaps read of whole lines of disabled 
guns which a successful issue of the battle is bound to 
deliver into the victor's hands. This all the more as the 
concentration of the fire of artillery on one objective is now 
perfectly feasible. 

Superiority of fire and the decision can not be coinci- 
dent in point of time; the latter cannot be gained until the 
former is attained, and it also depends on whether the side 
which has gained the superiority of fire will have sufficient 
fighting power left to gain the decision. Until 4 p. m. the 
French had undoubtedly the superiority of fire along the 
whole line of battle at Gravelotte, but nevertheless failed 
to gain decisive advantages at any point. It is also more 
difficult to ascertain the superiority of fire than is popularly 
assumed, which is demonstrated by the action of the French 
left wing at Gravelotte. Artillery which is silent for some 
time is not necessarily disabled; it may merely be held back 
for the decisive moment. It follows that it would not 
always do to hold the actual or supposed superiority of fire 
equivalent to the decision; the latter requires a general 
forward movement against the decisive points, of which 
infantrj' alone is usually capable. (XII. and Guard Corps 
at St. Privat, 33d Brigade at Loigny, etc.) Hence the new 
arms do not change the roles of infantry and artillery; the 
one cannot perform the duty of the other; the absence of 
smoke, etc., strengthens their combination as fighting 
branches; it is only now that all the requisite conditions for 
battle tactics are at hand. 

Artillery as well as infantry must be intelligently and 
correctly disposed and led, and comparatively large forces 
of either must be engaged in order to gain the superiority of 
fire as soon as possible by their common effort. It is feasi- 



404: Inquiries into the Tactics of the Future. 

ble in the case of either arm only after careful reconnais- 
sance and through unity of action; hence all commanders, 
down to those of regiments, should be well mounted and 
far out in front to observe and guide the troops into the 
proper direction at the requisite great distances from the 
enemy. If artillery and infantry act from the beginning in 
considerable force, the further course of the action, and ques- 
tions as to the employment of the arrived and of the com- 
posite bodies, need give no uneasiness. I again refer to 
Problus and St. Privat as examples of tactical correctness 
and errors; these matters have changed, not as regards prin- 
ciples, but as regards distances at which the preparatory 
measures have to be taken. They will therefore require 
more time than formerly, but on that account I would not 
jump to the conclusion, like some tacticians, that, the prep- 
arations once completed, the course of the battle proper 
would be swifter, for against it stand the undoubted in- 
crease of fighting power which the individual soldier derives 
from the much-improved arm, the greater supply of ammu- 
nition, and more careful training. Nor should we attempt 
to solve such questions in advance, because it is impossible 
and is apt to lead to wrong conclusions and ideas. In tac- 
tics we should invariably base ourselves on facts; they con- 
tain plenty of lessons for study. 

Correct disposition and apportionment of the forces is 
impossible without the intelligent employment of forma- 
tions suitable to the terrain. The only formation is that of 
successive lines, which is the most suitable for developing 
masses of skirmishers for the solution of the problem. I 
again refer to Problus and St. Privat (north), to Frosch- 
weiler, Loigny, and St. Quentin. For the deployment from 
the marching column, "Treffeii^^ are indispensable. Close 



Tactical Deductions. 405 

formations should therefore not be banished from the battle- 
field; they should rather be used with judgment. 

Since the employment of strong artillery and infantry 
from the start is the best guarantee to gaining the superior- 
ity of fire, such employment becomes a tactical law. If the 
assailant, for instance, has gained the superiority of fire, the 
danger for intelligently led close formations becomes less. 
These formations may be applicable in many cases, and I re- 
*peat that then a few closed companies or small battalions 
will be best able to quickly decide the conflict. (Frosch- 
weiler, Loigny, La TuiMrie.) The small-caliber arms, etc., do 
not make such action impossible, since a superior arm will 
be of small use to an enemy whose fire power is broken. Let 
us calmly and coolly retain and use what is good, and not 
stickle on rules. 

It is the same way with long-range and short-range fire. 
The danger of running short of ammunition seems some- 
what diminished by the greater number of rounds carried by 
the soldier, but it is at the same time increased by the maga- 
zine system and by the great range of the rifle. At Loigny 3 
battalions of the Fourth Bavarian Brigade expended all 
their ammunition, and in the same battle the First Bava- 
rian Division had expended so much of its ammunition by 
noon — i. e., in an action of 4 to 5 hours — that General von der 
Tann had to have it supplied with ammunition before it 
could resume the action. Under circumstances such as here 
and at Beaune, where the Sixteenth and Fifty-seventh had 
to replenish their ammunition several times — i. e., on the 
defensive — it will be practicable in the future also to bring 
up fresh ammunition; but the danger of running out of 
ammunition is very likely to exist in future as in the past, 
and so is the difficulty, perhaps impossibility, of replenish- 
ing it. Both will best be guarded against by economizing 
one's fire, and by opening fire as late as possible. Several 



406 Inquiries into the Tactics of ths Future. 

instances occurring at Wortli, where troops of the Y. and 
XI. Corps had expended nearly all their ammunition and 
where any considerable supply of fresh ammunition was out 
of the question, urgently enjoin us to delay the opening of 
fire as long as possible. I do not think much of our peace 
methods of replenishing ammunition during the attack. 
For obvious reasons I abstain from going into details; the 
first requirement is to supply the man before the action with 
as much ammunition as he can carry without losing his 
mobility. It should also be made a rule in battle to collect 
the ammunition of the killed and wounded. 

If infantr}' is capable of inflicting sensible losses on the 
enemy (by controlled fire, if the range is 1000 meters and 
over), it would be foolish not to do so. Mistakes and lack 
of foresight are bound to occur, and every body of troops 
should be formally trained in taking advantage of them. 
But fire and movement cannot alwaye be so combined as 
though the army consisted of automatons. Fire and move- 
ment are antagonistic in their character; the antagonism 
may be diminished, but not altogether removed; in general 
the weakness of human nature inclines to making the fire a 
welcome pretext for halting. No one will gainsay that. It 
entails two disadvantages: 1, the offensive blow loses some 
of its force; 2, the fire is delivered at less effective ranges 
and encourages waste of ammunition. Every tactician 
should therefore strive not to open fire until medium ranges 
have been reached, because in point of leading there is the 
additional reason, that troops not firing cau be more easily 
led than those which are firing. 

Though it may be assumed that efforts to direct and 
lead will never be lacking, it is unlikely that this end will 
always be accomplished. Fire enforces dispersion, and dis- 
l)ersion places the colors in great danger. Keeping in mind 



Tactical Deductions. 407 

the Sixteenth and Fifty-seventh, it should be made a I'ule 
not to take the colors into action. Otherwise, in addition 
to the disabled line of artillery, (juite a number of colors 
might be fonnd and it would be impossible to tell how they 
were lost. To be sure, the account of the loss of the colors 
of the Sixteenth is not calculated to support that conclu- 
sion; I am opposed to all legends, however fine they may 
sound, because they prevent actual facts from being un- 
' derstood and rendered instructive. The Sixteenth did 
lose the colors of the second battalion, and whoever 
Avants to see them should go to the Dome of the Invalides 
at Paris. The colore were not missed until the men were 
re-formed after the attack; one or more bullets broke the 
lance about the middle, presumably during the attack. On 
reaching the point where the colors were lying, the French 
carried off the upper part, the colors proper; the lower part 
was left on the ground, and, as the French withdrew soon 
afterward from this point, owing to the appearance of Rhein- 
baben's cavalry division, it was found there by the Six- 
teenth on the 17th of August. These are the simple facts, 
which in my opinion contain nothing derogatory to the 
troops. Still the loss of the colors is very apt to be consid- 
ered disgraceful, and their capture is always considered 
glorious. These are the reasons why the facts were prettily 
decked out by the Sixteenth, and converted by the French 
into an abominable lie. I do not care to go into details, bu.t 
am curions to know how long a legend will stand in print, 
which every experienced soldier feels is "prettily gotten up," 
of which I have the proofs. The French Fifty-seventh, 
which fought against the second battalion of the 16th Regi- 
ment, caused a statement to be printed in the Petit Journal 
in 1885, to the effect that the colors were"/;?-is en plein action.'' 
I contradicted the statement in the Deutsche Heereszeitung, 



408 Inquiries into the Tactics of the Future. 

because reputable French military journals, like the Avenir 
militaire and Progres militaire, also stated that the colors had 
been captured. That is not so; they were picked up. 

It should not be overlooked that outflanking tactics are 
more theory than fact. In great battles the flanks alone are 
capable of effective outflanking movements, and even in that 
case it should be remembered that as soon as the enemy 
extends his line to confront the outflanking movement 
(which he is very apt to do), the soldier will be fighting a 
frontal action, and that the commander alone is doing 
the outflanking. But, owing to the great range of small- 
caliber arms, the effect of the outflanking troops engaged in 
a local frontal action cannot but be very severely felt in 
rear of the defender's front, for tactical outflanking is eo ipso 
favorable for a speedy attainment of the superiority of fire, 
since the theoretically ideal concentration of fire is rendered 
practicable only by delivering the same from two lines mak- 
ing an angle one with the other, while the absence of smoke 
in turn is favorable for concentrating the fire of both fronts, 
and of infantry and of artillery, on the objective. Outflank- 
ing the enemy — with all three arms — is the most effective 
form of attack, and admits of great variety in execution. 

This tactical law should not mislead us to hold the 
frontal action in light esteem, which seems to be the case 
more or less. The front must not only be kept busy in the 
future as it was in the past, but should be attacked with 
great energy; it would be wrong not to take full advantage 
of the fire power and of the oiTensive power of infantry and 
artillery. We should keep in mind the services rendered 
by both arms at Worth, Vionville, and Loigny. No timid- 
ity should be allowed to creep into our ideas. War demands 
sacrifices, and every decision exacts blood; troops in the 
front line will in the future, as they did in the past, take a 



Tactical Deductions. . 409 

prominent part in the decision, otherwise the enemy is apt 
to crush the weak front; mistakes and weakness render this 
as possible to-day as it was in the days of Napoleon I., the 
only difference being that such a man is not always present. 
Hence we should not try to overdo the outflanking: where 
the front is not sufficiently strong, outflanking is wrong. We 
cannot give figures; numerical conditions in themselves 
make the front neither strong nor weak — it is the manner in 
which the figures are applied in the front. At any rate, we 
insist that the soldier should know nothing but to be the 
first in attack and the last in defense; and, in the future, as 
in the past, battles will be decided by stout hearts and bright 
minds who know how to use the improved arras. The lat- 
ter may be overcome by the former, the former by the lat- 
ter never! The most favorable case is, of course, if the stout 
hearts and bright minds in combination have at their dis- 
posal superior arms; yet all the advantages will rarely be 
found on one side. 

With well-disciplined troops, of good morale and in the 
hands of determined leaders, the decisive blow, which many 
reasons may combine in making unpromising of success in 
daytime, will retain its full tactical value in the evening, 
at dusk, and in the dark, not to mention foggy and misty 
days. During the battles in front of Le Mans in 1871, all 
points were simply assaulted at dusk with hurrah and beat- 
ing of drums, and among many successful cases I know of 
but one failure. This is another case where close forma- 
tions are suitable; such things can, in fact, not be accom- 
plished in any other way. 

In general the future fire action may be said to take 
place chiefly between 600 and 300 meters, and to reach its 
culmination between 400 and 300 meters; there will be ex- 
ceptions, of course. The leaders must be sufficiently famil- 



410 Inquiries into the Tactics of the Future. 

iar with the ballistic qualities of the small-caliber arms to 
know how far in each case they may push their swarms for- 
ward. Lack of such knowledge will cost much precious 
blood. 

It is idle to argue whether the infantry or artillery 
derives greater advantage from smokeless powder; in my 
opinion, both have enormously gained in tactical value from 
this invention, and both at the expense of the cavalry ; and 
however strenuously I have contended for the retention of 
that arm on the battle-field,! consider its useful employment 
there as extremely diflScult. But when the hostile army is 
morally and physically broken by the exhaustive fire fight, 
well-led cavalry may be upon the enemy before he has recov- 
ered; battles will be preceded by great cavalry actions, since 
it is necessary to defeat the enemy's cavalry before w'e can 
observe, reconnoiter, and make our last dispositions. I con- 
sider it so great and honorable a duty, that the cavalry 
might well be content; in any event, in small or large bodies, 
cavalry will have to do much fighting, and it consequently 
continues to be a battle arm, since it makes no difference, 
so far as the effect is concerned, whether it is produced at 
the beginning or at the end of the battle, or ad interim. The 
characteristic duties of cavalry can never be performed by 
the other arms. 

I have repeatedly stated that Gravelotte seems to be 
about the typical battle of the future, but I am of the opin- 
ion that when the position is of greater natural or artificial 
strength, the decision may not arrive until the second day or 
later. Perhaps we shall resort to battles of circumvalla- 
tion. Belgrad, Mantua, Plevna may be repeated in more 
or less similar form. For it is not impossible that the 
assailant may not gain a victorious battle at all, that he 
may enclose the defender by a circumvallation where he 



Tactical Deductions. 411 

finds him, that attempts at relief may bring on several bat- 
tles, etc., until hunger and exhaustion compel the invested 
defender to surrendei', 

I also believe that an offensive' of Moltke's kind will 
hardly be seen again. Everything points to an obstinate 
defense on the frontier and to the continuation of the 
defense on a grand scale in fortified districts. The v^ar will 
progress spasmodically. A protracted struggle will be waged 
for positions, exacting much blood and other sacrifices, and 
that side which possesses the greater endurance and gains 
permanent superiority by means of a well-selected base, 
etc., will gain the ultimate victory' and witness the complete 
collapse of the material and moral force of the opi)onent. 
It follows that greater enterprises will be launched against 
the vital arteries of an army. The war will thus be carried 
abruptly from stage to stage, with complete annihilation of 
one side at each stage, and the stages themselves may be 
much protracted. Metz, Paris, Belfort, Plevna, and Schipka 
are cases in point. 

Though smokeless powder does not introduce new prin- 
ciples into tactics, still it greatly modifies existing ones, 
and affects the conduct of the war where tactics and strategy 
blend. When there is no smoke, one can of course see as 
fai' as it is at all possible to see; hence the defender, or rather 
both sides, will be able to watch the approach and deploy- 
ment beyond the line of battle, which is important, particu- 
larly in prepared positions; and we should not permit our- 
selves to believe that it can be obviated by a skillful use of 
the topographical conditions, since we shall have to take 
the theater of operations as we find it. In some cases unob- 
served approach and deployment may be possible, and im- 
possible in others, and in the latter case the assailant will 
encounter difficulties which he should not underestimate. 



412 Inquiries into the Tactics of the Future. 

When the weather is not quite clear (in fog, or rain), unob- 
structed view no longer exists; in our climate, misty days are 
not at all rare, particularly in the fall, spring, and winter. 
What advantage would the new powder have conferred on 
the Prussians at Jena, on the Austrians at Kouiggratz, on 
the French at Sedan, on the latter in most of the battles and 
actions during the winter? But, under conditions similar 
to those obtaining at Kissingeu, neither party would derive 
much advantage from the small-caliber rifle — i. e., the ter- 
rain may remove all advantages. Hence topogi'aphy and 
weather put a considerable curb on theory. 

Another tactically important point is the color of the 
uniforms. In order to make cavalry as inconspicuous as 
possible, all glaring colors should be removed from its uni- 
forms, especially white and red; in the infantry also the 
bright helmet trimmings should be discarded and all metal 
parts, particularly of the rifle, should be of dull color. It 
has been my observation in the peace exercises that hostile 
infantry ensconced and concealed at 300 to 400 meters be- 
trayed itself by its helmets and by the motions of loading 
and firing; even at more than 1000 meters the infantry was 
only discovered by the movements of rifles — metal pai*ts glis- 
tening in the sunlight — whereupon the artillery was able to 
take it under fire. 

Something else I want to mention: On the 18th of 
August, 1870, I was able from near Remilly — i. e., more than 
6 German miles (about 30 English miles. — Tr.) distant — to 
make out the opposing lines of fire with the bare eye, which, 
as I afterward learned, were hanging curtainlike in dense 
white clouds over the battle-field of Gravelotte, and this 
although not a sound could be heard. 

The principal cause of the defeat of the Thirty-eighth 
Brigade on the 16th of August was the fact that the French 



Tactical Deductions. 413 

approached under the cover of smoke, and, without firing a 
shot, attacked us suddenly at close quarters; the smoke pre- 
vented us from seeing the danger. In the former case, the 
smoke might have been of some advantage for the superior 
leading in case of unsuitable arrangements for the march; 
in the latter, the smoke conferred an advantage on the de- 
fender and a disadvantage on the assailant. It is safe to 
assume that the assailant would not have rushed to the front 
without halting had he known that, without being aware 
of it, as it were, he was intermingling with the enemy; he 
would have been more cautious and would at least have 
been able to fight an energetic, defensive fire action, for 
which the surprise left him no time. When the view is 
unobstructed, smokeless pow der acts as a safeguard against 
any kind of surprise, which both sides should constantly 
bear in mind. 

Nor should we allow ourselves to be guided by the theo- 
retical fancies hatched in the studio as regards unobstructed 
view; but w^e should endeavor to gain a clear conception of 
true warlike situations. At Gravelotte the French might 
have observed all movements of the Germans from Mon- 
tigny la Grange as far as Roncourt with the same facility 
which is now theoretically claimed to be invariably the case 
with smokeless powder. There was nothing to hinder it, 
there was no smoke because the battle did not begin until 
after the movement and deployment, the air was clear, and 
yet the IX. Army Corps surprised the enemy; although the 
battle was raging at that point, the enemy, who had an unob- 
structed view from St. Privat of all our movements, did 
nothing to check or disturb our turning movement. In such 
cases, smokeless powder changes nothing, since before the 
opening of the battle one could formerly see just as far as 
to-day. The theorv of war should therefore not reckon 



414 Inquiries into the Tactics of the Future. 

without the shortcomings and failings of man; they are the 
chief sources of victory for the opponent. He will ever be 
the victor who makes the fewest mistakes! 



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